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Abstract 
This study analyzes the composition and structure of the Jordanian 
bourgeoisie over the period 1967-1989. Both the study of the structure and 
composition of the social classes and their role in the political and social change are 
neglected topics when Jordan is concerned. On this basis, the main argument of 
this thesis is that the bourgeoisie is an important social class, whose study and 
analysis can yield a better understanding of socio-economic structure and change in 
Jordan. 
This study uses the Marxist paradigm as a theoretical framework to define 
the bourgeoisie as the social class that has the economic ownership of the means 
of production and appropriates the surplus value. Some Marxist theorems had to 
be modified to be operative in studying the bourgeoisie in particular and the class in 
general. 
This thesis adopts an empirical approach in studying the bourgeoisie. It first 
locates and defines the bourgeoisie members within the domain of the private 
sector, which is their objective context. It then analyzes their activities and 
investment strategies. This study analyzes the bourgeoisie into the possible 
fractions that come to exist according to their activities, investments and assets. It 
also examines the possibility of the existence of fractions in the domain of the 
bourgeoisie according to vertical dimensions such as religion or country of origin. 
- - - -- ·---
IV 
y 
Dedication 
To tlie memory of 'Rehaab my sister 
tfo Tamam my motlier wlio fuu£ assumed" for 
sometime tliat slie fuu£ retired" as motlier before 
tlie aestiny 6rouefit lier baci to start alf over 
ana in 
'I'o N'tcofe wlio Fias niven unfimitea Cove ana 
support witliout wfiicfi tfiis stutfy wou{i;{ not 
liave been finis lied:. 
TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM 
The transliteration system that is shown in the tables below will be used 
throughout the thesis to transcribe in Latin characters Arabic words and 
phrases. However, for expressions and names of common usage, the form by 
which they are most commonly known will be adopted, even when this does not 
correspond to the system laid out below. For instance, a name like will be 
spelt in the widely established form Mubarak rather than as muubaarak. which 
would be the correct form according to our system. 
The transliteration system used in this thesis is as follows: 
1. Consonants: 
ARABIC ENGLISH ARABIC ENGLISH 
LETTERS LETTERS LETTERS LETTERS 
, , ~ d 
~ B J:a ! 
~ T .li d 
~ Th e ' 
[ J e gh 
c H u f 
- - . - .. 
t Kh J q 
VI 
J D ~ k 
• Dh J I J 
J R f' m 
j z u n 
WM s 0 h 
.. WM sh .J w 
~ s II y 
2. Vowels: 
- A 
-
I u 
-
- I 
-
I A a 
.J Uu 
1$ Ii 
3. Diphthongs: 
I 
VII 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Department of Statistics (DS) 
Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) 
Bourgeoisie Enterprises (BE) 
Mode of Production (MP) 
Social Formation (SF) 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) 
Public Shareholding Enterprise (PS) 
Limited Liability Enterprise (LL) 
General Partnership Enterprise (GP) 
Limited Partnership Enterprise (LP) 
Individual Enterprises (IE) 
Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) 
Nomadic Mode of Production (NMP) 
Nuclear Family (NF) 
Tribute Mode of Production (TMP) 
Vlll 
Introduction 4 
1. class 11 
1. 1 Mode of Production and Social Formation 12 
1 . 1 . 1 Mode of Production 12 
1.1 .2 Social Formation 15 
1.1.3 Articulation 17 
1.2 The Marxist Concept of Social Class 21 
1.2.1 Class at the Economic Level (Class Structure) 22 
1.2.2 Class as a Social Force 25 
1.2.2.1 Class in Itself and for Itself 26 
1.2.2.2 Interpretations and Elaborations 30 
1.2.3 The Alternative 34 
1.3 The Middle Classes 43 
1.3.1 Contradictory Locations within Capitalist Societies 49 
1.4 The Sectoral Classification of the Class 64 
1.4.1 Fraction According to the Economic Base and Sector 65 
1.4.2 Finance Capital 67 
2. 
2.1 
2.2 
2.2.1 
the historical, social and economic context of Jordan 
The Pre-capitalist Formation Debate 
From Ottoman Direct Rule to The Foundation of the State 
The Ottoman Central Authority in Jordan 
2.2.2 The Peasants' Communities 
2.2.3 The Merchants 
2.2.4 The Bedouins 
2.3 Jordan Under The British Mandate 
2.3.1 The Social Formation Components 
2.3.1.1 Peasants 
2.3.1.2 Merchants 
2.4 An Overview of Jordan (1949-1967) 
2.4.1 The Development Plans 
2.4.2 The Budget 
2.4.3. The Economic Performance .. _ ___ _ 
74 
75 
86 
87 
93 
105 
109 
114 
116 
116 
122 
128 
132 
136 
140 
3. The Methodology 
3. 1 What is the Bourgeoisie? 
3.1.1 Constraints and Considerations 
3.1.2 A Strategy to Locate and Extract the Bourgeoisie 
3.2 Terms & Concepts used to Analyze the BMs 
144 
144 
145 
149 
154 
3.2.1 Bourgeoisie Enterprises and the BMs 154 
3.2.2 The Enterprise Types 155 
3.3 The Economic Sectors and Sub-Sectors 157 
3.4 Ownership Forms of The Enterprises 165 
3.4.1 Variation and Fractions within the Bourgeoisie 177 
3.4.1.1 Sectoral Fractions 177 
3.4.1.2 Economic Power 178 
3.4.2 The Historical Fraction of the Bourgeoisie 185 
3.5 Vertical Dimensions and the Bourgeoisie Analysis 187 
4. An Overview of the Jordanian Economy (1967-1973) 193 
4.1 The State Economic Policy 196 
4.1.1 The Three Year Development Plan (1973-1975) 196 
4.1.2 The Budget 201 
4.1.2.1 Revenue and Receipts 202 
4.1.2.2 Expenditures 206 
4.1.3 The Macro-Economic Performance 207 
4.1.4 The Balance of Payment 1967-1973. 216 
4.1.4.1 Trade Balance 216 
4.1.4.2 Services 221 
4.1.4.3 Transfers 222 
4.2 The State of The Private Sector 224 
4.2.1 The Private Sector Enterprise Types 224 
4.2.2 The Sectoral Distribution 229 
4.2.2.1 The Sub-Sector 233 
4.2.3 The Geographical Distribution 239 
5. The Bourgeoisie (1967 -1973) 243 
5:-1 Bourgeeisie-EAterprises -and· BMs: General Trends 245 
5.1.1 BE and BM according to the Enterprise Types 246 
2 
5.1.2 The BE and BM according to the Economic Sectors 250 
5.1.3 The BE Ownership Trends 255 
5.1.4 The Corporate Bodies 262 
5.1.5 The Non-Bourgeois Equity Holders in the BE 270 
5.2 The Economic Powers 273 
5.2.1 Power A 
5.2.2 Power B 
5.2.3 Power C 
5.2.4 Power D 
5.2 .5 Power E 
5.2.6 The Economic Power (Power I) 
5.2.7 Nuclear Family Power 
5.2.8 POWER II 
274 
275 
276 
278 
280 
280 
284 
287 
5.3 Bourgeoisie Fractions 292 
5.4 The Vertical Dimensions and the Bourgeoisie 297 
5.4.1 Bourgeoisie and Gender 297 
5.4.2 Ethnic And Religious Background 301 
5.4.3 Country Of Origin 304 
6. An OVerview of the Jordanian Economy (1974-1989) 310 
6. 1 Macro Economy of Jordan ( 197 4-1989) 31 0 
6.1 .1 The Development plans 31 0 
6.1 .1.1 The First Five-Year Development Plan (1976-1980) 311 
6.1.1.2 The Second Five Year Development Plan 1981-1985 316 
6.1.1.3 The Third Five Development 1986-1990 320 
6.1.2 The Budget 324 
6.1.2.1 Revenue and Receipts 328 
6.1 .2.2 Expenditures 334 
6.1.3 Economic Performance 337 
6.1.4 Balance OF Payments 1974-89 
6.1.4.1 Trade Balance 
6.1.4.2 
6.1.4.3 
Service balance 
Transfers 
347 
348 
354 
357 
3 
7. The Bourgeoisie ( 197 4-1989) 358 
7.1 The State of the Private Sector 358 
7.1.1 The Private Sector Enterprise Types 368 
7.1.2 The Sectoral Distribution 362 
7.1.2.1 The Sub-sectors 366 
7.1.3 The Geographical Distribution 369 
7.2 Locating the BMs 372 
7.2.1 the Non-Bourgeois Equity Holders in the BE 374 
7.3 Individual/Corporate BMs 376 
7.3.1 Individual Bourgoisie Members 377 
7.3.2 The Corporate Bodies 382 
7.4 Bourgeoisie Enterprises and BMs: General Trends 385 
7.4.1 BE and BM according to the enterprise Types 386 
7.4.2 The BE and BM According to the Economic Sectors 388 
7.4.3 The BE Ownership Trends 393 
7.5 The Economic Powers 398 
7.5.1 The Economic Power (Power I) 399 
7.5.2 Nuclear Family Power 403 
7.5.3 POWER II 405 
7.6 Bourgeoisie Fractions 406 
7.7 The BMs and the Vertical Variables 411 
7.7.1 Ethnic and Religious Background 412 
7.7.2 Country of Origin 414 
Conclusion 418 
Bibliography 423 
Appendices (1·17) 
4 
Introduction 
Class analysis has been a subject of considerable interest and research for 
over 150 years in many countries. In Jordan, however, it has not been studied in 
any great depth to date. The main purpose of this study is to provide a detailed 
analysis of the composition and structure of the Jordanian bourgeoisie between 
1967 and 1989, as well as of its investment strategies at the economic level. It also 
analyzes the impact of the vertical dimensions of the Jordanian social structure on 
the bourgeoisie's formation and cohesion. 
Compared to studies that dealt with the international relations of the Middle 
East, the foreign policies of its countries, the political economy of oil, the Middle 
Eastern states and their political developments, studies focusing on the socio-
economic structure at large and the social classes in particular are limited. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the tragedy of the Palestinian people, which have been 
reproduced on a daily basis, and their direct and indirect consequences on the 
stability of the region are one factor that contributed to a wider interest in studies 
which had no connection to social class analysis. The phases that the middle 
eastern countries had undergone since their independence, such as the dominance 
of the pJanned economy, the increased direct and indirect role of the state in 
economic activities, the petrodollar revolution and the upsurge of the role of oil in the 
world economy, the economic opening up policies, the rise of political Islam and 
finally the direct involvement of the western powers in the region and the birth of 
Islamic terrorist groups attracted many studies to concentrate on issues related to 
these phases and what they brought to the arena of debate. The above-mentioned 
factors assumedly had a serious impact on the degree of interest in the social class 
analysis approach. The validity of the above points, however, does not tell the entire 
story. This study, in fact, argues that the limited interest in social classes is originally 
rooted in the dominant methodologies adopted in studying the Middle East since 
mutual contact was established between emerging capitalist Europe and the 
Ottoman Middle East, i.e. the methodologies of orienta/ism. The studies of 
contemporary Middle Eastern countries and societies are to a great extent 
influenced by the themes and theories that were originally put forward to tackle and 
analyze the history of the ME and of the Islamic civilization at large. Without any 
need to be caught up in reviewing their schools, one can notice that these theories 
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have some common shared premises, such as the idea that the history of the Arab 
region (Middle East) and the Islamic civilization are of a static nature. Cultural 
explanations that emphasized the role of religion, customs, language and social 
structure backed the widespread interpretation of Islamic societies as static entities. 
Ironically, some of the arguments that suggested that Islam and Islamic history and 
societies were inherently unprogressive and lacked internal dynamics were based 
on the diversity of these societies, famously known as the mosaic society. 1 As 
Turner obsetved2 
'Islamic social structure is conceived, then, as a mosaic or 
patchwork of diversity in furthermore treated as a major weakness of 
Islamic society and as a flaw within the social structure. Because of the 
internal diversity of the social system, it was necessarily difficult to 
organize consistent, coherent opposition to the authoritarian rule of the 
imperial hol.lsehold.' 
What is relevant to this study is that such arguiT)ents about Islamic history 
had their echo in many of the studies concerned with the contemporary Middle East. 
This was manifested, on the one hand, in a neglect of the studi"es about the socio-
economic structure and social class structure of the Middle East. On the other hand, 
the classes' weight, their role and their impact on political, social, economic, 
ideological, gender, ... etc issues were not taken into consideration. The same 
arguments, which range between claiming the absence of social classes or weak 
horizontal stratification, and the irrelevance of the social classes in the Middle 
Eastern societies in favor of vertical stratification along the lines of ethnicity, religion, 
tribe and kinship, are widely spread. According to this approach, the economically 
based interest groups are infiltrated by cross-class social groups, which prevents the 
former from developing to constitute any active or relevant political, social and 
economic actors. Informal and personal relations, modes of maneuvering and 
intrigues between the political and social elite determine the dynamics of the ME 
societies. 
Another blow to the class analysis approach was the fact that, in the western 
countries, the sociology and political science of the 1980s onwards evolved to 
1 Some of the arguments combined with the mosaic society theory claimed the absence or 
scarcity of social stratification. 
2 Turner, B.S (1 977) Marks and The End of Orientalism, p 44. 
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question the relevance of the class as an agent influencing the political, social and 
economic spheres, especially when these countries underwent a great deal of 
changes in regard to the enlargement of the middle classes, improvements in the 
conditions of the working classes and the expansion of the services sector. 
Furthermore, new successful political and ideological movements were born, such 
as those concerned with the environment, feminism or racial discrimination, which 
are cross-class phenomena. 
The purpose of this study is neither to review nor assess the different 
approaches applied in studying the Middle EastJ nor to give a critique of the 
orientalist or orientalist-influenced approaches,3 but rather to empirically analyze one 
of the social classes within the Jordanian society, i.e. the bourgeoisie as a class that 
owns the means of production and appropr1ates the surplus labour. 
Analyzing the structur:e and the composition of the bourgeoisie in itself is 
vital, since it defines the domain of the members of a class that is usually dealt with 
in the case of Jordan in a blurred and loose fashion. The composition and structure 
of the bourgeoisie provide insights into some of the different approaches and 
strategies that the members of the bourgeoisie use when pursuing their economic 
activities. Defining a clear domain of the bourgeoisie implies analyzing the 
cleavages that occur within this class as a consequence of its position in the 
production process. The identification of bourgeoisie fractions according to 
economic interests and quantitative assets flattens the ground for discussing its unity 
at the economic level. This study also takes on board the vertical dimensions of the 
Jordanian social structure by applying them to the domain of the bourgeoisie. Such 
a task is of vital importance, since it reveals in concrete terms the degree of 
influence that these dimensions have on the horizontal social groups. In other 
words, it examines empirically if vertical dimensions such as tribe, religion and 
country of origin undermine class cohesion, and thus its potential to be a political 
and social agent. 
The study is confined within a 22-year time framework, between 1967 and 
1989. The rationale for starting with 1967 rests on the fact that, for 17 years ( 197 4-
--- -3·Ref0ting such""litgu~nts.esp-~lalf~ranh·e·ttre-oreticalievel is a task that has-been taken-by--
some scholars. See Said, E. (1979) Orienta/ism and Turner, B.S (1977) Marks and End of 
Orienta/ism. 
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1989), Jordan included the West Bank, which was an important territory in terms of 
the social and economic output. The occupation of the West Bank and its continuity, 
coupled with all of the Israeli regulations and laws (especially those of an economic 
nature) resulted in the loosening of ties between the socio-economic structure of 
Jordan and that of the West Bank. Going beyond 1989 was not a conceivable idea 
in terms of the amount of data that needed to be analyzed over the 1990s. During 
this period, Jordan went through several changes, which brought about a great 
distinction from the 1980s and 1970s. The prosperity that lasted from 1974 up to the 
early years of the 1980s ended in the 1989 economic crisis, which manifested itself 
in the Jordanian foreign debt predicament and the collapse of the Jordanian 
currency. A political and economic opening up took place, replacing a period in 
which the state was characterized by being authoritarian or semi-authoritarian at the 
political level and heavily involved in a wide range of economic activities. These 
factors and the changes that took place in the region, such as the first Gulf War and 
the peace process with Israel, made it necessary to stop this study at 1989. 
This study is divided into 7 chapters. The first is devoted to giving a definition 
of class at large and of the bourgeoisie in particular. The Marxist paradigm is 
chosen over its main alternative, the Weberian one, as a basis for the class 
theoretical framework, Despite the great deal of literature spent showing the 
contrast between Weber and Marx, there is a substantial similarity between the two 
theories as regards the concept of class. For both traditions, classes are defined in 
a relational manner based on their sharing of economic resources which determine 
their interest, and thus a connection can be deduced between their interest and their 
actions.4 However, the Marxist paradigm bases its theory on the position of a class 
in the production process, where exploitation is a central theme. A class is 
therefore seen through its position in the production process, as well as through the 
causal nexus in the market exchange. The fact that the latter is the only way in 
which the Weberian paradigm views class means that the Marxist definition is 
broader and more inclusive. 
4 For tnstance. Weber defines a class situation which occurs when '(i) a number of people 
~ve in comm~>n a .~P~ifiu~sual COfT!P9~e~t of !tl~ir life cha.Q_£es, ~so~ar as (ii)Jilis component is 
represented exclusively by economic interest in the possession of goods and opportunities for income 
and (iii) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets.· Weber, M, (1978), p, 
927. 
8 
Despite the fact that Weberian class analysis is not used, the polemics 
advanced by the adherents to this tradition regarding the Marxist paradigm are taken 
on board . Marxist class analysis suffers from problematic aspects, some of which 
relate to a deficiency in its class concept. In addition to giving an account of the 
premises of the Marxist paradigm, problematic issues highlighted by scholars from 
within or outside the tradition are considered in the theoretical chapter, in order to 
advance a concept that is capable of addressing the concepts of class at large and 
of bourgeoisie in particular. The task that chapter one has achieved is to reconstruct 
a concept of class based on 1he premises of the Marxist class analysis, and of 
operative capacity. 
The second chapter covers the historical and socio-economic structure of 
Jordan since the late 191h century up to 1967. The socioeconomic historical context 
of Jordan during over a hundred years was not put forward in order to give a review 
of the historical developments, but rather to highlight the peculiarity of the Jordanian 
social formation and the change that took place in the course of the capitalization of 
the formation. This study claims that the peculiarity of the social formation and its 
development leave hallmarks on class structure, as well as on the structure. and 
composition of the bourgeoisie. 
Chapter three deals with the possible approaches that could be used in order 
to define the bourgeoisie and its members. It explains the approach that was 
adopted in the empirical part and covers the method that was used in collecting the 
data and analyzing it. Since this study was the first of its type in Jordan and even in 
the Middle East, it tends, in the course of analyzing the bourgeoisie or when coming 
across distinctive patterns, to coin terms and concepts that are explained fully in 
chapter 3. Chapter 3, in a sense, is a bridge between the theoretical framework and 
the pillars of the peculiarity of the Jordanian social formation on one hand and the 
empirical analysis of the bourgeoisje on the other. 
Chapters 4 to 7 are devoted to the empirical analysis of the bourgeoisie. For 
the proposes of the analysis, the span of this study was divided into two periods, the 
first of which goes from 1967 to 1973. Such a period is limited to 7 years because, 
this study argues, it had a transitional character; it is the period that came in the 
aftermath of the. J _9_67 waLan.d.J.ts . ..dJ.amatic.. Jmpac.Lcm_J_or.dan as a whole .. _ Ihis. ___ _ 
period also experienced the rise of the military presence of the PLO and its co11apse 
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through military confrontation with the Jordanians. On the contrary, the 1974-1989 
period witnessed a long spell of stability. The oil boom during the first phase and the 
decline in its prices in the last few years of the period show to what extent Jordan, 
and especially its economy including the private sector activities, was entangled in, 
and even dependent on, the developments in the region. 
Chapters four and six focus on the context within which the bourgeoisie 
operated, that is the macro-economy of Jordan. An overall view of the economic 
performance during the transitional period is given in chapter 4, one of the 1974-
1989 period in chapter 6. The state economic policies are also outlined through its 
development plans and budget. Each of the two chapters finishes with an overall 
review of the state of the private sector in its respective period. 
Chapters 5 and 7 contain a detailed analysis of the bourgeoisie in 1967-1973 
and 1974-1989 respectively. Throughout the analysis, the aim is to examine the 
bourgeoisie during this period, beginning by extracting it from the private sector 
participants domain. The analysis of the bourgeoisie during these periods covers all 
aspects of their economic activities. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CLASS 
In the introduction an overview of the contesting theorems about the 
relevance of class analysis was put forward. In this chapter, a review of the 
theoretical framework is to be undertaken employing the premises of Marxist theory. 
Gaps within themes of the Marxist concept of class were revealed throughout the 
different proposals advanced by scholars who challenged, contested and interpreted 
this paradigm, mainly at the level of the class as a social and political agent. 
Undoubtedly, one of the problematic issues that had existed, since the introduction 
of the Marxist class, relates to the conceptualisation of the class as social actor. 
Apart from rejections on an ideological basis, the development of capitalism 
in its place of birth resulted in a complex class structure that dictated revision of the 
Marxian class concept and its determining factors. Among these developments at 
the structured level a few have a profound impact on the concept of class. For 
example, the emergence of new middle classes put the Marxist class theme of 
polarization in jeopardy and sparked debate about what constitutes the working 
class in the sphere of the wage earners. At another level, the boundaries of the 
bourgeoisie have been a matter of continuous debate, triggered by what are well 
known as the 'managerial revaluation' theories. These issues and others are of vital 
importance to the entire concept of class at one level and th.e bourgeoisie at another. 
This chapter considers the analysis of the Marxist concept of class and attempts to 
tackle some of these problematic issues, which to some extent dictates the structure 
of sub-sections of the chapter. The chapter begins by discussing the mode of 
production (MP). social formation (SF) and articulation which are important themes 
for constructing the class concept in the Marxist paradigm, as well as its application 
in non-advanced capitalist societies. Class at the economic level and as a political 
and social agent is covered in the second section. Problematic issues that brought 
about by the new middle classes and the impact of managers on the class structure 
at large and the composition of the bourgeoisie in particular are covered _in a secti,on 
-- .. --- - ---- -
on the middle classes. Finally, cleavages within the bourgeoisie will be covered in 
II 
the last section.. However, while the sustained groups within the bourgeoisie are 
recognized, emphasis is still laid on the finance capital. 
1.1 MODE OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL FORMATION 
Prior to tackling the Marxist concept of class, it is vital to cover two main 
analytical devices that are of vital importance in regard to the study of the social 
classes of a specific society over a certain period, i.e. the Mode of Production (MP) 
and the Social Formation (SF). Apart from its importance in determining the main 
classes at the economic level and the social and political forces, in the last three 
decades the concept of articulation of the MPs has become one of the most 
important explanatory concepts employed in the study of various formations of third 
world countries and those of the Middle East in particular. This section will cover 
briefly the main elements of MP, SF and articulation as advanced by Marxist 
scholars. It is worthwhile to mention that despite the fact that Marx himself never 
systematically provided a definition or study of the MP and SF concepts, their 
construction and elaboration have been largely based on Marx's analysis, especially 
that of the capitalist MP and SF1• 
1.1.1 MODE OF PRODUCTION 
The MP as a concept characterizing different periods of human history is 
often mentioned in several works of Marx's, such as the historic periodization that 
appears in The German Ideology, his study of the pre-capitalist formation, or the 
analysis of the elements of the capitalist MP in Capital. However, in the celebrated 
Preface of the Critique of the Political Economy, Marx emphasizes the MP concept, 
1 The main work to which the studies about the MP mostly refer is Marx's Capital, which can 
be considered as a wide examination of the function of the capitalist system and of its social relations 
of production. However, in The German Ideology Marx and Engels also cover the elements of the MP 
through an account of the different stages of the class society and of the transformation from one 
stage to another. One could argue that the political, ideological and economic syntheses that 
appeared in Marx's political works about th~ -~~r~Q~.an events of his time an.d before are . . 
- - ~rmmifesUiUons of his ela6orat1on oflhe SF. For instance, his analysis of the political developments in 
France during the third quarter of the 19th century, with reference to the preceding period since the 
French revolution, implied the concept of SF. 
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revealing the complex relations that society experiences as a result of its economic 
foundation. 
"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably 
enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, 
namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the 
development of their material forces of production. The totality of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The MP conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness."2 
In this context, Marx and Engels state that a specific stage is demarcated by 
the degree of development that the production process has achieved and by internal 
and external interaction. The development of production and interaction is indeed 
determined by the development of the productive forces,3 which "brings a further 
development of the labour division".4 The social division of labour corresponds to 
the different forms of property. In other words, a particular stage of the division of 
labour corresponds to a definite stage of development that the productive forces 
have reached within the production process and to the relations of individuals to one 
another according to "instruments, materials and products"5. The relations of 
production, in their interaction with the forces of production in a particular MP, 
determine two large classes that differ from each other by their position in the 
production process: the class of the direct producers and the class that appropriates 
the surplus-labour and initially controls the means of production, usually in form of 
2 Marx, K. (1859), Preface of the Critique of the Political Economy, p 263, in Collective Works 
of Marx and Engels, Vol. 29. 
3 There is no consensus among Marxist scholars as to the primacy of the productive relations 
or the productive forces. For instance. Amin stresses the primacy of the productive forces, which is 
the spine of his theory of uneven development in the pre-capitalist formation. Cohen, too, gives the 
primacy to the productive forces, in which he includes the labour power. Among the Marxists who 
emphasise the primacy of the productive relations are Balibar, (Aithusser, L., Balibar, E. (1997) 
Reading Capital, p215-217) Poulantzas, (Poulantzas, N. (1973), p72), and Hindess and Hirst 
(Hindess, B .. Hirst, P. (1979), p13). Anderson tackles this issue through his discussion of the crisis 
that the feudal system underwent in Western Europe (Anderson, P. (1996), p 198-209): 
-
4 M~rx. K.~ Engel~ F. (1846) The Ge,;;;an Ideology. -- - ~ ·-
5 Marx, K .. Engels, F. (1846) The German Ideology. 
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property. According to Marx's text about the pre-capitalist formation,6 this 
abstraction covers even the pre-class societies. 7 
We can thus consider the MP as an abstract concept that does not refer to a 
specific conjuncture and can be defined as an articulated combination of forces of 
production and relations of production. The relations of production are defined as "a 
specific mode of appropriation of surplus-labour and a specific form of social 
distribution of the means of production corresponding to that mode of appropriation 
of the surplus-labour''8 . The existence of surplus-labour is a necessary element to 
the existence of the relations of production and subsequently of the MP. The 
manner in which the surplus-labour is appropriated is the fundamental factor which 
distinguishes one MP from another.'9 
The forces of production10 can be defined as the mode or the way of 
appropriation of nature. They correspond to three articulated levels: work itself11 , the 
instruments of production (tools), and the subject of work. This definition 
encompasses the differentiation of the forces of production according to the 
development that each of these levels has reached in its interaction with the other 
levels and with the relations of production. Hence, the forces of production reflect a 
specific level of development that distinguishes the forces within one MP from those 
within another, and more importantly, as Gramsci highlights, between the 
6 Marx, K. (1857}, Pre-capitalist Economic Formation. p67-71. 
7 In fact, the relationship that was established between individuals and nature in the course of 
the appropriation of natural produce or of the use of some parts of nature, including one's own body, 
was formed in terms of property relationship. In other words, it is 'the natural unity of labour within its 
material prerequisites' (Marx, K. (1857), Pre-captialist Economic Formation, p71 ). Hobsbawm 
emphasizes. however, that the concept of property that Marx introduces to describe the relation with 
nature in the known early stages of human history is not the legal private property of the class 
societies (Hobsbawm, E. (1965), Introduction for Pre-capitalist Economic Formation, p41). 
8 Hindess, B. , Hirst, P. (1979} the Pre-capitalist MPs, p9-10. 
9 For instance. it is appropriated collectively in the case of the primitive communist MP, while 
in the case of feudalism and capitalism, it is appropriated by the non-labourers. In the latter cases, the 
mode of appropriation establishes an antagonistic relation and social division of labour. In short, the 
way in which the surplus-labour is appropriated governs the distribution of the social labour and the 
division of the agents of production. 
10 Some of the Marxists argue that the objective conditions still have a fundamental role in the 
development of the MP. Cohen claims that elements such as climate and geographic location should 
be-eensidered as··components-of·the-productive forces (Cohen;-G:-A:-(1978), ·Karl Marx's Theory of' 
History: A Defence}. 
11 The degree of labour division and its organisation are included in the work itself. 
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conjunctures that belong to the same MP .12 It must also be emphasized that a 
specific MP can assume different forms according to the development that the forces 
and relations have already reached.13 Finally, it is important to point out that the 
development of each component of the MP implies a reciprocal impact on the 
others. 14 
1.1.2 SOCIAL FORMATION 
It is agreed among Marxists that the MP does not exist in its pure state, but it 
appears articulated in a variety of MPs. Therefore, studying a conjuncture means 
analyzing the whole complex of the MPs whose articulated forces and relations of 
production compose a particular type of social and economic structure. Each of the 
MPs in the conjuncture defines certain economic, ideological and political conditions 
that are necessary for its existence in the economic structure. This is the core 
notion of the concept of SF. 
The concept of SF encompasses three levels: economic, political and 
ideological. The economic level, which is determined by the complex of MPs, 
12 Gramsci argues that a certain development in the productive forces could be one of the 
crucial factors governing the evolution of the political and ideological levels of the superstructure, and 
therefore the whole process of transformation from one MP to another. The distinction between the 
various SFs governed by the same MP could lie in the different degrees to which their productive 
forces developed (Gramsci, A. (1999) A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, p203-205). 
13 Hindess and Hirst stress the concept of variant MP. The main example that they give is the 
variation of the labour-rent which is appropriated under the feudal system. It could be appropriated in 
different forms such as money, kind or labour. This variation, which is a central notion in the concept 
of MP, does not presuppose different MPs (see Hindess, B. , Hirst, P. (1979) the Pre-capitalist MPs, 
p12-13). In this sense, Amin distinguishes between two different forms of tribute-paying system: feudal 
and tribute-paying. For Amin, this difference in form occurs as a result of the variation in the objective 
conditions that characterise the feudal forces and relations (see Amin, S.(1976) Unequal 
Development, p 13-15). 
14 By applying this definition to a concrete MP such as the capitalist one, the mode of 
appropriation of the surplus-labour that results from the difference between the value of labour power 
and the value that is created by the labourers takes the form of surplus-value. One class, i.e. the 
capitalist class or bourgeoisie, appropriates this surplus-value. The appropriation of the surplus-value 
is characterized by the transformation of the whole social production, i.e. the labour power and the 
means of production. into a commodity. The former is bought by the capitalist for the price of the 
wages that the labourers use to buy items for personal consumption from the capitalist. As a 
consequence of this, the labourers are forced to sell their labour power for a further period. This 
means that the producers become proletariat after being separated from the means of production and 
forced to sell their power (Amin, S. (1976) Unequal Development, p59-62.). The social distribution of 
the means of production corresponds to the appropriation of the surplus-value, so that the means of 
production become private property of the capitalist class and are characterized by being a commodity 
which is subject to exchange between the capitalists. In fact, the commodity becomes the main 
characteristic element under the capitalist system. This is reflected in the f~rnous c~pitalist theor.y 
-bl~Se'd 6n'slipply and demana'=--t=urthermore, the commodity form is the main element that 
distinguishes the whole social production in the capitalist system to that in other systems at large and 
in particular under the 'simple petty-commodity' MP (see Amin, S. (1976), p62). 
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constitutes the basis on which the superstructure (the ideological and political 
domain) can 'arise'.15 Unlike the abstract concept of MP, the concept of SF 
corresponds to concrete society. The SF is a combination of several MPs, one of 
which holds the dominant role; all other co-occurring MPs are subordinate to the 
dominant one.16 The dominant MP constitutes the main source of surplus within a 
given SF; for example, a feudal SF may be articulated into a feudal MP, which 
generates the surplus, and subordinate MPs, such as the simple petty commodity 
and/or the slave owning modes.17 
Furthermore, in the above-quoted paragraph from the Preface, Marx explicitly 
explains the SF according to its two components - tne base and the superstructure -
and the relations between these two domains. This paragraph has been subject to 
different interpretations, which have led to different conclusions concerning Marx's 
method, but this is not the best place to review them. 18 However, this relationship 
will be reviewed when covering the Marxian concept of class as social actor. Here, it 
is sufficient to stress that most Marxists emphasize that it is misleading to assume 
that Marx meant that the superstructure is a mere reflection of the economic base. In 
fact, there is a mutual effective relation between the two domains, although the base 
remains the determining factor. In other words, if the superstructure does not 
contain the conditions necessary to the existence of a MP, this latter is bound to 
wither away. However, elements of a superstructure that are within the domain of 
the MP in process of disintegration may hold for a period after the disappearance of 
its economic foundation, and in some cases may act as conditions to facilitate the 
new economic foundation. 
15 Marx, K. (1859), Preface of the Critique of the Political Economy, Collective Wor*s of Marx 
and Engels, Vol. (29). 
16 Poulantzas (1973), pp. 70-71, Amin (1976), pp. 16-17 and Hindess and Hirst (1979), p13-
14. 
17 Amin gives a few practical examples of SFs. drawn from the history of pre-capitalist 
societies; he also claims that the slave owning MP was non-dominant within the capitalist SF in the 
United-States·prevlotJs to-1-865-{Amln;-~(4·976) ; p. 1'7). - · -- -
16 For some of the works engaged in such interpretation see Hall, S. (1977) Marx's theory of 
Classes, p21 . 
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1.1.3 ARTICULATION 
The concept of 'articulation' originally refers to the combination of different 
MPs. However, it extends to cover the political and ideological instances, in addition 
to the economic ones, of each combined MP, including the various exploitative 
relations that each mode may produce.19 In this framework, articulation is a flexible 
concept that goes beyond the rigid definition of the MP, taking into account the 
different factual dimensions that make up the peculiarity of some, if not all, SFs. 
During the period of transition from a formation that is dominated by aMP to another 
dominated by another, the importance of articulation as an analytical device is 
crucial to the study of that formation. In such a context. the different economic 
instances that are in the process of declining and the ones in the course of 
becoming dominant, together with the political and ideological instances, are in 
complex relationships, which could introduce different variants in the transition path, 
and different forms of outcome. The character and degree of complexity of a 
formation in transition is determined by the form of the relations that link the different 
MPs and their political and ideological instances. In this sense, Marx uses this term 
to signify a combination or, more accurately, as the spirit of his writing indicates, a 
certain type of combination with a relational dimension. Such an understanding of 
articulation appears in Marx's various accounts of the European political and social 
scene in the 191h century.20 A similar understanding also appears in Gramsci's 
analysis of the south and north Italian question21 • 
19 It is important to mention the emphasis of the various exploitative relations that occur in a 
given MP, since it is going to be incorporated into the section of the Middle Classes to give another 
dimension for redefining the boundaries of the class. 
2° For instance, Marx points out that the particular development of capitalism in the French 
society entailed an articulation of the capitalist MP and of the pre-capitalist ones which could survive 
the transformation and were still In the process of withering away. This articulation had an impact on 
the entire function of society, "SCting not only within the boundaries of the economic level, but 
extending to the political and ideological levels. It is interesting that Marx in different occasions 
contrasts the French formation with the English one, in which the classes, their interest and their 
political participation are sharply defined due to the significant development in the capitalist relations 
(Marx, K. (1851) The Class Struggle In France. Marx, K. (1871) The Civil War In France. Marx, K. 
(1852) The 18th of Bromiere). Similarly, Gramsci emphasizes the importance of variation in the 
economic level and its impact on the political and ideological levels when a specific instance is under 
study, especially in the transition period. Following Marx's analysis of the French political 
development, Gramscl shows that the French revolution of 1789 was not the moment that witnessed 
the foundation of a new SF replacing the previous one. On the contrary, it was just the starting point 
·et-a-period· of transformation ·that lasted··tJntif--1·871 or 1914 ·(Gramsci,-A (1999) A Gramsci Reader: 
Selected Writing 1916-1935, p203~205.) . See also Althusser, L. Balibar, E. (1997), p98-99. 
21 Gramsci, A (1996) Selection From the Prison Notebooks. p44-52. 
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The concept of articulation in its contemporary usage goes beyond the 
limitative definition of combination that was introduced by Althusser.22 In the 
Althusserian conceptualization, articulation is given by the different levels of relations 
that link the different instances of formation, which include different MPs in 
corresponding fashion.23 This linkage between different instances is not confined to 
the economic instances of the various MPs, but It is emphasized that articulation 
embraces the various levels of ideological and political instances as well.24 
As was mentioned before. the importance of this concept here is its 
explanatory use in dealing with third world countries such as Jordan, which brings 
about Rey's elaboration25 of the concept. Rey takes Althusser's concept and 
elaborates it on the basis of Luxemburg's thesis that a distinction should be drawn 
between capitalism that is born within a formation (Western Europe) and that which 
is installed in a formation (almost all of the rest of the world). 
Based on Rey's argument, one can deduce that articulation is a functional 
concept that corresponds to the different stages and developments that the 
formations where capitalism was installed have undergone in their path towards 
complete replacement of the pre-capitalist relations by capitalist ones. However, in 
such a course of development the co-existence of pre-capitalist and capitalist MP 
introduces a complex of corresponding relations between the different economic 
levels according to the existing MPs and their ideological and political levels. 
Moreover, there are not only corresponding, but also non-corresponding relations 
between the economic, political and ideological instances of SF.26 In this context. 
Rey claims that that of articulation is not a relational concept, but a diachronic one 
that implies three stages in regard to the installation of capitalism in the non-
European sphere. 
22 Foster-Carter, A. (1978). The MPs Controversy, New Left Review, (107). p15. Althusser, L 
(1996), For Marx. p204-207. 
23 Althusser. l. (1996), p205. Althusser, L. , Balibar, E. (1997), p41-42. 
24 Althusser. L., Balibar, E. (1997), p99-102. 
25 Foster-Carter remarks that articulation is used as an anatomical metaphor to indicate 
relations of linkage and effect between different levels of all sorts of things (Foster-Carter, A. (1978), p 
15-16). 
26
- ln sucti a fasnion, ··s hararaemphasizes the non--=coiTespondence relations between 
economics, politics and ideology in the Arab SF as a key point In analyzing this formation and the 
political and ideological trends (see Ayubi, N. (1995), p27) . 
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The first of the three articulation stages is one where the initial link between 
the newborn capitalist SF and the pre-capitalist ones is established in the sphere of 
exchange. At this stage of exchange, capitalism obtains raw materials from the 
sphere of the pre-capitalist SFs. The capitalist relations, however, are not promoted; 
on the contrary, in the course of the exchange and of its maintenance the pre-
capitalist MPs are reinforced and retain a status of dominance. In other words, the 
capitalist reproduction implies expansion of its relations only in the formations where 
capitalism is already dominant or born .27 
In the second stage of articulation, capitalism tak~s roots. subordinating the 
pre-capitalist MPs, but still making use of them. This does not exclude the possibility 
of reinforcing (at least some of) the latter for a certain period of time or in specific 
economic sectors, if needed. Nonetheless, this stage is characterized by the fact 
that the capitalist MP has the upper hand and penetrates the different stages of 
production. Hence, the different classes of the previous MPs are first partially and 
then completely transformed and merged into a labour force. Transformation is 
already partially achieved in the agricultural sector, but will not be completed except 
in the third stage, when the labour supply is ensured.28 
The third stage of articulation witnesses the total disappearance of the pre-
capitalist MPs, even in agriculture. According to Carter, this stage has not yet been 
reached in the third world29. 
Despite the criticism30 that was put forward concerning the construction of the 
theme, this approach is still vital and insightful when it comes to the study of the 
27 Many examples can be given .in this context, such as that of West Africa with its slave trade, 
which resulted in reinforcing the 'lineage mode of production' (see Foster-Carter, A. (1976), p 21 . 
Brewer, A. (1990) Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A critical Swvey, p246-245). Another example is 
the appearance of the feudal MP alongside capitalism in the Middle East, where the former could 
supply the latter with agricultural products and labour power. (Amin, S. (1978), The Arab Nation: 
Nationalism and Class Struggle, P 35-37). Examples from the Spanish and Portuguese expansion in 
Latin America, from the French in Algeria, from Egypt and the Dutch colonies in South East Asia are 
given by Taylor, J. G. (1961), From Modernization To Mode of Production, p191-194 and 218-226. 
28 Taylor, J . G. (1981), p220-229. Foster-Carter, A. (1978), p 23-26. Brewer, A. (1990), p249-
251 . Bradby, B. (1975) Economyandsocietyvoi.IV, p67-69. 
29 One could argue that this stage was accomplished, even though the third world formation is 
still not like that of the advanced capitalist one. 
30 Rey refuses the critique of his ideas that suggests that the articulation concept is static and 
therefore it eliminates a vita~arxist cgnce(2!LJ:e. _contradi~tioo~ claillJS that contradiction and 
con-flld exist between the different MPs and, in contrast with some theories, he states that in such a 
conflict the pre-capitalist MPs influence: the whole process of articulation. The pr&-capitalist MPs are 
not passive, but active (Foster-Carter, A. (1978), p 31 -34). 
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different SFs of the third world. Articulation brings about a complex of relations 
between political and ideological levels that were within the main reproduction 
process of the pre-capitalist MPs and whose economic basis has either vanished or 
is in the process of withering away, and the new political and ideological levels that 
are of importance to the reproduction of the installed capitalist mode of production. 
Hence, these stages of articulation are not only reinforcing the pre-capitalist MPs in 
some particular periods, but even putting to use their political· and ideological 
instances to facilitate the victory of the capitalist relations over the pre-capitalist 
relations. In this sense, some scholars have argued for non-correspondence 
relations between the economic and the ideological and political instances in the 
SFs of the Arab region31 • As a matter of fact, one could claim that capitalist 
development, when it is not born but is installed in a certain SF, makes use of the 
laws, institutions, etc. of the modified or rehabilitated political and ideological levels 
of pre-capitalist MPs to facilitate a swift and less costly shift towards capitalism for 
the ready born capitalist SFs, i.e. the colonial Western formations. The process of 
penetration and installation that causes a gradual destruction of the pre-capitalist 
MPs uses to a large extent the frameworks and the systems that had facilitated the 
reproduction of the pre-capitalist formation, and which are now built within the new 
structure that aims to give roots to capitalism and its reproduction. For instance, the 
presence of the pre-capitalist forms of social, political, cultural and ideological 
practices is not problematic, provided they contribute to the transformation process. 
They also become the agents who promote and facilitate this transformation making 
great use of the pre-capitalist political and ideological apparatus. In this context, use 
of the articulation theme is an important device in understanding the complex 
relations within Jordanian society, which sometimes lead to overstating the cultural 
dimensions at the expense of the economic foundations, undermining the 
importance of the classes as social and political actors. 
Limiting the usage of articulation to give an analytical account of the 
formation where capitalism is installed does not tell the entire story. In fact, 
articulation in the fashion that was defined is an important device to reveal the 
complex relations of the pre-capitalist formation in its dynamics. The pre-capitalist 
formation was not a static formation that has been activated and stimulated when it. 
was encroached on by capitalism, but a dyna~ic ~ne experiencing its own 
31 See Sharara in Aybui, N. (1995), p27_ 
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contradictions, combinations of modes of production and articulations. The usage of 
articulation, in this sense, can be very insightful to comprehend the pre-capitalist 
formation, its social and political and economic forces and consequently its 
application in the resulting formation when capitalism is installed. Throughout this 
study, the concept of articulation will thus be one of the corner stones in the analysis 
of the different aspects of the bourgeois class in Jordan and of its relations within 
other social spheres and structures. It was used also in looking at the nomadic 
system and its impact on studying Jordan. 
1.2 THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CLASS 
This is the central section, which covers the main principles of the Marxist 
concept of social class, reflecting the two key aspects of the Marxist theory of class. 
The first is class at the structural or economic level; in this respect, this study covers 
the main pillars that are necessary for defining class, without which the Marxist class 
concept is bound to collapse. The second aspect concerns the classes in practice, 
that is in the class struggle in a given phase or period. Thus, the classes are dealt 
with as social actors or, in Hindess's terms, as 'social forces132. The attention here 
shifts from the existence of class by virtue of its economic foundation to as social 
and political actor or, in Giddens's words, as 'an agent of social and political 
change'33, 
It is commonplace to say that there is no one Marxist concept that could refer 
to class in its dual aspects, despite the fact that the point of departure of the various 
- sometimes competing - notions is the Marxian concept of class. Hence, the 
analysis of the two dimensions of class in the Marxist paradigm will start with the 
Marxian theorems, not just because they are highly rewarding, but also due to the 
fact that the later elaborations took these theorems as cornerstones to construct new 
concepts of class or to confirm one or some specific aspects of class. Hence, each 
sub-section here starts by looking at the Marxian arguments, concepts and 
comments, followed by the elaborat~ons and interpretations advanced by Marxist 
scholars when the Marxian ones are inadequate or problematic. 
32 Hindess, B. (1987)~ Politics and Class Analysis, p17. 
33 Giddens. A. (1981), The Class Struciure of the Advanced SocieUes, p '31 . 
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1.2.1 CLASS AT THE ECONOMIC LEVEL (CLASS STRUCTURE) 
The main principles of class theory concerning the definition of class, its 
emergence and its existence in the Marxist paradigm are based on Marx's writings 
and elaborations. However, as the majority of Marxist scholars agree, Marx never 
systematically gave a definition and elaboration of the class concept, even though 
most of his works revolved around classes and the class struggle, since according to 
Marx the latter is the motor of history. In fact, the incomplete final chapter of Capital 
was supposed to address this issue and to provide a comprehensive definition of the 
class concept, since Marx himself advanced the problematic question of 'what 
constitutes a class?'34• The few lines that time allowed Marx to write in order to 
tackle this question remain insufficient. However, a review of some of his important 
writings covering this issue reveals that Marx's analysis of the class was articulated 
at different levels. 35 
A class is formed and defined according to the economic conditions that 
dominate a specific phase or period. The class concept is thus bound to the 
abstract concept of relations of production in a given MP. The relations of 
production mould a class structure in which individuals enter into social relations 
representing their interest, which is determined by their positions in the production 
and reproduction process. In other words, class structure, which is determined by 
the relations of production, defines positions each of which can be filled by 
individuals who share the same relation to the means of production. 
Marx and Engels referred to the property relations aspect of the relations of 
production in order to define class structure and consequently the different classes, 
i.e. the ownership of the means of production. Engels explains the terms 
'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat' in the English edition of the Communist Manifesto 
(1888). 'By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the 
means of social production and employers of the wage labour. By proletariat, the 
class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own. 
34 Marx, K. (1882), Capital, vol. (3) , p885-886. 
35 Wright argues that two distinct approaches characterised Marx's writings about the class 
concept. The first is concerned with the elaboration of the 'abstract stru~tural m~p~ o~ class relations'._ . _ 
- n1isanafysls can be.lound.in the ftieoretical works, and especially ih the analyses of the capitalist MP 
in Capital. The second one, which deals with the cases as actors or, in Wright's words, as 'class 
formation', occurs instead in Marx's political writings (Wright, e.o. (1997), classes, p6-8). 
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are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live.'36 The central role of the 
possession of the means of production in defining the classes is asserted in Marx's 
dissection of the different classes in 191h century France.37 In the above-mentioned 
incomplete chapter of Capital, Marx distinguishes three main classes that historically 
emerged under the capitalist MP according to their relationship to the means of 
production. These are the wage labourers, who are dispossessed of the means of 
production and 'the owners merely of labour-power'; the owners of land, and the 
owners of capital.38 In short, the owners of means of production and the 
dispossessed. 39 
The reference to the possession of the means of production remained a 
cornerstone in the majority of the theoretical elaborations of Kautsky, Hilferding, 
Lenin, Luxembourg, Lukacs and Bukharin, especially as far as the proletariat and 
bourgeois classes are concerned. Other criteria were deployed in studying the 
middle classes, as will be shown. For example, Kautsky analyzed the classes of the 
capitalist societies, starting from the proletariat and ending with the bourgeoisie, 
according to the possession of the means of production. 40 Moreover, in his attack on 
the Bolshevik revolution and the ensuing republic, he criticized the treatment of the 
bourgeoisie under the new regime, claiming that the bourgeois class was not 
bourgeois anymore after it had been deprived of its means of production. He went 
further to argue that such a treatment was far from being based on class,41 but that It 
was based on other factors, closer in quality to race or gender.42 Lenin, in contrast 
to Kautsky's argument, warned the members of the Bolshevik party that eliminating 
the property of the bourgeois class did not mean eliminating their political and 
36 Marx and Engels (1848), p.79. 
37 Marx, K. (1851) The Class Struggle In France, p 36-37, 44 , Marx, K. (1852), The 
Eighteenth Brumalre of Louis Bonaparte, p173. 
3s Marx, K. (1882), Capital, Vol. (3), p885. 
39 Marx and Engels stress that the distribution of wealth goods and power is not the ground on 
which the agents of production are distributed into classes and class relations are formed. The key 
factor is instead the distribution of the means of production among the agents of the capitalist 
production ('possessors' and 'dispossessed'). The former classification criterion is already included in 
the latter; it Is in fact the outcome of it (Marx, K., Engels, F. (1846), The Gennan Ideology, p78). 
4
°Kautsky, K. (1892), The ClassStruggle, p18-26. 
41 In this argument Kautsky dropped the political and ideological dimensions of the definition 
of class, where his analysis of the middle classes was highly emphasized (Kautsky, K. (1892), The 
Class Struggle, p40-42). This proposition is taken up some 6 decades later by Poulantzas, who 
__ _ el.abDrates it and applies it _to the petty- bourgeoisie and-·the- new- middle classes (Poulantzas, N. 
(1977), p 83-86). 
42 Kautsky, K. (1918), the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, p34. 
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ideological threat, which was actually still in existence two years after the 
revolution.43 However, Lenin was in full agreement with Kautsky regarding the 
fundamental role of the possession of the means of production in defining classes. 
He stated: 
'Classes are large groups of people which differ from 
each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined 
system of social production, by the relation (in most cases fixed 
and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in 
the social organization of labour and, consequently, by the 
dimensions and methods of acquiring the share of the social wealth 
of which they dispose'44 
From the above considerations, one can deduce that the social relations to 
the means of production basically define the class structure in which the agents of 
production are divided and classes come to exist. However, other elements result 
from the previous proposition and cover an important role in contrasting the Marxian 
class concept at the economic level. The concept of class as it was asserted by 
Marx in different works is a relational one, i.e. classes are defined in their relations to 
other classes. In the Grundrisse, it is stated that ctasses do not exist outside the 
relational concept. 
'Society is not merely an aggregate of individuals; it is the 
sum of relations in which individuals stand to one another. It is as 
though someone were to say that, from the point of view of society, 
slaves and citizens do not exist; they are all men. In fact, this is 
rather what they are outside society. Being a slave or a citizen is a 
socially determined relation between individual A and individual B. 
Individual A is not as such a slave. He is only a slave in and 
through society.'45 
This relationship, outside of which the classes lose their contents, is 
moreover articulated in two main aspects: the exploitative and the antagonistic. The 
exploitative relationship lies in the unequal distribution of the means of production 
among the agents, which results in the expropriation of the surplus-labour from the 
direct producers by the owning class, differentiating the various classes' capacities 
to act.46 In MPs such as feudalism and slavery, expropriation takes the form of 
'coercive exchange', since the exploited classes are forced to exchange their labour 
43 Lenin, V.l.(1918), A Great Beginning, in the Collected Works, Vol. (27), p231. 
44 1biQ.,J? 232. 
45 Hall. S. (1977) Marx's theory of Classes, p25, 
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or services for less than their value to the exploiting classes. The capitalist 
exploitation around which Marx's theory of value revolves is based on the 
expropriation of the surplus-value that the producers generate by the capitalist 
class. 47 The rationale behind this claim lies in the concentration of ownership of the 
means of production in the hands of the capitalist class and in the corresponding 
process of depriving the direct producers of the means of production, forcing them to 
sell their labour power, i.e. <alienation'. 
The other face of the relational concept, which is of vital importance, is the 
antagonistic one. Exploitation flattens the ground on which the objective variations 
of class interests are erected and forms an antagonistic relation between the 
classes. The two main classes which are located at the extreme edges of the 
production process are defined according to the sum of the above mentioned 
theorems. The proletariat and the bourgeoisie are defined by their relations to the 
means of production, on which their interest and the nature of their reciprocal 
relationships are shaped. The same approach is applicable when defining the 
classes of different MPs, such as lords and servants, slaves and freemen ... etc. 
1.2.2 CLASS AS A SOCIAL FORCE 
The relations to the means of production constitute the class structure, which 
implies an objective antagonistic relational conception of the classes according to 
the central concept of exploitation. The importance of class structure as the primary 
element in defining the classes is undeniable. However, according to Marxism, the 
class concept is not confined within the boundaries of its factual existence; it also 
has a great importance in regard to its social and political role in society. In this 
context, the class concept is not a device to characterize a given society in terms of 
locations occupied by different groups of individuals sharing an economic situation 
and a common interest.48 The fact that these different locations, within which the 
classes are distributed, are bound to each other by antagonistic relationship revolves 
around the concept of exploitation that flattens the ground for other dimensions of 
46 Wright. E.O. (1997), p 34-35 . Also see Hall, S. (1977), p24-27. 
47 Roemer, J . (1982a) General Theory of Exploitation, p10-12. Roemer, J . (1982b) New 
Directions in the Marxian Theory of Exploitation and Class, p29-33. 
48 Such ali ·asst..iniptiori reauces Marxist class tlieory to the level of other stratification 
theories based on the income differentiation between social groups or the Weberian concept of the 
'class situation' and 'market situation·. 
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the class concept, namely those of the class as a political and social agent. Within 
the understanding of class as an agent lie other important concepts, such as those 
of class struggle and of class contradiction. In Marx's words, 
'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, 
guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, 
stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an 
uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, 
either in a revolutionary reconstruction of the society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes. '49 
Accepting these new dimensions of the class concept does not constitute a 
problematic issue per se. However, the relationship between class at the structural 
level and class as a social and political actor functioning according to the interest 
that is dictated by its economic position was one of the most problematic issues 
within the Marxist circles and, to some extent, a ground upon which rival theorists 
based their polemics. 50 This issue is particularly important, since defining a possible 
rational relationship between class structure and class as a social actor is the only 
way to analyze concrete societies in terms of class. In the following sub-sections, 
the focus is on how Marxist analysts have dealt with this issue, starting with Marx's 
conceptions and the consequent elaborations and interpretations. 
1.2.2.1Ciass in Itself and for Itself 
Marx himself advanced two concepts that could explain the relationship 
between class structure and class as a social actor, namely those of 'class in itself 
and 'class for itself. Such concepts are directly and clearly mentioned in Marx's The 
Poverty of Philosophy. 
'Economic conditions had at first transformed the 
mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of 
capital has created for this mass a common situation, common 
interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but 
not for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only few 
phases, this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class 
49 Marx and Engels (1848}, p. 79. 
50 Such an issue is extended to cover the entire set of relations between the economic doma1n 
and the political and ideological ones. 
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for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the 
struggle of class against class is a political struggle. '51 
MarxJs concept of 'class in itself refers to the class as it is formed at the 
structural level and to certain functions and actions that this given class is involved 
in, but whose level does not qualify this class to be class for itself. Marx gives 
examples concerning the proletariat: 
'The proletariat goes through various stages of 
development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. 
At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the 
work-people of a factory, then by the operatives of a trade, in one 
locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them.'52 
These three types of struggle or confrontation, which indicate a certain 
degree of organization and consciousness, are still within 'he domain of the 'class in 
itself. On this ground, Poulantzas places these types of struggle53 within the 
economic interest struggle between the agents of production, since, in Marx's terms, 
they are not directed against the 'bourgeoisie's condition of production'54, but against 
the instrument and the imported products that are in competition with the labourer's 
own labour. Furthermore, the labourers at this stage of struggle 'still form an 
incoherent mass scattered over the whole country' .55 
Turning to the concept of 'class for itself, again in regard to the proletariat, 
Marx shows the necessary conditions according to which this class could be termed 
as class for itself. 
•.. . with the development of industry the proletariat 
not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater 
masses, its strength grows and it feels that strength more. The 
various interests are more and more equalised, in proportion as 
machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly 
everywhere reduces wages to the same low level [ ... ] the more 
collision between individual workman and individual bourgeois 
takes more aod more the character of the colljsion between two 
51 Marx, K. (1847), The Poverly ofPhilosophy, p, 143. 
52Marx and Engels (1848), p.88. 
53 Poulantzas, N. (1973), p62-66 . 
. - - · 
54 Marx and Engels (1848), p.89. 
55 Ibid, p89, 
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and 
classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations 
(Trade Union) against the bourgeois'56 
'This organization of the proletarians into a class, and 
consequently into a political party. is continually being upset by the 
competition by the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again. 
stronger, firmer and mightier. It compels legislative recognition of 
particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the division 
among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the Ten Hours Bill in England.'57 
Based on Marx's comments, one could argue that 'class for itself is a 
combination of class in itself and a certain degree of actions that the class is 
engaged in. This certain level of actions is beyond the types of actions and 
struggles that were mentioned above and correspond to 'class in itself. In this 
perspective, the class struggle that reaches the stage of 'class for itself is 
distinguished from the struggle at the level of ''class in itself by being a political one, 
i.e. the highest level of conflict and the core of the class struggle according to 
Marx.58 Such a political struggle comes into existence when the mass of a given 
class attains awareness of its interests, that is it becomes 'self-conscious' of its own 
interest.59 In this sense, one could argue that the struggle targets the entire class 
structure rather than some specific aspects of the production process. These 
developments at the level of consciousness and the types of struggle that are 
influenced by the types of organization that the class members are engaged in, have 
an impact on the development and the sort of organizations representing the class's 
interest. Concluding from Marx's conceptualization, the stage of class for itself can 
be identified from the function of the class on three main terrains60: class struggle, 51 
consciousness62 and formation63• 
56 Marx and Engels (1848), p.89, 
57 Marx and Engels (1848), p.90. 
58 Marx and Engels (1848), p.90. 
59 Marx and Engels (1848), p.92. 
60 It is important to mention that 'class struggle' is the most frequently used term, while the use 
of the others vartes. In fact, Marx never used them in the way i n which they are presented, but they 
are borrowed here from Wright. However, the elements that Marx indicated in his treatment of class 
practice are covered under these domains. 
61 Class struggle corresponds to all antagonistic forms of actfvities that the members of a class 
_ __are engflg~ [!1 accorgJn9. to thei[lnherent inJ.~rest,_ In this sense,Jh~U~lQD1i~e.Q -~onflict l?!tl!'t!ten. CL _ __ _ 
worker and a capitalist is still within the domain of class struggle; however, it is not class struggle that 
exists at the macro level when the class members collectively act at a certain level of consciousness 
for the interest of the class determined by the class structure (see Wright, E. 0. (1997), Class Counts, 
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The fact that the 'class for itself can be circumscribed on the basis of these 
terrains does not imply that their existence is confined to the domain of the class for 
itself. This assertion is vital, since Marx's comments concerning the function of the 
class below the stage of 'class for itself are undisputable. They can be deduced 
from his description of the proletariat above and from that of the small-holding 
peasants below. 
'The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of 
which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold 
relations with one another. Their MP isolates them from one another 
instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse[ ... ] In so far as there is 
merely local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and 
the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and 
no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They 
are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their 
name, whether through parliament or through a convention. They 
cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. '64 
Another conclusion that should be highlighted here is the full rejection of the 
treatment of the 'class for itself as an inevitabJe development of class structure.65 
The 'class for itself is a particular state that may or may not come into being. 
However, such a proposition was not associated with the proletariat. but was the 
base on which Marx built his analysis of the peasants of France in the mid 191h 
p382. Also Marx's treatment of the class struggle in the Communist Manifesto). In fact. there are 
different schools of thought regarding the definition of class struggle. Wright classifies them in three 
groups: the first is mainly concerned with the results of the struggle, the second emphasizes the 
consciousness of the classes in the course of the struggle, while the third is concerned with the nature 
of the actors that are engaged in the struggle. It is class struggle is class one when the actors are 
classes or formed on class bases (Wright, E. 0 . (1997). Classes. p57}. No evidence can be found that 
Marx was concerned with the outcome of the class struggle as a parameter for its existence, while the 
nature of the actors is repeatedly indicated and class consciousness to some extent (see for examples 
the French February revolution/1848 and June insurrection/1848. in Marx (1851 ). Marx (1852} and 
Marx (1871}). 
62 Class consciousness, as Wright asserts. refers to subjective choices of the individuals in a 
given class, i.e. to the micro - rather than the macro - level of the class. However. the actions of 
collectivities that reflect the direction of class consciousness are bound to the consciousness at the 
micro level (see Wright, E. 0 . (1997}. Class Counts, p382-385). 
63 Class formation corresponds to 'the formation of collectively organized social forces' of a 
given class regardless of whether this formation refers to the process or outcome. Class formation. is 
thus the ways in which the class capacities are shaped influencing the class struggle in particular, but 
the balance of power at large. Class formation is not confined to the formal social organizations that 
enforce solidarity between the class members, such as unions, political parties and clubs (in the 
Marxian sense}, but includes any form of informal social bodies that advance solidarity such as 
neighbourhood committees or social clubs (see Wright. E. 0 . (1997), Class Counts, p379-380). 
---· _64.Marx, K. (1.852), .The-Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapade, p214. 
65 See in the coming sub-sections how Lukacs developed Marx's arguments about the 
peasants and the proletanat into class-subjects. 
29 
century. They constituted a class by sharing the same material conditions, but at the 
same time they did not constitute a 'class for itself. 
The two concepts of class that Marx advances are vital, since 'class in itself 
corresponds to the existence of a class at the structural level66, with all the class 
actions dictated by this structure, though it is still below the stage termed 'class for 
itself. The latter is a class in its actions and functions as a political actor, once again 
determined by class structure. These two aspects of class are of great importance 
when considering societies like that of Jordan, where the articulation of MPs is more 
complex than that of advanced capitalist societies. Moreover, the prolonging of the 
transition period to a more refined capitalist formation by the specific historical 
conditions of Jordan and by the impact of the relations of Jordan, as part of the 
periphery, with the capitalist core, keeps the possibility open for autonomous 
ideological and political spheres. Therefore, the concepts of 'class in itself and 
'class for itself are useful, since the absence of the latter does not imply the non-
appearance of the class at the structural level, which may lead to the formation of 
'class for itself. 
1.2 .2.2 Interpretations and Elaborations 
A few problematic issues are associated with these two concepts, due to the 
fact that Marx never fully elaborated on them. One of these is that the relationship 
between 'class in itself and 'class for itself on the one hand and class structure on 
the other remains obscure. That is, the relations between class consciousness, 
struggle and formation and class structure are not well defined and have been 
subject to different elaborations. 
At another level, it is still difficult to identify the boundaries that differentiate 
'class in itself from 'class for itself, especially since both concepts share the same 
terrain. In fact, Marx's treatment seems to indicate that the linear development of 
class ascends from its structure level to 'in itself then to 'for itself, when the class's 
66 One can correctly assume that two understandings of the class in itself can be deduced 
from the Marxian comments and analysis: the first one is that the class for itself is nothing but the 
- - class structure ·(se-e-Figure 1 in Kppencmn); the seco naTefers- insteaaTo-a certain stage that-emerges 
with specific class features (see Figure 2 in Appendix 1 ). The la~er understanding exhibits very loose 
boundaries, to the extent that any particular feature can be dually viewed as class in itself or for itself. 
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structural conditions give it the possibility to do so. Such an observation implies that 
the 'class for itself is a permanent stage that the class reaches and occupies as long 
as the class structure continues to exist.67 If this is to be the case, how can the 
analysis cope with the decline of class as the main social and political agent and the 
rise of other social factors? 
Another important dimension is the relation between 'class in itself and 'for 
itself on one side and the other social spheres outside class structure such as 
gender, cast, ethnicity, religion .. . etc. These domains are grounds on which social 
and political activities can arise alongside ones which are determined by class 
structure. Hence, turning a blind eye on such a reality, in some specific societies 
like Jordan, results in a lame analysis. 
Marxist scholars discussed directly and indirectly the different concepts of 
class and some of the problematic issues mentioned above; some of the main 
interpretations and elaborations will be covered here. 
Some of the most well known interpretations are those advanced by the 
Marxist economism scholars. According to the arguments of this school, the whole 
issue of class 'in itself and 'for itself and the relation between the two aspects is not 
problematic, since the whole range of class actions, such as class struggle. 
formation and consciousness, are reduced to the level of an effect of the class 
structure or of the relations of production and productive relations. 58 This claim does 
not just reduce the class for itself to an inevitable consequence of the class in itself, 
but it eliminates the relations that are imposed by domains other than class structure 
on the dynamics of the SF. In other words, the whole SF, including the political and 
ideological spheres as well as the other social factors such as gender, ethnicity and 
religion are reduced to a mere effects of the economic foundation .69 
67 A change in class structure that gives birth to a new class and causes the decline of others 
does not lead to the class exiting the 'for itself stage, but to the entire class fading. 
68 As Giddens claims, such interpretations were advanced by virtue of the ambiguity of Marx's 
writings and of the different theorems that he posed concerning social change. Such emphasis could 
be found in some of his works, such as The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy. 
Giddens claims that Marx and Engels's later writings distinguished themselves from reductionism, 
stressing interdependence between the structure and superstructure, as with Engels's famous 
statement about the determining role of the structure or economy 'in the last instance' (see Giddens, 
A. (198), General Problems in the in the Social Theory, p57), 
---- sg. In the case of Jordan, such a claim cannot hold a ground when confronted with some 
ideological and political dimensions of a certain importance in the forma~on, even though their 
economic foundation has withered away. 
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Some Marxist scholars spend a great deal of energy polemicizing against this 
school. For instance, in his analysis of the role of the working class political party, 
Lenin criticizes the limitations of the main political themes of this school, such as the 
spontaneity of the trade union struggle, which it believes is the core of the class 
struggle and the only way possible for achieving a classless society.70 Along this 
line is Gramsci's polemic against reducing the class struggle to the boundaries of 
'voluntarism'. 71 In a different perspective, Lenin emphasizes the naivety of deducing 
the political power balance of the classes from their class structure. 72 Elsewhere, 
Gramsci goes beyond Lenin's proposition, stating for example that not every practice 
at the political level is tied to the economic level, and giving instances in which an 
economic basis is impossible to trace. Furthermore, Gramsci draws attention to the 
fact that even when the political struggle operates within the economic structure 
framework there is room for a 'mistake' that does not have a basis in the economic 
level but can influence the entire struggle.73 Gramsci thus emphasizes the relative 
autonomy of the political and ideological levels.74 Poulantzas highlights the role of 
the social relations of production, distinguishing them from the mere relations of 
production that the economic reductionists could not grasp. 75 Hindess looks at the 
legal aspects of the state to substantiate his refusal of the theme of the economic 
effect.76 
Another elaboration that came into existence based on the concepts of 'class 
in itself and 'class for itself, is the transformation of the proletariat into a 'class 
subject' with a role in history, without acknowledging its contradictions and 
differentiation. n Building on the class subject proposition, another important 
elaboration ascribes the destiny of historical and social change to the proletariat. 
The main manifestation of such an interpretation is Lukacs's formulation of class-
70 Lenin, F.l. (1902), What is To Be Done?, p1 08-111 . 
71 Gramsci, A. (1999) A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writing 1916-1935. 
72 Lenin (1919 ), The Agrarian Programme, in Hirst, P. (1977), p96. 
73 Gramsci, A. (1999),A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935. 
74 Based on such elaboration, Althusser conceptualizes the determination and over 
determination, advancing the autonomy of ideology (see Althusser, l. (1996), For Marx, p1 17-124 and 
Althusser, L. (1994), Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus. 103-107). 
75 Poulantzas, N. (1973), Political Power and Social Classes1 p60-63. 
76 
.Hindess,_B . . (J.989),. Class .Analysis-as-Social. Theory.,. p59·60;. Hindess, B. (1987), Politics 
and Class Analysis, p88-89, 96-98. 
n Hall, S. (1977). p27; Poulantzas. N. (1973), p60-61 . 
'32 
consciousness. 78 Lukacs suggests that the articulation of the objective revolutionary 
position of the proletariat and its empirical revolt comprise an 'object-subject' 
dialectical relationship. 
In this context, the proletariat has to form a political organization and to 
exhibit an empirically revolutionary political consciousness. 79 The emphasis on the 
subjective factor and false consciousness, together with the role of the party as the 
vanguard of the proletariat, goes hand in hand with Lukacs's understanding of 
Leninism, of which he considered himself a militant. 80 The elements upon which his 
treatment of the proletariat are based are exclusively confined to the proletariat,81 i.e. 
to the 'special class'. 82 
Despite the fact that Lukacs never attempted to elaborate a theoretical 
agenda of class, he argues that the smallholding peasants are not a class at all. 
His assumption is based on Marx's treatment of the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte83 and Bukharin's similar analysis of the Russian peasants. 84 Such an 
assumption, however, does not stand any ground, since Marx's assertions about 
the smallholding peasants not being a 'class for itself do not imply that they do 
78 Hall, S. (1977), p27. 
79 Lukacs, G. (2000), A Defence of History and Class Consciousness, p50. 
60 Lukacs employed the concept of 'false consciousness' in order to explain the fact that the 
proletariat does not always match its appointed historical mission. The objective conditions 
surrounding the collapse of the Hungarian soviet republic in 1919 and the success of the Bolshevik 
revolution were examples given by Lukacs to emphasize the fundamental role of the subjective factor 
embodied in the presence of a revolutionary political party, elevating class consciousness to the level 
of the proletarian interest (Lukacs, G. (2000), A Defence of History and Class Consciousness. p54-
55). 
81 In fact, Lukacs tries to extend the privileged objective conditions that the proletariat enjoys 
to other classes. such as the ones of pre-capitalist societies, stating that these objective conditions do 
not exclude them from having the same status that the proletariat has as a subject of social change. 
This analysis extends to cover other classes within the capitalist system, in particular the peasants. 
whose objective conditions hamper them from forming a class in the proletariat sense. In this regard, 
Lukacs goes back to Marx's account of the smallholding peasants, presented above. However, he 
gives considerable importance to the contradiction that results from the location of the peasants in 
capitalist production, especially in societies in transition to capitalism. This contradiction shapes a 
consciousness that is in complete form in the case of the proletariat, elevating the latter to having a 
role in history (Lukacs, G. (2000), A Defence of History and Class Consciousness, p83-89). 
82 Lukacs, G. (2000), A Defence of History and Class Consciousness, p83. 
83 Lukacs, G. (1971), History and Class Consciousness, p60-62. Lukacs states that 'We 
cannot speak of class consciousness in the cases of these classes [the peasants), if we can even 
- speak· af them as ,classes· in-the striGt-Mar:xist sense of the term. ,-.',--
84 Lukacs, G. (2000), A Defence of History and Class Consciousness, p82; Lukacs, G. (1971)1 
History and Class Consciousness, p64-65. 
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not constitute a class at all. There are a few examples from that period in 
Marx's85 works that show the peasants' interest and how it was pressed.86 
If one is to take Lukacs's assumption to its limits, what do these peasants 
constitute if not a distinct class? Based on Marx's analysis, the peculiarity of the 
peasants does not just come from their middle location in the capitalist production 
relations, since they are neither exploiters nor exploited, but from their 
surrounding objective conditions, which hinder the process of converting the 
scattered mass into a coherent class, and flattening their contradictions in favour of 
the basic one. 
The two above~mentioned aspects of the class subject were at the centre of 
the critique of Structural Marxism, due to their connection with the Hegelian tradition 
away from which Marxism established an epistemological break.87 However, this 
treatment is still adopted in the interpretations and elaborations of the Hegelian 
Marxist School.88 In the case of this study, using the class-subject concept leads to 
a dual system of analysis, one part of which concerns the objective conditions, while 
the other one is based on the degree of development that the subjective dimension 
of a given class has reached. The lack of subjective dimension and consequently 
the absence of the class vanguard, because of the specificity89 of the Jordanian 
formation, deprive its classes of being considered classes in the sense that the 
proletariat is treated in Lukacs. In this context, such propositions lead to an analysis 
of Jordan as, on the one hand a class society, and on the other as a society that 
lacks class actors, which, according to Lukacs, implies lack of classes. 
85 Marx, K. (1852), The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparle, p212. 
86 Lukacs does not deny that the peasants and similar social groups have their own interest 
and are even involved in all sorts of class struggle; however, he explains that this engagement has to 
be triggered by an external factor such as an upheaval in the urban centres, because of the lack of 
communication and the lifestyle of the peasants. This reason and the fact that 'class consciousness is 
prevented from emerging by their position within the process of production and the interests by this 
generated' do not lead the peasants to the stage of 'class for itself. On these grounds, Lukacs 
explains how the peasants fight under the flag of the opposite interest to theirs, and consequently 
argues that they do not constitute a class (Lukacs, G. (1971). History and Class Consciousness. p62). 
87 Althusser. L. (1996), For Marx, p31 . 
68 Russel, ·J . (1989), MPs in World History, p133-135. 
89 The peculiarity here refers to the co-articulation of the capitalist and non-capitalist MPs, 
which gives birth to classes that operate within more than one MP and have a dual objective base, 
beside the fact that such an articulation results ln political and ideological levels that do not correspond 
-w-an economic base: - rnis peculiaritY can be seen as somewhat analogous to the peasants' 
conditions, on Which Lukacs's treatment heavily rel ies (see the sub-section concerning the 
Articulation). 
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One of the most recent elaborations that appeared in this arena of debate 
and which has had an impact on the different succeeding schools is that of 
Structural Marxism. Its scholars' critique of Economism and the Marxist Hegelian 
elaborations was mentioned above. Poulantzas argues against the entire class 'in 
itself and 'for itself concept as a Hegelian one that slipped into Marx's early writings. 
Therefore, Poulantzas claims that classes should be defined at the economic and at 
the same time at the political and ideological levels. In this sense, the function of the 
class at the political and ideological levels becomes a determinant factor in defining 
it. Therefore, the classes are not defined objectively according to their relations to 
the means of production. In order to solve this problematic issue, Poulantzas claims 
that the political and ideological levels lie on the structural, i.e. the economic, level. 
In Poulantzas's words, ' ... the places of political and ideological dominations and 
subordinations, are themselves part of the structural determination of class'.90 
Such an elaboration leads to two contrasting conclusions. According to the 
first, the ideological and political factors that are at the structural level are completely 
determined by the economic dimension, leading to the same conclusions as 
Economism, as Wood has argued.91 According to the second, the ideological and 
political levels are the decisive ones in defining the classes, regardless of their 
positions in the production process.92 
Applying such a doctrine to societies such as that of Jordan means putting 
the whole relationship between certain groups of individuals and the means of 
production under further examination. These individuals, regardless of their 
objective position with respect to the means of production , cannot be considered a 
class if they lack a class aspiration at the political and ideological levels. A more 
threatening possibility is that new categories of class may emerge as a consequence 
of the political and ideological functions of certain groups of individuals, regardless of 
weather the latter were drawn from different positions as far as their relations to the 
means of production are concerned. 
90 Poulantzas, N. (1975), p180-187. 
91 Meiksins Wood, E. (1998), The Retreat From Class, p42-44. 
92 The concepti.Talization of tile miadle tlasses in 'Poulantzas's-elaboration is an example. of 
the determination of the Ideological level. Poulantzas (1977), p 73-75 (See the section on the Middle 
Classes). 
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1.2.3 THE ALTERNATIVE 
The unsatisfactory elaborations of 'class in itself and 'class for itself lead to 
the coinage of a new concept based on Marx's comments concerning class and the 
different interpretations by the Neo-Marxist scholars and others. Two main sets of 
constraints ought to be considered: the first ones are those that confine any new 
concept within the Marxist framework;93 the second ones are those that are related 
to the peculiarity of the Jordanian SF, such as the articulation of the different MPs, 
the importance of the social variables that are not of class character and the role of 
the state.94 
The point of departure in constructing an operational concept of class within 
concrete societies which could be an efficient device in analyzing the Jordanian 
bourgeoisie will be reemphasizing the definition of 'class in itself and 'for itself. The 
first is the stage at which members of the class take actions which are directly or 
indirectly dictated by their objective interest, resulting from their class position in the 
production. Along the line that Marx's comments trace, this stage is generated 
directly by the birth of class structure, indicating prototypes of actions that result 
objectively from the antagonistic and exploitative relations between the different 
classes within a given system.95 In this context, the 'class in itself reflects all the 
actions that are individually taken by some members of a class against the opposite 
class or against some of the production aspects or even against other classes or 
social groups, but not against the whole production system which produces their 
class position. 
'Class for itself stands at the other extreme with respect to the position 
occupied by 'class in itself: The actions that the class is engaged in are determined 
by its structure at one level and, at the other, by all the input that is dictated by the 
consciousness, formation and experience which are gained through its interactions 
(the different forms of class struggle) with other classes and socio-political elements. 
In this perspective, all of these terrains are determined by the interest of the class as 
93 These principles were emphasized in the previous sections on the MPs and class structure. 
9-4 The purpose of this set of constraints is not to develop a specific model which operates 
within the conditions of Jordan. However, within the scope of this study the consideration of the 
Jordanian case. as.an_example.oUhe.developing.countr:ies, has-to-be -put forward. 
95 See how Marx dealt with the proletariat in the sub-section about 'class in itself and class for 
itself. 
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class, not as a collection of members belonging to the same economic position. As 
a social and political agent, the 'class for itself defends its interest consciously. 
However, both 'class in itself and 'class for itself share these terrains, though the 
former is still an immediate outcome of class structure. The question that was put 
forward above, i.e. what is the link be1ween the two stages, is just a matter of 
mechanical shift from one to the other. 
In order to resolve these problematic issues, it is possible to coin a new 
concept that corresponds to all of the actions that are taken by any class and 
embraces the 'class in itself and 'for itself without the need to eliminate any of 
them.96 This is 'class in practice'. By 'class in practice' is meant simply all of those 
social, political and economic acts performed by the members of a given class or by 
some of them, which are based on class structure and which have the ability to 
affect aspects of society, including their own class. 
This definition indicates that the whole range of actions or functions of class 
character, from the simplest aspirations of the antagonistic relations between 
opposite (e.g. exploiting and exploited) classes up to the most developed class 
struggle. is political, as Marx states.97 The class in practice is the dynamic sphere 
where the different forms of actions of class character are manifested, and hence 
where the 'class in itself and 'for itself can come to existence. To conclude, the 
class in practice is manifested in the same three terrains of the 'class for itself 
according to Marx - i.e. class-consciousness, struggle and formation - and is 
determined by the class structure. The relations among these terrains and between 
them and class structure will be briefly advanced in the light of Wright's theory, i.e. 
models of determination. 
From this point of view, the 'class for itself is nothing more than class in 
practice, or, more precisely, it is a specific form of practice that exists when the class 
formation can produce a political representative of its interest and the class becomes 
consciously engaged in the political struggle by pursuing a change in structure, since 
variations of practice are born with the birth of class structure. Accordingly, one 
96 As a matter of fact. the concept of class in itself could be eliminated, since it corresponds to 
the spontaneous actions that class structure dictates. In this context, it is possible for the class in itself 
to be viewed as the initial stage of the class in practice per se. Moreover, some scholars refer to the 
---,class~in itself as part oHhe- class-stmcture: Considering sueh· a- possibility can be worthwhile; 
however, such a task falls outside the scope of this study. 
97 See the subsection about 'class in itself and class for itself. 
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could argue that Marx's analysis of social classes98 corresponds to three different 
instances: 'class in itself, 'class in practice' and 'class for itself. At any rate, the 
Marxian treatment of the proletariat corresponds to 'class in practice', since it is, at 
one level, 'class in practice' moving towards 'class for itself.99 According to this 
proposition, the presence of the class cannot be reduced to the 'class for itself, or to 
its engagement in the political struggle for its objective aspirations. The most 
conspicuous examples appear in Marx's treatment of the lumpen-proletariat and the 
peasants ih different works. 100 
The notion of "class in practice" has advantages over the other elaborations 
of the class's different aspects. Firstly, the problematic relations between the 'class 
in itself and 'for itself are resolved by virtue of the fact that both aspects are part of 
the same sphere, i.e. 'class 'in practice'. If the conditions of a class are not mature 
enough for it to be at the level of 'class for itself, and in the meantime they are 
beyond restricting it within the 'class in itself, such a class will be easily defined 
within the domain of 'class in practice'. 
Secondly, this concept can indicate that the movement of 'class in itself to for 
itself - or of 'class in practice' to 'class for itself - is not a linear ascending 
development that the class accomplishes by reaching the highest level. The class 
may succeed in reaching the 'class for itself stage in a particular phase or period; 
however, in another phase a movement of the class in the opposite direction is 
possible. In other words, the class function in the sphere of 'class in practice', with 
the determinations of class structure, can provide the necessary conditions for the 
class to reach a specific stage of 'class in practice', i.e. 'class for itself. If these 
conditions are not present in the first place, or fade for reasons such as the outcome 
of the class struggle or others that lie outside the 'class in practice', the same class 
moves from 'class for itself to 'class in practice'. Such an understanding can have 
explanatory power regarding the importance of the class as a social actor in 
different periods, in the light of different circumstances. 
98 This is the analysis that appears mainly in The Communist Manifesto. The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, The Class Struggle in France, Civil war rn France and other works 
concerning the proletariat, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and, in some cases, the bourgeoisie. 
----~ - -- . 
99 See the Marxian treatment in the first subsection. 
100 See Marx, K. (1852), The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 
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One of the examples that can contribute to the above proposition is Marx's 
interesting analysis of the industrial fraction of the French bourgeoisie. The contrast 
between the industrial bourgeoisie and the ruling fraction went beyond polemics 
when the former joined the 1848 revolution on the side of the social groups whose 
interest stood opposite not just to the financial aristocracy but to the entire 
bourgeoisie. By taking the conflict beyond the limitations of its class interest and 
supporting the opposite classes, the industrial bourgeoisie was placing the 
cornerstone for the abolition of the capitalist relations of production. This example 
may be analyzed in terms of 'class in practice'. However, Marx explains that this 
fraction reversed its position from revolting against the financial aristocracy to a 
fanatical alliance with it under its lead in the 'Party of Order' .101 This in turn meant 
that the industrial bourgeoisie gained the status of 'Class for itself.102 
It also shows that the sphere of the 'class in practice' is determined by the 
class structure at one level and by the interaction of its three terrains - i.e. class 
formation, consciousness and struggle - at another. The issue that comes forward 
objectively is the relation that ties class structure and 'class in practice' (including 
'class for itself), especially since in the latter sphere the political and ideological 
dimensions come together. The relations between class formation, consciousness 
and struggle are also important, since it is upon the articulation of the relations 
between these terrains (within the given constraints of the class structure) that some 
of the possible variations of 'class in practice' are produced, and in particular 
whether the stage of 'class for itself is reached or not. 
Wright advances the concept of 'mode of determination'. according to which 
models of determination can be deduced concerning the relation between the 
theoretical terrain and the practical one. The modes of determination are basically 
different forms of relationship that come to tie the different spheres with each other. 
According to the importance of each sphere, these relationships vary in their 
101 Marx, K.(1851), The Class Struggles in France, p. 11 1. 
102 In this context, the class for itself is, in broad terms, the entire bourgeoisie. One could 
argue, in terms of fractions' interest, that the industrial bourgeoisie compromised some of its interest in 
its alliance with the financial fraction. However, such a compromise was Inevitable if the industrialists 
were not to threaten the whole system reproducing their own position in the economic foundation. 
• ---- - - Mane claims that· th-a -aevelopment of the materiar conditions oflnelncusfry in France was not yet 
sufficient to allow the industrial fraction to take the lead in pressing their interests as the English 
industrial fraction did in the face of the landed proprietors. 
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strength and direction; they are, in order of their mode of determination: limitation, 
selection and transformation .103 
The main intent of the modes of determination here is to identify the relations 
between class structure and each component of the 'class in practice' on the one 
hand, and the interrelations between the different components of the 'class in 
practice~ on the other. Class structure imposes a limitation relationship on 'class in 
practice', as regards class formation, struggle and consciousness104. This 
relationship limits 105 the variations of a class in each of the above-mentioned 
terrains, i.e. it favours some and rules out others. For example, class structure 
establishes variations in the possible collective organizations (class formation) that 
could emerge in relation to one class, such as clubs, unions and political parties, etc. 
The same example could be extended to class struggle and consciousness. The 
analysis of the smallholding peasants on the one hand and of the proletariat on the 
other, as was formulated by Marx or even by Lukacs, could thus be better 
understood. In contrast to the proletariat, the former class, which already existed in 
practice and even had - as Marx mentioned -· concretely found in Napoleon Ill its 
representative, 106 could not become 'class for itself because of the limitations on the 
possible variations that were imposed by class structure on 'class in practice~. A 
change in some structural aspects 107 could have facilitated the access of this class to 
the stage of 'class for itself. Limitation does not mean that one of the possible 
variations will actually occur and it does not correspond to whatever concepts -such 
as shape or effect-indicate inevitable forms of class formation , consciousness and 
struggle. 
The selection imposed by class formation and class consciousness on the 
class struggle is still a relationship of limitation of the possible variations, but it is 
103 Wright, E.0 .(1979) Class, Crisis and the State, p15-22. 
104 See figure 3, Appendix 1. 
105 One of the best examples of the limitation relationship is the one given by Wright about the 
state forms under feudal ism. The economic structure based on the control of the peasants over the 
land. the appropriation of the surplus labour through coercion and the relatively limited surplus ruled 
out the possibility of a representative democratic state based on universal suffrage. However, a whole 
range of state forms, from a highly decentralised state to an absolute one. could occur (see Wright, 
E.O. (1979), Class, Crisis and the State, p16-17). 
106 Marx. K. (1852), p 183. 
- - - - -
107 The prei-eqUisi.te· Ch9nQe-does··not imply a radical chanQe in the entire economic foundation 
of the class existence, it just refers to some objective conditions that were an impediment for the class 
in practice to reach the stage of class for itself. 
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narrower than the limitation imposed by class structure. 108 Finally, transformation 109 is 
a yet narrower limitation relationship than selection, and it is the channel through 
which the class struggle (or the sum of the 'class in practice') can affect class 
structure and other social structures.110 
Based on the models of determinations, the class structure imposes a 
relation of limitation on the 'class in practice' as a whole, which, in its turn. imposes 
transformations on the former111 • The fact that the 'class in practice' is not a static 
sphere and can be 'class in itself or 'for itself leads one to argue that the 
transformation relation is not of the same intensity and impact on the class in 
particular and on the social structure at large. In other words, the changes that 
come as a consequence of the transformation relation, such as the re-production or 
non-production of the class structure, are dependent on the state of the 'class in 
practice'. This understanding dictates that two forms of transformation relation can 
be added to the broader one that is imposed by the 'class in practice' to the class 
structure: the first is transformation I, which is imposed when the 'class in practice' is 
at the state of 'class in itself; the second is transformation II , which is imposed when 
it is at the state of 'Class for itself. 112 The difference between the two forms implies 
that transformation I is a relation that lies within the boundaries of the reproduction of 
the class structure, while the second indicates not just an effective impact on the 
class structure, but also the possibility of leading to a radical change in it. 
One of the criticisms of the notions of 'class in itself and 'class for itself was 
the elimination of the impact that other social factors have on the class. According 
to different sociologists and other scholars, it is on other grounds (rather than or in 
addition to class structure), such as ethnicity, gender or religion, that people within a 
108 See figure 4, Appendix 1. 
109 It is important to note that the relation of transformation is not restricted to refer to a whole 
change in the social structure. It corresponds to a wide range of variations of continuous impact on 
the social structure. one of which is a whole change. In this perspective, and according to one of the 
examples that Wright put forward, the class structure limits the variations of the class struggle, which, 
in reciprocal fashion, keeps transforming the class structure. Another example is the transformation of 
the state (see Wright, E.O. (1979), Class, Crisis and the State. p20-22). 
110 Wright, E.O. (1979), Class, Crisis and the State, p15-29. Wright, E. 0 . (1997), Classes, 
p28-31 . 
111 See figure (3&4), Appendix 1 
112 See the different forms of transformation relations that are imposed from class in practice 
--orr class structore. These three foriiisoftfansformatlon are the same In their essence, however, they 
differ according to the state that class in practice is In and consequently on their impact on the class 
structure. See figure (6, 7 &8), Appendix 1. 
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specific formation can be categorized, mobilized and socially identified. This study 
argues that neglecting the impact of such social factors is equivalent to overstating 
their impact at the expenses of the class analysis. Hence, it is vital to incorporate 
such factors into the class approach, when analyzing a given SF. In order to relate 
these different levels, this study illustrates the relationships that may be formed 
between the various social spheres and that of the class. 
The point of departure is to consider that each of these social factors has its 
own domain, which is maintained and reproduced according to the relations of 
determination imposed by the economic foundation. Certainly, a sort of relationship 
is also imposed by each of these domains on the economic foundation, which 
contributes to its reproduction. Of concern here are the reciprocal relations between 
these social domains and that of the class. The proposal is that such relations come 
to tie the sphere of the 'class in practice' and the other social spheres. It is possible 
to argue that the 'class in practice', rather than the class structure1 is where the 
impact of other social factors comes into existence. The relations with the latter are 
to be defined within the context of the relations between these various social factors 
and the economic foundation. The main concern here is to assert that the other 
social spheres impose relations of limitation on the 'class in practice' at large, which 
coincide with those of determination imposed by the class structure. However, the 
relations that are imposed by these social factors on the 'class in practice' are 
narrower than the limitation relations imposed by class structure, since the former lie 
within the limitations of variations that the latter produces. Reflecting the intensity of 
these factors, relations are also highly dependent on the extent to which such social 
spheres are incorporated in the economic foundation, and consequently on their 
importance in the reproduction of the economic base. In a formation like the 
Jordanian113 one, the capitalist system has been built through a lengthy process of 
articulation that has reinforced these social spheres. Hence, it is rewarding to adopt 
the same inventory as models of determination suggesting that the other social 
factors impose relations of selection from within the boundaries of the limitation that 
the class structure imposes. Nevertheless, the intensity of these relations can be 
misleading. Since the selection form is used to connect some of the terrains of 
'class in practice'. this study argues that it is appropriate to use selection I. 
113 The same can be said about the transitional period from a formation dominated by a given 
MP to one dominated by another. 
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To apply such a proposal on 'class in practice' and 'class for itself, one could 
argue that the different variations that may characterize 'class in practice' based on 
the dynamics of its terrains - i.e. class formation, struggle and consciousness -
within the limitation of the class structure are not the only factors. Other social 
bases - such as ethnicity, religion ... etc. - come to have a role in the forms of 
variation that 'class in practice' takes, or undermine the internal dynamics of 'class in 
practice' or its mutual relations with class structure. However, the relations that are 
imposed by these social bases are of the selection I form and are themselves within 
the determination of the economic foundation. The complex relations that are 
imposed on the 'class in practice' - whether they originate in the economic structure 
or in other social bases - determine, together with the correspondence and the 
interactions of the above-mentioned terrains, the forms that 'class in practice' takes 
in a certain period and the particular importance of class as a social and political 
agent. Furthermore, such relations may rule out or favour the possibility of the 'class 
in practice' developing into 'Class for itself. Since the focus here is on the role of 
the social bases on the 'class in practice' - and apart from asserting their role one 
could argue that in a given SF mobilization and polarization are mainly based on one 
of social bases such as religion or ethnicity - the class as a main political and social 
agent is less relevant and the possibility of reaching a 'Class for itself stage is very 
slim. Such an assumption does not exclude the possibility that the classes and their 
struggle may have an impact on the whole social structure, but it explains their lack 
of effectiveness and the longer period they need in order to be effective or to 
develop into 'Class for itself. 
1.3 THE MIDDLE CLASSES 
The previous section has covered class as a concept in its different aspects. 
Concepts such as class structure, 'class in practice', 'class in itself and for itself 
were discussed and relations between them were reconsidered in order to achieve a 
better understanding of class as an economic position and as a social and political 
agent. In this section, the focus will be shifted onto the middle classes. The 
rationale behind paying some attention to these classes can be summarized as: 
43 
First, the middle classes are an important component within any given 
society, due to their location between the great polarized classes and to their 
position in the economic foundation, which gives a great deal of impact on the 
capacity of the classes - and of the bourgeois one in particular - to act within the 
sphere of 'class in practice'. 
Second, within the development of the capitalist relations, new locations 
within the wage-earning labourers emerged, calling for a more precise definition of 
the bourgeois class in question. Do these new locations belong to the proletariat or 
to the bourgeoisie, or do they make up their own class? and how could the class 
concept be mapped in order to take into consideration this development? This is of 
vital importance in Jordan, where the development of capitalism was articulated with 
non-capitalist formation, limited economic resources and reliance on foreign aid 
made the emergence of such locations more apparent than in other third world 
countries. 
The third point is totally based on the circumstances of Jordan, where the 
state, over different periods of time, assumed an important role in the economy. 
This resulted in a large public sector, in addition to a large bureaucratic, civil and 
military apparatus. Different categorizations may be applied to the bureaucracy, 
extracting groups whose undertakings and areas of function place them in positions 
of relative similarity to the bourgeois class. 
It is commonplace for some to argue that 'middle class' - or 'classes' - is a 
loose term referring to different social classes and social groups. Reference to the 
middle class varies from one theoretical paradigm to another, and from one scholar 
to another, in relation to the methodology that is used. In the Marxist paradigm, the 
middle classes differ according to the positions that their members occupy in relation 
to the means of production and the production process. A distinction within the 
middle classes in Marxist use is that between the 'old middle classes11 14 and the 'new 
middle classes'; the former term refers to the classes that were described in the 191h 
114 As a matter of fact, the Marxists used the terms 'old' and 'new petty bourgeoisie' rather 
than 'middle classes'. This was due to the fact that the new stratum that started to develop within the 
capitalist societies by the late 19th century was seen, in its attitude and ideological and political stand, 
to be close to the petty bourgeois class (see for example Poulantzas, N. (1975), p205-207), because 
of the ·ambiguity of its social position'. and the fact that it was 'unreliable and changeable in its attitude 
--- towards the proletar1at'-(Kautskr,K-:-(l899)·, p1'8)-:-Altnough ·this claimmay ·have ·been correct in those-
circumstances, in relation to Jordan's capitalist development it is adequate to use the term 'middle 
classes'. which has a broader meaning than 'petty bourgeoisie'. 
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century, particularly by Marx. Marx dealt with two examples of these classes, 
namely the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. In regard to France115 in the 191h 
century, the latter were represented by the smallholding peasants who gained their 
properties under the rule of Napoleon 1.116 In the case of the petty bourgeoisie, Marx 
enumerated the groups that composed this class as: 'cafe and restaurants 
proprietors, marchands de vins117, small traders, shopkeepers, craftsmen 118 , etc'.119 
The new middle classes resulted from development of the capitalist relations. 
The term refers to a whole range of different strata of the wage earning class, such 
as skilled labourers, white-collar workers, supervisors in production places, 
managers and professionals. Or, as Poulantzas puts it, the 'non-productive wage-
earners'.1 20 Apart from professionals who work for themselves, the other categories 
are distinguished from the rest by their privileged income and by their distinctive 
position in the production organization. Hence, it is not the possession of the means 
of production that puts the 'new middle class' in the heart of the debate, but the 
increase in its members' incomes and living standards. Kautsky points out that the 
emergence of this class was mainly a consequence of the concentration of capital, 
which led to the fact that 'the functions of the dominant and exploiting classes are 
increasingly being taken over by paid skilled workers'. 121 Hilferding emphasizes the 
effect of the emergence of finance capital on the expansion of this stratum. The 
birth of large-scale production and corporate forms of enterprise introduced a 
hierarchical system in which the members of this class took management and 
supervisory positions over production. Furthermore, the separation between 
115 Without reference to any country in specific, Marx counts 'the small trades-people, 
shopkeepers and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants' (Marx and Engels 
(1848}, p.88). 
116 Marx, K. (1851), The Class Struggle In France, p51 ; Marx, K. (1 852), The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, p220-222. 
117 The small wine shops (my translation}. In another place, Marx distinguishes between the 
wine merchants, who supposedly are wine wholesale merchants, and the marchands de vins. 
118 In spite of the fact that some of the petty bourgeoisie categories, such as the small traders 
or restaurant owners, hire labourers, Marx does not consider them among the capitalist. One could 
argue that this is due to the fact that these categories employ only a small number of labourers. 
Another important reason could be the fact that Marx kept referring to the proletariat as the class of 
industrial labourers. 
119 Marx, K. (1851), The Class Struggle In France, p65. 
120 P~ulantzas, N. (1975), p191-206. ---
121 Kautsky, K. (1899), p18. 
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and become blurred'129. The same conceptual treatment is applied by Marx almost 
10 years later when he explains the middle location of the smallholding peasant in 
the production process, since 'As owner of the means of production he is capitalist; 
as labourer he is his own wage labourer'130. 
The key in dealing with the intermediate classes in the Marxian elaboration 131 
and in other Marxist scholars' works is the concept of polarization132• According to 
this concept, Marx assumed that the capitalist relations of production would, in their 
course of development, conquer the entirety of society and even the whole world, 
reducing the different transitional relations of production to their laws. Marx and 
Engels emphasized that a process of transformation of the scattered means of 
production into capital, corresponding to the conversion of the labour into wage-
labour. was gradually taking place, paralleling the development of the capitalist MP. 
In this context, they stressed the progressive convergence of different social groups. 
which were identified according to their relation to the means of production. 
Referring to 19th century English society, Marx admitted the presence of different 
classes, which existed despite the fact that England was the most developed 
capitalist state. However, his interpretation was based on the fact that capitalist 
relations were still below the pure state that they would inevitably reach. 133 
Kautsky adopted the Marxian concept of polarization in his treatment of the 
middle classes. He highlighted the reduction of the petty bourgeoisie and 
smallholding peasants, and connected this process with the phenomenon of the 
129 Marx, K. (1852). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, p179. 
130 Marx, K. (1861-1863), Theories of Surplus Value, in Lukacs, G. (2000), A Defence of 
History and Class Consciousness, p67. 
131 Beside the position of the old middle classes regarding the production process, the other 
issue that is at stake here is the nature of the relationships that tie them to the other classes in the 
capitalist system. Interestingly, Marx characterized the relationship between the petty bourgeoisie and 
the peasants on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other, as one of exploitation. He stated, for 
example, that the petty bourgeoisie ownership of the means of production was nothing else but a mere 
illusion, since their belongings and even 'themselves' were owned by the bourgeoisie through the 
means of debts and credits. Marx emphasized that their surplus or part of it was appropriated by the 
creditors and debtors such as wholesale merchants. manufacturers and banks. The peasants were in 
the same exploited position, since their surplus was appropriated by the bourgeoisie through usury 
and mortgage. However, this relationship does not constitute the basic contradiction; it is the 
'secondary contradiction', whose role is recognized throughout the class struggle process (Marx, K. 
(1651) Class Struggle in France and Marx, K. (1852), The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapart, 
p158). 
132 This could explain the absence of treatment of the intermediate classes from some of 
~ - Mar.x's works. They were unproblematic, since they were going to-disappear gradually through the 
process of polarization (see for example The Communist Manifesto) . 
133 Marx, K. (1882), Capital, Vol. (3), p885. 
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concentration of production that the capitalist system underwent at the end of the 
19111 centuty. 134 Hilferding pointed out that this trend rapidly increased during the 
period of cartelization and monopolization. 135 
In similar fashion to the old middle classes, the new middle classes were 
unproblematic for these scholars, since they were going to disappear and the 
majority of them were to sink into the proletarian army. Kautsky observed two 
tendencies that would deprive this class of its middle location. First, the process of 
monopolization and the concentration of capital would increase the amount of capital 
required to be invested in independent business. This factor would curb the 'hope' 
or 'illusion' of the new petty bourgeoisie to climb the ladder of the capitalist class. 
The second tendency was the expansion of education, which would result in an 
increase in skilled workers and deprive this stratum of its competitive advantage. 136 
Hilferding, who stressed the first tendency,137 advanced other factors which would 
drive the 'semi-proletariat' into the proletarian stratum; for instance, the increase in 
skilled labourers' salaries would lead to the replacement of these workers by semi-
skilled ones. Furthermore, the expansion of the giant concerns increased the 
number of poorly-paid positions rather than of higher posts. In particular, there was 
a tendency among the capitalists or their descendants to occupy these high posts 
themselves. 138 
In addition to the points mentioned above, one could argue that the use of the 
surplus-value distribution in order to distinguish these classes from the proletariat 
was not a central parameter.139 However, Lenin emphasized that the 'labour 
aristocracy' was in a pact with its bourgeoisie, since the imperialistic tendency of the 
latter would increase the surplus-value.140 Thus, the share of the surplus-value that 
134 Kautsky, K. (1899}, p18. 
135 Hilferding, R. (191 0), Finance Capital, p347. 
136 Kautsky, K. (1899), p21 . 
137 Hilferding, R. (191 0) , Finance Capital, p347. 
138 Hilferding, R. (191 0), Finance Capital, p348-349. 
139 Especially in regard to the writings of Kautsky and Hilferding. 
140 Lenin's comments in this regard were not part of the theoretical work concerning the 
middle class and elaborating a specific cohcept for it. They were a political analysis mainly associated 
.withJhe 'nationalist' politicaLp.o,siti.o.o_tbat was taken by the majority of the socialist parties (of the 
Second International) supporting their countries in the First World War (the camp was mainly led by 
Kautsky). However, some of these comments implied the privileged position of the middle class ahd 
even of the whole population of the imperialist countries as a result of the plunder of their colonial 
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was to be devoted to the middle classes would increase. In fact, it was on these 
grounds that Lenin attacked the opportunists and social chauvinism. 141 
1.3.1 CONTRADICTORY 
SOCIETIES 
LOCATIONS WITHIN CAPITALIST 
As Wright noticed, in the advanced capitalist countries it is possible to say 
that the size of self-enterprises and small enterprises has been reduced in favour of 
the big corporations, 142 although this observation does not extend to third world 
countries such as Jordan, where capitalist development took place later and by a 
different path. However, in the second half of the 201h century the new middle 
classes showed an increase. Regardless of its universal underlying causes, this 
increase was experienced in Jordan as a consequence of the higher rates of 
education, the economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, the service orientation of 
the economy, the inflating of the public sector and the increasing role of the state. 
Therefore. the polarization concept is inadequate to deal with the new petty 
bourgeoisie or the position that the heads of the state apparatus occupy in a country 
like Jordan. 
With regard to this issue, different strategi_es and themes were introduced in 
the second half of the 201h century; some of them emphasized the polarization 
concept, claiming that capitalist societies are simply polarized, and the middle 
classes are nothing but a mere ideological illusion. According to the second 
strategy, the middle class was dealt with as a segment of another class, such as a 
new petty bourgeoisie or a new working class. The third approach claimed that, with 
the introduction of capitalism, 143 the class structure was altered by means of the 
territories {see in this regard Lenin's comments about British imperialism in Lenin, V.I. (1 917), 
Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism. p658). 
141 Lenin, V.I. (1916), Opportunism and The Collapse of The Second International, p623. 
142 Wright, E.O. (1997), Classes, p13-14. 
143 In this context, it is worthwhile to mention some of the arguments in favour of the 
replacement of the entire concept of exploitation relations by that of authority relations, of which 
Dahrendorfs work was pioneer. In his work, he claims that the capitalist system, according to which 
the owner of the means of production is the effective manager in putting the means of production in 
_function, is. just one type_of .industriaLsociety.- Consequently., .Dahr.endorf finds .it mo(e fruitful that. the 
relations of authority replace any other relations which results in forming a broader theme of conflict 
between those who are In authority and those who are not (see Dahrendorf. R. (1969), Class and 
Class Conflict in Industrial Society, p38-43). Nichols shows that these arguments were taken by the 
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addition of an entirely new class, i.e. the middle class.144 The first strategy will not be 
covered here, since it does not provide any new dimensions apart from those which 
were covered in the elaboration of Marx and the other classical Marxists. 
Poulantzas's elaborations are a good example of use of the second and third 
strategies; his approach was based on the possibility of identifying a new middle 
class distinguished from the bourgeoisie and working class. On the other hand, his 
elaboration indicated that some positions within the middle classes were considered 
as a segment of the bourgeoisie. In order to exclude the new middle classes from 
the working class, Poulantzas has to redefine the boundaries of the working class. 
He argues that, while a working class member necessarily is a wage earner, 
assuming that a wage earner is necessarily a working class member is a mistake. 
Therefore, he advances a new restrictive criterion to extract the working class from 
the entire domain of the wage earners.145 According to this criterion, the working 
class members are exclusively those wage earners who are involved in productive 
labour. That is, the 'labour that produces surplus-value while directly reproducing 
the material elements that serve as substratum of the relations of exploitation: labour 
that is directly involved in material production by producing use-values that increase 
material wealth'. 146 He defends his restriction of the working class, with which most 
of the Marxists147 disagree, referring to Marx, who identified the working class in 
relation to the production of commodity, which is in Poulantzas's view equivalent to 
material production.148 Political and ideological criteria, which are determined at the 
class structure, 149 are used by Poulantzas to exclude the supervisors and various 
ranks of managerial positions from the productive wage-earners working class. His 
argument is simply based on the fact that the productive workers who occupy such 
proponents of the managerial revolution to argue that capitalism was an old system that was 
succeeded by 'People Capitalism' , where new themes of conflict are founded between the possessors 
of authority (managers) and the authority-less employees {see Nichols, T. (1969), Ownership, Control 
and Ideology, p32-51). 
144 Wright, E.W. (1998), The Debate on Classes, p 3-4. Russell, J . (1989), p146-148. 
145 Poulantzas, N. (1975), p209-210, Poulantzas. N. (1977), p92-93. 
146 Poulantzas, N. (1975), p216-217. 
147 Wright, E.O. (1979), p35-36. Russell, J . {1989), p146. Meiksins Wood, E. (1986), p43-44. 
Benton, T. {1984), The Rise and the Fall of Structural Marxism, p144-145. 
148 For instance, the non-productive tabourer in commerce is exploited; however, the base of 
such an exploitation stands outside the main capitalist exploitation of the productive labour based on 
extracting the surplus value (see Poulantzas, N. (1975), p210-212). 
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positions are exploited by the capitalists, but their positions allow them to dominate 
the rest of the working class. This relationship, by which the managerial positions 
dominate the rest politically and ideologically on behalf of the capital, excludes them 
from the working class. On this basis, Poulantzas distinguishes between mental 
productive150 labours and manual ones.151 
In reference to the bourgeois boundaries, Poulantzas advances two important 
concepts concerning the ownership of the means of production: economic ownership 
and possession.152 None of these two concepts entirely corresponds to legal 
ownership of property. Economic ownership refers to 'real economic control over 
the means of production, i.e. the power to assign the means of production to given 
uses and so to dispose of the products obtained'. 153 Poulantzas recognizes that 
such a definition does not deny the correspondence to the legal ownership of the 
productive forces; however, he warns against the confusion of these two concepts, 
since economic ownership does not necessarily correspond to a restrictive legal 
ownership.154 On the other hand, the concept of possession is defined as 'the 
capacity to put the means of production into operation'.155 In the capitalist system 
the bourgeois class is the one which fulfills the two dimensions of the ownership of 
the means of production, i.e. economic ownership and possession. According to the 
fulfilment of the function of these two forms of ownership, the managers are seen as 
occupying a place within the boundaries of the bourgeois class. However, 
Poulantzas fails to give satisfactory answers for the whole range of managers who 
1
•
9 This is consistent With the themes concerning Poulantzas's definition of class, which were 
covered earlier in this chapter (see the critique of Meiksins Wood, E. (1986), p39-44. Russell. J. 
(1989), p144-146). 
150 In Capital, Marx discusses the production supervisors, drawing a distinction between 
mental and manual work (see Poulantzas, N. (1975), Classes in the Contemporary Capitalism, p225-
234). 
151 Poulantzas, N. (1975), p180-210. 
152 What is important for this study is the differentiation between the ownership in its legal 
definitions and the control over the means of production which characterizes Poulantzas's economic 
ownership. Control over the means of production is broader than the legal ownership of the means of 
production and includes the latter, while the latter excludes those who have control over the means of 
production without legal title. The development of capitalist relations, as well as the emergence of 
finance capital and corporate forms of firms, enhanced the importance of those who are in control. 
Poulantzas is not the first scholar to bring up the distinction between control and legal title over the 
means of production; in fact, this use can be traced back to Marx himself (see for example Althusser, 
L. , Balibar, E. (1997) Reading Capital. Nichols, T. (1969), p20-49). Control over the means of 
production is used in this study as it appears in the MP section. 
153 Poulan~a~.J~._(19?S). p1 e. 
154 Poulantzas, N. (1975), p18-19. See also Poulantzas, N. (1977}, p 69. 
155 Poulantzas, N. (1975), p19. 
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have limited access to the function of the two forms of ownership, or to just one of 
them. 156 This is one of the problematic issues that characterize his elaboration.157 
According to the previous propositions, Poulantzas classifies some of the 
managers - especially those who are within the sphere of the monopoly capital 
bourgeoisie- as a segment of the bourgeois class, while he situates the rest in the 
new petty bourgeois class. The members of the new petty bourgeoisie, which has 
come into existence as a result of their wage-earning labour, i.e. of the capitalist 
relations of production, share the same class position with the old one, which 
emerged from the simple commodity relation of production. The underlying logic of 
the fusion of two classes which are structurally based on two different modes of 
production is, from Poulantzas's point of view, the similarity of their political and 
ideological determinations. 
Another problematic issue that arises from Poulantzas's elaboration is that 
the equalization of authority or domination at the political and ideological levels on 
the one hand, and exploitation 158 on the other, as parameters of the class boundaries 
puts the whole _logic of the Marxist concept in jeopardy, since any authority relation 
or domination can become the ground on which new classes are conceptualised. 159 
Two inventories of classes must be produced, one of which corresponds to the 
domination relations, the other to the exploitation. if concrete capitalist society is to 
preserve systems of domination that not only exist within the sphere of capitalist 
relations, but facilitate its production. This dimension is crucial when the societies of 
concern belong to third world countries such as Jordan, where authority relations at 
either or both political and ideological level exist because of the articulations of 
specific modes of production, which lead some cultural and ideological spheres of 
previous modes of production to co-exist with those of the capitalist one. 160 On the 
156 Wright, E.O. (1979), p43-61 . 
157 Benton remarks that Wright's criticism in this point is not completely valid and Poulantzas's 
argument can still hold ground, although he does not elaborate very much on that {Benton. T. (1984), 
The Rise and the Fall of Structural Marxism . 146-147). 
158 Wright, E.O. (1998), A General Framework for the Analysis of the Class Structure, p4-6. 
159 This elaboration is very close to the theories of the managerial revolution that was briefly 
commented on above in this sub-section (see Nichols, T. (1969), p32-51 and Dahrendorf. R. (1969), 
p38-43). - - -
160 Concerning how these relations can be reinforced by the emerging capitalist relations in 
non-western countries, see Taylor, J.G. (1983), p183-191 . 
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other hand, Wright 161 looks at the different possibilities where certain ambivalent 
positions exhibiting different criteria could put their occupiers in different classes. 
For example, a productive working class member who has a possession relationship 
to a specific operational production, might be deprived of any authority over the rest 
of the working class and at the same time he/she is dominated by other wage-
earning managerial positions.162 
Given the unsatisfactory elaboration that the above Marxist strategies put 
forward concerning the issue of the middle classes and of the re-mapping of the 
boundaries of the bourgeois class, Wright elaborates the concept of 'contradictory 
location within the class relations' . In the course of developing an alternative concept 
to the previous Marxist strategies, Wright rejects the tendency that some Marxists 
exhibit of identifying the class concept in terms of domination rather than 
exploitation.163 The managers, in this perspective, occupy a contradictory location, 
since they are concurrently exploited and exploiters. Moreover, a class analysis in 
terms of domination relations revolves around the concept of authority, undermining 
the peculiar role that the class could take up in social theory and in understanding 
concrete societies.164 Wright, therefore, emphasizes the need to restore the 
exploitation concept as a central base in defining the classes and mapping the class 
structure of any given society. 165 Roemer's exploitation concept, which is adopted by 
Wright, is based on three fundamental elements. Firstly. the welfare of the 
exploiters is causally dependent on the deprivation of the exploited. This causal 
relationship leads on to the second element, which is the 'asymmetrical exclusion of 
the exploited from access to and control over certain important productive 
161 Wright, E.O. (1979), p43-61. 
162 Such an example is not given by Wright himself, but is constructed on the basis of Wright's 
challenge of Poulanzas's arguments. 
'
63 Wright mentions four fundamental reasons for rejecting the concept of domination as a 
replacement for that of exploitation: 1- it undermines the objective interest that the classes have and 
erodes the centrality of the class that Marxist theory upholds. 2- a relation of domination does not 
imply that the actors have intrinsically specific or opposite interests (that parents dominate children 
does not mean that they have opposite interests unless the children are exploited). 3- a classification 
based on domination relations opens the door to the ·multi-oppressions' approach to analyze 
societies, since class domination does not have any peculiar status distinguishing it from other types 
of oppressions such as sexual, racial or economic. 4- an analysis based on class domination could 
subsequently erode the theory of the trajectory of historical development that is central in the Marxist 
tradition (Wright, E.O. (1996). p 5-6). 
_ 
1
6<! Wright, E.O. (1998), p 8-10,. Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p 64-72, Wright, E.O. (1997b), 
Class counts, p14-18. 
165 Wright, E.O. (1997a) , Classes, p 64-72 
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resources'. 166 These two elements constitute economic oppression, which becomes 
exploitation when the third element is added, i.e. the appropriation of the surplus 
products, 'fruit of the labor', by those who are in control of the productive 
resources. 167 
Roemer168 uses two strategies in order to elaborate his concept of 
exploitation. According to the first, which is the labour-transfer approach, Roemer 
claims that market-based exploitation is a direct consequence of inequalities in the 
distribution of the means of production. While this approach is designed to deal with 
the exploitation that occurs in market exchanges, the second, 'game theory' 
approach is used to identify exploitation in the different systems, such as feudalism, 
capitalism and the Soviet system. Briefly. Roemer advances the question of 
whether the status of a certain coalition of actors will be better off if they decide to 
withdraw from the 'game', i.e. from the production process. The answer to such a 
question covers the status of the other actors which are outside the mentioned 
coalition, though within the production process. 169 The fact that this withdrawal, 
while improving the status of the exploited, would result in a worsening of the status 
of the exploiter, reveals that the latter's welfare is based on the labour of the former. 
It is important to mention that each production system has its own rules of 
withdrawal; for instance, the withdrawal rules of the capitalist system 170 are based on 
the fact that the actors will leave the game taking with them their per capita share of 
the total of the productive assets of the society .171 
Finally, Roemer argues that the material basis of exploitation is the unequal 
distribution of the productive assets or, in other words, the property relation. The 
166 Wright, E. 0 . (1997c). Student edition, p1 0. 
167 Wright, E. 0 . (1997c), Student edition, p14-1 5, Wright, E.O. (1 998),p7-8. For more details 
see Roemer, J . (1982a), P 202-204and Roemer, J. (1 982b), New Directions in the Marxian Theory of 
Exploitation and Class, p278-283. 
168 Roemer, J. (1982a), p 199-201. 
169 For instance, the working class is one coalition, while the capitalists constitute the other 
coalition, on which the withdrawal of the first would have an impact. 
170 In the feudal system. on the other hand, the withdrawal consists of leaving the game with 
one's personal assets. In this context, the serfs, who are freed from the obligations based on the 
-- - - _personal bondage, .will.be.better off in.contrast.to the.lords, who-will-be worse off (Roemer, .J . (.1.982a),-
'A General Theory ', p 206). 
171 VVright, E.O. (1998), p 8-9. 
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classes, in this sense, are defined as positions within the social relations of 
production derived from the relations of exploitation. 172 
Two fundamental points are emphasized by Wright concerning the concept of 
exploitation as elaborated by Roemer. The first one is that replacing a domination-
based class relation with an explortation-based class relation does not deny that the 
exploiting classes dominate the exploited 'in the sense of preventing the exploited 
classes from taking the exploiting class's productive assets'173. The second point 
Wright is highly concerned with is that an exploitation-based class analysis blurs the 
differences between the Marxist and Weberian traditions. Hence, Wright174 argues 
that the productive assets that the classes control are the base on which their 
income varies and the results of the market transactions are determined.175 
Wright distinguishes between four types of assets 176 upon which 
exploitation177 is erected and according to which class relation could be identified: 
1- Labour power in feudalism 178: the unequal labour power 
distribution among the lords and the serfs is the base on which exploitation 
is formed, resulting in an antagonistic relation between the two main 
classes. A coercive extraction of the surplus labour is practiced by the 
lords on the serfs, whose main task is seeking their individualliberty.179 
172 Roemer. J. (1 982a). p 78-81 . Roemer, J. (1982b). p256-266. 
173 Wright, E.O. (1998), A General Framework for the Analysis of the Class Structure, p 13. 
174 Wright. E.O. (1998). A General Framework for the Analysis of the Class Structure, p 13-14. 
175 By the same token, Marx and Engels in 'The German Ideology' refuse to use income 
criteria to define the class. The differentiation in the income, wealth . .. etc. are a result of the unequal 
distribution of the means of production (see section 1 and 2 of this chapter). 
176 See table 1, Appendix 2. 
177 These types are an extension of Roemer's elaboration concerning the types of assets that 
are unequally distributed. Roemer, however. specifies only two broad types of assets, which 
differentiate two kinds of exploitation: physical assets (alienable assets) and skill assets (inalienable 
assets) (Roemer, J. (1982a), p199-200). 
118 According to Roemer, the assets of both capitalism and feudalism are of the physical type. 
The differentiation between the two forms of exploitation is based on the different withdrawal rules that 
each of them exhibits according to the game theory approach. Wright pays some attention to the 
nature of exploitation in feudalism through the labour transfer and the game theory approaches, 
emphasizing that the distribution of the assets in feudalism reveals that the serfs do not completely 
own their labour power, part of which is in the hands of the lords, in the form of 'personal bondage'. 
Hence, Wright reformulates the difference between capitalist and feudal exploitation on the basis not 
just of the withdrawal rules, but of what assets are unequally distributed. In feudalism, these are the 
labour power assets (Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p 77-78). This elaboration is made viable by the 
- -- fact that Wright follows Cohen~s- argument that .labour power is -part. of the productive forces (see 
Cohen. G.A. 1978, 'Kat1 Marx's Theory of History: a Defence). 
179 Wright , E.Q, (1997a), Classes, p77-78. 
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2- Means of production in capitalism: exploitation is based on 
the property relations of the means of production . ldeally180, the capitalists 
own all of the means of production, while the workers own none. The 
appropriation of the surplus value is practiced through the market 
exchange. In this perspective, exploitation can be abolished by socializing 
the ownership of the means of production.181 
3- Organization in state bureaucratic socialism:1112 under this 
system ownership of the means of production is equally distributed among 
the members of the society. Inequality, however, appears in the effective 
control over the organizational assets183, which are of fundamental 
importance since the coordinated integration of the division of labour covers 
the entire society through the different institutions of central state planning. 
In this context, the exploitative mechanism comes to existence through the 
bureaucratic appropriation and distribution of the surplus along hierarchal 
principles. Thus, the corresponding class relations are between the people 
who are in control of the organizational assets and those who are not.184 
4- Skills in socialism: skills can be the base on which exploitation 
is built when 'it has to be in some sense scarce relative to its demand. and 
there must be a mechanism through which individual owners of scarce 
skills are able to translate that scarcity into higher incomes'185 . The experts 
who control their own skills and knowledge under the democratization of 
the organisational assets can appropriate some of the surplus out of the 
production by virtue of possessing particular skills. This type of exploitation 
implies that the power of the exploiting class is much weaker than that of 
the other exploiting classes in the above systems. 186 
180 Exploitation may exist even when the workers own some of the means of production, or in 
the absence of an exchange market, as in the case of cottage industries (see Roemer, J. (1982b), 
p256-259). 
181 Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p79-81 . Wright, E.O. (1998). Classes, p14-15. 
182 In Roemer's original inventory, the unequally distributed assets in both socialism and the 
bureaucratic state are the skills (Roemer, J. (1982a), 'A General Theory', p240-248 ). However. 
Roemer recognizes that it is not necessary for the bureaucracy to possess skills in order to define 
exploitation in the latter system. This fact leads him to advance the concept of 'status exploitation', 
according to which extra remuneration is devoted to the positrons that are occupied rather than to any 
special skills that the bureaucrats possess. Even though the introduction of the concept of 'status 
exploitation' is a serious attempt to explain state bureaucratic socialism exploitation, it is not 
satisfactory for at least two reasons. First, it is outside the general logic of exploitation, which relates 
the actors in each system to the forces of production. Second, receiving remuneration because of a 
prominent position and not of skills or ownership of capital leads to a levelling of the difference 
between the exploitation of state bureaucratic socialism and that of feudalism. Adopting Adam Smith's 
and Marx's view that the way in which production is organized is an independent productive resource 
from other productive elements such as the expenditure of labour power, the use of means of 
production or the producers' skills, Wright considers the organization as an asset controlled by a 
coalition of actors, resulting in the exploitation of those who are deprived of it (Wright, E.0.(1997a). 
Classes. p77-82). 
183 Wright emphasizes the fact that control over the organizational assets exists in the 
capitalist system, too, but is contained within the boundaries of the firm. 
2. 
1e.c Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p79-81 . Wright, E.O. (1998), Classes, p15. 
185Wright, E.O. (1998),-p21..-
186 Wright, E.O. (1998), 15-17. Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p78-81 . See table 1, Appendix 
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The importance of the typology of the assets and its corresponding class 
relations does not exclusively lie in the fact that it represents a comprehensive 
framework that explains the different exploitation systems, but it also enriches the 
class analysis of the concrete capitalist societies. In this context, considering the 
other exploitative relations, such as those based on skills and organization , is of high 
importance to solve some of the controversial issues that class theories at large and 
Marxism in particular are entangled with, among which are the non-polarized 
classes, i.e. the middle classes. Concrete societies not only encompass more than 
one MP, but they are articulated into various exploitative relations. 
In this context, the classes of the capitalist societies should be analyzed in 
terms of the dominant exploitative relationship- i.e. the major capitalist one, based 
on the ownership of the means of production - and of other minor relations, based on 
organization and scarcity of skills.18 7 The class typology that is displayed in table 
(2) 188 shows that three locations are circumscribed according to the relations of 
property, i.e. capitalists and smaller employers, petty bourgeoisie, and the wage 
earners. These locations are not problematic at this point, since the capitalist 
property relations distinguish between two classes: the capitalists and the workers. 
In this perspective, a class like the petty bourgeoisie, which owns its means of 
production but does not hire workers or self-employed producers, is neither exploiter 
nor exploited within the production process.189 According to these propositions, the 
entire Jordanian private sector is to be analysed in terms of petty bourgeois 
enterprises and bourgeois enterprises; when the focus is shifted to the bourgeoisie, 
by virtue of its definition, the petty bourgeoisie will be excluded. 
A problematic issue comes about when dealing with the wage-earners, where 
the new middle classes are concerned. At one level, these are part of the wage-
earning class, since they are deprived of the ownership of the means of production 
and hired by the capitalists; on the other hand, a fundamental distinction can be 
drawn between them and the rest of the workers. Their positions in the production 
process offer them the opportunity of having a certain control over the means of 
production . This includes a wide range of possibilities, starting with occupying 
187 Wright, E.O. (1998), p18-19. Wright, E.O. (1997a), p82-83. Wright, E.O. (1997b), p22-23. 
168
·See table 2·, Appendix 2. 
189 See the previous subsection, where Marx explains the existence of an indirect exploitative 
relation between the bourgeoisie and the old middle classes. 
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surveillance positions over the rest of the workers up to positions that allow them to 
act on behalf of the capitalists, including the control over the means of production in 
its non-legal sense. Some of the management positions give their occupiers access 
to and power over the process of decision- making on production, affecting not just 
the organization of the production and the ways in which it follows, but even its 
purposes, whom it should be targeting and the improvement of its efficiency. 
'On the one hand, they are like the workers in being 
excluded from ownership of means of production; on the other, 
they have interest opposed to the workers because of their 
effective control of organization and skill assets. Within the 
struggles of capitalism, therefore, the 'new' middle classes do 
constitute contradictory locations within exploitation relations.'190 
In addition to the above-mentioned dimension, these positions differentiate 
the new middle classes from the rest of the workers with regard to the income 
criterion 191• Some positions within the production process allow their occupiers to 
earn significantly more than the rest of the wage-earners within the same production. 
They exhibit a correlation with the degree of control over the means of production 
that their occupiers assume. In this sense, the income criterion can indicate what 
positions have access to some of the surplus value in its way to be appropriated by 
the bourgeoisie. Here analyzing the income differentiation in terms of surplus-value 
could be logically acceptable, since the occupiers of the managerial positions 
possess assets of which the rest of the wage-earners are deprived.192 These assets 
are simply the skills and the production organization that lead to the exploitative 
relations which were described above. 
By the two distinctive dimensions within the wage-earning class between 
those who are in positions of management and those who are not, one can highlight 
the different capacities of each group not just concerning the whole production 
process, but within the whole class spectrum and the society as a whole. Hence, 
the class typology according to the Marxist theory will be analyzed in terms of the 
control over the means of production as the generator of the basic exploitative 
190 Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p. 87. 
191 The use of the income criterion here is not meant to be a point of departure from the 
Marxist class paradigm towards the Weberian one; it is just a means of showing that social 
differentiation among the members of a given class is an indicator of control over the means of 
· --- - production. The· differentiation in the-ineame is ar:~alysed. ir.t-teuns-of .the surplus ,value according to. _ 
Roemer's criteria of exploitation. 
192 Wright, E.O. (1997a), Classes, p 89. 
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relationship between the polarized classes, and in terms of control over other assets 
such as skills and organization, which give birth to minor exploitative relations. 
Within the wage-earning society, the contradictory location is a device to highlight 
the differentiation between the new middle classes and the working class. This 
elaboration does not contrast the proposition made above concerning 'class in 
practice' and 'class for itself; on the contrary, it adds explanatory authority to the 
reasons determining the movement between 'class in practice' and 'class for itself. 
Contradictory locations have a great impact on class interaction with the other 
classes and social actors. Such an impact does not depend simply upon the assets 
that the class controls and consequently its capacity to act, but also upon its unity. 
At one level, some positions within the class typology, which were considered to be 
segments of a certain class, 193 are now distinguished from that class by virtue of their 
contradictory locations. Such an understanding shows, according to the minor 
exploitative relations, a contradiction between these locations and the corresponding 
class, which has a certain impact on the latter's stage of 'class in practice' and in 
some cases hinders it from reaching the stage of class for itself. Recognizing the 
contradictory locations results in redrawing the possible political strategies of the 
different classes when the concern is pursuing a change or transformation in class 
structure. Such an impact can be illustrated by the possibility of the class, since the 
contradictory locations and their swings between the opposite polarized classes can 
not only change the balance of power, but advance the interest and agenda of these 
locations that sometimes seem more attainable. Since the concern here is the 
t;>ourgeoisie, it is important to look at the relations between this class and the high 
rank managers. 194 
According to the class typology and the different forms of exploitative 
relations, the managerial positions who are acting on behalf of the bourgeoisie are 
nevertheless not part of it, since they lack the legal title to the means of production 
and have an objective interest in state control over production rather than being 
exploited by the bourgeoisie. Examining such a proposition in concrete terms, 
Wright follows the critics of the 'Managerial Revolution', claiming that the possibility 
193 For instance, the lowest right hand row positions in the contradictory location categories 
(table 2, Appendix 2) were - and still are for some scholars - part of the working class. Similarly, the 
-- - positions of the top right hand row--in- the same. table were.-consldered to be segments of the 
bourgeoisie. 
194 The reference here is to the top right hand row of table 2, Appendix 2. 
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own investments or as a partner with the private sector, in addition to its role as 
regulator. 199 
Its involvement in the direct production and the inflation of state bureaucracy 
resulted in a complex hierarchical structure of positions, some of which assumed 
relations of exploitation over the others by virtue of the possession of assets of skills, 
organization, or both.200 In this context, the attraction towards a statist option was 
more likely among the Jordanian state managers than among those of the advanced 
capitalist countries. However, this tendency was challenged by the political and 
ideological policy that the state of Jordan undertook since its official independence. 
This was a relative liberal economic policy, in the sense that the private sector was 
not under any threat of nationalization; on the contrary, its existence was guaranteed 
and even encouraged.201 
Based on the above considerations, in order to explain the relationship 
between the managers at large and the state ones in particular and the bourgeoisie 
on the one hand and the impact of such a relation on the class boundaries on the 
other, coining a new concept to deal mainly with the managers202 is of vital 
importance. The new concept is that of 'bourgeoisies in transition', referring to the 
dynamic status that is established in concrete terms when managers are practicing 
their jobs, which implies their possession of skill and organization assets greater 
199 In many of its direct investments, such as telecommunications and Jordanian Airlines, the 
state's projects were in a position of monopoly, since competitive private sector enterprises did not 
exist. 
200 In fact, not all the positions of the state managers that assume a sort of exploitative 
relationship are occupied by people who possess a certain type of skills; certainly some of them do, 
but other factors related to the SF and its balance of power give some the chance to occupy these 
positions. Whatever criteria are used to occupy such positions, these are still taking up exploitative 
relations, since they are in charge of the organizations. 
201 The claim that the state policy was liberal can be justified when it is compared with other 
Arab countries, whose measures of nationalization and regulation in some specific economic sectors 
led to driving the private sector from some economic areas or slandering its contribution and 
participation in favour of the public sector. Jordan never took such an option, and the intervention of 
the state as an economic actor in certain areas often came about when the capital intensive of the 
projects was beyond the reach of the private sector. In fact, one could argue that the economic policy 
of not targeting the private sector and its activities was part of the political and ideological package 
that the Jordanian state had undertaken, and resulted in the flowing of external aid to the extent that a 
serious reversal of this policy would have put this source in jeopardy. Certainly, such a policy was 
induced by the scarcity of the natural resources, which would not allow the state to sustain an 
economic policy, regardless its efficiency. 
202 Although the reference here · is to the- managerial- positions, such a concept could be 
extended to other positions within the contradictory 'locations, according to the degree fn which these 
positions assume incumbencies over the production process. 
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than those of standard wage-earners203. In addition to the above proposition 
concerning the strong ties between the interest of the managers and of the 
bourgeoisie at large and those of Jordan in particular, there are other dimensions, 
considered below, that ease the general assimilation of the managers to the 
capita list logic and give currency to the new concept. 
Under the circumstances in which the capitalist MP is dominant, the 
remunerations that these specific groups obtain in the course of their jobs (as part of 
the surplus-value) give them a certain range of possibilities to capitalize parts of 
these remunerations.204 Actualizing such possibilities might lead members of these 
groups to be part of the bourgeoisie if their investment, regardless of its form,205 
qualifies them to legal ownership of means of production. 
Apart from the remunerations that objectively give these groups the capacity 
to shift their class position to the ranks of the bourgeoisie, other assets that the 
occupiers of certain incumbencies possess facilitate this capacity. One such asset 
is knowledge, which corresponds here to the inventory of different forms of 
information , understanding and skills that the employees acquire through their work 
in certain enterprises or organizations in order for the latter's goals to be completely 
or partly achieved. This knowledge, which can be tacit or explicit, is not confined to 
the sphere of the workplace. In other words, in addition to the inside knowledge that 
serves to put the workplace in function, an exterior one is necessary to maintain the 
continuity of this function206• In this context, the managers have better access to 
different forms of knowledge that are related to the production strategies, and their 
associated planning, marketing ... etc. equip them with the possibility of possessing 
other types of assets that are not accessible to others.207 Knowledge as an asset 
can be used by the managers in order to form new businesses owned completely or 
203 This is does not imply that every wage earner possesses some skill and organization 
assets. It should be borne in mind that some of these wage earners are completely deprived of any 
sort of assets. 
20~ This does not indicate that such possibilities are inevitable. 
205 The common form of such an investment, in the advanced capitalist countries, would be in 
shareholding companies. In Jordan, however, variety of forms is possible, such as shares or other 
investments in different forms of enterprises. It is even possible to find investments in the names of 
the members of the nuclear family, such as the wife or the children, when the state managers are the 
ones who are concerned. 
200 What is at stake here, is simply the entire operation concerning marketing and promoting 
the products of the firm In question. 
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partly by them. thus transforming their class position from contrad ictory location to 
bourgeoisie. 
Apart from the above-mentioned type of knowledge, which is of vital 
importance, another can be distinguished. despite the fact that it is intrinsically part 
of the first. This is the knowledge that circulates exclusively among a limited number 
of managers and decision makers within a specific enterprise. This kind of 
knowledge corresponds to all strategic decisions that affect the enterprise function , 
structure, revenue and financial liability. Such information can provide investors with 
knowledge of the inside situation of the enterprise, and consequently with better 
assessment of the potential investments and risks that are not entirely available on 
the market. One could argue that there is a tight correlation between the degree of 
transparency in the market and the extent to which this knowledge is valuable. In 
other words, the more transparent the information, the less valuable this kind of 
inside knowledge is in serving the managers and in determining the transformation 
of their class position. In conclusion , managers find themselves possessing a 
certain type of assets that they might use to make the mile journey to the bourgeois 
class domain . 
Despite obvious difficulties, it is nevertheless possible to develop 
mechanisms to quantify the 'knowledge assets'. This is made somewhat easier by 
comparison to another level that the managers find themselves engaged in. and that 
might facilitate their access to the bourgeoisie terrain, i.e. access to the social 
sphere of the bourgeois class. This corresponds to a complex of intangible and 
elusive relations, which are formed socially between the managers and elements of 
the bourgeoisie. The different social forms and cultural systems give birth to various 
types of social circles in which the others can be engaged socially with the 
bourgeoisie. 208 
207 Possessing such knowledge certainly provides the managers with opportunities to occupy 
key positions in different enterprises. since they require a specific experience. 
:<OB The reference here is to the fact that, in a certain formation, one's social involvement can 
be manifested through belonging to social or sports clubs that are dominated by the bourgeoisie, while 
in another the relevant type of social engagement can be the medium through which the bourgeoisie 
in transition gets involved socially with bourgeois circles. In Jordan in particular, there are different 
possible venues where the bourgeoisie may be approached, among which is the family ties platform, 
which guarantees contact between the bourgeoisie member(s) and their relations. The articulation 
concept (discussed in the second section of this chapter) . which applies particularly well to the 
development of capitalism in Jordan. can explain its various peculiar social platforms or venues in 
which members of different social classes can come to interact. 
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The 'bourgeoisie in transition' is a concept that corresponds to the state that a 
certain type of public or private sector enterprise managers, who are with in decision 
making circles, enjoy as long as they occupy their positions. where they have access 
to different levels of the knowledge assets in addition to the skill and organization 
assets that provide them with portions of the surplus value. These assets provide 
them with the potential to transform their class position from a mere contradictory 
location to the bourgeoisie. Despite the fact that the transformation process is 
possible, it is not by any means inevitable. In fact, one can always find examples of 
occupiers of certain incumbencies in both private and public sectors who did not 
make it to the sphere of the bourgeoisie, in spite of their possessing the main criteria 
of the bourgeoisie in transition for a substantial time. In addition to the subjective 
reasons, certain objective factors can contribute to precluding them from the 
completion of the mile journey, such as the nature of the enterprise, its size, its main 
business or the objective conditions within the economy in a specific period. 
The main task of this section, apart from tackl ing the problematic issue of the 
middle classes in the Marxist paradigm, was to provide a new perspective which 
may contribute to the redrawing of class boundaries at large and the bourgeoisie's in 
particular. It was argued that the contradictory locations concept is a sufficient 
theoretical device for these propositions. The different exploitative relations that 
exist within the boundaries of the main capitalist one can provide an explanatory 
device in understanding the class function at the level of 'class in practice' and the 
possible alliance between the different classes. The concept of 'bourgeoisie in 
transition ' is also a useful device when it comes to analyzing high ranking managers 
- including the state ones - and can give an insight into the sources that provide the 
bourgeoisie with new members. 
1.4 THE SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE CLASS 
The class is defined structurally by virtue of its relations to the means of 
production , which determine the different possible variations of 'class in practice'. 
Such an assertion does not indicate that class should be regarded as a 
homogeneous unit: on the contrary, class has its own internal divisions, which arise 
according to the relation of these fractions to the means of production. This reality 
brings to light the internal contradictions of the class. The presence of class·internal 
divisions and contradictions is vital in regard to the possible variations that the 
structure assumes in the sphere of practice. The different Marxist parameters that 
focus on internal class division will be covered below. More attention will be given to 
the bourgeoisie fractions, in order to be able to use such parameters in the analysis 
of the Jordanian bourgeoisie. 
1.4.1 FRACTION ACCORDING TO THE ECONOMIC BASE AND 
SECTOR 
The first parameter could be described as the quantitative parameter, by 
which the class is divided into sections according to the assets possessed. Hence. 
the sections in the bourgeoisie reflect differential quantities of the means of 
production that they control. In this context, Marx mentioned sections such as the 
'small bourgeoisie' versus the large one, or the 'small manufacturers' versus the big 
ones or the large industry. 209 
The second parameter that could be used to reveal the class·internal 
fractions is the economic sector. Classes are differentiated according to the type of 
production that they are involved in. According to Marx's analysis, the French 
bourgeoisie during the second and th ird quarters of the 191h century was made up of 
three main fractions: 'Large Landed Properties·, 'Financial Aristocracy' and 
'Industrial Bourgeoisie'. However, the so·called 'financial aristocracy' - or 'capital' . 
as sometimes Marx named it - is composed of different sections: ' ... bankers. stock 
market barons. railway barons, owners of coal and iron mines and forests and a 
section of landed proprietors'21 0 . Elsewhere, he added two more sections: 'large 
scale industry' and 'large-scale trade'.2 11 It is obvious that Marx's classification of the 
main fractions and the financial sub·sections was based on the area of business or 
type of production. For instance, within the financial aristocracy we find financial 
bourgeois and mining bourgeois. while the large·landed proprietors' category is 
209 Marx, K. (1851 ). The Class Struggle In France, p38-39. Marx. K.(1852), The Eighteenth 
Brumiere of Louis Bonaparte, p216. 
210 Marx, K. (1851), The Class Struggle In France. p36. 
211 Marx. K. (1852). The Eighteenth Brumiere of Louis Bonaparte. p 173 
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exclusively made up of the agricultural agrarian bourgeois.212 Marx repeatedly 
emphasized that the fundamental structural division between the two main fractions 
of the 'Party of Order' was 'their material conditions of existence, two distinct 
sources of property, it was the old opposition between town and country, the old 
rivalry between capital and landed property'213 . 
With regard to the composition of the bourgeoisie, especially in the period 
before imperialism, Kautsky adopted Marx's wide division between capitalists and 
landholders. Among the capilalists, Kautsky distinguished, as Marx did before, 
between three types, namely 'merchants' capital , interest-bearing capital and 
industrial capital'21 4. Hilferding, Lenin215 and Bukharin216 follow this line, especially 
when the pre-imperialist era is the one under analysis. 
Although possession of the means of production was the primary element In 
defining class in Kautsky's elaboration, the distribution of surplus-value was widely 
used by him in identifying sections of the bourgeoisie other than the industrial one. 
In this perspective. merchants and interest-bearing capitalists are not direct 
exploiters, since they lack possession of the means of production . Their profit, 
however, being given to them by the owners of the means of production. is part of 
212 In regard to the large-landed proprietors, Marx explained that they constituted part of the 
bourgeois class. since their relations of production were already capitalized. They were no longer part 
of a class that was Shaped by the relations of production of the feudal system, even though they were 
the descendants of the 'lmmemorial domination of the lords of the soil' (Marx, K.(1852), The 
Eighteenth Brumiere of Louis Bonaparte, p. 173). This fraction , as Marx claimed, ruled France 
between 1815 and 1830 under the House of Bourbon. From 1830 to 1848, however, they were 
excluded from any pofitical power and represented an opposition party known as the 'legitimate 
monarchy'. Apart from their basic interest. which was the interest of the whole bourgeoisie in keeping 
the capitalist relations of productlon. they stood firmly against 'free admission for foreign meat and 
com' (Marx, K.(1851 ), The Class Struggle in France. p. 11 1 ). Such a thing would strike directly at their 
economic interest, hence promoting it was considered as a proclamation of socialism during the period 
of the legitimate assembly. Despite the fact that they shared legislative power as a part of the ·Party of 
Order', the large-landed proprietors never gave up their ambition to the French throne. The financial 
aristocracy was the section that was most involved in areas of stock market. speculations, crediting 
and providing loans. Thls part of the bourgeoisie exclusively governed France under the rule of Louis 
Phillip (1830-1848) (Marx, K.(1851 ), The Class Struggle in France, p. 36-37). As Marx put it, ' . ., the 
July monarchy was the only expression of the usurped rule of the bourgeois parvenus' (Marx, 
K. (1852), The Eighteenth Brumier-e of Louis Bonaparte, p. 173). Marx explained in detail how it was in 
the interest of this fraction to keep the state expenditures high. which led to deficit, so that they could 
strengthen their position as creditors and loaners (Marx, K.(1851), The Class StnJggle in France, p. 
114-116). It was implied by Marx that this fraction was predominant among the other fractions of the 
bourgeois class. and its influence after the revolution was also mentioned . 
.:m Marx, K.(1852), The Eighteent/1 Brumiere of Louis Bonaparte. p. 173. 
214 Kautsky, K. (1892), The Class Struggle in France, p40. 
215 Lenin, V.I. (1917). Imperialism. the Hlgl1est Stage Tn Capitalism. p719. 
216 Bukharin, N. (1915) ; Imperialism. 
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the surplus-value that was appropriated by the latter. This analysis was applied to 
the landholders, who rely on rent rather than on the exploitation of their lands.217 In 
short. the bourgeoisie in its different sections shares the surplus-value that is 
appropriated from the direct producers. 
What is at stake here is Marx's consistency in stressing the primacy of 
economic determination in shaping the fractions within one class, which is precisely 
the same determination he employs when defining the classes as a whole. The 
bourgeoisie can be subdivided according to two criteria, the first - and more 
restricted - of which classifies the fractions according to the economic sector they 
are involved in. such as banking, mining, manufacturing ... etc. The second criterion, 
which is broader and based to some extent on the first, yields the main classes that 
crystallized in the course of the development of capitalism. such as the industrial 
class, the commercial class, the large landholders.218 These classifications show a 
differentiation in interest and a contradiction between the fractions that, however. is 
still within the boundaries of the interest of the whole class.219 
1 .4.2 FINANCE CAPITAL 
Concerning the bourgeoisie fractions, the development of capitalist relations 
in advanced capitalist countries since the late 191h century resulted in the emergence 
of a new bourgeois sub-class, i.e. finance capital. The importance of finance capital 
is not limited to the radical changes in the bourgeoisie makeup of the advanced 
capitalist countries. let alone to its associated imperialism, but it is of vital importance 
when considering the development of the Jordanian bourgeoisie. The finance 
capital, as a stage in the capitalist development, came into existence as a result of 
three changes that capitalism underwene20 at the turn of the 191h century. 221 
"' Kautsky, K (1892), The Class Struggle in France. p45-55. 
2
'
8 The conflict between the financial aristocracy and the landed proprietors is analyzed 
according to the economic basis that these fractions are relying on. 
219
. The contrast between the different fractions of the bourgeois class. which manifested itself 
in the revolution. did not aim to overthrow the financial aristocracy, but to share the power with it. In 
fact, it resulted in consolidating such a fraction (Marx, K.(1852). The Eighteent/1 Brumiere of Lou;s 
Bonaparte, p 173. Marx, K.(1851). The Class Struggles in France, p. 109). 
220 The main concern here is to give a full summary of the concept of imperialism rather than 
looking at the development of the concept, or to highlight to whom this development is attributed tq. 
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First, the monopoly of production was achieved through combined 
production. Combined production took two forms: a combination of consecutive 
stages in working raw materials up to the finished goods, and a combination 
between different enterprises producing different articles within a given industrial 
branch. The effects of these combinations, in Hilferding's own words, were as 
follows:222 
'Combination levels out the fluctuation of trade and therefore 
assures to the combined enterprises a more stable rate of profit. 
Secondly, combination has the effect of eliminating trading. Thirdly, it 
has the effect of possible technical improvement, and, consequently, 
the acquisition of super-profits over and above those obtained by the 
'pure' (i.e. non combined) enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens the 
position of the combined enterprises compared with that of 'pure' 
enterprises in the competitive struggle in periods of serious depression, 
when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall 
in prices of manufactured articles.'223 
Lenin224 summarized this process by means of the expression 'complete 
socialization of production': the appropriation, however, was still private.225 
The second condition that contributed to the emergence of the finance capital 
was the radical change in the role of the banks, which moved from simply 
transferring idle money capital into active capital, becoming an economic player with 
a say in the production process226• The monopolistic process in the banking sector 
Thus, Lenin's work was the main source in covering this concept. due to the fact that it contained 
almost all the main principles that appeared in the others' works. Furthermore, Lenin's work, for a 
reason or another, became the most famous work in regard to this phenomenon. 
221 Lenin claimed that monopoly became 'the foundation of the economic life' since 1900· 
1903, after it had been in an embryonic stage between 1860 and 1870 and just a 'transitory 
phenomenon' from 1873 up to the threshold of the 20th century (Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the 
Highest Stage in Capitalism, p638). 
222 Lenin borrowed the same elaboration from Hilferding (Lenin, V.I. (1917). Imperialism, the 
Highest Stage in Capitalism, p639). 
223 Hilferding, R. (191 0), Finance Capital, p293. 
224 lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism, p645. 
225 Lenin outlined the characteristic features of the monopoly in production as follows: (1) in 
combined production, it is possible to obtain an approximate estimate of the row material and its 
sources not in one country only but in the whole market, together with the subsequent capture of these 
sources; (2) an approximate estimate of the capacity of the market is possible, which leads to dividing 
of the market among the various combinations and fixing of the quantity of products and their prices; 
(3) the means of transportation are captured; (4) skilled labour is monopolized by agreements 
between the cartels and individuals or trade unions; (5) agreements are reached between the cartels 
- ·--on-coAditions.of sales and payments(tenin, V.I. (1917), lmperialismr the Highest Stage in Capitalism, 
p639-642. See also Brewer, A. (1990) The Marxists Theories of Imperialism, p95). 
226 Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism, p649. 
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was characterized by the decline in number of influential banks due to mergers227 
that gave the remaining banks substantial economic power.228 This reality led to a 
fundamental change in the relations between the banks and the rest of the 
capitalists in two associated ways. On the one hand, the capitalists were limited in 
their choices for credits and loans;229 on the other, the banks started to interfere in 
the economic position of their clients . 230 
The third condition for the birth of finance capital is simply defined as the 
fusion between financial capital (banks) and industrial capital.231 Hilferding stated 
that the monopoly in production led to the reduction of commercial capital to a 
subordinate status and the decline of the return (profit) of its activities. Due to this 
fact, the banks were forced to invest directly in production. Furthermore, the 
monopolization that had taken place in the banking sector eased such a 
transformation. Whatever the different motors that drove the fusion between these 
two sectors, this change took place in reality, dictating new conditions for the whole 
capitalist system. 
The emergence of the finance capital was completed - as Lenin maintained -
by the union between it and the state. The state officials became part of the board 
of the finance capital enterprises without any contribution at the capital level. Lenin 
showed, by means of some examples, the development of such 'personal union' and 
its impact on the policies that were adopted by the state to serve the interest of the 
finance capital class.232 Prior to Lenin's observation233 , Hilferding had stressed that 
227 Brewer, A. (1990) The Marxists Theories of Imperialism. p92. 
228 Lenin, V.I. (1917}, Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism. p650·658. Bukharin, N. 
(1915), p 67. 
229 Bukharin and Lenin advanced a great deal of statistics to compare between the deposits. 
branches and internal organization of the big banks and that of the small and medium ones. 
230 Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism, p657-658. 
2 31 This definition is according to Hilferding. 
232 lenin, V.I. (1917), tmperfalism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism, p 648. 
233 One of the main policies that was put in practice to serve the interest of the finance capital 
class is one of protection. The protection policy was transformed from being a means of defending the 
national market against foreign industries to a means of penetrating the foreign markets in the hands 
of monopolies. Such a transformation was possible, since finance capital, by the means at their 
disposal, could fix the prices of the products at the national market and secure such prices against 
QOmJ2 .. etitive (oreigrt .PrQdy_c;::j~ thrQ.YgtuL~Y-~tem_otbigb_tarjft_tb.e_tariff, which was impo.sed ,on the 
foreign products, elevated their prices to the prices of the national products, i.e. it stabilized the prices 
at the hignest level possible. Concerning the penetration of the foreign markets, Hilferding explained 
that the monopolies could sell their own products at a loss outside their markets, due to the fact that 
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the elimination of the chronic conflict among the capitalists in the finance capital era 
flattened the ground for them to conquer the state.234 
Along this line, Hilferding argued that the presence of these sections and of 
the landholders were the characteristic features of the free competition period of 
capitalism. However, the decline of the above groups' role in the imperialist era 
does not imply their complete disappearance.235 Such an assertion can be found in 
both Lenin236 and Bukharin237 . 
Our concern here is the impact of finance capital on class structure and on 
the relations between the different classes. Hilferding claimed that, in the finance 
capital era, the bourgeois class reached its highest level of unification. The conflict 
of political and economic interests between the capitalist fractions of the free 
competition period was replaced by harmony and reconciliation in the monopoly 
era. 238 The new production conditions, which were brought about by the monopoly, 
eliminated the conditions upon which the interest conflict between the capitalist 
fractions was based. For Hilferdlng, the above·mentioned Marxian classification of 
the capitalist class into four sections was inadequate, since the cartelization process 
was present both in the financial and in the industrial capitals. Hilferding maintained 
that a differentiation could be made between the cartels and the 'pure' enterprises 
(regardless of the nature of the enterprise) that had not existed in the era of free 
competition capitalism. He assumed that the non-combined enterprises would 
realize their complete dependence on the cartels, accepting the reduction of their 
position to the status of agents. 239' According to this proposition, accompanied by 
concrete examples, Lenin outlined the possible means240 that were at the disposal of 
the overall profit was maintained by the profit which was deducted from the national market (Brewer, 
A. (1990) The Marxists Theories of Imperialism, p98·1 00). 
234 Hilferding, R. (1910), Finance Capital, p 335-:338. 
235 Hilferding, R. (1910), Finance Capital, p337. 
236 Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism, p719. 
237 Bukharin, N. (1915), Imperialism, 69. 
238 Hilferding, R. (1910), Finance Capital, p341 . 
239 Hilferding, R. (1910), Finance Capital, p338. 
240 Lenin enumerated 8 fundamental means, namely stopping the supplies of raw materials, 
__ s..,..,to-pp....,.in-,.g tiie supply oflabour (throu'gh agr·e-ements-wffh trade unions), cutting deliveries, closing trade 
outlets. reaching an agreement with the buyers, systemically cutting the prices sometimes below their 
cost. stopping credits and boycotting (Lenin, V.I. (1917) p645-646). 
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the combined enterprises to crush the pure enterprises. 241 The issue at stake here is 
the process of division of the capitalist society according to the market that is 
controlled by the monopoly production. However, this division is of a transitory 
character, since the pure enterprises are to be driven from the market or reduced to 
a subordinate status. Such a proposition becomes even more conceivable when 
taking into account Hilferding's assertion that a monopoly in production is 
transmittable from one sector to another. 242 
That the pure enterprise was subordinate to the monopolized one became 
more apparent with the emergence of finance capital, that is with the fusion of the 
industrial and financial capitals. The existence of the pure enterprises that 
represented small and medium capitalists was possible on condition that they would 
become completely dependent on finance capital through supplies and credit. This 
dependency was of vital importance, since it eliminated any serious conflict between 
them, given that the finance capital fraction had the upper hand.243 Otherwise, the 
means that Lenin counted as being at the disposal of the monopolized enterprises 
could crush the pure enterprises. Moreover, due to the fact that some of the 
medium and small capitalists' production was national market oriented and not for 
exporting, it was in their interest to support the finance capital, who were the most 
'powerful protagonists of the tariff244• This division among the small and medium 
capitalists hindered them from opposing the finance capital245• In fact, their 'way of 
combating other cartels is to form a cartel of their own'24t;. 
241 Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage in Capitalism. p645-646. 
'242 Brewer, A. (1990) The Marxists Theories of Imperialism, p95. 
243 Hilferding, R. (1910) , Finance Capital, p343. 
244 Hilferding, R. (1 91 0) , Finance Capital, p343. 
245 Hilferding stressed the fact that the monopolistic character of the finance capital eliminated 
the commercial capital by reducing its profit and limiting the scope of its activities (Hilferding, R. 
(1910), p338-339). Another means of reducing the commercial capital is the absorption of the big 
commercial. enterprises by the finance capital, as Lenin pointed out (Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, 
the H(ghest Stage in Capitalism, p658). 
As for the big land proprietors, who had constituted the worst enemy of the industrial 
bourgeoisie within the internal circle of the capitalists, Hllferding remarked that the finance capital was 
the era of the reconciliation of this conflict. The involvement of finance capital in the mortgage 
business increased the income of the big landholders and opened the door to new lines of investment 
in the countryside, such as intensive cultivation and agricultural industries, in which both fractions 
invested jointly. Moreover, an increase in land rents inspired land proprietors to invest in industrial 
production, where the profit rate is relatively higher than that of agriculture. Such an investment was 
_ .made_easieLby. the share .system .tbalcharacterized the phase_of monopolistic finance capital. Lenin 
and Hilferding also stressed other means by which the alliance between the two fractions was 
strengthened and their union made possible. Some of the most important were marrying into the 
landholder classes (Hilferding, R. (191 0), Finance Capital, p342. Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the 
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The finance capital with regard to the structure of the Jordanian bourgeoisie 
is vital. The term 'finance capital' can be used in its technical sense, as a fraction 
that includes the members of the bourgeoisie whose activities stretch over different 
economic bases and sectors. In this context, some important dimensions which are 
generally associated with the finance capital - such as the division of markets and 
areas of raw material resources or the features of imperialism -cannot be identified 
as crucial elements in the case of Jordan. 
Based on the review of the main technical features of the finance capital , 
such a fraction in Jordan covers distinctive characteristics that enabled it to be in a 
more privileged position than the other unilateral economic sectoral or base 
fractions. Finance capital at one level reflects combined enterprises in all aspects of 
their activities. from the initial production stages to the marketing ones, including 
intermediate activities that were - or still are - carried out by other enterprises in the 
case of non-finance-capital firms. The immediate differentiation between the 
combined activities and the non-combined ones manifests itself in surplus value and 
profit. Differentiation also occurs at the level of technical improvements, obtaining 
financial and credit facilities. In this context, those firms which are combined either 
in the production process or cross-sectorally are in a better position in to compete 
with non-combined firms of the same production line or of the same economic 
sector. The same argument applies to the competition between firms that are based 
on one specific economic base - such as commerce or industry - and those that are 
more diversified, e.g. combining import activities, manufacturing and banking. 
In addition to what was said above, and following Lenin and Hilferding, 
another important aspect of the finance capital is the fusion with the state or the 
state bureaucrats. Such a bond with the state can provide the finance capital with 
better conditions, than those enterprises that have no such attachments. The 
importance of the state becomes more relevant in the case of Jordan, since it 
constitutes a big market for the activities of the bourgeoisie. 
Highest Stage in Capitalism, p657), the acquisition of countryside property by the finance capital 
seeking social status, and the involvement of the two classes in the same social circles. In short, 
finance capital was extended to include the big landholders. Furthermore, the labour shortage in the 
countryside, which had been one the main factors underlying the rivalry between landholders and 
industrialists, became another element strengthening their alliance. Hilferding reported that the 
working class's demands for increased wage levels were faced by a hostile attitude from the 
-=-- --- "'lananolaers, tnus puttingtnelatterinfo grea teralliance witlllneinausmalists (Rilferaing, ·R:-(1_9_f(j)'-, - ---
Finance Capital, p340-342). 
~2 
However, it is important to modify the usage of the notion of finance capital in 
order to have a better application in the case of Jordan. The bourgeoisie is going to 
be analyzed in terms of economic bases and sectors, taking into consideration the 
presence of the finance capital. Such an analysis will not be based on enterprises' 
data, but on the characteristics of the bourgeois members. In other words, the point 
of departure when investigating the different fractions of the bourgeoisie and finance 
capital will be the members of the bourgeoisie rather than the enterprises in which 
these members hold equities. The differentiation is not between combined 
enterprises and pure ones that could be referred to from one time to another, but 
between finance capital members and pure enterprise members. In its technical 
sense, the finance capital bourgeoisie is a fraction that represents a combination in 
the production and economic activities, resulting in favorable conditions for its 
members compared with those bourgeoisie members who do not belong to this 
particular fraction. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
OF JORDAN 
In the previous chapter the focus was on the theoretical framework that may 
be used when analyzing the bourgeoisie. Such concepts as Mode of Production 
(MP), Social Formation (SF) and articulation were considered because of their 
importance when looking at the socio-economic context in a SF such as that of 
Jordan, where capitalism 1 was installed rather than born . Studying the main 
characteristics of the bourgeois class requires an analysis of the context of its SF. 
Hence, it is important, at this point, to establish a link between MP and SF as 
analytical tools and the concrete SF that exists in Jordan, with wider reference to the 
Middle East in general.2 
In the case of the Arab region at large (and this can be applied to the rest of 
the third world countries) and of Jordan in particular, such a study requires the 
treatment of two historical dimensions, which played a role in the particular evolution 
of the Arab SFs, and which are still of relevant influence. These are (a) the pre-
capitalist formations that dominated the Arab region and (b) the process by which 
these SFs were incorporated into the capitalist system and the current position that 
they occupy within world capitalism. These two factors together serve to explain the 
specific characteristics of the composition and formation of the Jordanian 
bourgeoisie and its capacity to ac.t collectively, and therefore constitute the focus of 
this coming section. 3 
1 There is no doubt that the capitalist system is the prevailing one in the case of Jordan, not 
just because this country is fully integrated in the world capitalist system by means of exchange, but 
also because the capitalist system covers all aspects of relations of production of the Jordanian SF. 
This capitalist formation, however, is by no means analogous to those of the western countries and 
Japan, which constitute the center of the world capitalist system. Jordan, like the other developing 
countries at large and the Middle Eastern ones in particular, is part of the periphery. 
2 The question to be posed here is not why capitalism did not emerge in the Arab region, and 
·neither what the rational-explanation ··of the backwardness of this region is; it rather concerns· the 
impact of these realities on the SF, economically and politically, When confronting such a task, 
however, one cannot avoid the afore-mentioned questions. 
3 In covering the first, reference· will be made to 'the Arab region in general, since the 
.geographical territory .where Jordan-was-founded-was-socially-and -economically part of. natural -Syria· -
(for the purpose of this study, this term covers the following modem states and territories: Syria, 
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In addition to an introductory section, which gives a brief review of the main 
arguments concerning the pre-capitalist MPs and SFs, this chapter is divided into 
three sections, each of which is concerned with a specific stage of the history of 
Jordan prior to the period of this study. The first will cover the second half of the 191h 
century up to the formation of the Jordanian polity in 1921 ; the second the period 
during which Jordan was under British mandate rule; finally, the third section will 
cover the period postdating the British mandate up to the 1967 war. It is not the 
intention to give a detailed account of Jordan's history, but rather to trace the main 
trends of its socio-economic development, attempting to achieve a better 
understanding of the Jordanian social structure and Jordan's bourgeoisie. 
2 .1 THE PRE-CAPITALIST FORMATION DEBATE 
There is a great deal of literature which tackles pre-capitalist SF and the 
articulation of the MPs within the dominant one, and a considerable amount of 
literature concerning the non-European pre-capitalist formations. Many of the texts 
concerning these issues focus on the absence of indigenous capitalism in the non-
European world and on its SFs, which did not lead to the emergence of capitalism. 
Thus, these studies cannot avoid taking the European pre-capitalist SF as a point of 
comparison, and even attempt to reconstruct pre-capitalist formation outside Europe 
by analogy with the European one. Those arguments concerning the pre-capitalist 
formation of the Arab region or the Middle East can be classified into three main 
categories. 
The first category comprises arguments which suggest that the SF of the 
Arab region was feudalist in nature, since the feudalist MP was the dominant one. In 
this sense, the pre-capitalist formatjon was either identical or similar to that of 
European feudalism. Hence, the pre-capitalist formation in the Arab region would be 
• -----teb'anon, the-Palestlnlarrteriitones (WesrBanJ<. East :Jerusalem ana-Gaza stnp), Israel and-Jordan) or 
the Fertile Crescent. Additionally, the literature aQ_ol;!! pr~·c_apitaJist toJr:n.~ttQr:t. il)j he Arab_reg(o_n cao. to 
some eXterifbe" applied to Jordan, which is part of it. . . . 
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nothing but a variant4 of the European one.5 The misguiding use of the concept of 
'feudalism' can also be explained in terms of a linguistic dichotomy within the Arabic 
word 'iqtaa '.6 
In the course of their conflict with the colonial powers, and in the period that 
followed de-colonization, those political movements in the Mashreq which sought 
modernization, development and preservation of independence adopted the term 
'iqtaa 'iin (feudal lords) to designate both their traditional opponents, i.e. politicians 
who were identified with the colonial powers, and traditional notables (especially the 
agrarian ones). 7 This gave the term 'iqtaa' 'feudal' currency, not just in the political 
discourse, but also in the academic circles, especially in countries such as Syria, 
Iraq and Egypt.8 
4 Such arguments. which were widely used by Arab scholars, were strongly influenced by the 
western European historical experience and historical methodologies. They simply aimed to 
reconstruct the pre-c~pitalist history of the Middle East in parallel to that of Europe, especially since 
these post-Ottoman studies were critical towards the Ottoman period. Besides, they were classical in 
their historical approach, which was imbalanced in favour of political history at the expense of social 
and economic history. 
5 AI-Sharief, Munier (1961), p 21-58; Hana, H. (1984), p47-49 . .§.aalah.M.S. (1978) , p90-95. 
6 On the one hand, such a term was used throughout Arab Islamic history to refer to land 
allocated to a person - usually an official - in return for collecting taxes, typically without allowing this 
person complete ownership of the land, which was not inheritable and could be subtracted (see Ayut>i, 
N. (1985), p65-67; Man.§uur, F. (1994), p35). On the other hand, the same word was used to describe 
the feudalism of Europe, although this was by no means the same phenomenon as the above-
mentioned (see for example Mutawalli, Mahmuud (1974) Al-u§.uul af-taariikhiyya lil-ra'ismaaliwa a/-
masriyya wa tatawurhaa. p12-22). Mutawalll draws a comparison between the main features of 
European feudalism and the pre-capitalist formation of Ottoman Egypt, showing that the main 
characteristics of the former were not present in Egypt. The shortcoming of such a comparison lies in 
the fact that 1t does not conclude that the pre-capitalist formation of Egypt was of an altogether 
different sort with respect to European feudalism. On the contrary, Mutawalli insists on claiming that 
the Egyptian pre-capitalist formation was simply a different type of feudal system. 
7 For instance, the political document that declared the foundation and political program of the 
Jordanian Communist Party (AI-Mwqaamah AI-Sh'abiiha (1951). issue (1); see also AI-Masri, M. 
(1995), p67-71) suggested that the social base of the Jordanian regime lay on the alliance of the 
feudal and tribal elements. Pan-Arab nationalist parties like the Arab Socialist Party (Salaamah, A 
(1991). p46-48) and the Baath party also emphasized the feudal character of the Arab region (AI-
'iisamii. S.H. (1979), p145-152; AI-Masri, M. (1995), p74-80). The communist parties and Marxist 
scholars of the Mashreq were highly influenced by Soviet literature in the period in which Stalinism 
was being built, when the Soviet establishment adopted a dogmatic and extreme position as well as a 
Euro-centered one (according to this view, five MPs characterize the SF witnessed by human social 
history, in a succession that, starting with the communal MP followed by slavery, feudalism and 
~@.f?.italism , culminates in socialism). This argument could be found throughout Soviet literature, 
providing the Stalinist variation of Marxism which fed into the so called 'Marxist scientific historical 
account' of the Middle East. An important source in this regard is Lutski, G. (1971). which was 
______ Q.Y.I:IJ~J:lftd_by_tb.e_er:ogr:ess_eublish.er_oLMo.scow,_and_Sleminsikia,_translated .. and. published- by- AI- ----
F~uaabi , the publisher of the Communist Party of Lebanon. 
8 Hamaadi, S'aduun, (1965), p 13-14. See also 'Abd-ai-Karriim, A. (1967), p57-59. 
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Another factor that gave currency to the concept of feudalism was that a form 
of feudalism displaying the same characteristics as that of Europe arose from time to 
time in Islamic history or in the Ottoman period. Additionally, feudal features 
appeared in some parts of the Arab region as a result of the contact with capitalist 
(and later imperialist) Europe, combined with the responses in terms of 'reforms' 
undertaken by the authorities.9 
The second category contains arguments that revolve around the Asiatic 
Mode of Production (AMP)10. The genealogy of the concept goes back to the 
Enlightenment period but, as Hamarneh 11 and others claim, was given a status by 
Marx.12 Marx's argument about the AMP ranges between a formation of communal 
character and a primitive MP with embryonic class relations. The main principles of 
this MP lie in the relationship that is established between the community since its 
settlement and the means of production, i.e. the land. Belonging to the community is 
defined by literal engagement in labour, which characterizes the right of each 
individual to consider him/herself as a possessor of the land. In this context, the 
concept of 'ownership of the land' refers to the natural relationship between the 
individuals in the community and nature.13 This is a very important proposition, since 
Marx indicates another precondition in the case of the AMP, i.e. that 'the all 
embracing unity14 which stands above all these small common bodies may appear 
9 Awad, A. (1969), p222-226. 
10 The revival of this approach was triggered in Europe to address the distinctive features of 
non-European pre-capitalist MPs that do not conform with the notion of feudalism, in addition to some 
specific problems that the independent third world countries advanced (see Rodenson, M. (1974) 
Islam and Capitlism, 119-137). 
11 Hamarneh, Mustafa B. (1985), p15-16. Also Anderson, Perry (1969), p 465-473. 
12 In fact Marx's treatments of this MP were fragmented and appeared in the form of 
comments or indications in some of his correspondence. Besides, Marx used the two notions of rural 
Asiatic commune and of AMP alternately as one concept and as two different concepts referring to two 
distinct realities (Mane. K. (1858), p68-92). However, these fragmented comments are the basis on 
which not only the Maneist concept of AMP, but also non-Maneist elaborations such as Wittfogel's well-
known work were established (see Wittfogel, K.A. (1957) Oriental Despotism, Yale University Press, 
Newhaven). Anderson highlights the limits of Marx's comprehension of the Asian societies and their 
dynamics. as well as the influence of the Enlightenment's discourse about Asia on Mane's thought. He 
attributes to these factors Marx and Engels's comments about the stagnant character of the Asian 
societies, dominated by oriental despotism. He adds that the development of such societies and their 
·advances in different periods of history were generally overlooked because of the general lack of 
information and of the fact that, contrary to those of feudal Europe, these advances did not lead to it 
into capitalism (see Anderson, P. (1989) Lineages of the Absolutist State, p489-496). 
---- -··- ----
13 Marx, K. (1858). p89-90. 
14 In Italics In the original. 
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as the higher or sole proprietof.15 Hence, according to Marx, the AMP operates as 
follows: the community has the right to use the land, thus producing a surplus which 
is appropriated by the highest unity that stands above the 'numerous and lesser' 
communities and has the real ownership over the land, appearing as the father 
figure or despot. 16 
Other principles that can be deduced from this abstraction, and which are 
emphasized by Marx and in some cases by Engels, are the absence of private 
property and the fact that the appropriation of the surplus is rendered in two forms: in 
form of a tribute to the higher unity or in form of labour to the glory of God. Marx 
delineates the internal structure of the base community in terms of its self-sustained 
character, which came about with the unity of agriculture and industry, resulting in 
the proposition that such communities had existed for thousands of years in static 
isolation under highly centralized states.17 In short, public works are the most 
important factor in generating the principal characteristics of the AMP as described 
by Marx and Engels. The most typical examples of such a formation are the ones 
that existed in the areas surrounding great valleys, where land could be artificially 
irrigated, such as Egypt, China, Indochina, Mesopotamia and lndia.18 
Some or all of the characteristics of the Asiatic SF have been employed by 
some of those authors who have tackled the issue of the Middle Eastern pre-
capitalist formation. It is not surprising that Egypt is often the center of such 
treatments, since its conditions constitute the best example that could fit within the 
model of Asiatic formation. 19 Among the Arab scholars' production, Sa'd's work 
15 Marx, K. (1858) Pre-capitalist Formation. p69. 
16 Marx, K. (1858) Pre-capitalist Formation, p69. Marx, K. (1853), The British Rule in India, 
p578-579. Compare these principles with those that are illustrated in Anderson, concerning the 
economic structure of the Orient according to the Enlightenment and the 19~~> century thinkers 
(Anderson, Perry (1989), p465-472). 
17 See, in this context, Marx's analysis concerning India (Marx. K. (1853), The British Rule in 
India, p579). See also Anderson, Perry (1989), p473-484. 
18 Marx, K. (1853) The British Rule in India, p579-580. 
19 Among the Arab authors, Ibrahim 'Amir does not only apply Marx's comments, but goes 
back to comments of Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith in order to 
confirm that a pre-conditional factor that distinguishes the Asiatic formation is the climate, which 
requires artificial irrigation, in contrast to the natural one of European feudalism ('Amir, I. ~959), p47-
- -59). Abdei-Malek briefly reviews the history of Egypt from the ancient times up to the 18 century to 
confirm almost all of the main principles of Marx's Asiatic formation. However, he labels this system 
1 _ ___ --=:;:.;a~Qriental Feu~alisni_(~bdei-Malek, Anouar (1968)~gr.e_t: Military_.§ociett__p25-41 ). Tuum a follows Abdei-Malek's example (Tuuma, Amiil (1985), p 24), According to tlamdaan, the need for artificial 
Irrigation characterizes the Egyptian pre-capitalist formation in terms very close to the Asiatic formation 
(tlamdaan, J. (1970), p 203-210). 
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about the socio-economic history of Egypr0 is the most faithful treatment of the 
concept of AMP as was formulated by Marx and Engels, although it also benefits 
from discussions concerning this concept in the mid 1960s. 21 The objective 
conditions of agriculture revolving around the Nile, such as artificial irrigation and its 
huge public works,22 the nature of the Nile floods and the need to control them, land 
fertllization and so forth, would not have allowed such a civilization to thrive without 
the existence of an organized community. The latter is the essential condition that 
flattened the ground for the AMP to develop. A central state that was legally the 
owner of the land and forbade private ownership was an objective necessity to 
maintain the organization of labour around the valley.23 
The AMP was subject to criticism at different levels.24 Hindess and Hirst 
explain that the AMP principles25 reveal a dual mode of appropriation of 'rent/tax' 
that should correspond to two distinct forces of production, which is not possible in 
the Asiatic societies. Therefore, the entire MP in question would not exist.26 At 
another level, the AMP- though it might explain some aspects of the pre-capitalist 
formations outside of Egypt, China, lndia27 etc. - is not a sufficient explanatory 
device in formations whose conditions are different, as in arid and semi-arid areas. 
20 Sa'd, Ahmed S. (1979) Taariikh Ma.§r al-ijtimaa'ii- al-iqti.§aadii. 
21 Mainly those initiated by the French Communist Party. 
22Sa'd's main theme is that of public works related to agricultural production rather than that of 
hydraulic agriculture, even though the latter was the prevailing form in Egypt This is one ground on 
which he distinguishes himself from Wittfogel, whose emphasis is on hydraulic agriculture. Sa'd, 
Ahmed S. (1979) Taariikh Ma§.r al-ijtimaa'ii- al-iqti§.aadii. 
23 The relations of production between the state and the rural community are characterized by 
the appropriation of surplus in form of tax and rent. This type of relation of production could be 
defined as 'oriental despotism' or 'comprehensive slavery'. In this sense, Sa'd follows literally Marx's 
comments about oriental despotism, but fails to determine whether the community is part of the means 
of production and to locate the differences between the system under the Soviet state and the one 
under the Asiatic state. Sa'd seems to accept Marx's argument about oriental despotism with a good 
effort to rationalize it, while he refuses Wittfogel's arguments, which he heavily criticizes (Sa'd, Ahmed 
s. (1979) p9-11 ). 
2
" Among those rejecting the concept of AMP, Amin puts forward another valid argument: it is 
not justifiable to use the term Asiatic to describe a typically non-European formation that existed 
throughout the globe and even within the European domain. This would only be possible if the 
purpose were to talk about an Asiatic formation as opposed to an African. a Russian, etc. Such a 
distinction. however, would deprive the abstract concept of MP of its universality, to the extent that the 
need for it would be only nominal. Amin, Samir (1976) Unequal Development, p16. Amin, Samir (1978) 
The Arab Nation. p10-23, 87-88. 
25 These are the absence of land private property and of an exploiting class Independent of 
the state and the non-commodity production in agriculture. Hindess, B. and Hirst, P. (1975), p182-184. 
26 Hindess. B. and Hi~t . P. (1975), p182-186. Hindess, B. and Hirst, P. (1977), p15-16. 
- - - ---Hamameh;-Mustafa·B:-(1985);-p20. - - --- - --
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The fact that some areas, which are generally termed Asiatic formations, 
experienced the emergence of feudalism in different periods and for different lengths 
of time, 28 oould not be explained according to the principles of the AMP, since the 
latter is complete!~ different from feudalism. 
The third approach that this study considers is an abstract concept that could 
operate within the conditions of pre-capitalist formation in the Arab region and 
explain the Jordanian concrete formation and its impact on the bourgeoisie: TMP as 
it was proposed by Amin.29 Amin's thesis of unequal development runs through the 
known human history, covering the pre-capitalist SF as well as the capitalist one. 30 
In accordance with this theory, he argues that the most prominent pre-capitalist MP 
is the tribute-paying one. The tribute-paying SF was born from within the communal 
formation. 31 By regarding the tribute formation as the first SF after the communal 
one, with either a classless structure or an embryonic class system, Amin discards 
the Stalinist version of the SF trajectory, which could find some reference in some of 
Marx's own works,32 providing an alternative universal interpretation. 
The universal SF based on a single dominant MP varies from one area to 
another. It is determined by the degree of development that the forces and relations 
of production have reached in a certain area, which gives birth to a specific 
formation that differs from another governed by the same MP. According to Marx, 
objective conditions and the path that these classless societies took towards 
developing a class structure have a great deal of influence on the variation in SF.33 
In Amin 's postulation, the variation in SFs is not just confined to the objective 
conditions, but it extends to the influence of external factors. In other words, the 
development of one formation, which is termed the 'core', could affect, and even 
hinder, the development of another (termed the 'periphery') at the universal level. 
- - - - - ----
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The concepts of core and periphery and the relations between them regard the pre-
capitalist formation as well as the capitalist one. 
Following the argument concerning the different variations of the same MP, 
the objective conditions and interconnections of the different formations give rise to 
two variants of the TMP. The most widespread form is the 'well-developed' one, 
which Amin terms 'TMP in its complete form' or simply 'TMP'. This emerged, 
developed and functioned in the different continents, apart from Europe, constituting 
the core of the pre-capitalist formation in universal terms. In the periphery, an 
undeveloped form of the TMP comes to existence, which corresponds to the 
feudalist one. Although feudalism is the underdeveloped variant of the TMP that 
evolves in the periphery, it can be seen as an advanced form from the point of view 
of historical trajectory.34 In this respect, it may be useful to note that the periphery 
could allow variants of any given MP to emerge, and consequently to break from the 
universal formation into a new type of MP.35 
The main characteristic of this MP in its well developed state - which is our 
main concern - is the separation of society into two main classes: 'the peasantry, 
organized in communities, and the ruling class, which has monopolized the function 
of a given society's political organization and exacts the tribute'36 from the rural 
community. The tribute, here, does not take the form of commodity. The main 
contradiction of this MP arises between the continued existence of the rural 
community and the negation of it by the state, which results in the fusion between 
the class which exploits and that which dominates the political organization.37 That 
is, the exploitative relation is, in this context, interwoven with the relation of 
dominance. These characteristics do not allow production to be reduced to mere 
legal property relations. This fact could sufficiently explain the widespread lack of 
34 Amin, Samir (1976) Unequal Development, p16. 
35 In this context, Hamameh points out the importance of the space that the periphery 
occupies as a result of its objective position within any system compared to the core, which could 
explain some of the important and sometimes fundamental changes that Jordan underwent not just at 
the socio-economic level, but even at the political one. Jordan, which is placed at the periphery of the 
Arab system according to its structural capacities, could be able to take certain development paths at 
different levels that the core is not able to take. Hemarneh's analytical device, which was used in 
stud5'ing the process of 'political opening' and the rote of-the civil society in Jordan during the 1990s, 
could help deduce possible scenarios of the development of Jordan (interview with Mustafa 
Hamarneh). 
. - - -
36 Amin, Samir (1976) Unequal Development, p1 . 
a7 Amin. Samir (1978) The Arab Nation. p 89. 
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private property of the land (without eliminating the possibility of its presence), which 
was one of the focal concerns of the Enlightenment thinkers and of some Marxist 
scholars. 
As was mentioned above, an analysis of the class system of a SF dominated 
by the tribute-paying MP reveals two main classes: the exploiting class. which 
includes courtiers (or imperial courts) and gentry officials, and the exploited one, i.e. 
communal peasants (or village communities). 38 The fusion that takes place between 
the class and the state in the developed form of tribute formation gives rise to other 
social groups whose functional role is extracting the surplus labour, such as the 
agents of the state, who fulfill the function of levying the tributes and organizing 
public works of irrigation and the water control wherever the agricultural activities 
require it. as in ancient Egypt or China.39 According to Amin, such social groups do 
not belong to any specific class, but to a mere bureaucracy.40 Amin 's valuable 
analysis of the tasks within the social production explains the existence of a 
relatively large state apparatus without falling into cultural explanations and the use 
of the label 'oriental despotism'. In a typically rich agricultural tribute formation, the 
city, which is separate from the village community and in which the ruling exploiting 
class and its army of officials resides, is the sphere within which other social classes 
exist. Surplus-labour, which is concentrated in the hands of the ruling class and its 
assistants, gives rise to craft production of those luxurious goods which urban 
society demands. The production relations which control the craftsmen's activities 
are often of the petty commodity type. The production, however, may also be 
organized in enterprises in which the producers are slaves or wage-earners.41 
Among the different classes and social groups that the tribute formation surplus 
38 Amin, Samir (1976) Unequal Development, p47. Amin, Samir (1978} The Arab Nation, p13-
14. 
39 Amin, Samir (1976), Unequal Development, p34. 
40 In spite of Amin's claim, one could argue that some strata of this bureaucratic apparatus 
can be conceptualized in terms of class, si.nce they have some control over some sort of organization. 
In this context, one could look at the different layers of the bureaucracy within a pre-capitalist state 
such as the Islamic empire and link each of them with a specific function within the social production. 
Such an interpretation could lead to look at the bureaucracy in terms of different strata. some of which 
could be qualified to join the state class due to the control they exert over a sort of organization that 
has a certain importance in the social production. However, such considerations go beyond the scope 
of this study. 
41 Hence the misconceptions of the two Bulgarian scholars Christo Gandev and Nicolai 
Todorov. who assume the existence of capitalist relations under the 'feudal state' during the 18th 
century in some parts of Bulgaria. 'lrlllght of the concept of tribute· formation, small manufa--c~tu~r~in_g ___ _ 
enterprises based on wage-earning relations according to the simple commodity MP could come into 
existence to satisfy the demands of the cities (see Karpat, K. (1968), p 81 -82). 
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gives rise to are the state-class, the village community, commodity enterprises, 
craftsmen, the bureaucracy and merchants, who come to play the role of 
intermediary, organizing the trade circuit. 
In fact, the articulation of the different MPs that could exist under the tribute 
formation reflects a complex of relations of production and circulation, as well as of 
social classes and groups. 
Amin puts forward a question that is arguably important not only for the 
analysis of the tribute formation, but also for the study of any concrete capitalist 
formation, namely what is the origin of the surplus? This question is followed by 
another of equal importance, i.e. is there any surplus that is transferred to the SF· 
under study? 42 In order to answer these questions Amin postulates the existence of 
two types of tribute formation in its well-developed form. One is the rich agricultural 
formation, as in Egypt, China and, to a lesser extent, Mesopotamia and India, where 
agriculture was the major or the only source of surplus and made a spectacular 
civilization posslble.43 The other type of formation emerges in areas where (at least 
some of) the natural conditions, such as the quality of the soil and the necessity to 
rely on fluctuating rainfall rates, do not favor a rich agriculture that could provide an 
adequate surplus for a civilization to develop. This is the case of the poor tribute 
formations of semi-arid or arid areas such as the Arab Mashreq, Greece or North 
Africa, where nonetheless astonishing civilizations were formed. 44 Amin enumerates 
the conditions that explain this contradiction between poor agricultural formation and 
civilization, in particular the articulation of the tribute formation with long distance 
trade. The latter cannot be considered as a MP; it is rather a mechanism according 
to which the surplus can be transferred from one SF to another. Control over the 
trade routes that linked the different SFs was a corner stone in transferring the 
surplus, since the recipients of the goods did not have knowledge concerning their 
cost in the formation in which they were produced, and at the same time the 
producers were denied knowledge of the value of the same goods in 'the consuming 
formation.45 
42 Amin, Samir (1976) Unequal Development, p18. 
43 Amin, Samir (1978) The Arab Nation, p 14-16 and 87-92. 
• '--- ------
4
_
4 Arnin,_samic(t9I6)_UnequaLOe.v.e/opment,_p_4_0~3-Amin,-Samir (.197.8) The.Arab-Nation,- - --
p13-18. 
45 Amin, Samir (1976), p 17-18. 
This surplus could thus become a substitution revenue for the missing 
agricultural surplus when the formation was subject to poor agricultural conditions. 
Amin further points out that these surplus transfers could even be used to pick up 
the agricultural production, but that they inevitably became the life vein of the 
different urban social groups and classes which were dependent on the courtiers, 
i.e. of the class-state fusions.~ The advancement of a tribute formation reveals two 
levels of articulation: one where the articulation of MPs revolves around a dominant 
tribute mode, and one in which tribute is combined with long distance trade. This 
second level of articulation brings about other dimensions of complexity concerning 
social structure at large and the social classes and groups in particular. The 
external revenue that is brought in from other formations reshapes the interest of the 
classes and groups not just at the social and economic levels but even at the 
political one, despite the fact that, at the economic level, these classes are 
determined by the relations of production of the MPs rather than being an outcome 
of trade. However, the long distance trade surplus flattens the ground on which 
dramatic changes could occur in the composition of the different social classes, such 
as the state-class or the merchants, the scope of whose activities goes beyond 
internal circulation, giving them the role of transferors of the surplus. 
The Mashreq, with the exception of Mesopotamia, can be placed in the poor 
tribute formation, since it occupies a semi-arid and arid area where agriculture 
depends largely on rainfall . The civilizations of this area and large flourishing cities 
such as Aleppo, Damascus and the coast cities largely depended on the surplus that 
was transferred as a result of the control over the long distance trade routes.47 A 
subsequent shift in these routes would have a severe impact on the urban 
civilizations that had flourished in the period when the routes of this international 
trade passed through their cities. During the Ottoman era, the organization of the 
Mashreq - including what will be known as Jordan - could be construed in terms of a 
tribute formation articulated with long distance trade.48 Therefore, as Amin points 
46 Amin, Samir (1976), p18-20. Amin, Samir(1978), p14-16 
47 Along the lines of the class concept that was constructed in the pervious chapter, one may 
argue that the class-state fusion in the TMP could provide services that are of considerable 
importance to maintain the trade routes going through its formation. In other words, control over the 
routes and their safety becomes one of the tasks of the state In tribute formations to secure the 
inflowing surplus from other formations. 
48 The distinctiveness an_d_c_h_a-ra-c-te-rl-st-ic_s_of all the communities that lived In the area ot 
Jordan was determined by the relations of production that the combined MPs dictated and by the 
effect of articulated long distance trade. Even when the area of Jordan did not lie on one of the trade 
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out, the center of gravity was the town rather than the countryside, which could not 
provide the sufficient surplus. The peasants in such a formation were living in their 
isolated communities, independent of the state-class and producing enough to 
sustain themselves and to provide a small surplus that was extracted from them. 
These terms can provide valuable insights when considering the area of Jordan in 
the last period of the Ottoman rule. 
Before looking at the main features of the 'Jordanian' SF during the Ottoman 
rule and other periods, it is important to examine the objective conditions that to a 
large extent determined the specificity of the Jordanian tribute SF. As was 
mentioned above, the area of Jordan could be characterized as a poor agricultural 
tribute formation, since it is prevalently arid and semi-arid, with the exception of the 
limited area of the Ghor Region49 and three relatively humid and semi-humid patches 
in the Eastern Highlands Region50. The area surrounding these humid patches, 
which makes up the rest of the Eastern Highlands and occupies 7.5% of the total 
Jordanian land, is characterized by being relatively semi-humid and semi arid.51 In 
routes, as was the case in different historical periods, its development still depended on this 
articulation, which appeared in the larger context that Jordan belonged to, such as that of natural 
Syria. 
49 This area is part of the Dead Sea basin and lies between the Yarmouk River in the north 
and the Khneizere Valley in the south, with the Dead Sea in the middle, while to the east lie the 
Eastern Highlands. Besides the Yarmouk River, the Jordan River also runs through the northern part 
of this region, which is called the north Ghor, while the Hedath and Khneizere Valleys occupy the 
south Ghor (Aresvlk, 0 . (1976) The Agricultural Development of Jordan, p 57). The south and north 
Ghor are two of the most fertile agricultural areas in Trans-Jordan, due to the availability of water from 
the rivers and valleys mentioned above. Furthermore, the land of this region, which is estimated at a 
1 00 thousand hectares. is characterized by its ability to produce more than one crop per year in many 
rotations, as well as by its early production capability relative to other regions (Aburamillah, (1986) p 
68). This area was the centre of the agricultural activities in the 191h century as well as in the 20'h. 
50 The region of the Eastern Highlands falls to the east of the Ghor region and Wadi Araba, 
and lies between the Yarmouk River and the Syrian borders in the north and Wadi Mousa in the south. 
It borders on the Badia region on the eastern and southern sides (Aburamillah, (1986) p 68-69). 
These patches include a small area between Ajulan and lrl:Jid in the north, one around Karak in the 
south and one between the two regions around Salt. They make up the most suitable area for 
agricultural activities in the semi-humid and humid zone, since the average rainfall ranges between 
500mm. and 800mm. However, their area is very small, being of about 1 million dunum and making 
up 1.1% of the total land of Trans-Jordan. 
51 This area can be divided into two zones: the first one, whose area makes up 1.8% of the 
total Jordanian land, is the semi-arid zone, where the rainfall ranges from a minimum of 300mm. to a 
maximum of 500mm. This region lies both in the northern part of Jordan, between Madaba in the 
south and the Yarmouk River in the north, and in the southern, around Karak. The second zone, which 
occupies 5.7% of the total land, is more arid than the first, since its rainfall averages between 200 and 
300mm. ( Aburamillah, S. (1986) p 69-71. Aresvik, 0 . (1976), The Agricultural Development of Jordan, 
p 58-60). The average volume of the annual rainfall in the Eastern Highland region represents 44.0% 
of the total volume of rainfall in Transjordan. The rainfalls in this region are characterized by variation 
•-----ln-~olu-n•re-;-density .. an1t-dUration from year to year. Furtliermore, ralnfalris ttie ma1ilSource of water 
used for agricultural purposes in this region, although other limited sources are exploited for irrigation, 
such as several scattered springs and a small amount of ground water. 
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general terms, these areas put together are the ones which are suitable to carry out 
agricultural activities, while the majority of the land (91.4 % of the total) is occupied 
by the Badia Region (desert), which is very arid in character.~2 
The absence of a vital continuous53 long distance trade route reduced the 
socio-economic historical paths of the area of Jordan to its ecological and climatic 
conditions, to the extent that one could argue that the story of its socio-economic 
development is the story of land and water. This reality is enhanced by the fact that 
even the cultivable areas where the sedentary community came to exist constitute 
the fringes of the desert. These factors made it possible for two ways of life, the 
rural and the Bedouin, to coexist. Prior to the capitalist encroachment, a peculiarity 
of the Jordanian SF - which was in its essence a tribute one - was the wide spread 
of the Nomadic Mode of Production (NMP) and its articulation with a very poor 
agricultural TMP. This articulation with the NMP, which was a result of the above-
mentioned factors, greatly contributed to hindering the possibility of any 
accumulative development, as will be shown in the coming section, covering the final 
period of the Ottoman rule. 
2.2 FROM OTTOMAN DIRECT RULE TO THE FOUNDATION OF 
THE STATE 
This section deals with the period that preceded the detachment of Trans-
Jordan from its natural context (i.e. natural Syria) and the foundation of a separate 
political entity. It attempts to reconstruct the main features of the SF in the area 
where the Trans-Jordanian state would be built in 1921 , giving a brief account of the 
52 The average rainfall in this region is of less than 200mm. per annum. The data about the 
different rainfall rates come from the 1940s and 50s. Lack of information concerning the 19th and the 
early 20th century and lack of accurate and comprehensive data concerning the 1920s and 1930s, 
coupled with the fact that the purpose of these data is to show the objective conditions not just under 
the Ottoman rule but also during the periods which are the focus of this study, dictate the use of data 
from different periods, assuming that the variations of the data between the mid and late 19th century 
and the beginnlng.of-the 201h centu1 are not of absolute significance. For Information concerning the 
estimations of the rainfalls in the 19 century and the first half of the 20th, see Abu-Jaber, R. (1989), p 
255-266. 
53
"Tt1e only vital activity that passed through the area was the annual pilgrimage caravans:-Tn-
- __ _Jh~-s~nse, Ayubi ~91~ect1y -~escribes_J.o~:daQ_as_being a 'corri~or' without. users.(see Ayubi , N. (1995) 
"p114). 
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main communities that existed in that period and of their articulation. A sub-section 
will be devoted to each of the peasant, bedouin and merchant communities that 
together made up the SF of the area under the Ottomans. The point of departure, 
however, will be the reinstatement of Ottoman rule, and the main policies that the 
Ottomans adopted with the local population under their authority will be covered. 
2.2.1 THE OTIOMAN CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN JORDAN 
Annexing the area of Jordan was of a certain importance to the central 
authority, based in Damascus, due to the potential revenue that could be poured into 
a treasury that suffered from deficit.54 In particular, the northwest of Trans-Jordan 
(i.e. 'Aj/uun), which was its most potentially rewarding agricultural area, bordered on 
Damascus. The vitality of this area lay in the fact that the Ottoman authorities kept 
the 50% tax increase that the Egyptian rule had imposed on the peasants. 
In fact, the area of Trans-Jordan was brought back under Ottoman direct rule 
gradually. The effort to extend the Ottoman ilyate's direct rule over the area started 
some time after the end of the Egyptian administration. Rogan traces the different 
attempts that took place between 1844 and 1867, when the Ottoman administration 
was able to establish the Qagaa' a/-Salt. He argues that the latter date could be 
taken to mark the restoration of the Ottoman rule in Jordan. Reinstating security for 
the peasants of the Qagaa' 'Ajluun which was considered to be part of the ilyate,55 
was apparently a matter of concern for the administration in Damascus, since 
various strategies were drawn to fulfill this purpose.56 Nevertheless, these various 
54 Rogan, E. L. (1991), p 60-62. 
55 Rogan, E. l. (1991 ), 65. A wad , Abdelaziz M. (1969) A/-idaara al-'uthmaaniyya fii wilaaya 
suriyya 1864-1914, p67-70. 
56 Different policies were proposed, some of which were put into practice. For instance, in the 
1840s a specific scheme based on an outmoded timaar land system was enforced in order to 
guarantee the security of the peasants of 'Ajluun and at the same time to provide a revenue for the 
~~~sury w!th<?.l!.t !~. ~"!al)~ial b~rdef!. beif'lg im_p~~e_q 9!1_tne la!tE![. /'.~~!ding to t_hls scheme, ttte ~.re~ 
of 'Ajluun was assigned to a notable from Damascus who had to use his own financial resources to 
secure the area and collect the taxes, providing the treasury of Damascus with a fixed annual amount 
of money. Another imP-ortant strategy was imglemented for a sh2!1.PJ~rio<lirL.1lt5..0 ..::..1Jl5..1 • ...oamely_tb.e _ _ _ •..,....------'c=..:.r7ea:.::'t~io=-=n of a whole community of fmmigrants wtio would-be in charge of security and tax collection ~ 
____ Ihis was the.short-lived experience. ofJhe Algerian colony in :Ajluun.- Another policy.was drafted·in the 
so-called 'al'aal project, according to which a permanent administrative body was to be established. 
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policies did not lead to the full presence of the Ottoman authority, and the region 
continued to be, in some specific phases and seasons. at the mercy of the Bedouin 
tribes' raids extorting the Khaawah. However, the presence of Ottoman rule was 
probably felt in the northern area of Trans-Jordan, since the moneylenders of Beirut 
granted loans to some of the peasants of that area.57 In fact, the selfsame deficit 
that motivated the authority of Damascus to be concerned with the area of Trans-
Jordan also hindered its effort to secure it, stretching it over an extended period of 
time. Damascus could not at the time afford the budget and the armed forces 
necessary to bring the region back under its rule: it had to wait until the 1860s, when 
a more conspicuous army became available as a consequence of the brutal events 
in Damascus. 58 
Following Karpat in his argument concerning the different social powers in the 
191h-century Ottoman empire,59 and the development that occurred in the socio-
economic structure of Jordan under the state presence (see below),60 one could 
argue that it was in the interest of the merchants of the Palestinian and Syrian coast 
as well as of those of the cities of the interior to see an extension of Ottoman rule to 
the area of Trans-Jordan . As much as the bureaucracy was interested in increasing 
the revenue, these social groups were driven by the profit that could be made 
through the purchase of agricultural commodities from this area, especially given the 
increase in European demand. Another source of profit could have been money-
lending itself. 
It is not the concern of this study to detail the activities that the central 
authorities undertook in order to bring the area of Trans-Jordan back under their 
direct rule. Although, the success met by the authorities' effort was remarkable, the 
area was still never under direct control and remained an open venue for the 
This project, which the i/yate of Sham presented before the authority in Istanbul, was not implemented. 
In the 1850s, a few military expeditions took place, targetlng the different Bedouin tribes (Rogan, E. L. 
(1991 ), p66-73). 
57 Rogan, E. L. (1991), p 72. 
58 Rogan, E. L. (1991 ), p 72-73. Owen, R. (1993), The Middle East in the World Economy, 
1800-191 4, p169-171 . see Owen for more details concerning the Damascus riots. 
59 Karpat's argument about the different social powers within the Ottoman empire in the 19th 
centucy was applied specifically to their role in the promulgation and implementation of-the land code. 
However, his account is still relevant to other issues. Karpat, K. (1968), Land Regime, Social 
Structure. and Modernization, p84-88. 
eo-concerning what the presence of the state brought to- the area of Joraan, especially in the 
_ _ s.~qe_ntary areas, see t:tamarneh, M .• (:1.985), ~83-:9.1,,_Ei~chbach, M .. . (200.0), p 36-49.-Rogan, ~E . L. 
(1994), p 48-49. Rogan, E. L. (1991), p 120-140. 
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nomadic activities. The real challenge that faced the government in Jordan was 
battling with the nomadic tribes in order to put an end to their raids against settled 
communities, which were burdened by the Khaawah. Apart from the different factors 
that motivated such a policy, including the cooperation of the peasants seeking a 
higher degree of security, Lewis argues that the success of the expeditions61 against 
the Bedouin tribes in the area of Trans-Jordan lies in the improvement of Ottoman 
armed forces, principally in their use of modern rifles, which shifted the balance of 
power in their favor against the less sophisticated weapons of the Bedouins.62 
Hamarneh's63 explanation of the success of the Ottoman efforts shifts the 
gravity to the socio-economic transformation that many of the tribes underwent 
during that period, by going from the purely nomadic, based on camel husbandry, to 
the semi-nomadic, based on multi-animal husbandry. This process meant that the 
tribes gave up their strategic asset, embodied in their mobility and the ability to move 
into the depths of the desert, which were unreachable by the Ottoman authorities.64 
The movements of some tribes came to correspond to the sheep's life cycle, limiting 
the area that the Ottoman armed forces had to cover in order to subject them. Apart 
from its explanatory power in understanding the facilitation of direct rule, 
Hamarneh's argument is vital in reflecting the social change that the break down of 
the NMP brought about.65 
Other policies used by the Ottoman government to subdue the Bedouin tribes 
were made effective by the articulation of the NMP with the tribute formation and by 
its decline in the case of some nomadic tribes, which increased the reliance of the 
nomadic community on other sources of revenue.66 Such policies included formally 
61 The reference is to the expeditions that the Ottoman authority undertook during the 1860s 
in the eastern desert of Syria as well as in the area of Trans-Jordan. The expeditions in 'Ajluun in 
1851 and At-Salt in 1867 resulted in installing a governor for the district. A punitive expedition 
targeted Beni-Sakher two years later, resulting in the latter's submission and its paying the cost of the 
expedition. Lewis, Norman (1955), The Frontier of Settlement in Syria. 1800-1950, p262. 
62 Lewis, Norman. (1955), The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800-1950, p262-64. 
63 Hamameh. M. (1985), p49-50 and 61-64. 
64 See Appendix 3 concerning the NMP and its decline. 
65 Lewis's argument on its own cannot explain the Ottoman authority's success in obtaining 
_!h~ _submission of th~ j3edQUin .tribes l:tnd assuring the end of their: raids, taking into account the size 
and quality of the Ottoman armed forces that were used for that propose. The presence of strong 
tribes such as Beni §.akhr and AI-'Adwaan and the availability of the desert as a safe haven for them 
.._ ___ ___,=-o~d .......  ~~!U:n~de_suct:Lao .. acbie:v.ementdifficuiLI:iowev.er,.Lewis~s .argument.can.be~valid.if-it .. comes-
within the framework fhat Hiirriameh's argument establishes. 
66 As was arguea In Kppendix 3. 
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rewarding those tribal sheikhs who collaborated with the Ottoman representatives in 
the area by awarding them title to the land or an official position within administrative 
bodies.67 The Ottomans used the means at the state's disposal to ensure the 
cooperation of certain tribes. such as giving one of them rather than others the right 
to protect the pilgrims' caravans, which meant extra revenue for the sheikhdom and 
for some of the tribesmen. 68 
Besides the rewarding and incorporating policies, the state was determined to 
implement punitive policies towards the sheikhs who showed a resistance to its 
authority. Such policies ranged from depriving the whole tribe of the possibility to 
conduct any services to the state, and consequently of potential revenue, to the 
imprisonment of their sheikhs, and the treatment of them as rogue figures.69 These 
policies were often very effective and resulted, in some cases, in turning the body of 
the tribe against the sheikhs or shifting the sheikhdom from one leader to another. 70 
A further policy was the Ottoman's establishment of settlements in different 
areas within the sphere of influence in order to host immigrants who were pouring 
into the area for reasons such as its wars with Russia or in the Balkans. Such 
settlements also proved to be effective in maintaining its direct rule in the area of 
Trans-Jordan.71 The settlement policy became more central during the 1860s and 
1870s, when the Circassians were settled in Amman, Jerash and Zarqa. Lewis 
argues that these settlements and others, such as the Christians72 of AI-Karak in 
Madaba, resulted in extending the cultivated area,73 with the result that the.y 
constituted a buffer zone between the already settled communities and the nomadic 
67 Rogan, E. L. (1991). p74-75 and also Hamameh, M. (1985), p 64-65. 
66 See Hamarneh. M. (1985). p67-69. Rogan. E. L. (1991), 139-144. 
69 Rogan, E. L. (1991), p72. 
7
° Concerning 'Adowaan tribe see Hamameh, M. (1985), p66-68. Rogan, E. L. (1991), p72. 
Rogan, E. L. (1 994), p33. 
71 Even though, according to Owen, the settlement policy took definite shape in the 1860s 
with the settlements that were established in different places in Sytia (Owen, R. (1993) p 170-172), 
Rogan shows that the first attempt to use this policy in Transjordan goes back to 1850, when an 
Algerian colony was established in Ajluun for a short period of time, mainly to play the role of 
challenging the Bedouin raids and thus securing a revenue from the peasants (Rogan, E. L (1994), 
p35-34; Rogan. E. L. (1991 ). p72). 
72 Rogan shows that the Ottoman authority encouraged the cultivators to settle in villages that 
had been abandoned over the previous periods. The first two new villages, AI-Euhii§ and AI-
• _____ Bumiimiin,._wer.e_Chr,istian_ones_(Rogao,_E .. -L.(.t994).-pt05::..1.07.J.:.-See-also-Abu~Jaber, .R.-(-1.989),, 
pi34-145. 
73 Lewis, Norman. (1955), The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800-1950, p265-66. 
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and semi-nomadic tribes. The settlements policy continued into the early 1900s, 
when four new mixed Circassian/Cecen villages which were founded to the east of 
Amman. 74 The internal social structure of these communities, which was essentially 
sedentary, their lifestyle, which had been imported from their original homeland, the 
support that they obtained from the central authority and their being armed, 
introduced a new balance of power between the rural and Bedouin communities. 75 It 
is worth-mentioning here that these settlers remained a closed community because 
of the continuous confrontation with the indigenous peasants and Bedouins. This 
fact can explain the lack of complete integration of the Circassian and Cecen 
communities into the Jordanian social texture of the 201h century, highlighting the 
importance of ethnicity as a social factor according to which the components of the 
Jordanian society should be studied. In this context, this vertical social factor will be 
incorporated into the analysis of the bourgeoisie. 
The socio-economic change that the Bedouin tribes had undergone, the 
policies of the state and its determination, the interest of some social groups (within 
the Jordanian domain and outside it) and the role of the settlements made the return 
of the state to the area of Trans-Jordan successful to a large extent. At one level, 
these factors themselves and the successful presence of the state meant the 
redrawing of relations between the different components of the SFs. At another 
level, the relations established between the different components of the society, or 
between some segments or individuals and the state, became a vital factor reflecting 
the importance of their status within the society. One could argue that the relations 
established between Ottoman authority and society in the late 19th and early 20th 
century gave a shape and characteristics to the forthcoming relations between the 
Jordanian state and society. 
The process of reintegration of the area of Trans-Jordan within the domain of 
the central authority control brought to the area the Ottoman administrative system. 76 
74 Rogan, E. L. (1991}, p113. 
75 Lewis, Norman (1955), The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800-1950, p265-66. Rogan, E. 
L. (1991). p117-120. Rogan reports some incidents where confrontations, some of which were 
bloody, broke out between the Circassians and the Bedouins when the former refused to pay the 
l<haawah on the harvest seasons or the Bedouins released their herds in the Circassians' fields. 
76 In brief, the Ottoman system was a hierarchical pyramid centralized in the capital, at the top 
of which was the Sultan. The_e..mQire ccm.slsted of diffe_renJ P.LOYJoceS.._called Vi/aye!$ (Wilaay.at) and 
ruled by a VaH. Each Vilayet was divided into Sancaks (Liwa ' or Mutasarrifiit) , each of which was 
under the rule of a Mutasarrif. In its turn, the Sancal< was made up of smaller administrative units 
called Kazas (Qaqaa'), which were under the management of a Kaymakam. The smallest unit in this 
91 
However, since the second half of the 191h century and up to the First World War, the 
area of Trans-Jordan did not enjoy a consistent administrative status. On the 
contrary, the different administrative units were subject to a continuous readjustment 
that affected both their centre and their subordinate units. n The way in which the 
administrative units of Jordan were connected to one another and were answerable 
to superior units could also vary over time.78 This lack of consistency can be largely 
attributed to the fact that integrating the area of Jordan was a gradual process. In 
this context, the change in administrative structure coincided with new conditions 
brought about by the extension of the central authority within Jordan. Other factors 
contributed to the frequent changes in the structure of the administration, such as 
the need to find an efficient system for collecting taxes, or to take into account the 
local balance of power. Moreover, one could claim that this distribution was not 
based on specific criteria, but rather on the old divisions and on the consideration of 
provincial differences which contributed to the continuous changes in the empire at 
large. 
At the turn of the century, the administrative structure of the area of Trans-
Jordan was subject to further adjustments.79 In the last phase of the Ottoman rule, 
system was the Nahiye, which belonged administratively to the Kaza and usually consisted of different 
villages and/or of a geographical area based in one village of some relative importance. The Nahiye 
was ruled by a Mudiir (Awad, Abdelaziz M. (1969) Al-idaara a/-'uthmaaniyya fii wilaaya suriyya 1864-
1914, p67-70. Rogan, Eugene L. (1994) Bringing the state back: the limits of Ottoman rule in 
Transjordan, 1940-1910', p37-38). 
77 In 1893, for example, the sancak Ma'an was established, having its center in Ma'an and 
including the qagaa' Karak, Ma'an and AI-Tafila (Awad, Abdelaziz M. (1969), p78-79). One year later, 
on request of the inhabitants of Karak, the authorities established a sancak Karak to replace that of 
Ma'an. Later still, the qaf!.aa' Salt was included, and became the center of the sancak together with 
Karak (Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988), p8-9). 
78 For instance, the qaf!.aa' Karak and Ma'an were linked to the sancak Jerusalem up to 1879, 
when they became connected to the sancak Nablus (Awad, Abdelaziz M. (1969), p78). The qagaa ' 
Salt had been attached to the sancak Nablus since its establishment in 1867; however, this link was 
changed in 1905 to the sancak Karak (Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988), p7-8). 
79 At the beginning of the 20th century, it included the qadaa' 'Ajluun, whose center was lrbid 
and which included 2 Nahiyes and 102 villages. This qadaa· was answerable to the sancak Hawran 
and consisted of almost the whole northern part of Jordan down to the river Zarqa, which lies to the 
south of Jerash and to the north of Amman and AI-Salt. Some of the area which became part of the 
Jordanian state in the 1920s was not included in the qadaa'. namely the Northam Ghor, which was 
linked to the qadaa' Tiberias, which was part of the sancak Acer. Ramtha and the surrounding 
villages, on the other hand, were connected to Dar'a (now a Syrian town), which was itself part of 
Hawran (Awad, Abdelaziz M. (1~9), p78-79, 340-342. Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988), p7). To the 
north of Karak was the qadaa' Balqa, whose center was in At-Salt and which comprised the area to 
the south of the river Zarqa, including the town of Zarqa and extending south to the Wadi ai-Mujlb, 
which ends in the center of the Dead Sea. As was mentior:ted.abo.v_e,Jbis.qadaa:..wasJinkedJo Nablus .. 
up to 1905, when the link shifted to Karak (Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988), p8). In 1900 it consisted of 
2 Nahiyes (Amman and Ziza) ar:td 9 villages (Awad. Abdelaziz M. (1969), p79, Madi, M. and Musa. S. 
(1988), p8). By the end of the 19th century, with the foundation of the sancak AI-Karak, the southern 
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the area that made up Jordan in the aftermath of the First World War already had its 
administrative unity. By then it comprised two main units, i.e. the qagaa' Ajluun, 
which was linked to Hawran, and the rest of the area, which since 1905 was 
revolving around the sancak AI-Karak. The existence of administrative links 
between the different districts did not by any means imply analogous economic ties; 
such ties remained, in the majority of cases, horizontal, i.e. with the urban centers of 
what would become the British mandate of Palestine. Certainly, economic relations 
between each of the Jordanian districts and Damascus - and to a lesser extent 
between them and the other Syrian urban centers - varied in strength and nature 
according to the district. However, these ties did not necessarily imply 
corresponding ties or even sub-ties between the different districts; in fact, mutual ties 
between the districts were almost non-existent. In this context, one could argue that 
the different districts of the area of Jordan were mere satellites or regions of 
influence of other urban centers, principally Palestinian or Syrian. 
The internal relations between tribes, villages and tribal confederations and 
the administrative structure of the area as they existed in the last phase of the 
Ottoman rule determined the regional differentiation of the areas of Jordan. Three 
distinct regions resulted: Ajluun, in the far north, Balqa in the center and Karak in the 
south. These areas, which did not correspond to any solid geographical foundation, 
became one of the bases by which the Jordanian society could be distinguished, 
and even regionally mobilized, throughout its historical development until the present 
day. In other words, these historical factors and the Ottoman administrative 
structure within the area of Jordan established the ground upon which regionalism 
was enforced as a base for social differentiations and mobilizations. Regionalism is 
thus a further vertical factor which must be taken into consideration in any analysis 
of Jordanian society at large and of the bourgeoisie in particular. 
2.2 .2 THE PEASANTS' COMMUNITIES 
The miserliness of nature was decisive in shaping the life styles in this region 
during the 19th century. As was mentioned above, the majority of the land is arid 
and uncultivable, while the actual cultivable area is about 6.0-8.0 %80 of the total 
--- - --Rar.ta.tJor.dan_constituted_ooe.administrative_body:,_with_tbe_exceptlon.of. Aqaba, .which was.linked.to. 
Hijaz. -
80 These data are based on the figures of the 1950s. 
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land, including the irrigated area. However, it should not be assumed that this small 
proportion was regularly cultivated. The fluctuation of the rainfall from year to year 
was a significant factor causing variation in the size of the cultivated area on an 
annual basis. 
Other reasons outside the natural and climatic realm, such as the limited 
population of the region over the 191h century, contributed to keep the cultivated area 
smaller than the cultivable one. By reviewing the accounts of the western travelers 
who visited Trans-Jordan or some parts of it in the 191h century, Hamarneh8' 
demonstrates that the population of the settled community was limited.82 The natural 
and climatic conditions together with 'famine, plague, and poor hygienic conditions'83 
put pressure on the natural growth of population, resulting in limited settled 
communities and consequently limited cultivated areas. 
Another important factor which had an impact on the area cultivated and 
limited the population of rural areas was the lack of security that the peasants faced 
due to the Bedouins' raids. The villagers had to cope with the burden of the tribute 
that the state exacted plus that which the Bedouins imposed in the form of Khaawah, 
which was sometimes more than they could tolerate and in some cases drove them 
to abandon their villages. In situations like these, they84 kept changing village every 
few years, seeking more secure locations.85 In addition to the above factors, 
abandoning villages was a practice known among peasants who were unable to pay 
back debts owed to urban lenders.86 
The means of production are another rational explanation for such a limited 
cultivated area. Hamarneh stresses the fact that the tools of production were very 
81 Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p72-74. 
82 In 1879, the population of the northern qadaa' was estimated around 20,000 inhabitants 
occupying some 60 villages, while the population of northern 'Ajluun (excluding Tibneh) was estimated 
at 10,463, covering some 36 villages. The population of AI-Salt was about 3,000 in 1812 and 6,000 in 
1879. In 1848, the population of AI-Karak was estimated at 300 families, while in 1886 it was 
estimated at 4,000-5,000, in 1889 at 8,000. Hamarneh attributes the variation in the population of AI-
Karak in particular to some of the population being excluded due to the fact that these estimations 
coincided with the annual cycle of people who were still semi-nomadic, though part of the community 
of AI-Karak (Hamarneh, M.B. (1 985), p72-77). 
83 Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p72. 
84 Lewis, Norman (1955), The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800-1950, p259-264. 
85
.See l:lamarnehr-M, B,...(-1.985),p7-1 -7.4~Aiso Abu Jaber: R.-(.:1989h.Pioneer over Jordanr p27-. . . ---
Lewis. Norman (1955). The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800-1950, p259-264. 
tl6 Rafeq, A . (1984). p388. 
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primitive and did not witness any significant improvement; for the most part the 
villagers of the Jordanian area continued to use the same tools of production that 
their ancestors employed. The only exception,87 in this context, was the introduction 
of the oxen plough.88 In fact, the villagers kept using traditional agricultural methods 
up to the first few decades of the 201h century. 
The characteristics of land ownership are of vital importance to review the 
sedentary communities. Along with the theoretical framework that Amin advances 
concerning tribute formation in arid and semi-arid contexts, the ownership of the land 
within the sedentary community in the Ottoman Empire at large and in Jordan in 
particular should be understood. The different land regimes that the Ottoman 
Empire, and consequently the area of Jordan, experienced maintained the principles 
of the TMP, according to which the peasants had the usufruct of the land and the 
state exacted the surplus in form of tribute. According to this equation, various land 
regimes were subject to change or complete replacement. The process of replacing 
one regime by another was an evident sign of the exhaustion of the old one to serve 
the relations of production maintaining their tribute and maximizing it when needed. 
In this context, the timal9 system was probably applied and then replaced90 by the 
iltizam or tax farming91 • The latter system went through the same process and the 
tanzimat that the state undertook were aimed at reconstructing the tribute relations 
87 Abu Jaber claims that in large landholdings more advanced tools of production were used 
compared to those used by the villagers. This claim, which is based on some remaining records of the 
agricultural activities of some of the large landholdings, Indicates that certain techniques and 
organizational methods were adopted in these fanns (Abu Jaber, R. (1989), p131-139 ). 
88 Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p79-80. 
89 This system was widespread in the Ottoman empire in the formative period up to the 
beginning of the 171h century. According to it, the state assigned an area of land known as a timarto 
military officers, who collected the taxes from the peasants in order to support themselves and provide 
the state with the required services in return. This practice was the spine of the fiscal system in the 
Ottoman Empire (see Karpat, K. (1968), 69-70). 
90 The need for replacing this system came about when it could no longer maintain the 
relations of production of the tribute formation: the presence of the central government was weakened 
and the power of the officers who were granted the land was strengthened, leading to a drop in the 
tribute to the state and evolving towards forming relations of production that could give the military 
officers the status of an independent class (Karpat, K. (1968) , p71 ). According to Amin, this is the 
core idea of a TMP evolving into feudalist relations (see Amin about the TMP in the previous section of 
this chapter). The process of centr~ll~atio_n that the state sought was aimed at reinforcing the tribute 
relations of production. In this context, the timar system was abolished and the social bases of its 
power were replaced by changing the land regime. 
• --------
9
'- ln-this-system-;-whichl'eplacecrtnerimar, ttie state· auctionecnner@it to collect tfle taxes ----
from a given area to a local notabl~.-I.~dUf~WQn_ oJ _t~i_§.Jig.!J!_var!~d $1nd b~CaiTJe at 011e_ point for life 
-(see·R·afeq; A. ' (1984) p382:3ss-and Karpat, K. (1968), p 71-72). 
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of production.92 In this sense, the 1858 land code was instituted in order to eliminate 
the old land systems. 
From the peasants' point of view, the relationship to the land could be of 
three main types: mashaaa3 , mirr4 and, to a lesser extent, private property. The 
concrete examples from the area suggest that these various forms of ownership co-
existed within a complex structure, and that the patterns in which they were 
combined were not comprehensive ones95. The underlying factors96 that gave birth 
to and maintained the mashaa' system in the area of Trans-Jordan are of vital 
importance, considering that this system continued to exist even after the restoration 
of the Ottoman direct rule and the implementation of 1858 land code. Regardless of 
the importance of his argument for looking at the system in the framework ot 
communal stages,97 Warriner claims that the mashaa' system evolved from the 
92 However, the context in which these latter attempts came about coincides with the rise of 
capitalism in Europe and the gradual incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist system. 
Moreover, as Karpat argues, the Ottoman government managed to hit the a'ayaan (local notables). 
who were the representatives of the iltizam regime, but was not successful in destroying the basis of 
its social power as it had been done with the timar(Karpat, K. (1968), p72-75). 
93 The mashaa' can be defined as the distribution of the land in equal shares between 
cultivators of one community, such as a village or tribe. In this sense, every member of the community 
has a right of usufruct on the land. For more information, see Warriner, D. (1 944), p75-76: Hamarneh. 
M. (1985), p82; Fischbach, Michael R. (2000), p44-46. 
94 The term miri refers to state land. In many cases, the miri that lay outside the boundaries of 
the village was given in form of mazara', ciftlik or timar, depending on the land system used by then. 
However, that did not mean that the state was not the owner anymore. Rafeq, A. (1982) p 374-375. 
95 The area of qagaa' 'Ajluun had the various kinds of land ownership prior to the direct 
Ottoman period. The mashaa' was the most common and the land used to be re-divided every two or 
three years, when each peasant took a share in the land that he could cultivate. Redistribution of the 
land took place when outsiders came to settle in the village. The rivalry between two family 
confederations in the town of AI-Salt led to a division of the land into sections: the first confederation 
was collectively assigned the land within the town, the other one the land outside the town. Al-tfaara, 
a neighborhood in the town center, consisted of 'Awaamilah and Oa1iishaat, while the confederation of 
families outside the town was called AI-Akraad and comprised 'Arabiiaat, Khariisaat, tlYaaraat and 
Nsuur. The three confederations that dominated the politics of Al-Karak also had a great impact on 
land tenure, since the land was divided into three sections among the confederations (Fischbach, M, 
(2000), p1 0-15). 
96 Despite the fact that there is general consent among the scholars on the concept of 
mashaa', the interpretation of the underlying factors that contributed to the preservation of this type of 
property is not unanimous. 
97 There was a stage that preceded the mashaa' which was equivalent to the communal stage 
in a sedentary community, in that the members of such a community had equal rights in the usufruct of 
the land and each member had the same share of the land quantitatively and qualitatively. Such an 
argutnent has a ground, since important factors kept the mashaa' system alive, such as natural 
conditions, social insecur'ity, general poverty and instability and their consequences (Warriner, D. 
(1944), p75-76), Hamarneh, who agrees with Warriner's definition, places great emphasis on the two 
stages of communal community. In the case of Jordan, some of the conditions are clearly natural, 
•- -----,s=-u,..,..cn as the need tifrely -on fluctuating rain-falls, whih:i. others. are related to securifY.bei'ng the resUif of' 
the artlculation of the NMP with the sedentary community as part of the tribute formation (Hamarneh, 
M.B. (1985), p76-77) . 
96 
Arabian tribal customs. 98 Such claims have been recently challenged by some 
scholars, based on the co-existence of private property and the mashaa', as noted 
above and to be considered below.99 Accordtng to these scholars, the persistence of 
the mashaa' is a consequence of the taxation policy. The mashaa' system was a 
very effective device for the community to bear the taxes levied on their lands. '00 
Such an argument has explanatory power as regards the preservation of the system; 
however, other factors believed by Warriner to explain the emergence and 
reinforcement of the mashaa' are also vital in the case of Transjordan. This acquires 
a certain significance, bearing in mind that the NMP was articulated with the TMP101• 
In this context, the raids of the nomads were equivalent to a taxation system; hence, 
the peasants collectively tried to protect themselves or paid the khaawah . The 
continuous alteration of villages and plains that the peasants practiced in natural 
Syria reinforced such a system. 102 
Private ownership existed along with the mashaa,_ Fischbach argues that 
some sheikhs of 'Ajluun acquired the land as their own private property, especially 
when they led their tribes and followers to conquer new villages. On some 
occasions, the sheikh managed to reduce the peasants to sharecroppers, claiming 
the whole land for himself. 103 In more common circumstances, the sheikh divided 
the land into two (not necessarily equal) sections, one of which was distributed 
98 Warriner, D. (1944), p75-76. In very Similar fashion , Rafeq emphasizes the fact that the 
limited number of the peasants, which favoured a distribution of work according to family unit, 
contributed to extend the life of this system (Rafeq, A. (1982) p 382-385). On the basis of Warriner's 
tribal customs interpretation and Hamarneh two routes that nomads take to sedentary, one could 
argue that some nomadic unit, in its process of sedentarization, carried with it a distribution of the 
cultivations based on kinship ties, which had developed in the period of nomadism. The unfavourable 
conditions, whether they were environmental or related to the structure of the SF, reinforce such trend. 
See Appendix (3) about the tribes of the weakest link in process of abanding the nomadic relations of 
production. 
99 The fact that there was not a unique system even within the domain of one village or one 
tribe, in addition to the existence of private property in some tribes and the mashaa' in other 
neighbouring ones, makes it difficult to accept Warriner's arguments without a great deal of 
precaution. 
100 Fischbach, M. (2000), p44-45. Mundy, M. (1994), Village Land and Individuals Title, p60-
101 About the two forms that break down of the NMP relations take and their consequences 
see Hamarneh (1985), p51-57 and see also Appendix 3. 
102 Based on Amin's thesis concerning the peasants in the poor agriculture tribute formation, 
•-----the.peasant.communities.were-isolated.and.their-production.was-limited.to. their-own.sustenance.- . . -
103 Ttle example that Fischbach gives is the case concerning Sheikh Jabr ai-Warda in the 
village of Amraawa. Fischbach, M. {2000), p49-50. 
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among the villagers, while the other was privately owned by him. 104 In many of the 
cases in which the sheikhs appropriated some land, the land size was not their main 
concern, but the land quality: the irrigated lands or the ones with olive trees and 
vines were the domain of their interest. Based on Fischbach's account concerning 
land distribution. one could argue that the tendency towards having plots owned by 
sheikhs was more common among the stronger tribes than among the weaker ones. 
However the land was distributed, the sheikhs had a determinant role in the division 
of the land and in the decision of whether they themselves would possess any 
private plots. The strong tribes in an area played the role of tribute collector from 
different villages for the state. The social power of the sheikhs of such tribes was 
thus based on their exaction of the surplus rather than on the possession of 
agricultural estates, which in fact was not their main concern.105 
The forms of ownership should have undergone a change after the 
introduction of the 1858 land code and its implementation . In some specific areas of 
the Ottoman Empire, this assumption is to a large extent correct. Therefore, in 
dealing with the sedentary community in Jordan, it is necessary to take a better look 
at the code and its objectives. The objectives of the land code, according to 
scholars who studied it, can be summarized as follows: to re-assert state ownership 
over the land that had slipped away as a result of the previous land systems.106 A 
direct relation between the state and the cultivators was established by granting the 
latter a title to the land and flowing revenue to the treasury. In this context, the 
code's main objective was to weaken the power of the feudal notables and sheikhs 
that flourished under the previous land regimes and to favour the centralized state 
by reasserting its ownership over land.107 Warriner extends this argument to suggest 
that the code's main political objective was to reconstruct a strong centralized 
government presiding over a basis of smallholding cultivators.108 The concrete 
1().4 For instance, Falah ai-Ruusaan took a large share of Umm Qeis village when he led his 
tribe to conquer it; the rest of the land, however, was left to be distributed among his followers. 
105 Fischbach, Michael R. (2000), p4. 
108 Karpat, K. (1968) , Land"Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization, p86. 
107 Baer, G. (1962). The Evolution of the Private Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile 
t,.--- -Cr.escent, p84-85; WarriAer~D,...(-t944),p~73-74r-Karpat,.K-(-1.968),L.and-Regime,-Sociai -Str:ucturerand----­
Modernization. p86. 
-- - · 
168 w~rrine-r;·-o-. (1-944): 73-74. --
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reality109, however, suggests that what was achieved was not consistent with the 
above-mentioned objectives. For example, the application of the land code resulted 
in ownership 110 forms that did not correspond to the literal meaning of some of the 
code articles, with no attempt on the authority's side to challenge them, 111 especially 
as regards the emergence of the large land owners, who evicted the peasants or 
reduced them to sharecroppers.111 In Trans-Jordan, in some cases the authority 
reinforced old land regimes. For instance, in 'Ajluun tax-farming was reintroduced in 
1875, when the land was auctioned, and it took a villagers' revolt in 1877 to 
persuade the government to stop collecting taxes according to this system.113 
Moreover, the government never attempted to challenge the Transjordanian 
villagers' conceptualization of land ownership, which remained outside the essence 
of the code .11"' 
On another level, an argument of Warriner's - widely adopted by other 
scholars - is that the intention of the land code was to weaken the power of notables, 
tribal sheikhs and local powers. This is challenged by the Slugletts,116 at least within 
109 This contrast is attributed to implementation faults, inaccurate land surveys in the rural 
areas, an insufficient and incompetent registering body and the fact that the peasants preferred not to 
register the land in their names fearing this could lead to conscription (Awad, A. (1969), p 2). 
110 These ownership forms were sometimes in contrast with each other, some of them being 
consistent with the articles of the code. others standing in complete contradiction with respect to what 
the law stated. For instance, shared ownership of the land among the inhabitants of a given village 
continued to exist. contrasting article 8 of the code. In contrast with this form, the large land-holders 
emerged in the process of land registration to oppose the code, which sanctioned that the title of the 
entire village land should not be given to one person. In certain villages, on the other hand, the land 
was distributed among the villagers in conformity with the articles of the code, establishing another 
form of ownership. 
111 On the contrary, it seems that the authority was satisfied with the results of the 
implementation of the code, and that its main concem was to Improve the efficiency of tax collections. 
112 Sluglett and Farouk-Siuglett refute the claims suggesting that the large-holding lands in 
Syria were the result of the application of the land code, regardless if this result was due to 
implementation faults or to a conscious state policy. According to them, the large-holding lands were 
a direct outcome of the extensions of security and of the economic conditions that made continuous 
cultivation more feasible, rather than of the introduction or application of the code (Siuglett, P, and 
Farouk-Siuglett, M. (1984), Applications of the 1858 Land Code, p413). This becomes apparent in the 
fact that there was a quantitative increase in the large estate private ownership rather than a 
changeover to this form of ownership. Such arguments find a great deal of support in Rafeq's 
assertion that in Syria the large-holding lands emerged prior to the introduction of the code, as a main 
result of money-lending and other practices. Loans and advanced payments were common in 
different areas of Syria since the 1840s, especially in Hawraan. Rafeq claims that the interest rate for 
such advances and loans stood at 25% in the ear1y 1850 (see Rafeq, A. (1984), p389-390). The 
transfer of the land from the peasants' hands to the urban notables', however, took place mostly 
dunng the process of implementation of the code after 1858. 
113 Fischbach, M. (2000), p32. 
----- • tf4!=ischbach, M.-(2-00-0-).- p-4-9-5-1-. - -
tts Sluglett, P. and Farouk-Siuglett, M. (1984), Applications ofthe 1858 Land Code, p413. 
99 
the domain of the Syrian case, since such notables and tribal sheikhs maintained 
their power and actually gained ground in the process of land registration. 
Moreover, the authority used the power of the sheikhs and notables in order to 
extend its direct rule, collect taxes and implement the land code. Incorporating 
sheiks and notables of the Transjordanian area was in fact one of the policies 
implemented during the late-191h century. 
In this context, it is appropriate to recall the Slugletts' claim that the code was 
intended by the Ottoman authorities 'as a revenue-raising device to take advantage 
of the evident demand for the formalization of 'property rights', however defined'116• 
In this sense, the interpretation of the code and the results of its implementation 
were highly hallmarked by the socio-economic conditions and the politics of the 
environment.117 The variations in the results of the implementation of the code over 
the different regions of the Ottoman empire was by no means a reflection of faults in 
its application or of the underlying objectives of the code, but rather of the flexibility 
of the law118 and of its application, which resulted in making the role of the objective 
conditions of each region determinant. This provides a point of departure for looking 
at land tenure and ownership and at the relations of production within the sedentary 
domain in light of the application of the land code. 
In Jordan, since land registration varied from one region to another, the 
significance of the code also varied. In this context, Fischbach claims that 'Ajluun 
was the only region that experienced a comprehensive registration, which began in 
the late 1870s and lasted for about 30 years. In the first years of the 20th century, 
the majority of the land of 'Ajluun was registered according to the 1858 code. 
However, several factors contributed to the delay in the registration and hindered its 
completion, such as the fact that the local cultivators were suspicious that the 
registration was associated with conscription, the lack of budget for carrying out a 
swift registration and the alterations in the land policy dictated by the difficulties th~t 
116 Sluglett, P. and Farouk-Siuglett, M. (1984), p414. 
1
'
1r See the contribution of Rogan on the debate concerning the code, and in particular on the 
Slugletts' conceptualization of the aims of the code. The relevance of Rogan here is that he 
- -conceived the aim of the code in light of its applications in Ottoman Jordan (Rogan, E. (1.991 ), p304-
305). 
118 Clearly, the flexibility of the law was not exclusively dependent on the essence of the code 
1- ---an-d::-o-::f:-:cit,.....s-artl.cfes, or -on their objectives, but reasons such as ·the· lack ora suffiCfenfbudget or of a 
capable cadre and the inaccuracy of. tl:le land surveys contributed in some cases to the flexibility of the 
code at large and of its implementation in particular. 
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the center faced .119 Contrary to 'Ajluun, where the implementation of the code was 
based on instructions from the authorities to the qaflaa' to carry out registration, the 
application of the code in AI-Balqa was carried out voluntarily by the villagers. A 
registry office had been there since the establishment of the qaf!_aa' in 1867. 
Despite the fact that land continued to be acquired according to the customs and the 
rural/Bedouin politics, land registration and the legitimization of titles to land by 
deeds from the Ottoman authorities became a trend in the last two decades of the 
191h century. Several factors encouraged this voluntary registration, including the 
fear of some tenants of losing the usufruct of their lands, which could be acquired 120 
by other tenants or by a tribe, especially if such lands were a subject of dispute. The 
settlement of Circassians in Amman and Zarqa, where lands were given to them by 
governmental deed, motivated others to request deeds over their lands for fear that 
they could be reassigned. Land transaction by the registry office was another 
channel through which lands were registered. The need to officially register loans 
and advanced payments that cultivators obtained from money-lenders were further 
factors which favored the registration process.121 In AI-Karak, since the documents 
of the registry office were destroyed in the 1910 revolt , information concerning the 
registration are limited; 122 however, Fischbach claims that there is evidence that 
voluntary reg istration took place from 1899 in Al-Karak and AI-Iafiila and from 1905 
in Ma'an. Mandatory land registration was introduced in A~Karak in 1909.123 
Apart from the relief from the khaawah and the improvement in the security 
measures, the impact of the code and of the direct rule of the Ottomans on the 
general conditions of the peasants' lives was insignificant. The means of production 
remained at the same primitive level. The increase in the agricultural output was 
mainly due to the extension of the cultivated land that came about as a result of 
introducing better security conditions for the peasants and for the new settlements, 
rather than to any development in the agricultural methods. The only cases in which 
better agricultural methods, and to a lesser extent improved means of production, 
119 Fischbach, Michael R. (2000), p29-32. 
120 The acquisition of the land in the region of AI-Balqa and to the south of it was done just by 
tribal encroaching of a given land or by changing the boundaries of the land. 
121 Rogan, E. (1991), p142, 300, 308, 313-315, 317-318, 324-328. 
122 Rogan, E. (1991 ), p308. 
123 Fischbach, Micheal R. (2000), p47. 
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were applied were the large-holdings.124 Communication between the different 
peasants' communities remained almost absent. 
Concerning the implementation of the code and its impact on the ownership 
of the land, Fischbach claims that the different land types of the 1858 code were of 
no significance in the perception of the villagers in Trans-Jordan. A parallel simpler 
inventory was known among the villagers and better reflected their conceptualization 
and perception of the land, i.e. the classification of the land into mashaa' and 
mafruuz. 125 The latter refers to plots privately owned by individuals. There was no 
unique pattern concerning which type of land was divided according to the mafruuz 
system, nor a particular region that had this system rather than the mashaa'. In the 
different regions, the two systems might co-exist even within the same village. 
Concerning the type of land, it seems that there was a sort of correlation between 
the irrigation of a land and its being privately owned according to the mafruuz 
system. though irrigated lands owned according to the mashaa' could be found in 
several places in the northern part of Jordan and elsewhere. The other tendency, 
which again does not constitute a rule, is for plots privately owned by individuals to 
be in the tree lands. 126 
These systems were the continuation of those that existed before and which 
were covered above. However, in accordance with the articles of the code, the 
holdings were registered in the name of individuals, hence the plain villages were 
registered in the form of shares, that is the village land was divided into shares 
representing the entire land of the village. According to this method, the individuals 
owned a certain share of the village holdings, 127 although the area that corresponded 
to the individual shares was not specified or fixed. The peasants' conception of the 
land remained as it had been before, since the land still formed 'a whole divided 
between cultivators'. 128 In this sense, the mashaa' system was the peasants' device 
124 Abu-Jaber, (1989), p46-57. 
125 Fischbach, Michael R. (2000), p49-51 . 
126 Fischbach, Michael R. (2000), p49-55. Also Mundy, M. (1994), p65-66. 
127 The village land was typically divided into different quarters, in which each member of the 
community or each family had a share. The land division into areas reflected a qualitative 
•-----liiff~reotiation_c.oocer.oing.tl:le.t_Qpography.oUheJand,-the.water.~ources-(irrigated-or rain-fed)-·and·.the-- --
presence of tree land (Fischbach, Micheal R. (2000), p38; Mundy, M. (1994}, p64). 
128 Mundy, M. (1994), p65-66. 
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to bear the taxes collectively, and this system would continue until the British land 
program abolished it in the 1930s. 
One of the main applications of the code in Syria in particular and in other 
Ottoman regions at large was the emergence of large-holdings. Several factors 
contributed to such a phenomenon, one of which was the tendency on the 
cultivators' part to register the land in the name of notables, merchants or sheikhs, 129 
based on the peasants' suspicions concerning the 'hidden' objectives of the 
registration process.130 Contrary to other areas of Syria, where this practice took the 
form of a trend, in Jordan it remained rare. This is supported by Rogan, who 
concentrated his examples on AI-Balqa, 131 and by Mundy and Fischbach, whose 
examples are from 'Ajluun. 132 
According to Hamarneh, large land-holdings emerged in the area of Jordan 
as a result of two developments which took place in the sedentary community. The 
first is that the tax-farmers, who were mainly from the local community and had a 
certain social status within it, were instated in order to tax the rest of the villagers 
within their areas. Some of these, according to the several examples that 
Hamarneh 133 reports, managed to acquire large portions of land, which qualified 
them to be part of the large landholders. 134 
The other process that paralleled the previous one and had the same effect 
was money-lending. The presence of the central government and the 
implementation of the new land law encouraged capital money to flow into different 
regions of Trans-Jordan, especially into the areas where the influence of the 
Ottoman authority was more profound. The level of security that was brought 
around by the presence of the state was one of the factors that induced the 
merchants and other wealthy peasants or bureaucrats to invest in agricultural 
129 Rafeq, A. (1984), p393. 
130 As was mentioned above, in general terms the Transjordanian peasants were suspicious 
for a period of time before the registration went smoothly. 
131 Rogan, E. (1991), p304. 
132 Fischbach, Mi~heal R. (2000), p 54-58. Mundy, M. (1994), p76-79. 
133 Hamarneh, M. (1985), p84-86. 
134 Through his examples, Hamarneh makes a very important correlation between the wealth 
l::- ---of.-a- c-ommunity and the emergence of large land~holders witrunrr- Aence, 'in poor agricultural -
- _communities. withir:~ the sph,ere .. o.Lit<m~t:J9I.d.<~n.Jb.e_possiQi!ity_ of .the mat~riajjz~ti.9n of a larg~ J~nd_­
holder is .. rare (Hamarneh,'M.B. (1985). 84-88) · · 
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lands.135 The different types of money-lending, none exclusive to Jordan, placed 
neither the lender nor the borrower in social stigma. Moreover, the moneylenders 
did not constitute a specific class of capital holders providing loans: the lenders 
whose extra capital made it possible for them to provide loans ranged from small 
shop owners to great merchants. Loans were vital for the peasants, since some 
needed them to keep carrying out their agricultural activities based on rain 
fluctuation, while other loans were just for personal use.'36 Money-lending was 
promoted, regardless of the harsh conditions of loans, by the absence of any 
financial institutions specialized in this sector according to clear regulations. The 
state's sole agricultural bank which advanced loans at an interest rate of 8.0% was 
of no significance, since the budget of its Transjordanian branches could not satisfy 
the needs of the peasants 137. 
Based on Rogan's sample, the data shows that the great majority of the 
lenders' place of origin was not AI-Salt (only 23.0% were from there), nor the area of 
Trans-Jordan; almost half of the loans were by lenders who came from the 
Palestinian cities, in particular Nab/us, whose lenders provided 39% of the total 
loans. Moreover, 27% of the loans were provided by lenders originally from 
Damascus. 136 Such percentages suggest something about the integration that was 
taking place within the region's wider context. It is not surprising that the majority of 
these lenders were from outside the region , since the commercial sector was under 
their dominance. Another important feature is that money-lending operated as an 
integrating device not among the regions that would make up Jordan later on, but 
horizontally with the Palestinian towns and vertically with Damascus.139 In contrast 
135 Karpat highlighted that the urban elite developed high interest in securing a right to the 
land in the light of the European demand on the agricultural products from the Ottoman Empire. 
(Karpat(1968). p73) The· share of agricultural exports in net agricultural production rose from 18.4% 
and 17.8% in 1889 and 1899 respectively to 22.3% in 1910 and 26.5% in 1913. (Pamuk, S. (1987), 
The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism 1820-1913, p83-84.) 
136 The sample that Rogan worked on concerning the loans provided within the ai-Salt domain 
shows that the money lending peak lied over four months of each year, form October until the end of 
January. Relatively moderate activities could be witnessed over the spring and the months from July 
until September. The activities of money lending were clearly influenced by the agricultural base of 
the Trans-Jordanian community of the time: it increased in the sowing period and decreased in the 
period of the harvest (Rogan. E.L (1991). p279-280). 
137 Fischbach, Micheal R. (2000). p 60-61 . See in Fischbach the assests of three branchs 
(lrbid, ai-Salt and ai-Karak) of the Ottman Agricutural Bank in 1918, p62 · 
136 Rogan, E.L. (1991), p281 . 
139
-Rogan-;-ET:-(f99Tj, p2'82-83. See Hamameh concerning these· economic ties-of each 
r~gLo.n ~b~t_cpul~ to S.QrrJe_e).<t~oLe.xplainJIJe_jjjstfn.ctipn_b.etw_een the _diffe(ent regions. (Hamarneh, M. 
(1985), p85-86 and Hamarneh. M. (1996). p1-2) 
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to the lenders, the majority of the borrowers were from AI·Salt, 140 since 86% of loans 
were taken by them. Borrowers whose place of origin was Syria and Palestine141 
possessed only 6.9% each of the total loans represented in the sample.142 Hence, 
the sample and the other data in Trans-Jordan up to the end of the Ottoman rule 
indicate that money-lending was a common practice according to which the 
ownership of large tracks of land was transferred from peasants or semi-nomadic 
individuals to money-lenders. The money-lending relationship tied mainly native 
borrowers and non-native money-lenders. The importance of such an arrangement 
lies in the fact that the almost complete division between the two agents of the 
money-lending process would have an imprint on the emergence of the bourgeoisie 
and its composition in the later periods of Jordanian history. 
Hence, large estate holders emerged within the sphere of Trans-Jordan; 
some of them acquired large extensions of land through money lending, others 
through their social status or their ties with the state. However, the emergence of 
large land-holdings did not result in the general evacuation of the peasants. As 
Hamarneh 143 points out, the relatively underdeveloped means of production used on 
large estates, the limited population of the area and the fact that the development 
towards large land holdings was not a comprehensive change prevented this.144 
2 .2.3 THE MERCHANTS 
The above review of the money-lending activities leads logically to a 
consideration of merchants, who were among the most active lenders and 
140 Among this majority of native borrowers, 12,6% were Bedouins. Rogan, E.L. (1991), 
p282-83. 
141 Rogan shows through some examples that there were some cases in which the borrowers 
were also active lenders in the same period of time. His interpretation for such phenomena is at times 
that the lender ran out of credit due to his extended loans and was thus forced to start borrowing, at 
other times that the lender decided to borrow because of investment opportunities (Rogan. E.L 
(1991), p28.4-85). 
14z Rogan, E.L. (1991), p281 . 
143
.Hamameh. M. (1985), p7o5-78. 
144 The process by which land ownership slipped from the peasants' hands into the emerging 
large landholders' was not an intensive process, due to reasons such as the natural conditions of the 
•-----are-a;the-rack-ot·security ancrtffifCielay rn incorporating·ttie area ·in ttle spl1ereof ltle state. Sfiiceff)e--
population was limited, the formation of large es~tes . dic;l nQJ .L~ag tgJ.tte el,{ac_y_~t(Qn .of tne peasants 
· from tne.lra-nsjordanian- c6uniryside. · · - - · ·· · 
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constituted another component of the SF. Amin's tribute formation in the arid or 
semi-arid areas, which is articulated with long distance trade, gives rise to urban 
centers that could benefit from the transferred surplus of other formations by virtue 
of control over trade routes. Amin states that other commercial activities take place 
within the domain of the tribute SF, i.e. those activities that bind the different 
communities of the formation together. 
However, the area of Jordan did not enjoy a status that could allow it to 
benefit from long distance trade, the only exception being the !J..ajj. The !J..ajj caravan 
was not a normal procession that went through the region, but was a whole city on 
the move, containing all people who served the pilgrims and merchants who sought 
some trade. 145 Nevertheless, the impact of this annual activity on the formation of 
the area of Jordan was not profound. The period in which the caravan remained in 
the area was relatively short and the exchange with the local communities was 
limited. 146 
In light of these circumstances, Trans-Jordan was confined to the second 
type of commercial activities, i.e. to the internal trade that connected the peasants, 
the Bedouins and the urban centers together.147 The fact that Jordan did not 
develop any urban centers in the late Ottoman era due to the nonexistence of trade 
routes and the lack of security in the presence of the articulation of the NMP and 
TMP, left a great deal of the commercial activities to be conducted by merchants 
from Palestine or Damascus. There are two forms in which the commercial activities 
can be categorized: in the first instance, the Bedouins and the peasants approached 
the urban centers either in Palestine or Syria to exchange their products for 
necessary goods; 148 in the second, the exchange process was reversed, the 
merchants being the ones who targeted the communities of Trans-Jordan. The 
145 Hamameh, (1985), p67-68. 
146 Hamarneh, (1985), p68-69. The tLajj had a certain Impact on the nomadic tribes in the 
area of Jordan, as will be covered below. 
147 Amin, (1975), p12-16. 
148 Such a form, which was practiced at the tribal or regional level, was organized in seasonal 
caravans, some of which were periodical. The mem_bers of a. given community woulq conJribut~ .to Jhe 
cdmposition"'of the caravafi, 'wnlte the exchange process was in 'the na.rids of thos'e wl10. travelled with 
the caravan. Ooumani, relying on Burckhardt, shows that in the summer season the Bedouin tribes, 
such as Benr-§akhr, .!::!uuataat and 'Adwan, gathered large quantities of barilla, processing it to 
• o-- - --;prodace=-q//w;-whlch\Vas ·vitarfor tne soap proauctionintilaolus; and· sennfin caravans toNablu_s_. ---,.... 
See Doumani, B. (1995) Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasaf)ts_ ifl .}fJbal Nai)Jus. tl.OO: 
--·(900, p203-30·f . . . -·· ·-- - ·- -~ .. . - - ·- - - - - ' ' 
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latter is the main concern of this section. This form of exchange, which was 
employed mainly by non-native merchants, and even the character of the 
commercial activities in the area were to a large extent determined by several 
factors, above all by security considerations and the motivation that moved the 
merchants to take up such adventures. In this sense, it is correct to claim, as Rogan 
does, that the patterns and intensity of the commercial activities in the area changed 
according to improvements in security.149 Prior to direct Ottoman rule, the lack of the 
state's presence and consequently the low level of security moulded the pattern of 
commercial activities.150 Relying on Burckhardt's accounts in 1812, AI-Salt had 
around 20 shops, which served the communities of Trans-Jordan. These shops 
operated on a commission basis for Palestinian merchants from Jerusalem, Nablus 
and Nazareth and were supplied by monthly caravans151 from Nablus.152 
Lack of security was the main factor limiting the number of shops and the way 
in which such shops operated. However, the security factor did not result in the 
abandonment of this form of commercial activity and in its complete replacement by 
the first form, according to which the members of the Trans-Jordanian communities 
would go to the urban centers seeking the exchange of their products. Hamarneh 
advances an important argument to explain the desire of the merchants from the 
surrounding areas to participate in commercial activities in the high-risk region of 
Trans-Jordan. The main incentive was the high profit that could be obtained, since 
the prices in Trans-Jordan were about 50% above their level in Damascus or the 
Palestinian urban centers153• Other factors motivated merchants - and particularly 
those from Palestine - in their establishment of commercial activities in the area. 
1~9 Rogan, E.L. (1991 ), p244. 
150 Rogan claims that commercial activities prior to the Ottoman direct rule can be 
characterized under what he calls entrepot phase (Rogan, E.L. (1991), p242-246). 
151 The exchange activities were affected by the frequency of caravans, which in tum was 
strongly influenced by the levels of security. 
152 Hamarneh,M. (1985), p 90-92. and Rogan, E.L. (1 991), p244. 
153 C~mpari~ons be~een the pric~~ of animals such as camels, st)e~p and hors~s in Trans· 
Jordan and their prices in other parts of Natural Syria such as Palestine, as well as the prices of 
different agricultural products showed by Hamarneh, reveal that prices in Trans-Jordan were 
considerably low. This meant that a high margin of profit could be gained b~ the merchants who 
l ::-----.raaea with tlie area (Ramarnen.1JI-:( l985). p6676-8). Rogan adopts Hamarneh s argument, showing 
. ~PJ9fjU~_<;.tor ~~ .10@ main iD.~~n!!ke_f9! P~!e.s.ti.ni~n mer:.chants: activ.iti~s. Jn_ Tra[,ls:-Jordan (Bogan, 
E.l. {1991), p251 -253). 
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such as the dependence on qwif54 for the soap production in Jabal Nab/us and 
elsewhere155. This situation, as Doumani demonstrates by means of different 
examples, made 'Ajlun and ai-Balqa part of the natural commercial domain of 
Nablus in particular. 156 The development which took place from the 1840s onwards 
in the Palestinian domain, resulted in the rise of the economic importance of some 
cities such as Jerusalem and Akar at the expenses of Nablus, and forced the latter's 
merchants to intensify their commercial activities in Trans-Jordan157. This factor, 
together with better security conditions, modified the characteristics of the 
commercial activities 158 in the area. At one level, an increased number of Syrian and 
Palestinian merchants began to settle in Trans-Jordan, which for some became a 
permanent residence, while others settled only on a seasonal basis.159 At another 
level, those shops that had previously existed on a commission basis were replaced 
by shops completely owned by Palestinian and Syrian merchants or owned jointly 
with native merchants. 160 The scope of the products that were offered by these 
shops increased dramatically, compared to those of the early 19111 century, and the 
merchants' interest in the wider range of products which could be exported to the 
Palestinian and Syrian coasts increased as a result. 
These developments in commercial activities continued to take place, to the 
extent that one could argue that a merchant class was in the process of formation, 
during the last decades of the 191h century and the first two of the 20th. To end this 
section, it is important to emphasize again that the merchant class which was in the 
process of formation was mainly made up of non-indigenous merchants. This fact 
154 The Importance of the qilw as a source of income for the Bedouins dramatically declined in 
the 1860s, after the introduction of cleaner and cheaper industrially produced caustic soda (see Abu-
Jaber. R. (1989), p139). 
155 Abu-Jaber. R. (1989), p139. Doumani , B. (1995), p203. 
156 Doumani, B. (1995), p203. 
157 Doumani argues that the rise in importance of Jerusalem and the shift of the economic 
gravity to the coast cities had an impact on Nablus's economic role within the Palestinian sphere. The 
need to overcome such an impact led the merchants of Nablus to focus more on their activities 
eastwards (Doumani, B. (1995), p47-48). 
158 Rogan argues that the first three decades of the second half of the 19111 century could be 
categorized as a 'peddler phase' with regard to the commercial activities. The improvement in the 
security conditions was manifested in the presence of the peddlers, who used tg . travel .to d.iff~rent 
regions of Trans-.:loraan among the tribal and peasinfcommunitle~. ·selling their vari'ous products. ·For 
more details see Rogan, E.L. (1991 ), p247-249 and also Hamarneh, M.B. (1985). p68. 
-=-------:-~-:----- 159 tl:le_fact .tbaUhese_mer9ha_n!s-h~d.-~9P~ifJ-12aJestipian-cities or- Damasct:Js that-needed- ----= 
looking after limited their settlement in Trans-Jordan to a certain period of time. 
-- - - •
160
-Rogan, E.L -(1991), p250 -- - - -
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did not constitute any obstacle to their commercial activities, neither from the point of 
view of the local communities nor of the merchants. This situation advances the 
argument that the presence of non-indigenous merchants during the British mandate 
in Jordan was no alien dimension, but a continuous trend rooted in the socio-
economic structure of the Ottoman era that the indigenous communities were not 
unfamiliar with. 
2 .2.4 THE BEDOUINS 
This subsection is an overview of the main features of the Bedouin 
community, which is an essential part of the formation of Trans-Jordan during the 
191h century and afterwards. It is important from the outset to state that, in this 
context, the term 'Bedouin' refers both to the pure nomadic tribes and to the semi-
nomadic tribes 161 • 
With regard to the socio-economic change, this study argues that the 
Bedouin community can be analyzed in terms of the NMP, which embraces two sets 
of means of production, herds and land.162 The NMP is an analytical device capable 
of designating both the Bedouin tribes whose herds are made exclusively of camels 
and the tribes that practice multi-animal husbandry. The latter is nothing but a tribe 
whose NMP is in the process of decaying, i.e. in its transition period towards 
adopting a sedentary mode of existence. The NMP is also a useful device to 
analyze inter-tribal relations and the interaction amongst the Bedouins and the 
sedentary formation. 
As far as the socio-economic structure is concerned, the area of Trans-
Jordan witnessed a profound but gradual break-up of the nomadic relations of 
production. One could correctly characterize the 191h century as a continuous wave 
of sedentarization, according to which the Bedouin communities were generally 
passing through a transitional period towards complete settlement. However, the 
capacities, forms and paths that this process assumed vary from one tribe to 
another. As asserted in Appendix 3, this study argues that the tribes which 
1---~---16-1 -'the tribes. that-owned- exclusively camels and-those-whose .herds were diversified and. 
practiced some agriculture (see Appendix 3). 
162 See Appendix 3. 
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constitute the weakest link in the nomadic formation are the ones that are most likely 
to experience the disintegration of the nomadic relations of production, taking the 
path towards sedentarization. That was the case in the area of Trans-Jordan, where 
the tribes that were under continuous pressure'63 from more powerful tribes were the 
first to suffer from the deficiency of the nomadic relations of production, giving up 
their sole animal husbandry and adapting themselves to an annual migration cycle 
dictated by the herds' diversity. As Hamarneh states, around the second half of the 
191h century a substantial proportion of tribes - such as Beni Hamiida, Beni Hassan, 
and ai-Balqa tribes - took the initiative to move towards a sedentary lifestyle. It is not 
surprising that the majority of them were under continuous pressure from more 
powerful tribes. Raids, khaawah, small portions of diirahs and limited access to the 
desert resulted in the gradual decay of the NMP into a MP articulated with the tribute 
formation. 164 The goat and sheep, in addition to the camel, became important 
breeding animals. Members of these tribes started to cultivate limited land tracks in 
the outskirts of villages or lands of abandoned villages.165 The cultivation continued 
to proceed well in the following years. 166 As Hamarneh argues, these tribes 
continued to live in tents; however, their mobility was further limited by virtue of the 
migration cycle of goats and sheep and by the boundaries of the diirahs of more 
powerful tribes. 167 
Concerning the internal structure of these tribes, no revolutionizing process 
took place, since the transitional period upheld the same structure that was 
promoted by the NMP and because the interaction with the other nomadic tribes 
163 Concerning some of the raids and disputes between the different Trans~Jordanian tribes, 
see Peake, F.G. (1958), The History of Jordan and its Tribes, p125-139. Concerning the power 
relations between the different rival tribes in AI-Karak, see also Gubser, P. (1973) Politics and Change 
in AI-Karak, Jordan. Hamarneh, M. (1985). 
164 The Beni Hamiida tribe is a good example, since it started the process of sedentarization 
after its defeat. This resulted in reducing the size of its diirah , which is very unfortunate when 
qualitative criteria are taken into account (Hamameh, M. (1985), p53). 
165 Hamameh relies on Henry Layard's travel account of 1840, which reveals that, in the area 
of AI-Balqa, limited patches were cultivated with com and barley. Hamarneh points out that the 
Awazem tribe started to cultivate in the vicinity of Main, near Madaba. The tribes of AI-Balqa, such as 
'AI Abad, the Ajarmeh, AI Hadeed, AI D'ajeh, and AI Ghneimat, cultivated scant portions of land in the 
area west of Madaba. north through Hisban and Amman to Yajuz and west to Wadi Sir and Naur.' 
(Hamarneh, M. (1985), p54). 
166 In 1872, Dr. H. B. Tristram. Canon of Durham stated that '[l)nstead of heads of camels, 
[we] had before us an almost unbroken reach of corn land, the wheat well up, thick and vigorous, and 
• - ----of- the-deepest ·green;-whi(e .. many- yokes -of dwarf- oxen -were-.dotted -about. ploughing~ (quoted--in -- -· --
Hamarneh, M. (1985), p54). 
167 Hamarneh, M. (1985), p53. 
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enforced such a structure. 168 Based on Hamarneh's rewarding observation and 
postulation concerning the routes to sedentarization , this study argues that the 
transformation of the weakest-link tribes into sedentary communities reinforced the 
tribal structure and its unity. Hamarneh states that these 'poor tribes were less 
hierarchal and socially differentiated therefore, the more egalitarian and semi-
nomadic they became, i.e. land for cultivation was distributed more equally among 
the various clans and each clan divided its allocated parts into shares among its 
households. '169 Certainly, the ownership of the flocks was still individual, but the 
cultivated area was collective property or usufruct. 
Intertribal relations around the second half of the 191h century reveal that Beni 
Sakhr, 'Adowan and Hwai1aat were the most dominant tribes within the nomadic 
domain. The absence of the direct rule of the state was a fundamental factor in 
maintaining their superiority. The socio-economic change towards sedentarization 
had begun when they were at the peak of their power. Important factors associated 
with this reality made the process of sedentarization and the transitional period differ 
in their socio-economic features from those which affected the other tribes. It could 
also be argued that they were less costly and more fortunate either in their process 
or in their prospect for the coming periods. Factors such as the accumulation of 
surplus were at their highest level, which meant that a given tribe was not under 
pressure to adopt a specific route towards sedentary life or to accelerate the entire 
process. Dominance over both the nomadic and the sedentary domains had many 
168 Applying the concept of articulation as was discussed In the first chapter is appropriate 
here, since the stage of transition from one MP to another can reinforce some relations of the previous 
MP to be dominant in one stage of the transition. In this sense, the internal structure that is important 
in regard to the relations that tie the tribe to the land becomes dominant. A similar structure is 
promoted amongst the peasants by virtue of the lack of security and the taxation system. 
169 Hamameh, M. (1985), p53. Ro~an supports this argument through his review of land 
registration in the last two decades of the 191 century and the first one of the 201h. He notes that the 
land was communally registered in the names of the households of the poor tribes. while in the rich 
tribes some of the land was registered in the name of individuals, especially when it came to the land 
of the sheikhs. Rogan suggests that the sheikhs of the poor tribes could not keep the title for 
themselves. due to the fact that cultivation had already become a source of subsistence for these 
tribes. On the contrary, subsistence for the rich tribes was widely based on sheep-breeding. This fact 
enabled the sheikhs to assume a legal title over large tracks of their tribes' diirahs (Rogan E. (1991 ). 
332-334). The shortcoming of this explanation lies in the fact that it deals with the consequences of 
the process of sedentarization . The poor tribes were forced by inter-tribal relations to accept the areas 
that were confined as their diirahs. Under these circumstances, they started the process of 
sedentarization. The fact that they relied on cultivation more than sheep-breeding was mainly due to 
the early start of such a process compared to other tribes and to the limited size of their diirahs and 
._ ____ tfieir lower qualit}i:-Rence, although if was posslblelor a rich tribe to drawt he bulk of its substance 
frorQ cultivation carried out by different means, the qualitative aspects of the diirah, such as size and 
location, could be used by the tribe if it was to decide to give up cultivation 
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important applications.170 This dominance. which included a military aspect, 
produced an extra surplus in the form of khaawah and raids, which could in its tum 
lead towards a more privileged route to sedentarization. Their dominance also 
meant that these tribes possessed a larger and better portion of the land. A 
significant application of such a dominance within the particular domain of a given 
tribe occurred when the relationship with the state was redrawn in the light of the 
new circumstances. 
In the case of Trans-Jordan, military ability and significant power over the 
area had given certain tribes privileged status when they were subjected to Ottoman 
direct rule. To different degrees, these factors had an impact on the sedentarization 
of the Beni Sakhr and 'Adwan tribes. In the case of Beni Sakhr, for instance, early in 
the second half of 191h century multi-animal husbandry was practiced; however, 
camel herds were still substantial in both their number and relative importance, 
indicating their significance not just in securing part of the surplus but in equipping 
the tribe or some of its clans with a potential to go back to exclusive camel 
husbandry.111 Cultivation started to be practiced on Beni Sakhr's diirah further into 
the 191h century, and in a gradual fashion. The earliest example of cultivation was 
probably under Sattam EI-Fayez, who took Egyptian peasants172 to cultivate the land 
around Ziiziiaa.173 Hence, cultivation within Beni-Sakhr's diirah took another route 
compared to that which was experienced within the poorer tribes' domain . 
Accordingly, the tribe gave the right to the cultivators to use some of its land in return 
for a share in the harvest or the use of slaves in cultivation. In any case, this 
17
° For the power that Beni Sakhr manifested in the different conflicts, see Peake, F.G. (1953). 
Hamarneh also shows how the Beni Hassan tribe occupied an unfortunate location, since it was to the 
west of the Beni Sakhr diirah and to the east of a sedentary community that was already under the 
protection of Beni Sakhr (Hamarneh, M. (1 985), p54). 
171 Based on Henry Layrad, Hamameh shows that around the mid 19'h century ai-Jahawsheh, 
a section of Beni Sakhr, became the shepherds of the rest of the tribe, which, in its tum, continued in 
its camel migration cycle. Interestingly, a further social division of labour, outside what the nomadic 
system dictated, took place, indicating a different mode of socio-economic change brought by 
adopting multi-husbandry (Hamarneh, M. (1985), p55). 
172 These Egyptian peasants fled harsh life conditions in Egypt to arrive at Beni-Sakhr's diirah. 
173 Hamarneh, M. (1985). p59. Fischbach claims that 15 Palestinian families were given the 
right to settle and cultivate land around the village of Sattam ei-Fayez, in return to one fifth of the 
harvest (Fischbach, M. (2000), p15-16). Another form of expansion of the agricultural activities came 
about under what is called 'opening the land' agreements, according to which members of the Abu 
Jaabar clan were granted cultivation rights in ai-Yaaduudah by the Rumayh ai-Sulayman ai-Fayez, in 
• - --- - retorn- for· a· portlon-of-thellarvesC(Aou-:.raoef, -R. Tf9B9)Tf3·e:-f3'9)-. - similararrangements ·were 
made between the Huwautaat tribe in the south and the inhabitants of Ma'an (See Fischbach, M. 
(2000), p15). 
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provided the tribe with another sort of surplus without the need to give up the 
advantages on which its nomadic system was based. 
The social differentiation that had its expression in the nomadic system took 
anther turn in the transitional period of articulation with the sedentary formation. 
which asserted its nature and pushed it further. In the rich and dominant tribes like 
Beni-Sakhr, the land was not just held communally as in the case of the poorer 
tribes: individuals or households owned tracts of land which at times were very large. 
As a matter of fact, around the last quarter of the 19111 century the Beni-Sakhr diirah 
was subdivided among the different clans. The better portion of the land was 
divided into three parts and distributed among the three main sections possessing 
the sheikhdom of the entire tribe. 174 
The state attitude towards the Bedouin tribes in the transitional period was 
not consistent, One can distinguish between two different approaches used by the 
state in dealing with the Bedouin tribes: the first one was employed with tribes which 
were forced to sedentarize, the other one with tribes 1hat went through the process 
dictated by the accumulation of surplus. The tribes of the first type, such as Beni 
Hassan, were subjected violently, the state having no difficulties in gaining their 
compliance. Regardless of the fact that the state used punitive expeditions and 
other sorts of violent measures to subdue dominant tribes such as Beni Sakhr, its 
approach to such tribes was mainly based on co-opting the recognized sheikhs by 
alternative means, such as granting them official positions that could bring them 
salaries. bribing them with money, registering lands in their individual names or 
hiring them for specific service. By these means the Ottoman managed to gain the 
tribes' consensus through influence on their sheikhs. Bribes, salaries. gifts and 
hiring for certain services are all further means of transferring some of the surplus 
that was extracted from weaker domains to the dominant tribes. The most well-
known service performed by the Trans-Jordanien tribes was without any doubt 
protecting the Hajj caravans. The Beni Sakhr, which was in charge of this service 
during the best part of the second half of the 19th century, was able to gain access to 
sources of surplus not available to other tribes, thus maintaining its superior position 
__ _within its domain. 
114 The northern part was given to ei~Khreeshaa and ai-Jbur. the middle part to.ei-Fayez a nd 
the third was given to ai-Zaben. For details about the diffe[ent parts and the parts which were given to 
the rest of the Beni Sakhr clans, see Hamarneh, M. (1985) , p57-59. 
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2.3 JORDAN UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE 
Undoubtedly, the creation of the state was the most important development of 
the 201h century concerning the history of the area of Trans-Jordan, and was also, to 
a great extent, one of the pivotal events in the history of the region .175 The creation of 
a political entity in the area of Trans-Jordan added new dimensions to the area, 
bringing about objective conditions that had never been experienced before. At the 
regional level, the state of Trans-Jordan would play a vital role in all the major 
political developments, and particularly in the Palestinian question, which continued 
to constitute the central political issue in the Middle East in the second half of the 
201h century. 
Despite the fact that a considerable number of modern states were created 
by the colonial powers in the third world, the case of Jordan exhibits a certain 
peculiarity. The conditions necessary for state formation - namely surplus and a 
social force or elite or class that could initiate such a process - were both absent. 176 
Moreover, the area where the state had to be created was extracted from its natural 
context, by a process which destroyed many of those long-existing relations which 
had tied it to neighboring areas,177 and which left it with scant natural sources that, if 
exploited, might not provide the necessary surplus. The poor natural resources of 
the country continued to be one of the squared pillars of the socio-economic 
175 Such an argument could be used for the different states that were created in the Mashreq 
or the Gulf. However, the importance of Jordan lies in the maintenance of the state with the same 
regime that was built within the process of state formation, with little modification concerning its broad 
ideological , political and social economic structure. 
176 A leadership or social force across the area of Jordan as representative of an interest in 
building national polity within national Identity never emerged, despite the fact that a leadership having 
a social base had occurred from time to time in specific areas: the objective conditions that were 
briefly .. reviewed in the previous section never gave such leaders the opportunity to go beyond the 
boundaries of the areas in which they emerged. 
171 See in this context Hamarneh's argument concerning the emerging of the modern state 
· nat1onari(jentity ifnne~asnreq aflarge, wittl a specili'c reference to Jordan (Hamameh, M. B. (1996) 
_!!!!! .. ~orclani~J):.f>al~stif]i'!n ~f!Lat{Q.rl§J)jp_, 'TM .. QQmestlc Oimeosion:, Center_.for Strategic Studies, 
Amman. p3·6). See also Hamarneh, M.B. (1985) , p113·114. 
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structure of Jordan, which made the survival of a political entity with almost no 
profound political and ideological change a miracle.178 
The creation of a state in the area of Trans-Jordan was a deliberate British 
policy, based on the premise that Jordan was nothing but a 'buffer zone' and that 
maintaining it was a necessity in the context of regional security. This situation, 
coupled with the fact that Britain was the provider of the surplus, required the 
creation of a state apparatus. Moreover, the different agendas and interests that 
were held by the different political actors such as the emir, the lstiqlal party, and the 
influential sheikhs and notables 179 in the blurred period of 1920-1924 obstructed 
complete British control over the country. 180 This latter was to be institutionalized by 
the local army, better known in the West as the Arab Legion, under the command of 
British officers and the British air-forces, as well as by the tight control of annual 
financial sources through what was called 'aid in grant'. On the other hand, the 
complete submission of emir Abdallah, who put himself in the British camp as early 
as 1921 and the expulsion- first from power and then from the country - of the active 
leaders of the lstiqlal party in 1924,181 made colonial control complete. Hamarneh 
points out that, after the British managed to take a tight grip over the political, 
financial and military powers, they consolidated their control over the population in 
two stages: 'the first stage was the pacification of the settled community and the 
second was the pacification of the nomads.'182 The scope of this section does not 
include a discussion of the process of creating the state nor of the political and social 
actors that had a role in the history of the period. The section will be restricted to an 
178 One could argue that the Gulf States were in similar conditions when they were created. 
However, their rich oil and gas resources, whlch were exploited later on, made the idea of their 
survival more conceivable than that of Jordan. 
'
79 These are the main political actors in the years of the foundation of the state. For more 
details see Hamarneh, M. (1985), p 125-134 
'
80 In this sense. a complete proposal about what to do with the area was not at the British 
hand from the outset, i.e. 1919. Different points of view towards the area within the constraints of 
British security strategy were held by the British policy makers either in London or in Palestine. For 
example, it seems that in 1920 Churchill and the commissioner in Palestine held two distinct 
viewpoints (see Hamarneh, M. (1985}, p 136-148). For the period of the local governments, see 
Hamarneh, M. B. (1985), p 136-148, Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988), p 127-144. 
181 Concerning the arrival of Emir Abdallah from the Hajaz to Jordan, the alliance between him 
and the lslqlal party until its collapse, his relations with the British starting by the meeting with Churchill 
in Jerusalem, the different agendas of the British, the lstiqlaliis. the Emir, the relations between the 
•=-----QO_vernment.in .its.early .. ye.~rs-and-the-populatior:~.of-the area-and-other -issues that-led-to-the.comJlllete----
control of the state, see Hamarneh, M. (1985), p 137-138, Madi, M. and Musa. S. (1988), p 86-98. 
182 Hamarneti, M.·B~ (1985). p133. --- - - - - -- - -
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overview of the main social communities in the country and reference will be made 
in the different sub-sections to state policies and their impact. 
The lack of natural resources and the almost complete dependency of the 
agricultural activities on the fluctuating, ungenerous rainfall rates, coupled with the 
incorporation of the poorest areas of internal Syria put together in one separate 
entity, made it difficult to achieve the conditions necessary for economic 
development, such as the presence of surplus, the formation of an internal market, 
circulation and a developed social division of labor. This reality did not just 
determine economic development, but, at another level, it gave a great deal of 
importance to the economic policies of the colonial power as another determining 
factor. As Hamarneh concludes, 
2.3.1 
2.3.1.1 
' In brief, Trans-Jordan was emerging as a dependent and 
underdeveloped country with no possibility of initiating an autonomous, 
self -generating process of economic development as a result of the 
existing, internal conditions coupled with colonial rule which determined 
the process and the direction of Trans-Jordan's development.'183 
THE SOCIAL FORMATION COMPONENTS 
Peasants 
Under the British mandate, the agricultural sector and the rural areas of 
Jordan were the cornerstone of the entire social formation. The majority of the 
economic activities revolved around agriculture, which represented the main means 
of existence for the great majority of the population, since the other sectors, such as 
mining, manufacturing and services, were underdeveloped if not inexistent in the first 
place. As was mentioned in the previous section, since the mid 19th century, the 
NMP had been in the process of breaking down, resulting in the nomadic tribes 
taking the only available sedentary option, i.e. agriculture, as their main mode of 
existence. On the threshold of the British mandate, some of these nomadic tribes 
·------------------- ---------------
183 Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p150. 
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were already cultivators, while the majority of the others were in their transitional 
period towards agriculture. Hence, the agricultural sector was the principal sector 
and the rural population was ultimately the most important component of the entire 
population . Before looking at the main features of agriculture and the rurar 
population, however, it is important to reassert the argument that the development in 
this sector and the extent of population that was engaged in its activities was largely 
determined by the British policies in Trans-Jordan. 
The point of departure will be to recognize the importance that objective 
conditions 184 had, as had been the case in the previous periods, for the entire 
agricultural activity - its output, problems and development - since their importance 
was not undermined by serious investment in the production factors. 185 During the 
1930s, agricultural output and the prosperity of the rural population were based on 
the fluctuation of the rainfall. A year of drought and/or frost meant a poor harvest. 
with severe consequences for the rural population and mainly for small cultivators, 
affecting their financial liability and the depth of their poverty. The only option for 
these cultivators was to hope for a better season the following year, since the 
possibility of having a major investment in their production sector was untenable and 
the development of other sectors able to absorb some of the rural population was 
not at hand. On the other hand, the selfsame fluctuation in the rainfall and other 
natural conditions meant that the surplus that resulted in a good year season was 
not directed towards investment, but rather kept to be consumed in bad seasons or 
was used to balance debts that had accumulated in earlier bad seasons. 
Concerning the means of production, Hamarneh notes that the great majority 
of the cultivators, both on small and relatively large holdings, 186 used the same 
means of production that they had in pervious periods.187 The only expectation was 
184 Some such conditions were the rainfall rate or the limited area suitable for cultivation. 
185 The main British policy towards agriculture was tax remission when a bad season 
prevailed. Fischbach shows that these measures were put in action in 1933, 1935, 1942 and 1948. 
Tax remission or tax reduction was based on authority assessment, which varied from one region to 
another. Therefore, the percentage of tax reduction varied in some cases from· one village to the other 
(Fischbach, M. (2000}, p127-128). Hamameh claims that this policy was too insignificant to have an 
impact concerning the development of agriculture (Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p178-179). 
186 The development of the means of production and a comparatively respectable investment 
in the factors of production had already taken place in the large-holdings since the last quarter of the 
1,..-----~.Q!t!..century-(see-the-previous-section;-see-also-Abu-Jaber,R:-(4989))-. - - - - - · 
'
67 For details about the means of production used during the last period, see the pervious 
section. See also Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p72-78. 
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the introduction of the iron-tipped plough. The use of tractors, on the other hand, 
was rare. The old system of fallow farming was kept intact and represented for 
cultivators the only method by which to challenge the fluctuations in weather 
conditions. Large scale usage of tractors. pest control , fertilizers corporations and 
other methods were absent.188 In this sense, the means of production was an 
indication of the state of backwardness that characterized this sector. As Hamarneh 
puts it 'Thus, in the absence of any government initiative for the development of 
agriculture, this sector, like the rest of the economy, remained backward and 
peripheral to Palestine'189. 
When considering the social structure in the rural areas, patterns of land 
ownership reveal the importance of the British land policy as a determining factor in 
this period of the history of Jordan and in periods to come. Despite the fact that 
different policies towards the rural areas were introduced as early as the foundation 
of the state, the milestone of these policies was the British land program 
implemented in the early 1930s. Before giving an overview of that program, it is 
important to point out that land ownership in the early years of state building 
continued to be the same as in the pervious period. The mashaa' system remained 
the prevailing one in the areas where it had already been in the Ottoman era. The 
mafrooz system continued to co-exist with the dominant mashaa' without having any 
transforming influence on the latter. In this sense, the conceptualization and 
perception of the cultivators towards land ownership continued within the limits 
dictated by the mashaa' and mafrooz systems 190. Small-holding ownership was the 
main feature of land ownership; however, the large-holdings that had emerged in the 
second half of the 19th century continued to exist and to increase at a moderate rate, 
encouraged by the comparative security and stability brought about by the 
establishment of the state, although this cannot be seen as a change in ownership. 
The second half of the 1920s witnessed the British efforts 191 to introduce what 
would be the British Land Program. 192 From the British vantage point, the land 
188 Hamarneh, M.B. (1985), p174-175. 
189 Hamarneh, M.B. (1985). p181 . 
190 Fischbach, M. (2000), p65-70. Fischbach, M. (1994), p82-84. 
'
91 The state policy towards the land at large and the cultivators during this phase revolved 
around the provision of security to the rural areas and the collection of land tax. For the latter, which 
was one of the main priorities in order to cut down the cost of adminlsterfng the country by increasing 
the domestic revenue, the Ottoman land records were still used. The Registration Office (whose 
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program aimed to stimulate the agricultural sector. to increase domestic revenue 
from the land tax, to enable the state to assume control over land that had belonged 
to the Ottoman authority, to solve the disputes that occurred from time to time 
between different villages, tribes and cultivators concerning the boundaries or 
possession of the land by granting the individuals a title and finally to establish a 
direct relationship between cultivators and the state by reducing the power that the 
sheikhs had assumed.193 In order for the above objectives to be achieved, the land 
program needed to accomplish the following: a full fiscal survey, partition of the 
mashaa', registration of the land in the name of individuals, taxation as the 1927 
report, which laid the ground to the land program, recommended.194 
Regardless of the difficulties that faced its implementation, a fiscal survey195 
took place over the period 1928-1933, which resulted mainly in the destruction of 
the mashaa' system by granting individual title to the land. Moreover, the state 
assumed the ownership of the land that was deemed to have belonged to the 
Ottoman state 196 and of the forests197 • A taxation system was put forward according 
to the assessments made about the different types of land. The British land program 
had a vital role in shaping the new relationship between the cultivators in particular 
and the population at large and the land. 
name changed to Land Registeration Office in 1924), which was established in 1921 , used the 
available land records due to the fact that these records did not cover the entire land. Few attempts 
were made by the government to acquire a copy of the land records in order to fix the title and tax the 
land. (Fischbach, M. (2000), p70-72). 
192 Fischbach argues that the British land policy in Trans-Jordan was not different from the 
policy they implemented in different colonies after the First World War. This policy was 'based on 
three main points: surveying the land and drawing cadastral maps, determining tltle or at least 
provisional title to specific plots of land and partitioning collectively owned musha' land where 
possible, and recording information about property rights in central government land registers' 
(Fischbach, M. (2000), p78-82. also Fischbach, M. (1994), p81 -83). 
193 The aims of the land program are put together from different sources: Fischbach, M. 
(2000), p84-86, Robins, P. (1988), p188, Amawi, A. (1992) , 370-374. Fischbach, M. (1994), p80. 
tS4 Fischbach, M. (2000), p84. 
195 Fischbach gives a detailed account of the implementation of the fiscal survey, the 
difficulties that it faced, the methods that were used and the disputes between the different villages 
and communities concerning the boundaries. However, the cultivators generally welcomed the 
program (Fischbach, M. (2000), p104-116). 
196 Different types of land, such as the Mudawwara, which is fertile and has access to the 
water from the Jordan valley, and the Mahlul, whose area was about 2 million dunum, were part of the 
Ottoman state domain and were transferred as the land of the new state (see Hamameh, M.B. (1985), 
p171-172). 
197 This was one of the issues that the villagers were disputing. claimi11g that the forests were 
part of their mashaa' (Fischbach. M. (2000), p145-146). 
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The aims of the program were not entirely achieved. For instance, 
enhancement of the productivity of the agricultural sector was not accomplished, and 
agricultural output continued to be determined by the weather conditions and lack of 
any investment in the sector.198 On the contrary, in the long term the fragmentation 
of land that the implementation 199 of the program brought about had a negative 
impact on agricultural output, especially since there was no genuine cooperative 
effort. Besides, land taxation did not lead to any increase in the domestic 
revenue. 200 
The land program assigned land titles to individuals, which meant socially the 
creation of a large class of small cultivators. In some respects. this corresponds to 
the natural evolution of the mashaa' system when it breaks down on its own. 
However, in social and political terms. the destruction of the mashaa' by state policy 
resulted, to some extent, in the production of a direct relation between cultivators 
and the state, which replaced an earlier reliance upon intermediate channels, such 
as the mokhtaars of villages or tribes chiefs.201 It would be simplistic, though, to 
conclude that the role of the local power elite. whether at a tribal or at a village lever. 
was definitely waning, since sheikhs were still influential at different levels, between 
the cultivators and the state, as well as in the social and political sphere of the 
village or the tribe. In addition. they were still consulted concerning land partition 
and some of them obtained huge gains from the land settlement. 202 
196 Hamarneh gives the best account of the lack of investments in the agricultural sector, 
regardless the fact that some British officials recognised the misery of these investments (Hamarneh, 
M. (1985), p151 -1 55 and 166-1 67). 
199 Fischbach shows. by means of a detailed table, the respectable increase in the number of 
the owners in 1954 compared to the different base-years in the 1930s and 1940s (Fischbach. M. 
(2000), p134 ). 
200 The late years of the British mandate show that the income of land tax was almost the 
same as in the years before the program; in real terms, however, it was less (Fischbach, M. (2000). 
p129). 
201 This argument is taken from Fischbach's account, which is supported by some examples 
according to which the fiscal survey committee or the land dispute court did not rule in favour of the 
sheikhs, when a dispute over land arose between the sheikh and a fellow member of his tribe. 
Another ground on which this argument has credibility is that the land survey and the title assignment 
were not based on the accounts of the sheikhs, as was the case with the implementation of the 
Ottoman land law of 1658 (Fischbach, M. (2000). p 164-166). 
202 Some of Mudawwara and Mahlul lands that were appropriated by the state during the 
fisical survey were disposed of. Hamarneh shows that corruption factored in the latter process led in 
some cases to register the land in names of Influential sheikhs, such as 'Adown, who managed to 
assume the ownership of 106,000 dunum of the mahlullands in one transfer (Hamameh, M. (1965), 
p172-173}. 
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The fact that the land program resulted in a large class of small cultivators did 
not mean that it constrained the expansion of the large landholdings. On the 
contrary, one could argue that the measures the program brought about - i.e. the 
destruction of the basis of the mashaa' system, the grant of the land title to 
individuals and the establishment of a more efficient taxation system - provided a 
better context for land acquisition and the growth of large landholdings. The 
different means which led to the conservation and growth of the large holdings were 
almost identical to those that were used in the preceding period and mentioned in 
the previous section. Money-lending was the main mechanism through which land 
slipped from the hands of indebted cultivators, usually small-holders, into those of 
the money-lenders. The fluctuation of agricultural output, which was largely the 
result of climate conditions, coupled with the underdeveloped means of production, 
resulted in demand for loans. 
The absence of a governmental development policy to target the agricultural 
sector in particular or the rural areas at large, meant that the small cultivators were 
forced to find other avenues for their personal financial obligations, as well as for the 
requirements of their agricultural activities. The Agricultura l Bank. which provided 
loans at an interest rate of 9.0%, was neither powerful enough to eliminate the 
money-lenders' activities, nor to be a serious competitor that would lead to lower 
their interest rates. Hamarneh attributes the failure of the Bank to provide major 
investment to its lack of assets, limited capital and credit inability. The Bank. 
according to British policy, was to provide the farmers with assistance to survive the 
unfortunate seasons. The great majority of the loans that were provided by the Bank 
were below PP 5.0. This situation allowed to money-lending to flourish in the 
different regions of the country at very high rates (between 30.0% and 1 00.0%). 
Hence, the land slipped from the hands of the cultivators who could not meet their 
obligations to the creditors. Furthermore, the merchants, who were the main money-
lenders, invested part of their profit in land purchase.203 It is important to point out 
that money-lending and continuous accession to the land by merchants, money-
lenders, sheikhs and others did not result in the eviction of cultivators from the 
countryside, mainly because of the lack of development of the urban economic 
203 Hamernah. M.B. (1985), p183-1M. 
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sectors. such as industry and services204. Consequently, as British officials noted , 
the landless stayed in the countryside as agricultural workers.205 
Fischbach argues that the land program had important political and social 
implications for the regime's social base in the countryside and its overall survival. 
His argument is based on the fact the small cultivators felt that land settlement was 
in one way or another in their own interest, even when the results were not actually 
favorable.206 Larger landholders also benefited from land settlement, as did 
merchants, who could continue to buy and sell the land207 as they wished. This 
triangle of satisfaction among such different social actors harvested social support 
for the regime. 208 
2.3.1.2 Merchants 
As was mentioned in the previous section. the term 'merchants' covers all 
those who are involved in trade and commercial activities, whether they are 
middlemen, shop-owners or seasonal traders. The great majority of these 
merchants were not originally from the area of Trans-Jordan, but from urban centers 
such as Nablus, Jerusalem and Damascus. They were motivated to move to Trans-
Jordan, regardless the lack of security, by the high profit that could be gained in the 
area compared with elsewhere in the Levant. The trade activities developed rapidly 
during the second half of the 191h century and the last phase of the Ottoman era. 
The security that the direct rule brought about,209 the demands on agricultural 
204 Hamernah, M.B. (1985). p183-184. 
205 Fischbach, M. (2000}, p 172. 
206 The assignment of titles to individuals meant that the farmers in Jordan were in a better 
position compared to their counterparts in other Arab countries, where they fed the revolutionary 
actions or supported regime changes (Fischbach, M. (2000), p176-177). 
207 Concerning the discrepancy between the land policies in the neighbouring Arab countries 
and in Jordan, Fischbach states that ' the land program can be characterized as a type of Jordanian 
laissez-faire' (Fischbach, M. (2000), p175). 
208 Fischbach, M. (2000) , p170-178. 
209 The building of the garrison, the presence of the troops and their administration could be 
added as dimensions that contributed to stimulate some commercial activities. It is noteworthy that 
one of the main trading families during the late 19m century and throughout the 201h was Seeduu 'Ali 
ai-Kardii. whose father arrived to ai-Salt with the garrison troops (see Robins. P. (1988), p296). 
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products due to the incorporating process of the Levant in the capitalist system, the 
building of the Hajaz railway and the First World War were all factors that gave a 
boost to the commercial activities210• Besides the considerable growth in commercial 
activities, a few important changes took place in the sphere of the merchants, one of 
which concerned their composition, which started to include some native Trans-
Jordanians. An other important development was the significant level of 
engagement of some merchants in money-lending. Some of the profit made through 
trade and (for some) through money-lending was invested in land purchasing , whjch 
resulted in a significant fraction of large land-holdings being owned by merchants211 • 
These features of the merchants' activities in the last phase of the Ottoman 
rule continued after the foundation of the state. However, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the state foundation became one of the main structural determinations of such 
commercial activities. Different factors contributed to such a situation. Firstly, 
relying on several British reports, Robins shows that the merchants benefited from 
the improved security conditions, extending their trade activities in different reg ions 
of the country and scrapping the cost that had been devoted to security purposes, 
which had an influence on the development of the commercial sector compared with 
its conditions before the state was founded212• Secondly, the different British financial 
resources which were allocated to the building and preservation of the state 
according to the British strategic perspective were unprecedented in size, continuity 
and detachment from any domestic revenue or economic performance. This created 
greater liquidity into the economy and enhanced circulation. Not infrequent wer:e 
recipients of annual British financial expenditure in Trans-Jordan. such as that upon 
the Emiir and his court213 and the annual military grant devoted to building the 
army2 14 , which include not only buildings and equipments, but also salaries of the 
210 See the previous section. For more details about the merchants, see Rogan E. (1991 ). p 
208-216, Hamarneh, M .S. (1985), p84-93. 
2 11 See in this context Rogan E. (1991}, p234. Hamarneh, M .S. (1985), p76 . Robins, P. 
(1989). p 294-297 
212 Robins, P. (1989), p 300-302. 
213 For the first six months, the British allocated to the Emiir's private expanses L 5000 per 
month. This grant was fixed at L 36000 per annum. See Robins, P. (1989), p 298. 
21 4 The British grant-in ~aid varied from year to another as the figures below indicate 
1921- 1922- 1923- 1924- 1925- 1926-
22 23 24 25 26 27 
180000 90000 150000 75632 101358 66000 
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Arab and Jordanian soldiers and officers and the expenses of the military and civil 
British mandate administration. All these dimensions of the British financial 
injections resulted in the expansion of the local market by increasing purchase 
power and creating the rising demand for more diversified goods. The foundation of 
the state thus meant a general rise in expenditures, whether devoted to the 
establishment of required institutions or to the building of edifices. which resulted in 
increase demand for particular goods, such as construction materials, furniture for 
offices and other necessities. 215 
The composition of the merchants in this period and up the Second World 
War was mainly consistent of non-indigenous Trans-Jordanians.216 The Trans-
Jordanian faction was small compared to both the Palestinian and the Syrian one. 
The peculiarity of the Jordanian tribute formation of the 191h century was the main 
factor determining such composition, projecting its shadow well beyond the Ottoman 
era, into the British mandate period. 
The overwhelming majority of the members of the Council of Amman 
Chamber of Commerce from the 1920s to 1945 were not originally from Trans-
Jordan. Just 16.7% of the entire Council was made up of Jordanians, compared to 
39.6% each of Palestinians and Syrians. In fact. the Jordanian presence in the 
Council stretched over the period between 1926 and 1935, while they were absent 
from 1936 until 1941 and had three members only in 1941 -1943, while the Syrians 
and Palestinians were present throughout the whole period.217 This statistics, 
however, especially prior to the 1948 war, can be highly misleading, since there is 
no solid evidence that divisions within the merchants' circles were drown according 
to the new national identities, which in their turn were in the process of being 
These figures are taken from Hamameh. M.B. (1985), p 135. See also Robins. P. (1989), p 
296-299. 
215 As Robins claims, the establishment of a political entity attracted professionals such as 
doctors, lawyers, pharmacists and others from the neighbouring countries to Trans-Jordan, where their 
services were needed. This fact made some difference in the demand on consuming goods (see 
Robins, P. (1988), p300-301). 
216 Using the term 'indigence' can be highly misleading, since there had been no separate 
state in the area of Trans-Jordan prior to the British mandate. No national bonds were expressed at 
the socio-economic level, or at the political and ideological levels. The area of Trans-Jordan before 
the mandate and In the first few years of it was still considered to be part of natural Syria when it 
comes to people who had immigrated in the 19th century or In the first three decades of the 20th. The 
distinction is very hard to make especially for those people who had settled in Jordan in the late 19th 
century or early 20~~'~ century. 
217 All the data concerning the members of the council are taken from Amman's Chamber of 
Commerce. Those about the country and city of origin were obtained from a wide range of interviews. 
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articulated just after 1919, not just amongst Jordanians, but also amongst Syrians 
and Palestinians. Breaking down each of the above components reveals that the 
majority of the Syrian merchants were Damascene, while among the 19 Palestinians 
who occupied positions within the Council, 13 (68.4%) were from Nablus; i.e. 27.1% 
of all the Council's members were from one Palestinian region. Thus regional 
breakdown may be a more appropriate ground on which the alliance and 
contradiction can be traced. 2 18 Such an argument finds further evidence in the 
merchants' composition in AI-Karak, where Trans-Jordanians owned just 10.0% of 
the shops, while Syrians and Palestinians owned 50.0% and 30.0% respectively. 
However, all of the Palestinian merchants were Hebronese and all of the Syrians 
were Damascenes. 2 19 
Figur e 2-J: The Distribu tion of Counci l of Amman Chamber of Cornmerce accordi ng t o 
country of Origin 
• Palestinian [_ • Syrian o Trans-Jordanian o Others 
The formation of the state was a determining factor in bringing better 
conditions for the commercial activities and therefore better opportunities for 
merchants, who efficiently exploited them, making of themselves a wealthy social 
group. In addition to their wealth, the merchants may have been the most powerful 
218 For example, the marriage relations that tied the Damascene commercial families in 
Amman were not induced by the fact that these families were Syrian, but by the fact that they were 
part of the Damascene community, which was culturally distinct from the rest of the population. In fact, 
no rnter-marriages took place between Damascene and non-Damascene elements of the Syrian 
community. Even if such marriages were motivated by the fact that these families were commercially 
orientated, such a tradition was likely to be brought from the Damascene social and cultural domain. 
219 The commercial shops in ai-Karak in 1948 can be grouped according to the country of 
origin , as follows: 25 shops owned by Syrians (from Damascus), 15 owned by Palestinians from 
Hebron, 5 owned by Trans-Jordanian from ai-Karak, and the last 5 owned by Armenians (see Gubser, 
P. (1973), p33-34) 
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social group, by drawing on their wide range of economic involvement, from money-
lending to retail activities. and also by employing their favorable position with the 
state220 at one level and with the Emiir at another. 221 However, their importance was 
confined within the Trans-Jordanian domain; as Robins puts it, 'Neither the wealth 
nor the operations of these merchants [in Trans-Jordan] compared with those of 
merchants in Syria, Lebanon and Patestine.'222 The British economic policy, the 
poverty of the state and of the territory, and the small size of the market were factors 
reinforcing this situation. 
The situation started to change in the late 1930s. First, the merchants of 
Jordan took advantage of the Palestinian rebellion of 1936, which was observed 
closely by the British.223 However, it was the Second World War that made all the 
difference for the merchants in the entire period of the mandate. 
At one level, the war highlighted the importance of Trans-Jordan. It was a 
strategic policy of the British in the Middle East during war time to have one 
integrated system, treating the entire region 'as one economic unit[ ... ] supposed to 
be self-supporting in order to reduce the demand on shipping'224 • to overcome the 
limitation and shortage in supplies as well as to ensure economic stability, 
unleashing inflation rates and avoiding riots through implementing a fair system of 
distribution concerning the imported supplies. On these premises, MESC225 was 
erected to control the imports and exports in the region. This control was put in 
220 see the importance of the trade and commercial activities in the perception of the British 
administration that contributed to favourable position of the merchants. Robins, P. (1986), p312-320. 
221 the Emilr had a close relations with the merchants. At one level he was keen on such 
close relations with merchants from Syrian origin since the latter could provide him with some 
influence in the Syrian political domain that might contribute to his long-lasting ambition to gain that 
crown. At another level, the merchants regardless their origin were important as an important social 
force with a certain power that could limit the power of other social forces. The Emiir found in the 
merchants a financial source on which he can rely whenever he needed for that. After his, for 
example, it was found that he owed the Ottoman Bank and other merchants about JD 70,000. 
(Robins, P. (1968), p309-312). 
222 Robins, P. (1 986), p324. 
223 Robins relies on the reports of the acting British representative in November 1936, in 
which the latter mentions that some merchants were unhappy at the end of the strikes in Palestine, 
since they curtailed opportunities that could have been exploited (Robins, P. (1 986), p325). 
224 Hamameh, M. (1965), p184. 
225 MESC stands for the Middle East Supply Center, which was established by the British in 
1941 to coordinate the imports and exports in the Middle East. This body, which took Cairo as its 
--headqoarter;-became-an-Arrgto-:-Amerl't'an enterprise controlling alrtffifimpons of ttfe 'MiaaleEasr after 
the US joined in December 1942 (Hamerneh, M. (1965), p185; Robins, P. (1988), p325-330; Amawl, 
A. (1992), p422~425). -
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place through the issue of licenses for importation by the local governments and 
shipping space by MESC. The MESC meant that governments including the Trans-
Jordanian exerted direct control of the over the import-export activities. 
This policy brought about effective control over the entire trade system, which 
was in the hands of a few British officials, and stretched from assigning the 
commodities to be imported to shaping the conditions in which retail was conducted. 
It was up to the judgment of the Director of Customs not only to issue import quotas, 
but to decide the size of these quotas, the commodities to be imported, the 
merchants who were to be given the quotas and whether there would be a monopoly 
over the commodities. The merchants to whom the quotas were given benefited 
from the system, in addition to their access to the general benefits and opportunities 
that the war brought abouf26• In short, the quotas were a landmark of the wealth, 
the success, the economic power and the prospects of their holders227• Despite the 
great increase in commercial activities, only a small number of merchants managed 
to acquire the quota licenses228• 
It is not within the scope of this study to give an account of the commercial 
activities which took place during wartime; however, it is still vital to look at the 
criteria that were employed to select those merchants who were given quotas. 
Based on the accounts of the scholars who studied this period, one can deduce two 
sets of rules that made it possible for specific merchants to obtain quotas. The first 
set of rules, which served the goals and purposes of the entire system, were 
experience, ability, reliability and expertise. These conditions were necessary to 
maintain the functioning of the system. The other set of rules was based on the 
relations that the applicants had with the power circles of Trans-Jordan. or with one 
Z26 See Hamameh for details about the increase of the profits from the commercial activities 
during the wartime. Hamemeh, M. (1985), p183. 
227 Apart from what the privileges that quota holders enjoyed over the commercial activities of 
the commodities were assigned to them, another dimension for their wealth came from smuggling and 
contraband trade. Two main factors laid the ground for such activities, the first is the shortage in the 
necessary materials and other in the neighbouring countries especially Syria and Lebanon which 
made smuggling very rewarding. The second was the grain-extraction policy according to which the 
grain supply is to be secured to the markets keeping its price at low level. In order to implement such 
a policy the British increased the supply of the consumer goods that would be purchased by the 
cultivators whose grain is. target~d rather than keeping· the money in their hands. Since Jordan was 
one of these countries that was included in the scheme, quotas were issued to import such consumer 
commodities. However, some of these commodities found their way to neighbouring countries 
• - ----(eturning_hlgb.protlt._ SeeJn.this.matter_Amawi,.A .• (.1.992),-P.4!lO~A6._Wilmington, M. W .. ( 1.91-1) .-The-
Middle East Supply Centre.'p120-132. · · .. · · 
228 Robins, P. (1988), -p325. ·Amawi, A: (1992). 1)449. 
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of them. Such circles included Emir Abdallah, the government's ministers and under 
secretaries and the British officials229• Factors such as the undeveloped socio-
economic structure compared to the neighboring countries (let alone to the colonial 
power), the small size of the merchants' community and the limited population of 
Amman (the center of political and economic power), made the relations which are 
included in the second set of rules contribute to satisfy the first set of rules.230 Such 
a suggestion indicates that the second set of rules displays two aspects, one of 
which covers favoritism as a device that helped some merchants to obtain quotas, 
while the other one is the mechanism according to which the quota providers 
examine the first set of rules. Another dimension that is important and tightly related 
to the second set of rules is the competitive advantage that some merchants had 
over others, i.e. the scope of their economic activities, which provided them with 
more expertise of the regional and international import-export. 
The main outcome of the WWII was an unprecedented level of accumulation 
of capital in the hands of merchants. Moreover, a differentiation in wealth and 
economic power took place between those merchants who benefited from the quota 
system and those who did not. Quota holders also benefited from the wide range of 
expertise that import-export operations provided them with and from trade links that 
were developed with new economic centers and enterprises, which put the other 
merchants at a disadvantage. These process allowed new economic opportunities 
and new economic areas to be exploited by these merchants. Newcomers entered 
the domain of the commercial activities in particular and the economic sphere at 
large attracted by new opportunities or by the prospect of obtaining a quota. 
The fact that this subsection started by asserting the broad definition of the 
merchants to include even shopkeepers does not mean that this period ended with 
the same features. On the contrary, the commercial activities concluded by the end 
of this period saw a cleavage between a limited number of merchants who 
constituted the core of the commercial bourgeoisie and the rest of the commercial 
private sector participants. The development that had undergone during wartime 
and the quota system brought different types of opportunities and resulted in 
2211 Robins, P. (1988), p325. 
230 The suggestion here is to consider the structural determination on the function of the 
policy. In otner worctS,"wflafis arnancranne structuranevelwilrflave a sliarp 'influence-on the paths 
that the implementations of economic policy would take. In this sense, the ways such a policy is 
implemented in each of the colonies differ. 
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accumulative capital and expansion in the activities of some merchants, and in turn 
led to their separation from merchants who did not take advantage of wartime or 
were excluded or at least did not try direct their profits in rewarding investments. the 
characteristics either at the level of the interest or activities (or prospects) of the late 
19th century or early 201h merchants does not subscribe to the merchants who 
benefited in qualitative and quantitative terms from the wartime. 
2.4 AN OVERVIEW OF JORDAN (1949-1967) 
This section is an overview of the period 1949-1967, the phase immediately 
preceding that which constitutes the· focus of this study. During this phase, Jordan 
experienced a considerable amount of political and socio-economic challenges and 
changes. It is relevant to mention that this is the period between the two wars in 
which Jordan was directly involved in the 201h century: the 1948 and the 1967 wars. 
These had a great impact on the country not just at the political level, but also on its 
economic and social texture. Despite the fact that Jordan gained its independence 
in 1946, this event did not bring a profound change in the political or in the economic 
and social structure of the country. As for relations with Britain, the ties that were 
institutionalised in the form of the alliance treaties of 1946 and 1948 maintained 
Jordan in an inferior position with respect to the former mandate power. Apart from 
the political and economic dependency of the new independent state on its ally, the 
British continued to dominate more than one vital state apparatus, especially the 
army and the police. The British commissioner and subsequently ambassador 
became the legitimate inheritor of the influence and internal political power that 
mandate residents had. The political system that resulted from the foundation of the 
Kingdom was a continuation of the old one, which had governed the country under 
the Emirate. Such a conclusion can be applied to the state's military and civil 
apparatus. and even to the political and economic elite and ruling figures. The 
state/society relations did not experience any profound change in their legal form nor 
in their functions, the same methods in ruling the country and the same channels 
being maintained231 • Jordan had to wait until the early 1950s before it entered a 
comprehensive process of change that affected its different domains and almost 
231 AI-Masri. M. (1995). The Political Development in Jordan (1953-1957), p15-33. 
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lasted for the entire decade. Such a process was so profound as to threaten the 
very existence of the regime. 
The creation of the state of Israel on 78% of the Palestinian mandate, apart 
from having a vital impact upon the whole contemporary history, politics and 
international relations of the Middle East, had an incomparable impact on Jordan in 
particular. It was after the 1948 war that Jordan, for the first time and the only one 
so far, expanded its territories. In addition to the territory of the West Bank, 
quantitative and qualitative socio-economic, cultural and political aspects were 
added to the state of Jordan. These were brought not only by the West Bank 
population, but also by the influx of the refugees from the territories where Israel was 
established and would continue to exist. This population, which settled on both the 
West and East Banks of the Jordan, did not just bring the entire social and political 
complexity dictated by its different backgrounds. The uprooting process according 
to which they became refugees did not only deny them their homes, but also 
destroyed the socio-economic, cultural and political context whose existence they 
had pursued, projecting them in an entirely new context. In other words, at least at 
the socio-economic level, a process of proletarization took place, where the refugees 
were transformed economically by evacuating them from where their old system 
existed.232 Recognising the socio-economic, cultural and political variations that the 
refugees brought with them and that continued to function making differentiations. 
the above dimensions and others contributed to the formation of an identity distinct 
not just from the Trans-Jordanian, but even from the West Bank Palestinian. The 
'Laajiin', or 'people of the camps', became a distinct community within the 
boundaries of each camp and the new socio-economic structure that they were 
forced to live in, as well as in the perception of the other communities. Over the 
years, this reality gave them not only distinctive socio-economic characters, but also 
peculiar features at the political level. 
Having said that the war had a great impact on the new state's population, 
territories, socio-economic and cultural texture, other dimensions were born with the 
new state. The fact that a high percentage of the population was Palestinian and 
232 Apart from the physical assets such as houses, land, tools, etc., there was another type of 
assets wt'lich were vitanortneif exisfence in their homeland even Tn case of natural socio-economic 
transformation. These comprised the experience from careers that they were pursuing in the pre-war 
period and other sorts of accumulated knowledge. 
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that the state possessed the longest borders with lsrael233 made the Palestinian 
question interwoven in the domestic sphere, having a profound impact on internal 
politics in a way that none of the frontline countries ever experienced. 
The reality of the new state involved a process of moulding the different 
aspects of Trans-Jordanian society, the West Bank and the refugee population in 
one nation. The indications at several levels reveal that such a process was to a 
large extent smooth and successful. The Palestinians, and mainly the West-
Bankers, were incorporated into the Trans-Jordanians' society, forming together with 
them the political elite of the new state. and political parties and groups, both 
conventional and radical, merged and emerged in the new national domain. The 
economic sphere became the domain of the new state. The bourgeoisie, which in 
Trans-Jordan had started to form in the 1940s, was widened to cover those of the 
West Bank and those who came from Palestine in 1948. 
Serious turning points that the new state experienced making a break with its 
predecessor are the 1952 constitution and its amendments in 1953, which made the 
government accountable to the lower house of the parliament, restraining the 
unleashed power of the executive authority. 234 Laws about the press and the 
political parties, which stressed the concepts of freedom and political participation, 
reflected the political opening process and the sense of liberalism in the 1950s. The 
process of breaking up the mandate patterns that governed the alliance with Britain 
during the 1950s was established in 1957.235 This process, limiting the influence of 
the British, brought the USA to be Jordan's principal ally and the latter to be 
dependent on American military and economic aid. The honeymoon between 
Jordan and Nasser's Egypt, which finished as early as 1957. was replaced by the 
233 In reality, it was not just a matter of borders: many of the inhabited West Bank villages 
(better known in that period as 'front line villages') lay on the lines of the armistices, thus being easy 
targets for the Israeli aggressions during the 1950s and 1960s (for more information, see Madi, M. 
and Musa, S. (1988)). 
234 See the constitution of 1952, the political parties law of 1953 and the press law of 1953. 
Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988), AI-Masri, M. (1995), pp62-77. 
235 One could argue that this period stretched from 1951 up to 1957, when the Anglo-
Jordanlan·treaty waS' en'de-tr However.ll'fe~d-to such- a conclusion came through Jordan's refusal 
to join the Baghdad pact and the dismissal of Glubb pasha as the commander of the Jordanian army. 
For more details, see AI-Masri, M. (1995), The political development In Jordan: 1953-1957. 
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alliance with the Saudis, which will be known as 'the conservative alliance' I as 
opposed to the radical Arab regimes236• 
A detailed account of the different social components of the country during 
this period is not possible within the limited scope and size of this section. For the 
same reasons, a detailed account of the state of the private sector or of the 
bourgeoisie over those years will not be given. Moreover, the fact that during this 
period the state included the West Bank, which would be under the Israeli 
occupation from 1967 I means that such an account will be of little use for the 
following chapters, which deal exclusively with the East Bank, not to mention the 
lack of data concerning the West Bank. However, in the course of the analysis of 
the following periods, reference to the developments at the level of the bourgeoisie 
or of the socio-economic structure of these years is to be made when it is needed. 
Hence, the coverage will be confined to an overview of three main areas of the 
economic development of the country, namely the development efforts, the 
governmental budget and the main indicators of the macro-economy. During the first 
few years of the 1950s, a process of break-up with the economic patterns and 
policies that dominated the mandate period took place. It took a long spell of time 
for this process to be accomplished, because of the resistance that the British 
showed against softening the grip on such policies and because Britain was the only 
possible potential provider of development loans. 
2.4.1 THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
The Jordanian government started its economic development efforts237 in this 
period. They were manifested first in 'the five-year program for economic 
development (1962-1967)'238 which, in 1963, was replaced by a 7 -year program 
236 Dann, u. (1994). p50. and also see Madi, M. and Musa, S. (1988) 
237 As a matter of fact. an earlier development plan was proposed by the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) in 1955. This 1 0-year plan was the product of the 
World Bank's mission in 1954 upon the request of the Jordanian government for economic technical 
assistance in order to undertake a general review of the country's economic potentialities and to 
provide the government with recommendations for a long term development program (Hourani, H. 
(1994), p103). See the preface of The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1961), 
The Economic Development of Jordan). 
238 The theme, assumJ:!ti.Q.o_and expectations of tl]is plan..we.re. to a large extent, comparable 
to the ten-year development program proposed by the mission of the World Bank. Even the goals, the 
investment, and the expenditure of this plan were the same as. or derived from, the World Bank 
recommendations. This is not unexpected in the light of the fact that the program was the first 
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(1963-1970)239• The two programs. sharing the same destiny of not being 
implemented (the tatter because of the 1967 war), reveal in their objectives the 
state's economic strategies of that period. The two programs240 aimed at 
accomplishing three broad targets: reducing the trade deficit, increasing income per 
capita and reducing the unemployment rate.w Agriculture and industry were the two 
main sectors around which the Jordanian planners' strategies revolved, in order to 
expand the economy and accomplish a growth of GOP and GNP at an annual rate 
above 10.0%, and to achieve the implementation of the above-mentioned aims. The 
planners were not in the process of undertaking a radical change in the base of the 
Jordanian economy; rather, they were determined to keep the economy as it was, 
i.e. based on agriculture, whose contribution to the national income ranged between 
20.0% and 30% and absorbed almost a third of the labor force. The devolvement 
effort in agriculture, which took up the largest share of the plans' expenditure, 
targeted the implementation of stages I, II and VI of the East Ghor Canal, which 
would result not just in increasing the cultivated areas (especially the irrigated ones), 
but in stabilizing the agricultural income, which would become less affected by the 
fluctuation of the rainfall. 242 This project became of vital importance in the 7 -year 
concrete and comprehensive development plan prepared for the country, and that the World Bank was 
represented on the Development Board of Jordan. 
239 The Jordanian planners attributed the introduction of the new plan to the reduction in the 
external financial budget support which occurred in 1962/1963 for the first time, as well as to the 
expectation that a further reduction would take place in the coming years. According to the planners. 
this evolution would have a negative impact on the entire economy and on the whole development 
process. Hence, an appropriate economic response was needed in order to hold down the effect of 
the reduction (see Jordan Development Board, The Seven Year Program for Economic Development 
of Jordan 1964-1970, p24 ). Mazur argues that the availability of development grants that could be 
obtained only by assigned projects led the planners to make a change to enhance their projects. He 
adds that the finance of the 5-year plan should not have been affected by budget support cuts, since 
its projects were not financed by external aid, but rather by development loans and grants (see Mazur, 
M.P. (1979). ~conomic Growth and Development in Jordan, p244). 
240 It is very important to highlight that the aims of the two development plans were very close 
to those of the Wor1d Bank's 1 0-year plan, extended to the aims of the different sectors. especially 
agriculture and infrastructure projects. Such a similarity can be attributed to the fact that the World 
Bank report itself was one of the main sources available to the Jordanian planners concerning the 
state of the economy (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1961) , p 5-12 and 
152-173.) Furthermore, Anani claims that the economic and development policies of the state during 
the 50s and 60s were influenced to a large extent by the recommendations of the consultant from the 
World Bank (Anani, J (1994), p 92). 
241 There are two slight differences between the objectives of the two plans. The first is the 
order of importance of the goals: reducing the trade deficit was the third objective according to the first 
plan. The second discrepancy is that the second plan associated the reduction of the trade deficit with 
a reduction of dependency upon external budget support; hence, Jordan could rely on itself to sustain 
itself (see The Jordan Development Board, The Seven-Year Program for Economic Development of 
Jordan 1964-1970, p137 and. Klat, P~J, (1962), Jordan!.s_Eiv.e~.Year Program for Economic 
Development, 1962-1967, p. 53). 
242 Klat, P.J, (1962), Jordan 's Ave-Year Program. p. 54. 
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program, since it was the main project allowing for the export of agricultural 
products.243 In fact, the 7-year program centered its plans around increasing exports 
and replacing imports with domestically produced goods.244 Along the line of 
production for exportation, industry was the second most important sector to be 
emphasized. The second plan stressed that the state would step into direct 
investment in mining projects to enhance the country's exports of phosphate and 
introducing potash production. 245 As for manufacturing, the plans leant heavily on 
private sector investment, while the state's co-operation would focus on providing 
the industrial projects with loans, training facilities, modern laws and feasibility 
studies. The other sectors that were assigned a great deal of investments were 
transport at 19.3%, housing at 12.1 %, tourism at 4.4% and electricity at 3.1 %. The 
governmental investment concentrated on transport, which obtained 76.8% of the 
sector's entire allocated investments, followed by electricity at 66.8% and tourism at 
20.5%.246 
At the level of financing the development efforts, the planners stated that the 
investments of both plansz"7 would be divided almost equally between the private 
and the public sector. For the latter, the 7-year program relied heavily on loans from 
foreign sources.2A8 The second biggest source would be the development grants, 
and finally modest domestic sources would be available through the issue of 
2 43 Jordan Development Board. The Seven Year Program, p43-49. 
244 The seven-year program. in fact, introduced a distinction between two major types of 
development projects. One type aimed to increase the national income without necessarily expanding 
exports, but, conversely, by frequently increasing net imports. The other type of projects was 
designed to increase the exports and diminish the imports, which would inevitably lead to an increase 
in national income. The planners, who made it clear that the program would adopt the second option, 
assumed that increasing the exports would be accomplished through investments in the agriculture 
and mining sectors. The substitution of some of the imports by domestic products would be achieved 
mainly through supporting and encouraging the Investments in the manufacturing sector. See Jordan 
Development Board, The Seven Year Program for Economic Development of Jordan 1964-1970, p.3-
7. 
245 The Jordanian planners predicted that the phosphate exports would reach the value of JD 
7 million in 1970 by improving the productivity of the ai-Rasiifa mines and completing the works in the 
ai-Hasaa mines to be ready for production and exportation in 1966. They also assumed that exploiting 
the potash of the Dead Sea would make this product available for exportation by 1968, bringing JD 5.3 
Million by 1970. 
2
<16 Jordan Development Board, The Seven-Year Plan, p5-15. 
247 The fixed capital formation of the 5-year program was estimated by JD 126 million, while 
the 7-year program was at JD 260 million (Jordan Development Board, The Seven-Year Program, 
p12-16). 
248 JD 100 million would be pr:ovided-through loans, JD ·35.6 million would be obtained from 
development grants, and JD 5.1 million would be secured through governmental bond sales (Jordan 
Development Board. The Seven year Program, p16). 
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governmental bonds by 1966. In contrast, the plan did not explicate the financial 
sources that the private sector would depend on to cover JD 129.1 million, its 
projected share of investment.249 Focusing on the projects and their financing, some 
scholars argue that the plans were not national development plans. The lack of 
sufficient economic data as well as the absence of detailed projects and available 
finance for the private sector made the plans look more like governmental 
investment programs. 250 
As was mentioned above, the outbreak of the 1967 war and the lack of 
stability of the period 1968-1971 brought the plan to an end. However, the 
achievements of the plan before the war suggest that it was not implemented before 
the spring of 1965. This was due to the slow approach that the government adopted 
in approving the plan or in proposing it for parliament's approval. Such a delay on 
the behalf of the government was possible because of the cabinet change and the 
fact that the Jordanian Development Board was not a power pole in the Jordanian 
political context, or in relation to the cabinet.251 Nevertheless, the figures during the 
first three years {1964-1966) show that the real gross capital formation amounted to 
JD 110.5 million, at an average of JD 36.5 million per year. That figure was almost 
the same as had been predicted according to the plan. The actual governmental 
investment, however, did not meet the planned figures and averaged JD 12.1 million 
per annum, i.e. it was JD 6.5 million short. The real GOP at market price showed an 
average growth rate of 11 .3% yearly during the period 1964-1966, exceeding the 
planned one. The high increase in the agricultural output was the main reason of 
such a high GOP rate.252 
249 However, the plan emphasized that the saving deposits would arise due to the predicted 
difference between the high GNP growth rate and the slow rate of consumption. which would 
presumably be diverted to private investment. Private sector investment in housing and transportation 
was anticipated to grow at 5% and 4% respectively per annum. which was the natural annual 
expansion computed on the basis of the annual growth rate between 1959-1963 (Jordan Development 
Board, The Seven year Program. p19}. 
250 Mazur, M.P. (1979), Economic Growth and Development tn Jordan, p243. Hourani, H. 
(1994}, p1 04. 
251 Nielson, Howard, C. ( 1970), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Seven-Year Program for 
Economic Development, An Evaluation. Amman, Unpublished Report, chapter 1, p5-7. Nielson 
provides another reason for the delay in the implementation, i.e. the leaving of the Ford Foundation 
___ tearn,_which was on the board for consultancy .proposes.. - --
252 EI-Ahmad, A.Q. (1980), The Effect of the Encouragement of Investment Law on the 
Jordanian Economy, p34-35. 
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2.4.2 THE BUDGET 
If the development plans reveal some aspects of the economic policy of the 
state, the budget is certainly the other main indicator. Hamarneh claims that the 
British mandate's economic policies reproduced the lack of development and the 
dependency of the country. The legacy of this conclusion and its continuation can 
be seen in the overview of the state's budget during this period. One can identify 
three main pillars that characterized the budget over these years: its chronic deficit, 
its reliance on external aid to cover the deficit and the high proportion of its defense 
expenditures. 
Table (1 )253 shows the extent to which domestic revenue failed to cover 
expenditure. The external aid tha1 came to central government to compensate this 
deficit was neither steady nor fixed. As part of Britain's obligation to Jordan 
according to the Anglo-Jordanian treaties, the latter continued to receive budget 
support from the former until 1957, when it was replaced by American assistance.254 
It was not only the source of the budget that was not steady. but its value fluctuated 
over the years. It increased from JD 10.2 million in 1953/54 reaching a peak of JD 
16.4 million in 1960/61 and 1961/62. However, it started to decline from 1962/63, 
reaching JD 12.4 million in 1966.255 The budget support does not only exposes the 
financial dependency of the state on its western allies, but it conditioned its political 
options in a period dominated by the Arab cold war. If the proportion of this aid to 
other sources of revenue indicates the degree of the state's dependency, in this 
period it showed a dramatic decline: after having reached a substantial percentage 
of more than 50% during the 1950s, it went down in the 1960s, registering 25.5% in 
1966.256 Although the decline in the proportion reflected a decrease in aid 's absolute 
value and an increase in domestic revenue, the economy started to rely on new 
external sources, i.e. development grants and foreign loans. These two new 
253 See table 1, Appendix 4. 
254 This financial support was part of the American commitments towards Jordan, which were 
created in the light of the political circumstances that took place at the regional level in 1957, in order 
to substitute for the British financial aid. 
255 Despite the fact that 1960/61 showed the largest amount of budget support, the highest 
proportion of it - i.e. 63.8% - to the entire receipts was experienced in 1953/54. See table 3, Appendix 
4. 
256 Jordan Development· Bb1lrd; Tlfe Seveh-YifaT PI'O'QfBIT\ for Economic Development of 
Jordan 1964-1970, p 42. See also Porter, R.S. and others (1963), The Economic implication of 
Balancing the Jordan Current Budget, p 1-2. 
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avenues kept the proportion of the whole external257 financial sources at more than 
50.0% of the entire state's revenue.258 
The state was bound to the provider of the external budget not just at the 
economic level, but also at the political one. The continuation of its political 
dependency had been a serious issue since the early 1950s. In the context of fiscal 
policy, the government pursued the possibility of augmenting its domestic revenues. 
Despite the latter's share increase up to an annual average of 56.6% of the total 
receipts over 1962/63-1966 compared with 40.7% during 1953/54-1961/62, it 
remained inadequate to replace the foreign aid. 259 
The tax regime and its application was the main factor making domestic 
revenue inadequate. For example, direct tax260 receipts, which stood at JD 0.8 
million in 1953/54, after 13 fiscal years had increased only up to JO 2.7 million. 
Porter attributes this fact to the regressive nature of taxation laws, which did not 
sufficiently reflect the variation in income and production and continued to bear 
heavily on the low-income groups, in addition to the inefficiency of the taxatron 
system.261 In fact, it was the indirect taxes262 that contributed more than anything 
else to the increase in the relative share of the domestic revenue, since they made 
up around 58.0% of the overall domestic sources on average, and in 1965/66 and 
1966 their share exceeded 60%263 of the total. 264• Along with the indirect taxes, the 
2!>7 Odeh, H.S. (1972), Economic Development of Jordan, p37. 
258 In 1965/66 and 1966, the percentage dramatically dropped to about 40.0% and 37.0% 
respectively. See table 3, Appendix 4. 
259 The increase in the domestic revenue was mainly generated from indirect taxes, non-tax 
revenue and the earnings from the governmental shares, particularly cement and phosphate (see 
Harris,G.L (1958), Jordan: its People, its Society, its Culture, p 141 , and Mazur (1979), p126. 
260 This includes income tax, urban property taxes, National Guard tax, Social Welfare tax, 
Agricultural Land tax, and Animals Head tax. 
261 Porter, R.S. and others (1963), The Economic Implication of Balancing the Jordan Current 
Budget, p21-22. Furthermore, and taking into account that the Jordanian economy was based on 
agriculture. the tax on agricultural land and animals was very small. For instance, it accounted for less 
than 1% of the agricultural income in 1961/62 and 1962/63. Neither was the income generated from 
agricultural activities covered by the income tax. 
262 This includes Customs, Excise, trade Licences, import Licences and fees. 
263 The volume of indirect taxes rose from JD 0.5 million in 1953/54 to JO 15.3 million in 1966. 
264 The expansion in the imports of both capital and consuming goods, which led to a rapid 
--increase in customs value. was the main reason behind-thel naifecnaxes revenue (See table '(1), 
table (3), table (4), and table 11 , Appendix 4. Porter, R.S. and others (1963). p 28; Central Bank of 
Jordan (1966) , p13. 
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non-tax receipt265 rose from JD 1.5 million in 1953/54 to JD 6.0 million in 1966. 
Furthermore, it recorded its best revenue in 1961/62 and 1963/64, when its share of 
the total domestic receipts was 45% and 40% respectively.268 The government 
considered a few times the possibility of introducing a taxation reform that would 
reduce its dependency on foreign receipts, especially after the prospect of the 
decrease in budget financial aid that was mentioned above. These plans, which 
could have been of considerable importance, were never implemented.267 
Concerning the third pillar of the budget characteristics, which is the defense 
and public security expenditure, the figures show that this category was 
predominant, with an average annual proportion of 53.9%, i.e. almost three times the 
average share of the development expenditure. However, the defense budget 
dropped during the 1960s, reaching its lowest proportion in 1966, at 41 .4%.268 Apart 
from the defense budget, civil service expenditure was a substantial category, 
whose relative importance to the entire expenditure rose from 24.5% in 1955/56 to 
29.7% in 1966.289 Education, health and social welfare had around 50% of the 
265-y-his includes gross receipts of posts. telephones and telegraphs, oil transit royalties, 
currency profits and governmental profits from cement and phosphate enterprises. 
268 Central Bank of Jordan, (1966), p11 . 
267 In early 1961 the Royal Fiscal Commission recommended a comprehensive reformation of 
the taxation system and its procedures in order to add another JD 2.0 million yearly to the domestic 
receipts. Moreover, the 5-year development plan proposed a detailed project to be undertaken in the 
first year of the plan in order to amend the tax laws, and particularly the ones that were contained in 
the direct taxes section. A reduction from 20.0% to 10.0% per annum applied to the buildings rental, 
the imposition of a fine for the delayed payment of the income and property taxes and the application 
of the income tax on the people engaged in agriculture and breeding cattle were among the major 
changes that the development plan aimed to implement. Other measures were proposed to improve 
the fUnctionality and efficiency of the taxation system, such as adding new qualified assessing officers, 
spreading the body of the Department of Taxes to the districts that were special need of taxation 
representatives and, finally, establishing specialised tax courts. 
The report recommended that serious attention should be given to the small amount of 
income tax levied on the profits from trade and commerce, taking into consideration that the wholesale 
and retail trade contributed almost one fifth of the GOP. It was also recommended that the privileges 
that the income tax payer enjoyed, by offsetting their share of the tax levied from the shareholding 
companies and urban property taxes, should be abolished. An extensive revision of the evaluation of 
the urban property was highly recommended in order to increase tax yield from this section of direct 
tax (Jordan Development Board, The 5-Year Plan. p322-332. Also see Porter, R.S. and others (1 963), 
p 26-28). Augmenting the domestic revenue was discussed again in the first half of 1963, when the 
government was preparing to adopt a development strategy that would allow the economy to absorb 
the oblation of the foreign budgetary aid. It was recommended that new taxes should be imposed or 
existing ones should be increased, such as the tobacco tax, the alcoholic beverage tax and the fUel 
tax. Various licenses were called for. such as trade licenses, Import licenses and road transport 
licenses. 
268 As a matter of fact, the decline in the proportion of defense and security was due to its low 
gro..wth rate and to the rapid increase in. capitaLexpendlture-in.the-civillan services component, which 
showed an average annual growth rate of 13.1 %. 
269 1t recorded Its best share in 1963/64, at 31 .0%. 
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civilian service expenditure, while general administration, justice and post, were 
covered by the rest.270 Still at the level of expenditures. it is worth mentioning that 
there was an increase in the development budget, whose ratio to the entire 
expenditures averaged 17.3% per annum. and rose from JO 2.12 million in 1953/54 
to JO 15.9 million in 1966, registering a growth rate of 20.4%? 1 This increase was 
massive compared to its almost non-existence during the mandate period. Apart 
from the different efforts that were made by the state in order to invest directly into 
irrigation projects in agriculture, into mining and into oil refineries, it was its 
infrastructure projects that the country needed in response to the increase in 
population and economic activities. 272 
Figur e 2- 2: The Main Components of the Budget Revenue (1953- 1966) 
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270 The figures indicated that general administration, justice and post expenditures grew at a 
faster rate than those of education. health and social welfare. 
271 The development expenditure's average annual growth rate was more than double of that 
of current expenditure, i.e. 9.3% {see table 2. Appendix 4). 
272 As was noted by Odeh, and as our figures indicate, some of the reasons to increase the 
development efforts can be, since the mid '50s experience, the new sources of receipts, development 
grants and foreign loans. which no doubt diverted funds to the development expenditure and 
increased its size (Odeh, H.S. (1972), Economic Development of Jordan, p38. See also table 2/ 
Appendix 4. One could argue that the US budget support from 1957 was not as strict as the British 
aid prior to 1957 in its expenditures, which made it possible to divert some of it to development 
proposes. 
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2 .4.3 THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
The economy in this period showed respectable growth, as the main 
economic indicators reveal. For inStance, GOP at factor cost tripled , whilst the GOP 
and GNP at market price rose by more than three and a half times. 273 With a limited 
increase in the price index and the low inflation rate during this period,274 the real 
GOP at factor cost increased from JO 72.1 million in 1954 to JD 187.0 million in 
1966, rising almost threefold or growing by 159.3%, at an annual growth rate of 
9. 7%. Similarly, the real GOP and GNP at market price registered an increase of 
178.7% and 197.0% over the same period.275 
Despite the overall expansion of the economy, the figures indicate that 
economic performance was neither consistent nor steady, displaying dramatic 
fluctuation in rates from one year to another. 276 This can largely be attributed to the 
fluctuation of agricultural output, as the figures suggest a positive correlation 
between agricultural output and the growth rate of GDP.277 One could argue that the 
political uncertainty of these years may also have been a significant factor in slowing 
economic growth.278 The priorities of economic decision makers at the state level, as 
273 By 1966, GOP and GNP at market price increased by 232.7% and 254.6% respectively, 
compared to 1954. 
274 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1961), p63·67. Odeh, H.S. 
(1972), Economic Development of Jordan, p45. 
275 The real GOP rose from JO 76.6 million in 1954 to JO 213.5 million in 1966, at an average 
growth rate of 10.3% per annum. The real GNP increased from JD 78.2 million in 1954 to JO 232.4 
million in 1966, at an average annual growth rate of 10.8%, exceeding the other indicators mentioned 
above. 
276 For example, in years such as 1955,1957,1960,1962 and 1966, the growth rates of GOP at 
factor cost, GOP at market price and GNP in real terms recorded either negative figures or less than 
2.0%. In the rest of the years of this period the growth rates were above average, even remarkably 
high. For instance, in 1965 GOP at factor cost, GOP at market price and GNP indicated growth rates 
of 38.8%, 40.2% and 40.0% respectively. 1956 and 1959 also experienced similar rates. 
277 See table 6, Appendix 4. Tt)is reality led Odeh to use the average growth rate of two years 
in his statistical comparisons, In order to limit the effect of agricultural fluctuation. For the same 
purpose. Mazur applied an approach using various collections derived from the average agricultural 
production, which stabilised the agricultural output and limited its fluctuation (Odeh, H.S. {1972) 
Economic Development of Jordan , p33; Mazur, M.P. {1979), Economic Growth and Development in 
Jordan, p174-177. 
- - --
278 For example, the y~ars 1955 and 1957, in which the economy dramatically slowed down, 
experienced political instability because of the plans to include Jordan in the Baghdad pact. An even 
worst situation was experienced in 1957, after the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the 
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laid out in the development plans, coupled with what figures concerning industrial 
origin of the GOP suggest,279 show that the Jordanian economy during the entire 
period was still based on agriculture. 
The fact that the trade and banking280 sector had the same average relative 
importance in the structure of the GOP reveals the extent to which the Jordanian 
economy was expanding within the same framework of the mandate period, i.e. 
being underdeveloped, lacking an industrial base and continuing to reproduce itself 
as a dependent economy. This assertion can be supported on the one hand by the 
fact that public administration and defense had the second largest share of the GOP, 
at 17.6% on average. On the other hand, the industrial and electrical sector, 
including phosphate mining projects, averaged annually just 10.1% of the GOP. 281 
The deepening of the dependency of the Jordanian economy can be 
examined by means of trade balance indicators. The deficit on the trade balance 
increased from JD 40.7 million in 1964 to JD 56.8 million in 1966, i.e. by 39.5%. 
limited Jordanian exports factored in this deficit; for instance, during the 1950s, 
exports were mainly agricultural products.282 At the end of this period phosphates 
became the sole major export, meaning that the Jordanian economy shifted its 
dependency from being based on fluctuation in rainfall to the fluctuation in the 
international price of phosphate.283 Apart from exports, an increase in the rate of 
imports made the deficit more profound. Despite the fact that development efforts 
internal conflict between the palace and its right wing supporters on one side and the government and 
the leftist parties on the other. In the case of 1966, which was the worst year for the entire period, with 
the economy losing around 20% of its value in the preceding year, agriculture could not be the only 
reason for the economic setback, since all of the economic sectors registered a negative growth rate 
compared to 1965, and even the value of indirect taxes and the net income from abroad were 
affected. This can be explained, to a certain degree, by the fact that the economic performance in 
1965 was outstanding and did not represent the real potentialities of the economy, with unusual 
growth rates ranging between 25.0% and 40.0% for all the economic sectors, and by the political 
uncertainty which had started to overshadow the region on the path to the 1967 war. 
279 The agricultural sector had the biggest proportion in GOP at 21 .4% on average during the 
period. However, it shared this position with the trade and banking sector. 
280 The main component of this sector was clear1y the commercial one, both in retailing and 
wholesale, despite the tact that a few new banks were established during this period, such as the 
National Jordanian Bank est. in 1955, the Bank of Jordan est. in 1961 and the Cairo-Amman est. in 
1965 (Companies Registry Record, Ministry of Trade and Industry). It is vital to recognize that the 
figures show that the share of trade and banking was more stable than that of agriculture. 
281 The relative importance of the rest of the sectors was: transportation (11 .2%), services 
(7.8%), ownership of dwelling (6.2%) and, finally, construction with the lowest share at 4.3%. 
282 Such as fruit, vegetables.and olive oil, .which were-maiAiy-directed to other Arab countries. 
283 Between 1964 and 1966, agriculture accounted for 58% of the commodity exports, while 
the rest was mostly phosphate exports (see Central Bank of Jordan(1966), p18-19}. 
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meant an increase in the volume of imports of capital goods, the increase of 
imports284 by 36% between 1964 and 1966 was due to the rapid rise in the value of 
consumer goods, whose growth rate was faster than that of the population.285 
Figure 2- 3: The Share of the Economic Sectors in the GOP at Factor Cost (1954-1966) 
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Despite the chronic trade deficit, the basic balance was not in debt for the 
entire period. This was due to foreign aid which kept the budget afloat, maintaining 
capital account credit and overcoming the trade deficit, as well as that of the balance 
of trade and services. In fact, the latter was in continuous debt; for example, in 
1950-54 the average annual deficit was $36m, whilst between 1959 and 1962 it was 
nearly $76m and between 1963 and 1966 it averaged $79m. However, the service 
balance was in credit during the last few years of this period, making an important 
contribution to the current balance at large and having some impact in reducing the 
trade deficit. An unprecedented source that was in the economic accounts and 
would be the golden chicken in periods to come was the worker remittances. The 
latter, which was the main balancing category in the services accounts, contributed 
an average of JD 9.6 million between the years 1964 and 1966. Contribution to the 
service account was also coming from the travel account. 
284 The main suppliers of imports were the U.S., West Germany, Japan, Syria and Lebanon. 
285 See table 11 , Appendix 4. Kanovsky (1975), p9. 
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As the figures and the main trends that were overviewed above indicate the 
Jordanian economy was small and highly dependent on external sources, in the 
form of financial aid, remittances and tourism. During this period, the contribution of 
the productive sectors to the national accounts was still limited compared with the 
contribution of services or the infrastructure sectors.286 The main productive sectors 
upon which the balance of the economic accounts depended were still vulnerable to 
the changing levels of external demands - as in the cases of mining and agriculture -
or to variable climate conditions. The manufacturing sector, despite the 
considerable number of new projects established in these years,287 was still in a 
period of foundation and was still unable to satisfy the needs of the domestic 
market.288 
296 The productive sectors (agriculture and industry) made up an average contribution to the 
GOP of 31.4%, while the infrastructure sectors (construction and transportation) had the smallest 
proportion of the GOP at 15.5% and the services sectors contribution averaged 54.1 %. However. the 
relative importance of the economic sectors showed a change over the period. For example, the 
average shares of construction, trade and banking, ownership & dwelling and services rose in three 
years (1954-1956) from 2.9%, 19.2%, 4.9% and 6.5% to 5.9%, 21 .7%, 7.3% and 8.7% respectively. 
These sectors showed an improvement around 2.0% on average. Even though the industry's share 
also improved, its improvement was lower than the average achieved by the other sectors. The 
proportion of the industry in the GOP rose from 10.4% to 11 .6%, which was an increase of 1.2% on 
average. Other sectors showed a drop in their relative importance: public administration, agriculture 
and transportation declined from 20.1%, 25.0% and 11 .0%, in 1954-1956 to 14.5%, 22.1% and 8.9% 
in 1964-1966 respectively (see table 7, Appendix 4; see also Kanovsky, p9-11 and Odeh, H.S. 
( 1972), p 9-12). The use of the average of three years was to eliminate the impact of fluctuation. 
mainly caused by the agriculture output. 
287 Among these projects was the cement industry (est. in 1954), producing 204.8 thousand 
tons in 1966, petroleum refinery, which started producing in 1961, and cigarette manufacturing. 
288 Some industries, however. were sufficient to meet the market demand, such as that of 
cig~rettes , which covered 109% of the domestic needs, allowing Jordan to export. Some industries 
indicated that the ratio of their production to the domestic ·supplies In 1966 were close to satisfy the 
market's needs, such as beverage (87.0%), wood and furniture (76.7%), petroleum and its products 
(87.0%) (Mazur, M.P. (1979). Economic Growth and Development in Jordan. p212-218). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE METHODOLOGY 
The task of this chapter is to put forward the methodology that is used 
throughout this study to define the members of the bourgeoisie empirically. 
Additionally, this chapter looks at the methods that this study uses in order to 
analyze the bourgeoisie, highlighting its structure and composition. The first section 
covers the main problems in defining the actual members of the bourgeoisie and 
provides a strategy that uses the available data to locate the bourgeoisie elements 
within the Jordanian society, distinguishing it from other classes. The second 
section gives definitions to all terms and concepts that are used throughout the 
thesis. The third section provides the framework that is adopted to define the 
ownership forms of the enterprises in which the bourgeoisie carried out their 
investment and activities. The fourth section is devoted to the factors that can result 
in the division of the bourgeoisie into different fractions. 
3.1 WHAT IS THE BOURGEOISIE? 
Chapter one offered a theoretical definition of the bourgeoisie and of its 
position in the socio-economic structure of capitalist relations, while chapter 2 was 
concerned with the peculiarity of the socio-economic development of the Jordanian 
social formation. However, neither the theoretical framework nor the peculiarity of 
the Jordanian social formation are able to answer the main question of what the 
Jordanian bourgeoisie actually is. In other words, what constitutes the Jordanian 
bourgeoisie? In this section the concern is to address the problem of locating the 
bourgeoisie members within Jordanian society. The first sub-section will advance 
some considerations and constraints that must be taken into account when any 
mechanism is used in order to be consistent with the theoretical framework. The 
mechanism used to define and extract the bourgeoisie will be the concern of the 
second sub-section. 
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3 .1.1 CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
In the first chapter, it was suggested that a class should be defined according 
to its position in the production process. Possession and lack of possession of 
means of production and the manner in which surplus labour is appropriated and 
distributed are the two necessary conditions to define class. Despite the fact that 
such conditions seem to be clear and straightforward in defining the different social 
classes in general and the bourgeoisie in particular, they cannot on their own identify 
the members of the bourgeoisie. A more adequate mechanism must take into 
consideration the economic situation of Jordan on the one hand and the data 
available on the other. However, theoretical conditions are necessary to constrain 
any practical mechanism from compromising the very basic definition of the class as 
was asserted in the first chapter. This is the focus of the present subsection. 
First of all, the bourgeoisie members' active sphere is the private sector, in 
the sense that they have to have an economic base in the private sector. It is 
according to this base that their economic position and power are defined, and it is 
upon this base that such a position and power are reproduced. Any economic or 
other social base outside the private sector providing its members with any sort of 
power does not qualify them to be part of the bourgeoisie, even though these 
positions tie their occupants to certain types of interest and solidarity, such as those 
of the family or of the tribe. In this context, the private sector is simply defined as 
'that part of the economy concerned with the transaction of private individuals, 
business and institutions (the personal sector, corporate sector and financial sector 
respectively) .'1 The private sector, together with the public one, makes up the 
domestic economy. In this context, the 'distinction between the two sectors depends 
on the legal distinction of ownership; in the private sector individuals or other firms 
own the organization that does the producing. Hence, any position within the public 
sector or the state, even if of an economic nature, does not make of its occupant a 
bourgeoisie member. 
Secondly, the private sector economic base of the bourgeoisie should lie in 
the domest~c economy if the bourgeoisie in concern is the Jordanian one. To 
' Pass. Christopher, Lowes, Bryan and Davies. Leslie (2000) Dictionary of Economics, p420. 
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consider somebody as a member of the bourgeoisie in spite of the fact that his/her 
ownership of the means of production is outside the domestic private sector means 
bringing in a whole range of production, interest and power relations belonging to 
socio-economic structure(s) that are alien to the Jordanian SF and of no relevance 
to the structure of its bourgeoisie. In other words, to be part of a certain SF the 
bourgeoisie requires a qualification of ownership of means of production and 
appropriation of the surplus labour in that formation. A person's residence in a 
formation where s/he is idle economically while his/her ownership of the means of 
production and appropriation of the surplus labour takes place within another 
formation does not qualify him/her to be a member of the bourgeoisie in the first 
formation. This consideration rules out individuals who are wealthy or have high of 
consumption levels or belong to the social circles of the Jordanian bourgeoisie, but 
are economically idle in the Jordanian formation. 
Based on the second, the third constraint is related to foreign capital or 
investment. In the previous point, it was specified that residence in the Jordanian 
formation does not qualify an individual to be a member of the bourgeoisie unless 
s/he is economically active. The emphasis here is on the fact that nationality or 
place of residence are not determining factors in qualifying individuals as members 
of the Jordanian bourgeoisie; these individuals must be economically active in 
Jordan, according to the theoretical framework and by virtue of the fact that they 
possess means of production and appropriate surplus labour in the country. The 
Jordanian bourgeoisie, therefore, is made up of people who belong to different 
nationalities and may not take Jordan as a place of residence; they are, however, 
bound together by the fact that they are economically active. 
Fourthly, the non-Jordanian elements of the bourgeoisie are those who come 
under the foreign capital category. Foreign capital will be analyzed in the context of 
investigating the state of the private sector in Jordan and in the study of the 
bourgeoisie. However, not all foreign capital in Jordan is to be analyzed as part of 
the investments of the non-Jordanian bourgeoisie. In this sense, the study 
distinguishes between three types of foreign capital : 
1- foreign capital that is invested on a temporary basis. This type 
of capital usually com~s as p~rt of cont~acts between non-Jordanian firms 
and the Jordanian government or the private sector to conduct specific 
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projects, the completion of which ceases the activities of that firm. This 
type of investment is not considered as part of bourgeois activities, due to 
its temporary presence; however, the analysis of the private sector will 
embrace such investments. 
2- foreign capital invested through equities held by non-Jordanian 
individuals or corporations. This type of investment is usually a long term 
one and can come into existence in different forms, either as direct 
investment of non-Jordanian individuals or firms or through joint ventures 
with Jordanians. It will be considered as part of the bourgeoisie's 
activities. 
3- the foreign governmental capital that is invested in Jordanian 
private sector enterprises. This type of capital is usually invested by Arab 
governments either as part of their obligations through the joint Arab 
economic project - as in the case of some of the Arab state cooperative 
enterprises,'- or as direct investments by some of the Arab governments 
in specific private sector enterprises. 
A fifth , and last, consideration is that owning means of production and hiring 
some wage earners does not necessarily qualify that owner as a member of the 
bourgeoisie. It is possible for members of the petty bourgeoisie to own their means 
of production and hire, on a temporary or permanent basis, a limited n.umber of 
workers to put their enterprise into function. 
The above constraints have a considerable impact in determining any 
mechanism that is to be used to identify the members of the bourgeoisie. On the 
one hand, they make constructing any such mechanism an easier and more 
straightforward process. On the other hand, however, they show that constructing 
an efficient mechanism to locate the bourgeoisie is a complex and problematic task, 
especially under the circumstances experienced in Jordan. The fact that the 
bourgeoisie exists within the sphere of the private sector means that the latter and 
its participants are to be analyzed in order to extract the bourgeoisie elements. 
Because of objective and historical factors related to Jordan, it is not possible to omit 
analysis of the private sector, since there are no alternatives to provide data about 
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the bourgeoisie. That is, there are no associations that may embrace all big 
participants in the private sector who can be considered as bourgeoisie members. 3 
There is no correlation between types of private sector enterprises and the class 
position of their owners that could lead the analyst to study certain types of 
enterprises knowing that their owners would be bourgeois members. Furthermore, 
the literature about social classes, investors, or even private sector activities is 
limited and not detailed in the sense that can provide researchers with a set of rules 
upon which the bourgeoisie would be easily identified. Factors such as the late 
development of capitalism in Jordan and the manner in which it took place, as well 
as the small size of its market and its scarce natural resources, may hinder the 
attainment of a straightforward mechanism which could categorize the elements of 
the bourgeoisie. In this perspective, a device must be constructed that is able to 
extract the bourgeoisie form the sphere of the private sector. 
In theory, it is possible to construct more than one mechanism that is capable 
of extracting the bourgeoisie elements in Jordan. Income taxes, for instance, can be 
a basis on which a system can be put in place differentiating the bourgeoisie from 
the rest of the private sector members. Also, taxes imposed and collected from the 
private sector businesses can give insights to draw the line between enterprises 
owned by the bourgeoisie and those owned by other classes, such as the petty 
bourgeoisie.• The sales or added values of different enterprises can be another 
appropriate foundation for a selective system extracting the bourgeois elements from 
2 The Arab Potash Company is the first company that was established by the initiative of the 
Arab states. 
3 Some of these societies and clubs were established during the 1990s, which are outside the 
scope of this study. For Instance, The Businessmen Association was established in 1994. Reviewing 
the names of the latter's members leads one to conclude that It is a society of the elite of 
businessmen. A social club that was widely considered to be the club of the wealthy, the bourgeoisie 
or the elite of Jordan is The Royal Automobile Club. Certainly, the membership fees and subscription 
requirements during the 1970s and 1980s confirm such a belief. The management refused to grant a 
study of its membership records. 
4 Despite the fact that, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, the taxation system lacked 
efficiency, it still has great deal of importance as a source of information, especially since the late 
1970s. Concerning the business taxes, they were imposed as such on the public shareholding 
companies since the mid 1970s, while money was collected from other enterprises through income 
taxes. In the early 1990s, taxes were collected directly form the ll enterprises. A great deal of effort 
was made to obtain such information from the Jordanian Income Tax Department. The Departmenfs 
refusal was based on the notion that accessing such information would violate the Income Tax Law, 
which considered such information as classified. This refusal was comprehensive, even when the 
request was to provide the names of the largest one thousand income tax payers without revealing the 
amounts that were paict by tfiem, or {fie largest SOU enterprisesaccording to their tax payments. Apart 
from the obstacles imposed by the department headquarter directorate, the Director of the Income Tax 
Department stated his refusal in a written letter. 
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their wider context, the private sector.5 Looking at detailed accounts of the big 
importers and exporters is another possible approach that can satisfy the purpose. 
Certainly, it would be ideal to build a mechanism that is based on all these different 
grounds and approaches. However, lack of information and the inconsistent nature 
of the available data generate difficulties in constructing any such mechanism. 
3 .1.2 A STRATEGY TO LOCATE AND EXTRACT THE 
BOURGEOISIE 
In light of the difficulties concerning data collection, in accordance with the 
theoretical background and the above-mentioned constraints and in order to have a 
mechanism that is able to operate over the different periods of this study, the only 
avenue was to rely on the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) archive.6 Since 
1965, all private sector enterprises have had to register in the MIT/ where a record 
of each enterprise is kept containing information on the name of the enterprise, its 
capital, its equities holders according to their share, the date of its establishment, its 
address, its economic activities and its management if applicable. In other words, 
this record is a legal document without which an enterprise does not exist, and 
contains the main information about it. The record is regularly updated with further 
information about the enterprise, some of which is obligatorily supplied to the 
ministry with any change related to the basic information that the record already has. 
For example, any change related to the economic activities. capital, address, 
branches, and equity holders (i.e. a change in the equity holders or their shares) has 
to go through the MIT for its approval. Other information is sometimes voluntarily 
5 Such information should be available in the Department of Statistics by virtue of periodical 
surveys targeting the different establishments and revealing substantial information about sales, 
production at factor cost and employment. The results that are published in the end of each survey 
does not spacify data about each establishment. The OS refused to disclose this information. 
8 The Ministry of Industry and Trade was called the Ministry of National Economy up to 1972. 
To avoid any confusion, however, this study adopts the new name even when referring to the 
preceding period. 
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supplied by the enterprises to be added to their records even when it is not 
required.8 
This study argues that the MIT records can be assumed to repre.sent the 
private sector enterprises, which in their turn can be analyzed in order to extract the 
bourgeoisie from among their owners. In this sense, this study assumes, along the 
lines of its theoretical framework, that any bourgeoisie member in Jordan has to own 
means of production that are embodied in her/his ownership of a private sector 
enterprise. The fact that information about the sales or value added of the 
enterprises is not available led this study to rely on figures of the current capital of 
the enterprises as an indicator reflecting some characteristics of a given enterprise. 
Despite the fact that the MIT data is comprehensive and refers to all private 
sector enterprises, it is inaccurate to assume that it covers all private sector 
activities, since not all these activities are conducted through legally registered firms 
or enterprises. This assertion does not refer merely to the actual existence of an 
informal market, but also to the complicated nature of the private sector in general 
terms and that of the Jordanian one in particular. In this context, some private 
sector economic activities that are carried out in the Jordanian countryside - such as 
land cultivation and livestock breeding- are not registered in the form of enterprises. 
Although a household that is engaged in agricultural or other food manufacturing 
activities constitutes a firm with its own organization, division of labour and access to 
the market, incorporating it in the domain of private sector enterprises is beyond the 
aims of this study. In this sense, this analysis of the bourgeoisie misses out some 
members who are rooted in the countryside or in other sectors where they are not 
obliged to register their activities. It is comforting that it is still accurate to assume 
that the majority of these activities are carried out by smallholders, whose production 
is conducted by them, their families and seasonally hired labourers. This argument 
has a basis in the historical development of land ownership, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, which made it clear that the implementation of the Ottoman land 
law in the late 191h century and early 201h century and the British land program of the 
7 Prior to 1965, when the Company law was promulgated, firms could register either with the 
Ministry of National Economy or with the Ministry of Justice. According to the 1965 law, the MIT 
became the only body with which enterprises could register. 
8 Some enterprises are not obliged to supply the Mit with information about their annual 
budget; some of these, however, still do so for different reasons. Although this information does not 
have an intensive character, it was useful in relation to specific enterprises. 
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1930s and 1940s resulted in land ownership being overwhelmingly characterized by 
smallholding. In fact, the presence of large landholders was limited; on the other 
hand, among those who acquired large tracts of land were merchants and usurers, 
whose economic activities can be accounted for through the MIT records. In 
conclusion. however, some of the bourgeoisie's activities could have been missed 
out, especially in the countryside.9 
Since 1974. when land prices rocketed, providing the landholders with 
potential capital, there has been another important aspect to land ownership. 10 
Since it was difficult both to track land ownership and to trace back land transactions 
and their impact on the shifting class of landowners (if there was any), this study 
assumes that the capital resulting from land transactions was used in one of two 
broad possibilities. The first is that such capital was invested within the domestic 
economy, thus it would be accounted for in the MIT records. The other possibility is 
that the capital was used for consuming purposes, such as buying luxurious goods, 
constructing private buildings, or any other sort of consumption. At any rate, the 
second possibility - though involving losing track of some of the capital - would not 
have any serious impact on the class structure of the bourgeoisie. As for the lands 
that, in spite of a dramatic increase in price, were never sold, they should not be 
problematic, since they retained a capital potential that being idle, has no influence 
on class structure at large. 11 
The point of departure in advancing this system is to state that the private 
sector participants make up a domain that contains all those who are equity-holders 
in the private sector ente.rprises, which in their turn registered in the MIT. The 
domain of the private sector participants contains two groups, one of which is to be 
considered the bourgeoisie members (BMs), while the second contains the 
remaining of the private sector participants that are not qualified as BMs. In other 
words, the private sector participants are the equity holders of all of the private 
9 Hence, the size of the majority of this production is still inadequate to yield a significant 
surplus accumulation capable of shifting these smallholders into the domain of the bourgeois class. 
One possible solution to this problem would have been to take land ownership Into consideration and 
expand the sphere of the private sector to include large-, but not smallholders. However, this attempt 
failed due to the continuous refusal of the Land Registry Department to grant access to such data. 
10 The main factor leading to an increase in land prices was not the rewarding return of the agricultural 
activities, but rather the demand on land for residential purposes. The liquidity available to the 
Jordanian expatriates in the·oil ·producing countries made such-a-thing possible. 
11 The land was not source of income in Jordan as the case in Europe since the industrial 
revolution through what is called land r.ent. 
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sector enterprises in Jordan in a given period, including those participants who are 
to be considered as bourgeoisie members according to the following mechanism: 
1- A thorough review of the enterprises and their types as well as their legal 
framework and that of their equity-holders led the study to take the enterprise 
as the starting point in locating the bourgeoisie members. 
II- Because of the variations in the types of enterprise, and the impact of these 
variations on the equity-holders and the potential BMs, it was better to divide 
the private sector enterprises into two sets, the first being the private sector of 
all types of enterprises other than the public shareholding enterprises and the 
second being the public shareholding enterprises (PS) only.12 
Ill- Extracting the BMs from the private sector participants of the first set of 
enterprises, i.e. the non-PS enterprises was achieved as follows: 
1- Analyzing the different patterns and the trends of the enterprises in the 
first set E1 , according to their number, their aggregate capital, their 
average capital, and standard deviation as a whole. in each type of 
enterprises and in each economic sector. According to the outcome of 
this analysis, a certain figure of capital (x) is to be chosen. 13 All the 
equity-holders of the enterprises whose capital is x or more are to 
considered to be the first group of the bourgeoisie members 81. 
2- Any member of 81 who was extracted in the point above and was an 
equity-holder in any enterprise whose capital is less than x is to be 
qualified as a member of the bourgeoisie by virtue of the fact that it 
has been already extracted.14 These new members are called 82. 
12 The rationale behind such a division is due to different conditions of the equity-holders in 
PS (such as the stock market) unlike those in other types of enterprises. 
13 The process of defining x takes into consideration that the proportion of the sum of the 
capital of the enterprises whose capital is x or more makes up more than 50.0% of the total capital of 
all enterprises, in each type of enterprises and in each economic sector. 
14 The qualification of a member as B2 is based on his/her individual capacity, which means 
that the partners of that member In ttre-~t!fiip of a gillen enterprise (capital = less than x) are not 
considered to be part of the bourgeoisie so far. This is in contrast with the previous stage, where 
every equity-holder of any given enterprise (capital =x or more) is part of the bourgeoisie. 
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3- Any equity-holder that has not been qualified as part of the bourgeoisie 
in the previous two stages and has equities in more than one 
enterprise is to be considered as member of the bourgeoisie. These 
members make up 83. 
4- Any equity-holder that has not been qualified either as 81 , 82, or 83, 
but his/her equities make up a proportion of 0.1% or more of the total 
equities is considered to be 8M. These members make up 84. 
1111 Extracting the 8Ms from the private sector participants of the second 
set of enterprises, i.e. the PS enterprises, is achieved as follows: 
1-A simple formula is put forward according to which the shareholders in each 
PS enterprise are ranked in order of the number of shares {from large to 
small) that they own. The bourgeois members in any PS enterprise are those 
who possess the biggest number of shares up to the point where the sum of 
their shares is around 60.0% the total shares in that enterprise. These 
members make up 85. 
2- Any equity-holder who has not been qualified in the previous stage, but is a 
member of 81 , 82, 83 or 84 is considered to be part of the bourgeoisie. 
These members constitute 86. 
3- Any member who has not been qualified to be 85 or 86, but has shares in 
more than one PS enterprise is to be considered as 8M. These members are 
called 87. 
IV- The bourgeoisie members {8Ms) are those who have been qualified in each 
of the previous stages. 
8Ms=81+82+83+84+85+86+87 
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3.2 TERMS & CONCEPTS USED TO ANALYZE THE MEMBERS 
OF THE BOURGEOISIE 
3.1 .3 BOURGEOISIE ENTERPRISES AND THE MEMBERS OF 
THE BOURGEOISIE 
According to the mechanism that was introduced above , two concepts were 
coined and used in order to identify and study the bourgeoisie; these are the 
members of the bourgeoisie (BMs) and the bourgeoisie enterprises (BEs). The 
relation between these two concepts is simple and direct: the BMs are the equity-
holders who possess assets in the private sector and were qualified according to the 
above mechanism to be considered as the members of the bourgeoisie, while the 
BEs are the enterprises that are fully or partly owned by them in a certain period. 
It was vital in the course of this study to explain the concept of BE, since, as 
was mentioned above, applying the mechanism meant ending up with a list of 
individuals whose assets and characteristics distinguished them as BMs from the 
rest of the private sector participants. These members, however, differ from each 
other at different levels. one of which being the enterprises in which they own 
shares. Analyzing their enterprises can contribute to showing the common and 
private grounds of these members. Although it is possible to find some enterprises 
which are entirely owned by BMs, other enterprises are jointly owned by BMs and 
non-bourgeoisie private sector participants. Such a reality is possible firstly, 
because some BMs were qualified according to the criteria of their assets and not 
the criteria of their enterprises. Secondly, because some enterprises contain equity 
holders who are by no means part of the bourgeoisie class. For instance, the PS 
enterprises contain some equity-holders whose number of shares are nominal 
compared to that of the BMs in the same enterprise. Another important example is 
the state. which in some cases was an equity holder in a private sector enterprise, 
despite the fact that it cannot be considered a BM. The same can be applied to 
equity-holders charities or employee saving funds, .. . ~tc. 
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Certainly, the existence of enterprises which are only partly owned by BMs, 
does not imply that these enterprises are of lesser relevance compared to 
enterprises completely owned by BMs. From the point of view of this study, both 
categories are at the same level of importance. In this context, the BE is an 
important domain that shows the characteristics of the BM enterprises, regardless of 
if they were owned partly or entirely by BMs. In the course of the analysis, however, 
the characteristics of the BE should not be mistaken with those of the BM. In other 
words, the BE makes up a structure within which the BM and others carry out their 
business, while the BM's characteristics exclude the non-BM partners. In fact, the 
capital of the BE is equivalent to the sum of the equities held by the BMs and by the 
other shareholders, while the BM equities are always less than (or equal to) the 
capital of the BE. Despite the fact that some BE ownership is shared with non-BMs, 
the BE is still vital in revealing the context in which the bourgeoisie re-produces its 
economic existence. Hence, the economic power of the bourgeoisie is based to a 
large extent on the activities of these enterprises and therefore analyzing the BE 
reveals the strategies and some important features of the bourgeoisie. Despite the 
fact that the BE capital is used by the bourgeoisie and contributes to the total 
capacity of the bourgeoisie, in literal and legal terms this capital does not in its 
entirety belong to the bourgeoisie. 
3 .1.4 THE ENTERPRISE TYPES 
The focus of this section is on the enterprise types as an important indicator 
that could display different characteristics of the enterprises themselves. Due to the 
fact that this indicator is used throughout the research, the types of enterprises will 
be briefly defined and their main characteristics will be covered here. The enterprise 
types are those that the legislation set up in order to organize the activities of the 
private enterprises. Certainly, the classification according to the Jordanian 
legislature is of relative importance, since enterprises that belong to a specific type 
are distinguished from the others by means of regulations and conditions. However, 
making an indicator of a specific type could reflect some important characteristics 
concerning the ownership and to a large extent the weight that type has in the 
·- - ----economic sphere, from which ·the- class -characteristics of the owners can be 
deduced. In sum, analyzing the different types of enterprises revealed that there is a 
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correlation between such types and the characteristics of the enterprises of each 
type. 
The types of enterprises that are referred to throughout the research are 
based on what the 'Companies Law' no. 22 of 1997 has laid down. Other types of 
enterprises, however, were known in previous periods of the history of Jordan. In 
1964, the 'Companies Law' no. 12 was introduced to cover and institutionalize all the 
legal aspects of the private sector enterprises in one integrated law for the first time. 
According to this law, the enterprises were organized in new categories consistent 
with their capital and conditions of partnership. The law also indicated the different 
regulations that applied to the different types of enterprises regarding their 
foundation, registration. conditions of partnership, liquidations ... etc. Other types of 
enterprises outside the ones established by legislation continued to exist after the 
promulgation of the 1964 law due to the relaxation of the enforcement of the law 
itself. 
The rationale behind using the enterprise types that were drawn by the 1997 
law is to keep a unity of analysis, especially since the difference between the types 
of enterprise as designed by the 1964 law and its amendments and those of the 
1997 law is a merely terminological one. Furthermore, the names of the enterprise 
types had already been changed to the same ones that were later used in the 1997 
law in the late 1980s, according to the 'Provisional Companies Law' no. 1 that was 
introduced in 1989. As a matter of fact, this amendment did not bring about any 
fundamental change in the content of the characteristics of these types. 
Hence, the enterprises that are used herein are as follows: 
1- Public Shareholding Enterprise (PS): this type of enterprise is the 
most sophisticated type in terms of structure. The Companies Law 
requires each enterprise to have a General Assembly consisting of 
the enterprise's shareholders, which in its turn elects a board of 
directors, which is nothing except a management committee. 15 The 
15 The relations between the board of directors and the administrative body of the enterprise 
are led by the director general, who is appointed by the board of directors.ln all cases of the 
-enterprises analyzed in this stu'dy~ tne (jjrecfOr general was a memoer of (he board of directors, as a 
shareholder. By looking at the experience of more than 80.0% of the PS, it appears that there was no 
conflict between manger general and board of directors. 
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shareholders are subject to daily alteration. since the shares of a 
PS are usually traded in the Amman Stock Market. 
2- Limited Liability Enterprise (LL): this type is less sophisticated than 
the PS. However, as the Law sets out, a board of directors is to be 
appointed by the equity-holders. There are no limitations on the 
number of partners. 
3- General Partnership Enterprise (GP): the taw sets out the number 
of partners which should not be less than 2, nor more than 20,. 
Each partner acquires 'the capacity of merchant''6 . Apart from the 
general regulations concerning the registration, title and change of 
owners for this type of enterprise, the law does not indicate any 
specific regulations except those referring to the capital as the 
main measure on which the rights and the obligations of the 
partners are based.17 
4- Limited Partnership Enterprise (LP): the great majority of the GP 
regulations are applicable to this type of enterprises. 18 The main 
difference, though, is that the LP type comprises two types of 
partners, namely the General Partners and the Limited Partner. 
The former type of partners are those who have the exclusive right 
to manage the enterprise, in contrast to the limited partners 19• 
3.3 THE ECONOMIC SECTORS AND SUB-SECTORS 
The classification of the economic sectors is to some extent problematic, 
since there are both official classifications used by the Department of Statistics (OS) 
'
6 Article 9/c, the Companies Law no. 22, 1997. 
'
7 As a matter of fact, the law indicating the capital as a gauge is not enforced if there is a 
specific agreement that determines the rights and obligations of the partners (Article 16/a, the 
Companies Law no. 22. 1997). The great majority of the registered enterprises of this type indicate 
the owners' shares of capital as a reference to their rights and obligations. (interview with the 
Controller of Companies) . 
18 See articles 42-48, the Companies Law no. 22, 1997. 
19 The articles 41/A and 8 outline the main distinction between the two types of partners as 
follows: 'a- General Partners: they shall manage the partnership and carry out its activities. They are 
jointly and severally l iabl~ for ~llltle pc:u:toer.ship's debts and .liabilities with their private properties. a-
limited partners: they shall contribute to the capital of the partnership without having the right tQ 
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and by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), on which the national accounts and the 
main economic indicators are based, and an inventory of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MIT), according to which the private sector enterprises are classified. 
Covering the major macro-economic developments is almost impossible without 
adhering to the official classification of the OS and CBJ , which were subject to 
several modifications during the last forty years.20 The problem does not arise just 
from having two non-corresponding economic sector inventories - one of the CBJ 
and OS and one of the MIT - or from the continuous modifications, but also from a 
discrepancy between the CBJ and OS classifications. Not until the early-mid 1990s 
did the latter official bodies have the same economic sectors inventory.21 The latest 
OS and CBJ classification, which covers 12 economic sectors,22 is broader than the 
limited one given by the MIT; however, it is still not of much use when analysis of 
the private sector enterprises is concerned. For example, the government services 
and producers of non-profit sectors are of no use for profit-oriented private sector 
enterprises. Moreover, sectors such as the personal and social services and the 
domestic services as contributors to the GOP23 were put under the service sector, 
which includes 'hotels, restaurants and coffeehouses'24 and 'communications' as 
sub-sectors according to the CBJ and OS most recent classifications. However, 
such classifications do not give a full analytical account of the private sector 
enterprises, since they contain the governmental contribution to the economy in the 
form of defense or public services. Moreover, the changeable character of the 
manage the partnership or to carry out its activities. and liability of each one of them is limited to his 
.share in the capital of the partnership' . 
20 According to the classification that was used by the CBJ until the early 80s, the economic 
sectors were: agriculture, industry, construction, trade, transportation, services, banking and insurance 
and public administration and defence estimations (see for instance CBJ (1984), p2-6.). 
21 The identical classification of DS and CBJ is to be attributed to the fact that the statistics of 
the latter are based on the former, as the CBJ publications indicate. (Central Bank of Jordan (1995}, 
the Annual Report, p 4-6 and Central Bank Jordan (1997), the Annual Report, p 2-7). However, in the 
late 60s and early 70s the CBJ classification was slightly different from that of the DS. though CBJ 
figures still relied on the OS ones (See Central Bank of Jordan (1968), A quarter Report. Vol. (3). p3 
and Central Bank of Jordan (1972), p 2-6). 
22 The economic sectors which are still adopted by the CBJ are: 1-agriculture, 2-mining, 3-
manufacturing, 4- electricity & water, 5- construction, 6-trade. restaurant & hotels, 7-transportation and 
communications, 8- finance, insurance, real estate and business services. 9-social and personal 
services, 1 a-domestic services, 11- producers of non-profit services 12-government services. 
23 Such non-profitable sector is of no importance concerning the private sector enterprises, 
- tl:lough enterprises with such activities could be covered. under one-of the services sub-sectors. 
24 As was mentioned above, hotels, restaurants and coffeehouses are included in the trade 
sector and communication is included in the transportation one. 
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official classification does not maintain a unified criterion over the different periods 
under analysis. 
The MIT, which is legally responsible for registering the enterprises, adopted 
a seven~way classification of the economic sectors: agriculture, industry, commerce, 
services, construction, transportation and tourism. According to this classification 
electricity & water, mining and manufacturing were under the umbrella of industry, 
while the real estate enterprises were divided between the construction and the 
service sectors. Similarly, insurance and financial enterprises were covered 
sometimes under the services sector and sometimes under the commerce sector. 
As for the tourism sector, it was extended by the Ministry of Industry and Trade to 
cover hotels, coffeehouses and restaurants; however, some of the cafeterias and 
restaurants were included either in the commerce or the service sectors. Some 
other enterprises, such as travel agencies, are included in the tourism sector. It 
should be noted that the tourism sector is a loose one, since the shared ground of its 
enterprises is not well defined and these enterprises could be distributed among 
different sectors taking into account the nature of their activities and their purposes. 
For instance, one could argue that travel agencies could be covered under a specific 
sub-sector of transportation, while coffeehouses, restaurants and hotels are not 
enterprises that rely entirely on tourism activities. On the contrary, the majority of 
the coffeehouses and restaurants service the local communities, and can therefore 
be more reasonably included in appropriate sub~sectors under services. Real 
estate, which CBJ and DS listed under 'finance and insurance', was removed and 
placed in a separate sector. 
Hence, two types of classification were adopted concerning the economic 
sectors: the first is exclusively employed to give an account of the macroeconomic 
developments, while the second is used to cover the economic sectors of the private 
sector enterprises. The first classification is entirely taken from that of the CBJ 
without any attempt to change or modify it, while the second one is developed on the 
basis of the official figures and differs slightly from the one of the DS and CBJ, as 
will be explained below. Regardless of the differences between the two 
classifications, relations and correlations between the figures of the economic 
sectors according to the second classification and the figures of their counterparts 
according to the first classification we·re-drawn-wh-elrever possible. 
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In order to put together a useful inventory for analyzing the enterprises 
according to the economic sector, this study had to go through the activities as they 
were declared by the enterprise owners or equity holders or the management when 
the enterprise was established, indicating the main areas of its activities. According 
to the regulations issued by the MIT under the companies laws, an enterprise does 
not just have to state its activities at the time of the incorporation but also to apply at 
the MIT in order to modify its activities, whether such a modification is an utter 
change of the areas of activity, an expansion of its existing activities or the removal 
of one or more of the activities that were originally stated in the incorporation 
documents. 25 This provided the Company Registry Office at the MIT with a detailed 
account of the different purposes and activities of the great majority of the Jordanian 
enterprises.26 This study had to go through these records. which mentioned about 
half a million different purposes, classifying them in categories each of which 
became a general heading for similar purposes and activities.27 These categories 
were the base on which the subsectors in each economic sector were identified. 
Reviewing the different purposes and areas of activities at one level and 
taking into consideration the inventory of national accounts of CBJ and OS, it was 
sensible to introduce a 10-sector classification to be used throughout this study. 
These economic sectors are: 1-Agriculture, 2-Mining, 3-Manufacturing, 4-Eiectricity 
& Water Supply, 5-Construction, 6-Commerce, ?-Transportation, 8-Finance & 
Insurance, 9-Services, 10-Real Estate. In the course of the thesis, however, the 
25 Each enterprise has its own activities listed in details, and sometimes one of the enterprises 
has more than one activity, up to ten or more. For instance. a specific enterprise in the trade sector 
could have the following activities: retail sale, food products sale, vegetables and fruits sale and other 
products trade. 
26 There was no clear system for specifying the activities or the areas in which the enterprises 
are involved. For example, one enterprise can have two separate activities in retails, fruit retails and 
vegetable retails, despite the fact that both activities can be under one simple category such as fruit 
and vegetables retail or greengrocers. This reality, which extends to every economic sector. can 
explain the huge number of purposes. Some of the detailed activities did not make sense, as in the 
case of trading or retail without any specification of what area of trade that particular enterprise is 
involved in. Some of the purposes simply could not be read. However, such cases were rare in 
proportion to the total number of purposes. Some enterprises were left without purposes, though the 
purposes of the majority of these enterprises were indicated by the names of the enterprises. For 
example, when the name of enterprise is x enterprises for vegetable retails or Z enterprise for fixing 
radios and TVs. Such indications were used to put the relevant enterprises into their appropriate 
categories, mainly small capital ones. 
27 As a matter of fact, the MIT made an effort to provide categories under which the different 
enterprises' purposes could come. However, these categories, whcih amounted to 13,000, were 
divided into two inventories, one for the IE and the other for the rest of the enterprises. The categories 
or 60fli inventories and lhe purposes of the enterprises reveal an incoherent use of the two 
Inventories, since a substantial amount of enterprises that share the same areas of activities have 
different categories within one or both the inventories. without any logical explanation. 
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mining and manufacturing sectors will be referred to under the more general heading 
'industry' when it is useful to the analysis, since there is no distinction between them 
in some of the Jordanian national accounts. It seems appropriate to devote one 
sector to the real estate enterprises, since some of these enterprises are just estate 
agencies that deal with buying and selling lands and some others involve some 
construction activities without engaging in the construction itself. As was mentioned 
above, travel agencies are more appropriately dealt with as a sub-sector of the 
transportation services. They will therefore be included in the transportation sector, 
taking into account that the details of the travel agencies do not indicate any 
distinction between their specific areas of activity, such as airlines, tourism or travel 
services in general. 
Concerning the classification of the private sector enterprises, their different 
purposes and activities have been reviewed and then categorized into ten different 
economic sectors. This classification, being based on the activities of the various 
enterprises, is broader than the different classifications that were used by the 
Jordanian official bodies,28 which lack coordination among them concerning the 
economic sectors. 
As was stated above, the different detailed activities of the different 
enterprises were reviewed and gathered in sub-sectors, which in their turn fall under 
one or the other of the above-mentioned economic sectors. It was not easy to 
accomplish this task, taking into account that the detailed activities of all the 
enterprises amounted to more than half a million, and could be categorized into 
more than 13 thousand economic sections. One of the main problems in including 
these detailed activities in specific sub-sectors was that it resulted in a big number of 
economic sub-sectors, since the availability of detailed activities made such a thing 
possible. Hence, it was essential to the purposes of this research to minimize the 
number of the sub-sectors to manage a better analytical account. However, this 
constraint was challenged by another important oner that is avoiding the tendency to 
over-minimize the number of sub-sectors, which could easily lead to deny separate 
categories for some sub-sectors of a certain relative importance. Over-minimizing 
and over-classifying the number of the economic sub-sectors are therefore the main 
28 The most important official dep_ar:tmEtn.ts will be c.ov..e.r.eJI .tu'tre. namely the CBJ, the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry and the OS. Other official departments - such as the Ministry of labour, the 
Investment Promotion Bureau, etc. - have their own classifications. which vary to some or to a large 
extent from those of the official departments mentioned above. 
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constraints that are taken into consideration. The classification strategy adopted 
here in order to implement the application of the above constraints, is looking at the 
relative importance of the sub-sectors. In other words, a sub-sector is allocated a 
separate category when its contribution to the composition of the relevant sector is 
substantial. 
A different experimental classification has been made to figure out the 
appropriate percentage above which the proportion of a sub-sector's contribution is 
to be considered substantial, and consequently constitutes a separate sub-sector. 
Candidate sub-sectors that fall below that limit will clearly be covered under other 
appropriate sub-sectors. Such an experimental classification was conducted 
according to the main constraints, i.e. avoiding over-classifying and over-minimizing 
the number of sub-sectors. According to this criterion, the proportion of 1.0% was 
deemed to be the minimum requirement to qualify sub-sectors to have their own 
categories. In the absence of data about the composition of an economic sector, 
other criteria were employed to indicate the relative importance of its sub-sectors, 
such as the contribution of the sub-sector to the composition of exports. Another 
approach is to look at the proportion of the labour force that the sub-sector 
possesses in comparison with other sectors. Finally, fundamental activities for the 
economy such as education, health, etc. were granted separate categories despite 
the fact that they might not meet the criteria of classification. 
Due to the fact that the research stretches over more than one period, some 
of the sub-sectors that do not exist or whose importance is insignificant in one period 
may have a certain importance in another period. This reality is not just due to 
economic development due to which new sub-sectors emerged or their activities 
expanded, but it is also related to the characteristics of the Jordanian economy, 
which is small and has regional and international ties; these factors had certainly an 
impact in expanding some sub-sectors in certain periods.29 Hence, the classification 
of the sub-sectors was designed to take into account those that had a relative 
importance in one period and lost it in another and those that had no significance in 
one period and became very important in another. Unity of the sub-sectors over the 
different periods of the research was in fact one of the basic criteria, in order to avoid 
• ---
29 The most striking example is the "impact of the Iraqi-Iranian war on the expansion of some 
specific sub-sectors, for example industry and transportation, mainly serving some of the needs of the 
Iraqi Market . 
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designing different sets of sub-sectors each suitable for only one period and lacking 
common ground, which is fundamental for comparison purposes. For example, 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, which was unknown in Jordan in the 50s and 60s, 
was introduced in the late 1960s, had little significance in the 70s, and only 
flourished from the mid 80s up to now, was not given a separate sub-sector. It was 
included in the chemical industries, which cover a wide range of other 
manufacturing, such as detergents production, etc. 30 However, the importance of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing within the chemical industries has been highlighted in 
the periods in which 'it was of some relative importance. In addition to reflecting all 
of the fundamental sub-sectors of the Jordanian economy, the sub-sector 
classification attempts to coincide as much as possible with both the classifications 
of the different Jordanian governmental and civil society entities, and those 
classifications used by international organizations.31 
Manufacturing is the most classified sector among the others, having 25 sub-
sectors. Some of the sub-sectors could have been put together, such as food 
manufacturing, beverage and tobacco or paper & paper production and printing & 
publishing, but it was thought to be more suitable to keep these sub-sectors 
separate, since each of them had some relative importance in the early period , when 
some of the other sub-sectors were still insignificant. 
Although these sub-sectors are separated, their figures will be gathered 
together when the analysis at any point requires it. As far as the number of sub-
sectors is concerned, services come second with 18 sub-sectors. Although some of 
the sub-sectors of the services - such as general administration and defense, social 
works, religious institutions and professional organizations - do not meet the 
classification criteria, it was important to keep them separate. Their lack of 
relevance in one period actually takes on particular importance by highlighting some 
economic areas in which the private sector does not have a significant presence and 
which are prevalently occupied by the public sector. Other fundamental economic 
activities- such as education, health and computing -were allocated separate sub-
sectors regardless of their relative importance. The computing sub-sector, which 
30 A different example is plastic manufacturing, which was introduced in Jordan in the late 60s 
and became of significance-slnce.the .early 70s. This was.giveJ:l.its.own sub.sector, shared with rubber 
manufacturing, which started to lose its relative importance since the early 70s. 
31 See table 1/ Appendix (5). 
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had no relative importance before the 1990s, covers all the enterprises that are 
involved in the software industry, the computing services, or the services that make 
use of computers. It was difficult to eliminate the enterprises producing software and 
include them in a specific sub-sector under manufacturing, since the majority of 
these enterprises carry out more than one activity, ranging between providing a 
certain quality of computer printing or ready software installation to designing whole 
operating systems. Therefore, enterprises with such activities were classified under 
the computing sub-sector, which in its turn is part of the service sector. 
Since the 'communications' sub-sector was included in the services rather 
than in the transportations and storage sector,32 the latter was left with six sub-
sectors, four of which cover the different types of transportations, while the 
remaining two cover the storage and transportation services, All the enterprises that 
provide travel services as mediators between the actual carrier and the consumer 
were included as part of the travel service. The transportation services additionally 
cover enterprises whose activities are exclusively designed to serve the means of 
transportation, such as those that provide trucks with places for relaxation or 
different services for the planes. 
Agricultural enterprises were divided into six sub-sectors, while mining was 
divided into five. Concerning the latter sector, it was important to adopt such a 
classification in order to separate the other mining activities from the phosphate 
mining activity, which is the main Jordanian export since the late 1960s and covers 
all the enterprises that produce agricultural and animal products. Analyzing the 
activities of the agricultural enterprises led to classifying them into six sub-sectors, 
which are Agricultural Production, Hunting, Fishing, Forests and Forest Products 
and Agricultural Services. The electricity and water sector was straightforwardly 
classified into Water and Steam Production, Liquid Gas Distribution and Electricity 
Production and Distribution. It was impossible to distinguish between the 
enterprises that produce electricity and those that distribute it, taking into account 
that almost every distributor was taking part in the production. 
32 According to the latest economic sectors classification of1he CBJ and OS, communications 
were included in transportation. (see Central Bank of Jordan, (2000) , p 5 and Department of 
Statistics, (1997), Statistics Yearbook, p 173). 
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Real estate and the finance and insurance sectors are the least classified 
sectors. The former includes all the enterprises in one group, there being no need to 
classify them into sub-sectors, while the latter was divided into two sub-sectors, one 
covering the Insurance enterprises and the other covering the financial institutions. 
The commerce and construction sub-sectors were to some extent designed 
differently from other sectors, since they were not classified according to the subject 
of activity. Instead of classifying commerce enterprises, for instance, into food, 
commerce, construction materials. furniture etc., they were classified according to 
the nature of the activities and regardless of the goods that were traded. In this 
perspective, the commerce sub-sectors were four: Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, 
Import and Export and Trade Services. However, another classification was 
adopted to divide each sub-sector at large and the first two in particular into different 
sections, taking into consideration the main traded goods (e.g. food) . The 
differentiation between general and partial construction was the ground on which the 
construction sub-sectors were designed. General construction, however, was 
further divided into two sub-sectors, one specialized in building constructions, the 
other specialized in other types of constructions such as roads, airports, factories, 
dams, etc. 
3.4 OWNERSHIP FORMS OF THE ENTERPRISES 
Classification of ownership advances a better understanding of the different 
relations that are established between the members of a class. It exposes a micro-
dimension of the class by looking at the structure of enterprise ownership. Such a 
structure is highly important, since it influences the relations that connect the 
different enterprises. Moreover, it reveals the different relations between the 
owners, those which are based on mere interest and those which are to some extent 
based on different grounds, and could be described as having an informal basis. 
Before reviewing the different ownership forms of enterprise, this section covers the 
main relations that could be erected between business partners and that can 
potentially determine the forms of enterprise ownership. 
Relations develop objectively between the owners of an enterprise as a result 
of being partners in the sam~. Q.usiness, sharing the jnter~st of its operation, success 
and existence. The interest that arises from the first step of establishing an 
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enterprise fakes on different forms at the various stages that the enterprise 
undergoes. In this context, the most basic and fundamental relation that comes into 
existence with the birth of the enterprise could be termed a 'cooperation/conflict' 
relation. This relation fulfils the conditions of two fundamental articulated types of 
interest: the first covers the various aspects of the interest of the enterprise, while 
the second covers the interest of each individual owner. Moreover, this relation 
functions within the limitations that are dictated by these two kinds of interest 
combined with the different conditions that the market33 indicates. Hence, the 
interest of the enterprise as a whole and the interest of each individual owner could 
be seen as, internal factors, while the conditions of the market could represent 
external factors. The latter reproduce the relationship between the owners in pure 
forms of conflict or cooperation or in mixed form. It should be emphasized that this 
relationship is not of a static type, but on the contrary it is dynamic and highly 
influenced by the two kinds of interest and by the fluctuation of the market 
conditions. Hence, this relationship ranges between extreme cooperation and 
extreme conflict, and can turn into a mere contradiction that hampers the basic 
running of the enterprise. In this case, the enterprise must be shut down if a radical 
change in the internal organization does not take place to ensure the presence of 
the necessary elements of cooperation. The latter case could be manifested in the 
withdrawal of one or more partners or in a modification in the proportion of capital 
that each owner holds, leading to a new balance of power. 
Clearly, the proportions in which capital is distributed among the different 
owners is highly important in determining the nature of the cooperation/conflict 
relationship, since such proportions reflect the owners' shares in the assets, income 
and profits, besides its legal enforcements. In this context, another type of 
relationship arises which goes hand in hand with the cooperation/conflict one, 
namely the 'power relationship'. This reflects the proportion of capital that each 
individual possesses, in that it is directly linked to his/her share of the capital 
compared to the rest of the owners' shares. A plain power relation comes into 
existence when one of the owners possesses more than 50% of the entire capital of 
the enterprise. In this case the power relation is of mere dominance, and it is 
imposed on the owners of the minority capital by the holder of the majority capital. 
33 The conditions of the market include all external aspeCts that could influence the function of 
the enterprise: competition with other enterprises, political and economic environment, state 
Intervention, relevant laws and regulations. See Sweezy, P (1956). The Capitalist Development. 
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Such a dominance relation is our concern, since its existence and function are 
undoubted and easily interpretable. 
It may be suggested that the power or dominance relation is the other side of 
the coin of the cooperation/conflict relation, or that it is nothing more than another 
form of cooperation/conflict and therefore there is no need to identify two sorts of 
relation. This is a highly valid comment. However, the rationale behind 
distinguishing two sorts of relations - cooperation/conflict and power or dominance -
is based on the fact that the presence of the latter, even when it is dominance, does 
not entirely eliminate the former. On the contrary, the existence of the former is the 
main engine that guarantees the other owners' interest, maintaining the existence of 
the enterprise. Lack of such a relation could lead the minor owners to leave the 
enterprise or to perform a crucial change to reinstate their interest. Moreover, the 
presence of capital majority holders does not necessarily mean reducing the other 
owners to mere bondage, especially since the existence of the enterprise is not only 
bound to the availability of capital, but also to other factors such as history, 
experience, maintenance of stability. Furthermore, the fact that one owner 
possesses more than 50.0% of the capital does not by any means indicate that this 
owner has the capability of covering the proportions of the others. In this sense, the 
dominance relation is a structural determinant that reflects the capacity to act that all 
owners are entitled to have at their disposal, and limits the scope of the 
cooperation/conflict relation without eliminating it. The dominance relation, 
moreover, has a fundamental role when cooperation is overcome by conflict or 
contradiction, or when exceptionally critical decisions are about to be taken. 
Other aspects can have an important role in the nature of the 
cooperation/conflict and dominance relations, such as the sector to which the 
enterprise belongs to, the nature of the enterprise, its size, the complexity of its 
internal organization and management and the distribution of managerial tasks and 
the like among the owners. 
Other factors which may give rise to different kinds of relations between the 
owners, or at least have an impact on the cooperation/conflict relation, are friendship 
between some owners or all of them, the nature of expertise, education, career, etc. 
It is essential to mention that, in the case of the absen9~ of a capital majority holder, 
the cooperation/conflict relation is more influenced by other domains such as 
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informal relations or managerial organization. It is difficult to cover the impact of 
these relations on the cooperation/ conflict relation, since it would need a separate 
research using qualitative and quantitative data collected over a period of time to 
draw some conclusions and trends. Their influence can be partly deduced relying 
on some collected data, without however having enough evidence to abstract trends. 
Kinship ties are another important factor on which relations between 
enterprise owners can be based, co-existing with the cooperation/conflict and power 
relations. It is commonplace that kinship ties are of fundamental significance in the 
Arab societies. They occupied a central position in traditional Arab social 
organization and to a large extent they still carry out a central role despite the social 
transformations that have taken place in the last few decades. Sharabi34, who paid a 
great deal of attention to the patriarchal features of the Arab family, and Barakat35 
emphasize that the Arab family is still the central unit of the socio-economic activities 
and that it exhibits a considerably cohesive character. Barakat analyses the main 
characteristics of the Arab family which maintains its role as the basic social 
institution. However, he also observes the changes that Arab societies underwent, 
undermining the role and influence of the Arab family, particularly the role of the 
state as a provider of services, a task that had previously been allocated to the 
family. The recent trend towards abandoning the tradition for families of three 
generations or more to occupy the same household is another ground on which the 
extended family could lose its traditional role.36 However, fundamental changes in 
kinship ties have not been paralleled by corresponding social and economic 
transformations. The fact that the extended family continues to live in the same 
neighbourhood, 'to intermarry, to group together on kinship basis, and to expect a 
great deal from one another'37 keeps extended ties relevant. 
Jordanian society is no exception concerning the role of the family and its 
patriarchal character. Taking into account that the prevailing lifestyles in Jordan 
before the foundation of the state and during the first few decades of its existence 
were the Bedouin and the rural ones, it is no wonder that extended family ties should 
be strong. However, a dramatic change took place in Jordanian society, some of its 
34 Sharabi, H. (1974), p 37-44. 
35 Barakat. H. (1993), The Arab World: Society, Culture and State, p 47. 
36 Barakat, H. (1993), p66-69. 
37 Barakat, H. (1993), p1 06. 
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main features being the growth of the urban centres, resulting from the continuous 
immigration from Bedouin and rural areas, the expansion of the military and civil 
state apparatuses, and a shift in preferences towards households occupied by 
nuclear families. The establishment of Israel in 1948 added unique dimensions to 
the development of Jordanian society compared to the other Arab societies. From 
1949 up to 1967 Jordanian society enjoyed the expansion of its territory to include 
the West Bank, which, although its cultural and social organization was within the 
characteristics of the Arab societies, added diversity to the social texture of the East 
Bank. The Bedouin lifestyle in the West Bank was very limited and the urbanized 
centers were more advanced than those of the East Bank. Additionally, the West 
Bank was in a better condition than the East Bank in terms of some social aspects 
such as education and some economic activities, especially the industrial ones. The 
other main impact of the foundation of Israel was that the refugees, who were 
uprooted from their social context and dumped into Jordan, established a community 
with new social and economic conditions. 
The process of forced migration that the refugees were subject to could at the 
theoretical level have diminished or at least weakened to a large extent kinship ties 
and the role of the family. The fact that the Palestinian exodus resulted in smashing 
the socio-economic conditions they had been enjoying prior to 1948 meant 
capitalization of all aspects of their lives by changing them into an army of 
proletarians. This should have brought about a decisive transformation in the 
structure and role of the family as well as in the role of the kinship ties. Moreover, 
the fact that the Palestinians left their homeland to live in exile, in different countries 
or in different camps of different Jordanian cities or outside the camps, led to the 
absence of that vital objective condition for the existence of strong kinship ties: is an 
integrated geographical location, let alone an integrated neighbourhood. 
These changes, which were technically supposed to revolutionize the role of 
the family and of the extended ties favouring the development of a society based on 
individual interests and on citizenship bonds between individuals, failed to do so. 
Clearly, these social developments did to a certain extent undermine the role of 
extended family ties in some specific areas of the Jordanian socio-economic sphere, 
but in other areas they remained dominant. Lifestyle is a fundamental factor in 
determining the strength of family-ties:while in rurat~and· Bedouin areas such ties are 
still very influential, in the urban centers they are far less effective. Another ground 
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on which different types of kinship bonds can be distinguished is the country of 
origin. 
The factors suggested by Barakat to show that the role of the Arab family was 
still central fully apply to the Jordanian case. However, the role of the state was not 
a viable factor in revolutionizing the social system. This is due to the fact that the 
Jordanian state, while taking responsibility for some of the tasks that the family 
traditionally used to take care of, actually reinforced the traditional patterns. The 
juridical and legal framework of the social organization was based on the fusion of 
modern and tribal laws. Because of the political challenges that the regime faced 
from the ear~y 1950s, it had to rely on traditional social institutions, one of which was 
the tribe (Qabiilah) or the clan ('Ashiirah), and to recognize the sheikhdom as a 
channel of political mobilization. Up to now, Shuyuukh ai-'Ashaa'r, which is the term 
referring to the sheikhs of Tribes, is one of the categories that the regime recognizes 
as the social and political elite of the country.38 Moreover, one of the permanent 
advisers of the king is that known as the 'Secretary for the Tribes' Affairs'. 
In the last decade, Jordan underwent a process of political opening. In spite 
of this, the 1992 election law known as 'one person one vote'39, according to which 
two parliaments were elected, reinforced the role of the tribe and its components. 
Hamarneh argues that the election law undermined civil society organizations in 
favor of the tribes, which underwent a process of institutionalization with the 
formation of tribal councils. It is important to mention that these councils in their turn 
reinforced the role of the nuclear family (NF) and its patriarchal characteristics, 
though the organization and the efficiency of the councils exhibited modern aspects. 
38 For instance, during the official celebrations for national or religious occasions, the political 
leaders are invited to the royal palace, including tribal leaders besides ministers and former ministers, 
members of parliament and former members of parliament, etc. The same thing takes place when the 
activities are organized by the Prime Minister. The relations between the center and the provinces are 
also carried out by governors and local councils. It common practice that the regime emphasis the 
support of the tribes, when it is taking a curial political decisions. In 1983, for example, the dispute 
that took place between the government and some of members of Beni .!:!assan tribe concerning the 
some of the tribal members' land was escalated to be a valiant conformation between the government 
and the tribe as whole. In consequence, ironically, The Beni .t!assan Youth was formed as alike civil 
society organization confined by the tribal perception. 
39 According to this law, Jordan was divided into 20 electoral constituencies to elect 80 
parliament members. Each of these constituencies had at least two members to elect, although the 
voters cannot vote for more than one candidate. According to the previous election law, on the 
contrary, the voters had the right to vote for as many candidates as indicated by the share that their 
consistency had in the parliament seats. This change in the law shifted the power in the interest of the 
tribes that have a substantial number of members, whose vote could be crucial in deciding which 
candidate should win. 
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What is at stake here is an examination of the role of kinship ties, which had 
much to do with some social and political aspects of Jordan, in the private sector 
activities at large and in the bourgeoisie in particular. The role of the kinship ties in 
the bourgeoisie could hamper consolidation, or at least make it harder to attain it. 
Such a conclusion can also provide scholars who purport the lack of social classes 
or their minimal role in the Jordanian society with concrete evidence. This study 
assumes that the kinship ties could establish other conditions according to which a 
new sort of power relation comes into existence, together with the power relations 
that are dictated by the distribution of capital among the owners. In other words, a 
sort of vertical power relation, based on family ties, exists within the limitations of the 
sphere that is established by the horizontal relations based on the capital of the 
enterprise and its distribution among the owners. Although the vertical relations 
should be determined within the limitations of the horizontal relations - i.e. 
cooperationfconflict and power relationship - they have an impact on the latter by 
establishing another kind of power relation based on the synthesis of two primary 
realities, i.e. the proportion of capital that members of the same family hold together 
and the family ties that bring them together. 
Before giving a definition of the different types of family ties and of their 
relevance in characterizing ownership, it is important to clarify in what sense the 
terms 'family' and 'NF' are used. From a sociological point of view, a NF is 
composed only of one or two parents and of their dependent child or children, who 
certainly share a single household. In theory, however, the concept of NF should 
vary depending on the period of time and the society that are under study. That is, 
the concept is changeable, taking into account the transformations that family 
structure and family ties can undergo. Similarly, the concept of extended family can 
be regarded as unfixed and subject to transformation depending on certain 
variables. The extended family, however, could be defined as encompassing more 
than two generations. Obviously, the presence of a common household is an 
important element in defining this type of family, too. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, which examines the impact 
of family ties on private sector activities and on the bourgeois class, the household is 
not an important element in defining the family, and will therefore be dropped from 
a·ny definition. Hence, this research uses the term 'nuclear family' (NF) referring to 
the following ties: 
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1-parent(s)/chlld(ren). 11-siblings. Ill- Grandparent(s)/ Grandchild(ren) 
According to our definition, the term 'nuclear family' (NF) designates a larger 
unit than that of the classicaJ definition, which is largely influenced by the cultural 
and social development that western society experienced in the last two centuries. 
Moreover, our concept as characterized above can be more appropriate, taking into 
account that the focus of the research is on private enterprises, as well as the fact 
that family bonds (grandparent-parent-child and sibling) are still of significant 
relevance in Middle Eastern societies at large and in Jordan in particular. 
Turning to the 'family/tribe' category, th is is a loose term that does not refer 
just to the extended family but to any member of the family/tribe. In the course of 
the analysis, a distinction will be made between the members who belong to the 
family/tribe at large and those who are from one specific part of the f~mily/tribe , 
characterized by first cousin ties. 
Based on the above considerations, this study defines four ownership forms 
of enterprise that were used by the BMs in conducting their investments: 
Neutral Control enterprises: this type comprises all enterprises whose 
ownership characteristics do not quality in the categories coming below. In other 
words, the distribution of capital among the owners does not imply specific features 
of importance to the analysis of the enterprises in general. Hence, the dominant 
relationship ties the owners to each other, and, according to what has been argued 
above, it is a cooperation/conflict relationship. In this type of enterprise the share of 
capital that each of the owners holds is undoubtedly important, since it establishes a 
power relationship determining the nature and the scope of the cooperation/conflict 
relationship. However. this factor cannot be determinant in establishing a 
dominance relationship, because all shares are under the 50.0% threshold. It is 
beyond the scope of this research to provide a power scale corresponding to the 
proportion of capital when the latter is below 50.0%. 
Figure 3- 1: The Cooperation and Conflict Relationship in Neutral Enterprises 
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Individual Control enterprises: this category covers all enterprises that fall 
under the control of one individual whose possession of capital or shares legally 
allows him/her to act independently from the other owners or shareholders. This 
situation is potentially achievable when an owner possesses more than 50.0% of the 
shares of the capital of a specific enterprise. Two types of relations can be 
highlighted here, of which one is the cooperation/conflict relation that ties the owners 
to each other as was explained above. The second type is the one that is imposed 
by the owner who possesses more than 50% of the capital on the rest of the owners, 
who are left with a minority of the capital. There is a positive correlation between the 
increase of the majority capital holder's proportion and the strength and' 
effectiveness of his/her dominance over the rest of the owners. Hence, the 
cooperation/conflict relation between the rest of the owners and the majority 
proportion holder will become weaker, the closer the latter's majority is to 100%, until 
it is reduced to mere influence rather than partnership. 
In this sense, every IE is included in this category. The rationale behind not 
specifying a separate category for the IEs is the similarity of power relationship that 
the ownership relationship establishes. 
Figure 3-2: Individual Control Enterprises 
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Corporate body Control enterprises: In this category, a corporate body 
possesses more than 50.0% of the equity of an enterprise. The relations between 
the corporate body and the remaining partners is as that of the individual control. 
This body can be another enterprise, the government, a governmental or semi-
governmental agency, a charity organization or a religious institution. In this type of 
enterprise, the institution holds more than 50% of capital, developing the same 
patterns of relations that appear in the Individual Control enterprise. 
Individual Control combined with Family Support enterprises: the term 
'individual control' is used here because this kind of enterprise includes an individual 
owner whose proportion of capital exceeds 50.0%, implying the same relations that 
appear in the Individual Control enterprises. What differentiates this category is the 
fact that the owner who possesses more than 50.0% of the capital has extra support 
based on kinship ties, and therefore more room 'for maneuver. In accordance with 
kinship ties, another relationship of dominance is imposed by the family alliance on 
the rest of the owners. This situation has two important sides to it: firstly, the holder 
of the majority of the capital possesses another base that strengthens the 
relationship of dominance, which is in existence by virtue of his/her proportion of 
capital. This new balance of power limits the scope and the effectiveness of the 
cooperation/conflict relation, since the kinship alliance weakens the position of the 
rest of the owners, who are outside the family . The second implication is that the 
family ties entitle a minority capital holder to a relationship of dominance that is 
based on an alliance with the majority holder, who is from the same family. 
Therefore, two dominant relations are characterized here, one objectively arising 
from individual control over the rest of the owners, including the owner(s) who are 
from the same family, the other being imposed on the basis of family ties and 
serving the majority holder and his/her family members, even if their shares 
represent just a minority. 
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Figure 3-3: Individual Control and Family Support Enterprise 
, 
, 
-----... ,' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 1-------, ' 
' ; I , I 
t ,' I 
~ , I 
;( I 
,'. / 
' I I 
," I I 
' I I 
" I I 
I I 
I I 
'I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
, I \ I 
~----:;"---- -------_t:" i \ :--- ---i 
: &.----------..0.----~---L- I 
I 1 ', : : 1 , _____________________ , ', ·-------·' 
.... _ ," 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
' 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
More than 50~o 
Less than 50°o 
Fami ly T ies 
- -
Cooperation/Conflict 
Relationship 
~---- - ----. 
Dominance of 
Relationship based on 
Family T ies and Share 
of Capital 
• 
Dominance Relation 
• 
Nuclear Family (NF) Control enterprises: this category refers to the 
members of a given NF, according to the definition that was given above, who 
possess together between 50% and 90% of the capital or shares of the enterprise. 
Apart from the virtual cooperation/conflict relations that connect the different owners 
to each other, there is a kinship relationship exclusively binding the owners who are 
from the same NF. The latter type of relationship functions within the structural 
determination of the former one. Since the owners with family ties possess more 
than 50% of the capital , however, the kinship relationship shapes the organization of 
the enterprise into two domains. In this perspective, family ties establish a block of 
interest based on the majority of the capital and shaped by external relations. The 
rationale behind specifying 90% of the capital rather than 100% as the maximum 
share of the family is to draw the line between Family Control and NF enterprises, 
under the assumption that a proportion of less than 90% of the capital could 
establish the possibility of reshuffling the alliance between the different owners. If 
the family members' proportion is above the 90% line, it becomes very difficult in 
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practical terms to form an alliance between a family member owner and other 
owners that supersedes the family ties and engages the rest of the family members, 
outside the alliance, in a relationship of dominance. Clearly, this situation is still 
possible unless the family joint capital is 100%, but it is much less likely if capital is 
above 90%. On the contrary, when the proportion of one family decreases, there is a 
stronger possibility for a family member to desert the fami ly camp and establish an 
alliance based merely on the cooperation/conflict relationship. 
Figure 3- 4: Nuclear Family Enterprise 
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Extended Family Control enterprise: This type of enterprise appears when 
partners from the same extended family hold more than 50.0% of a given enterprise. 
The same relationships that were put forward in the NF Control enterprise are 
applicable. but the form of the kinship ties between the partners has less influence 
compared to those of the NF. 
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3.1.5 VARIATION AND FRACTIONS WITHIN THE BOURGEOISIE 
The fact that the BMs belong to the same social class, bound together by 
control over the means of production and appropriation of the surplus-value, does 
not imply the absence of differences among them. Apart from all sorts of variation 
that individuality brings about, which is not the concern here, there are several 
elements inherent in the bourgeoisie as a class which establish a differentiation 
among its members. Based on the available data, this section deals with what this 
study believes to be grounds that lead to such a differentiation. 
3.4.1. 1 Sectoral Fractions 
In the previous section, it was asserted that the structure of the bourgeoisie 
can be looked at in terms of sectors. Economic sectors are not only useful tools of 
analysis when examining the investment strategies of the BMs, but they can be 
useful in terms of looking at their determination of class at the structural level as well 
as at the level of 'class in practice'. In accordance with the theoretical framework, 
class can be divided according to qualitative measures. In 'Capital' and other works, 
Marx dealt with the bourgeoisie in terms of its sectoral fractions, such as the 
industrial, commercial, financial, ... etc. Some of the scholars who dealt with Third 
World or Middle Eastern countries looked at the bourgeoisie in the form of divisions 
such as commercial, comprador, industrial, national40 , agrarian ... etc. 
The shortcoming of these classifications is that they do not make clear cut 
distinctions between the fractions. Based on empirical research on the bourgeoisie 
in Jordan and their economic activities according to the field , it was almost 
impossible to claim that some enterprises that are involved in a certain type of 
manufacturing are not commercial at the same time. Some enterprises that are 
active in importing some specific products and only packaging them before they start 
selling them directly to consumers are considered to be manufacturing enterprises 
40 The national and comprador fractions were widely referred to. However, their definitions 
were loose and changeable from one study to another. The former seems to refer to the industrial 
bourgeoisie, while the latter Is sub-sector within commerce rnainly active in imports. Such a division. 
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compared to others that import and sell a product without alteration. For instance, 
the first would be classified as an industrial bourgeoisie, while the second would be 
considered as comprador or commercial. The above classifications also turn a blind 
eye on the bourgeoisie that are involved in services, banking or transportation. 
This study, thus, argues that classifying the bourgeoisie can be clearer and 
more rewarding if seen in terms of sector. The economic sectors in which the BMs 
are involved constitute another ground for the formation of cleavages within their 
class, by distinguishing not only their areas of activity, but even the interest and 
goals that each sector of the bourgeoisie pursue. It was also observed that the 
members of the bourgeoisie are not only involved in just one sector, but some of 
them are involved in more than one sector. Analyzing the figures of the BMs and 
their equities reveals that it was not a limited phenomenon, but it constituted a pillar 
within the bourgeoisie structure. In this sense, as much as any group within a sector 
is distinct by virtue of its belonging to a specific sector, the multi-sector BMs are a 
distinctive group by virtue of their non-belonging to any of the economic sector 
exclusively. In fact, finance capital as a concept that refers to a fraction within the 
bourgeoisie, and which was put forward in chapter 1. is equivalent to the multi-sector 
BMs used here. In the use of the concept of finance capital as a fraction within the 
bourgeoisie, this study does not use its associated concept of imperialism. 
3.4. 1.2 Economic Power 
Certainly, the assets that the BMs control, and which distinguish their 
capacity to act within the economic system of Jordan from that of the other classes, 
is a ground on which the BMs differ among themselves. The degree of control of the 
means of production and of appropriation of the surplus-value is not an even 
parameter providing each BM with the same capacity. A break-down of the different 
profiles of the BMs becomes necessary in order to obtain a better understanding of 
the bourgeoisie's structure, composition and formation. Based on the available data 
collected about the BMs, the subsection advances a concept according to which the 
seems to be rooted around at the time that some of the third world countries took steps towards 
industrializatioh through lSI method or any other. 
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capacity of each BM to act can be quantified, i.e. economic power. This is a concept 
that was coined for the purpose of this study, based on a formula that transforms the 
available data about the BMs into an index, which in its turn reflects each BM's 
assets, and consequently his/her capacity to act. Each BM's economic power is 
calculated as the sum of five power parameters. These five power parameters, 
which are reviewed below, are based on three areas. This study claims that each of 
these areas influences the BMs' capacity to act. 
3.4.1. 2.1 Power A 
The first ground on which these members are differentiated is the size of their 
equities. The size of the equities of each BM varies, and in some cases there is a 
large gap between those members who possessed an outstanding amount of 
equities and those who were within the average range, or who only owned a 
moderate amount of equities.4 1 As this study argued above, the volume of equities 
or shares can be taken to correspond to the control of the means of production, so 
that the totality of equities that the BMs owned corresponds to the totality of the 
means of production that lay under their control. Hence, establishing what part of 
the total equities each member possessed is of vital importance, reflecting a 
discrepancy in the BMs' economic power and consequently a differentiation in the 
capacity of these members to act. On this premise, the study advances the first 
power parameter; Power A. Power A is calculated according to the percentage that 
each BM possessed with respect to the totality of the BMs' e.quities, multiplied by 3. 
The rationale for multiplying the percentage of each BM's equities by 3 is due firstly 
to the fact that this percentage was generally small, and even trivial for many BMs.42 
Secondly, the percentage that each BM had is the most direct and accurate 
measure available to differentiate the BMs according to their equities. 
Power A= 3*[(BM share/ Total Bourgeoisie's equities)%] 
41 As a matter of fact, the mechanisms that were used in extracting the BMs from the domain 
of the private sector participants. which was meant to go carefully through all of the private sector 
participants in order to minimize any possibility of missing some members who could be considered 
BM, might be one of the reasons for the occurrence of a large difference between some members and 
some others. 
42 See chapter 5 and 7for more details about the distribution of the equities among the BMs. 
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3.4.1.2.2 Power 8 
If Power A takes into consideration the proportion of each BM's equities to 
the total equities of the bourgeoisie, Power 8 is another economic power parameter 
that still concentrates on the percentage of equities that each BM possessed, but 
this time with regard to the total equities of the enterprise(s) where that BM's 
investment was. This study argues that the BMs were differentiated in their assets 
and capacity to act not only according to the percentage of their equities to the total 
equities of the bourgeoisie, but also to what extent their equities made up the total 
equities of the enterprise in which they had equities. In other words, the percentage 
of the equities held by a given BM to the total capital of the enterprise where these 
equities were is a determining factor in the degree of control that that BM had 
concerning the whole range of decisions affecting the way in which the enterprise 
functioned. This was reflected in the form of the cooperation/conflict relations that 
existed among the partners in a given enterprise, as was argued in the section about 
the forms of enterprise ownership. Hence, within a certain enterprise, the proportion 
of the total equities that each partner possessed governed the degree of power and 
control that each partner had in deciding on all matters regarding the management 
of the enterprise. This study argues that the level of control assumed by BMs in 
their enterprise as a result of the percentage of their equities to the total equities of 
the enterprise influenced their capacity to act not only at the micro-level (the 
enterprise level), but even at the macro-level (the bourgeoisie in general). When the 
BMs are compared to each other, the degree of control and power within the domain 
of the enterprise results in a variation of economic power. A straightforward 
example is the discrepancy between the economic power that a BM assumed in an 
enterprise where his/her percentage of equities was above 50.0%, and that of 
another BM, whose percentage of another enterprise's equities was below 50.0%. 
The cooperation/ conflict relations that governed the partnership were of a dominant 
form in the first case, while they were not in the second. This simply leads to the 
conclusion that the BM in the first scenario could wield power in the enterprise in 
which he/she was dominant, having a greater capacity to act than the member in the 
second case had within his/her enterprise. Clearly, the comparison could be 
inadequate, since the BM whose percentage of equities in his/her enterprise was 
bigger did not necessarily possess a larger amount of equities than the other BM in 
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absolute terms. On the contrary, it is possible to come across BMs whose 
percentage of their enterprises' equities was lower than others, but who 
nevertheless possessed large amounts of equities in comparison to others. Such a 
factor could lead to overweighing those BMs who had larger percentages despite 
their small absolute amount of equities. This problem, however, is obviated by virtue 
of the fact that the Power B parameter is combined with Power A, which tackles the 
percentage of each BM's equities to the totality of the bourgeoisie. 
In this context, Power B is to measure the degree of the economic power that 
each BM assumed as a result of the percentage of his/her equities to the total 
equities of the enterprise in which his/her investments were. The formula to 
calculate power B for each BM was based entirely on what percentage he/she had in 
the enterprise, multiplied by 1.5.43 The rationale behind choosing 1.5, which is half 
of the points given to power A, is to give the latter the upper hand in determining the 
scale of power. 1.5 was also a satisfactory factor in order to reduce the power score 
that some BMs gained due to their ownership of individual enterprises, which were 
one of the most frequent enterprise types in this period. 
Power B = Sum (1.5*([BM equities/ equities of the enterprise]/1 00) 
3.4.1.2.3 Power C 
A thorough review of the BMs over the two periods of this study, shows that 
the great majority of the BMs in a certain period are equity-holders in one enterprise. 
However, the analyses in chapter 5 and 7 will show that there is a significant 
proportion of BMs whose investments spread over more than one enterprise. It will 
also be seen that the latter had a substantial proportion of the total BMs' equities. In 
addition to the conclusion that there is an uneven distribution of the BMs' equities in 
favor of the multi-enterprise BMs, these results also question the outcomes that 
result from the variation between the one-enterprise BMs and the multi-enterprise 
BMs. Apart from the likely immediate variation in equity size, which in its tum 
differentiated the capacity of members to act, there were BMs whose ownership of 
the means of production was not confined to the means of production of one 
enterprise, but rather extended to all of those enterprises in which he/she owned 
equities. This resulted in those BMs controlling assets which were quantitatively and 
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qualitatively better than what the means of production of one enterprise could 
provide. Consequently, the surplus value that was obtained by multi-enterprise BMs 
was more diversified in its sources than that of one-enterprise BMs. Therefore, this 
study argues that the risk that is taken by a BM whose investments are in more than 
one enterprise is less than that of a BM whose investments are concentrated in one 
enterprise. Finally, this study argues that those BMs whose equities were in one 
enterprise were likely to be self-employed; in contrast, the separation between multi-
enterprise BMs and the direct function of some of their investments was inevitable. 
This distinction is important, since the separation between BMs and direct 
involvement in production confirms that these members are fit to be considered as 
BMs. On the contrary, those members who were self-employed and got involved in 
the different stages of production could be mistaken for petty bourgeoisie members. 
Based on what was said above, this study advances another parameter that 
can differentiate between the economic power of the BMs according to the number 
of enterprises in which their investments were. In the course of constructing the 
formula of Power C, it was important to distinguish between the BMs who invested in 
one enterprise and those who had investments in more than one. The rationale 
behind such a division is the fact that every BM had investments in one enterprise by 
virtue of being a BM, otherwise they would not be considered a BM in the first place. 
Therefore, Power C assigned 0.1 points to each BM whose investments were 
confined to one enterprise. On the other hand, a BM whose investments were in 
more than one enterprise was assigned 0.1 points for the first enterprise and 0.4 
multiplied by the number of enterprises minus 1. In this way, a given BM gets 0.1 
points for the first enterprise (like those BMs whose investments are in only one 
enterprise) and 0.4"number the rest of enterprises. 
Power C of a certain BM= 0.1+(0.4*(n-1)) 
Where n is the number of enterprises 
3.4.1.2.4 Power D 
This study argues that Power D is another economic power parameter that 
takes into consideration the variation in the number of economic sectors in which 
each BM is involved. Power D is a parameter that is calculated according to the 
43 As a matter of fact, It would be possible to advance a formula that can differentiate the 
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number of economic sectors by assigning certain points to each BM for each sector 
In which he/she has investments. The formula was built on the basis that each BM 
has to be involved in at least one economic sector, and ten at most, as a 
prerequisite to be considered a BM. The formula was designed to square the 
number of the sectors that a BM was involved in, divided by ten, i.e. the ultimate 
number of sectors any BM could have investments in. In this context, the 
distribution of the power D points stands in correlative relation to the number of 
sectors, and the scale of power ranges between 1 for one sector and 10 points for 
ten sectors. 
Power D of a given BM= (n)*(n)/10 
n is the number of the economic sectors, ranging between 1 and 10 
3.4.1.2.5 Power E 
This power parameter is like the previous one in that it deals with 
differentiation among the BMs based on the fact that their investments belong to an 
unequal number of economic sectors. The previous parameter, however, gives an 
equal score for the BMs whose investments are spread over an equal number of 
sectors without paying any attention to the variation in the volume of their 
possessions in each economic sector. Hence, the purpose of this parameter is to 
take into consideration the equities that each BM possesses in each economic 
sector in which it is involved. The basis of the formula of this parameter is the 
percentage that each BM possesses in a specific sector to the total BMs' equities in 
that sector. 
Power E= Sum (0.3*([BM equities/ equities of a sector]/100) 
3.4.1.2.6 The Economic Power {Power I) 
The economic power 'Power I' is the sum of the points that each BM scores 
in each of the power parameters covered above. 
Power I of BM = BM [Power A+ Power B+ Power C+ Power D+ Power E) 
3.4.1.2.7 Nuclear Family Power 
score of power based first on the percentage. 
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In the section concerning the forms of enterprise ownership, the importance 
of kinship ties in the social, cultural and political context of Jordan was asserted, to 
the extent that one of the purposes of this study is to examine if these ties have any 
role in the private sector or in the bourgeoisie's strategies in running their 
businesses. Throughout the analysis of the private sector and of the bourgeoisie in 
chapters 4-7, it will be observed that the BMs invested and carried out their 
businesses along the lines of NF ties, since there was a tendency towards having 
NF enterprises. This study argues that it is rewarding to analfyze the BMs in terms of 
NFs. Such an aim can be achieved under the assumption that the NF became a 
structure at the BMs' disposal to use as a device or block to carry out their 
investments. In fact, the concept of NF enterprise was put forward to analyze the 
role of the NF ties among some BMs in establishing and running a certain business. 
In other words, to assess the importance and impact of the NF ties between BMs at 
the level of the firm. i.e. at the micro-level. The aim here lis to look at the macro-
level, i.e. at the bourgeoisie as a whole, in order to find out to which extent NF ties 
can be a ground on which the bourgeoisie can be subdivided. 
In this sense, NF ties are not a structure constructed to serve the interest of 
some BMs, nor its contingent existence, but it is a social construct existing 
independently and could be used to serve the interest of the members who belong to 
one NF. Hence, one could argue that there are two forms of relationship that 
support and maintain such a structure, one of which is the bourgeoisie interests of 
the members and the other one is the family ties themselves. Clearly, contradiction 
between the two forms of relationship is possible and could develop into a conflict 
that would have an adverse impact on the bourgeois interest, which is the concern of 
this study. 
From the outset, two different groups can be distinguished here, the first 
made up of the BMs with NF ties, the second of the BMs with no NF ties. The 
discrepancy between the two groups arises from the fact that the sum of the 
ownership of the members of a given NF in the first group gives each member a 
higher capacity to act compared to other members of the second group whose NF 
relatives do not appear in the BMs' domain. 
In this context, NF power is an economic power parameter that measures the 
sum of power of the members whose NF relatives are present in the BMs' domain. 
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NF Power-Sum Power BM1+ Power 8M2, ... . + Power BMn 
n Is the number of a given BM's NF members 
3.4.1.2.8 Power II 
The previous NF power made a distinction between those members who had 
NF relatives within the BM domain and those who did not. It also shows that there 
are differentiations between the economic power of the different NFs. Here the 
focus shifts to the impact that NF ties have on individual BMs. 
Based on the above considerations and on the general understanding of the 
importance of NF ties either within the domain of the BMs at the micro-level (NF 
enterprises) or within Jordanian society at large, this study argues that any BM 
whose NF relatives were also BMs had more power and capacity to act than a BM 
who had none. In a nutshell, the economic power and capacity to act of a BM with 
NF relatives in the bourgeoisie are not only generated from his/her own assets, but 
also from the economic power of the relatives. 
3.1.6 THE HISTORICAL FRACTION OF THE BOURGEOISIE 
Despite the fact that analyzing the bourgeoisie during a certain period 
confines the analysis within the time limitation of that period, it is still important to 
look at the historical background of the bourgeoisie under study. This implies 
categorizing the bourgeoisie into fractions based on specific criteria not related to 
economic sectors or fields of activities nor to political positions, but rather rooted in 
the historical development of the bourgeoisie. In fact, fractioning the bourgeoisie in 
this fashion is based on the fact that the paths that the bourgeoisie took in its 
formation established a ground according to which cleavages within the bourgeoisie 
appeared. However, the purpose is to examine to what extent this ground is sound 
in influencing the economic activities, political position or interest of these fractions. 
Based on what was said before, this study also examines the question of whether 
the existence of these fractions resulted in a tendency for the members of each 
fraction to cluster and distinguish themselves from the members of the other 
fractions. 
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Since this study covers a portion of time between 1967 and 1989 divided into 
two periods, the fractions that are used in the first period are different from those 
from the second. Based on the social and economic historical context of the country 
pre-1967, the bourgeoisie of the first period seems to be a continuation of that of 
1950-1967, excluding those BMs who were located in the West Bank and had 
stayed there despite the occupation. Pursuing a categorization of the bourgeoisie 
fractions of 1967-1973 means going back to the pre-1948 war and to the unification 
between the West and East Banks, advancing three fractions: the pre-1948 Jordan 
fraction, the pre 1948 Palestine Fraction and the newcomers (1950-1973). Despite 
the use of the term 'bourgeoisie' when referring to the first two fractions, this study 
does not claim that they were bourgeois classes formed in pre-1948 Palestine and 
Jordan. With regard to pre-1948 Jordan,44 it was stressed in chapter 2 that it is 
possible to say that a commercial bourgeoisie was in the process of formation in the 
1940s, stemming out from the merchants' class of the late 19th and the first half of 
the 20th century. Factors such as the gradual spread of capitalist relations 
throughout the mandate era, the establishment of a polity, better levels of security, 
an inflow of liquidity and the application of the British economic policy for the Middle 
East in Jordan, which revolutionized some of the merchants' activities, were factors 
that can explain the process of transformation of some merchants or private sector 
participants into the developing bourgeoisie. This study which prefers not to commit 
itself to any argument concerning branding these groups neither in Jordan nor in 
Palestine calls the pre-1948 fractions 'bourgeoisie' in relation to their status in the 
first period of this study. In this respect, the social and economic status of these two 
fractions in the pre-1948 period is that of members of a certain economic power. 
Hence, one can claim that there were three fractions in the first period according to 
the historical background. The first is the pre-1948 Jordan bourgeoisie, referring to 
BMs in the first period who came from members of a certain economic power dated 
from before 1948. The second group is the pre-1948 Palestine, referring to 
members who came from active economic circles in Palestine before the 
establishment of Israel. The third is made up of the newcomers, who are the 
members who joined the BMs of the first period over the years 1950-1973. This 
44 It is outside the scope of this study to follow the social economic historical context of 
Palestine before 1948. However, it is still debatable the class system in that period. See for example 
al-sharif. M. (1979). 
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study, categorizing these three fractions,45 does not claim that accuracy runs 
throughout every record; it is possible that it placed some members who were from 
the pre-1948 period (especially pre-1948 Palestine) among the newcomers. 
Concerning the second period (1974-1989), the fractions changed into two 
main fractions. First, the traditional bourgeoisie, which contained all of the BMs who 
were BMs in the first period and was composed by the above mentioned three 
fractions. The second one includes the newcomers who joined the BMs during the 
period 1974-1989. These are called the 'newcomers2'. 
3.5 VERTICAL 
ANALYSIS 
DIMENSIONS AND THE BOURGEOISIE 
It was mentioned in the introduction that the tradition. that ignored class 
analysis in Middle Eastern studies based its arguments on the fact that the vertical 
dimensions such as religion, ethnicity and tribalism are the key factors in 
understanding the social structure and change in the Middle Eastern societies. It 
also claimed that power relations in Middle Eastern societies stem from these 
vertical dimensions and revolve around them. The role of the tribe, religion, 
ethnicity, ... etc, in the formation of Middle Eastern society at one hand and their role 
in social, economic and political change on the other hand were the subject for many 
studies. Moreover, these dimensions were looked upon, analyzed and put forward 
as factors that hinder the formation of socio-economic groups or play down their role 
in the Middle Eastern societies. In the theoretical chapter, in the course of providing 
a class concept of operative quality, it was stressed that not only the relations that 
stemmed from the class structure, but also relations rooted in other spheres could 
have a determining impact on the outcome of class formation and activities. 
Along the line of the introduction, this study does not aim to assess the 
importance of the vertical dimensions versus the class stratification in Jordan. 
However, it examines to what extent these vertical dimensions had an impact on the 
composition of the bourgeoisie, assuming that the larger role that these dimensions 
45 The classification of the based on the record of the MIT, records of the Amman chamber of 
commerce. 
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had on the bourgeoisie structure and composition, is the less that this class was 
united and the less its potential for solidarity. In other words, the unity of the 
bourgeoisie does not only correspond to the economic interest that fractions it into 
different sub-groups, but its very unity is threatened by other factors that are not 
related to the location of class in the production process. Therefore the class 
composition is to be studied along the line of these vertical dimensions. 
There are some important vertical dimensions that this study considered as 
dimensions that have a role in the social formation of Jordanian society. These 
dimensions cannot be put under one umbrella such as political, social, identity, 
.. . etc. Some of these dimensions cannot be in their roots and function and 
sustaining bind in one sphere. They function or/and articulate and sustain 
themselves . Different dimensions are considered in the course of analyzing the 
bourgeoisie: 
Tribalism: the role of tribe in Middle Eastern societies including Jordan has 
been subject to a considerable amount of research. Despite the fact that the role of 
the tribe is recognized in certain social and political activities as well as a possible 
facilitator of relations between at local communities and the state, there is a lack of 
studies that asses the role of the tribe in comparison with other social, economic and 
political institutions. In the previous sections concerning the forms of ownership, the 
extended family form of ownership was put forward as a possible approach to 
examine the role of the tribe in the composition of the bourgeoisie and its strategies. 
Ethniclty: the ethnic structure of the Jordanian society is overwhelmingly 
Arab. Two main ethnic groups are distinguished numberwise along the Arab 
population; Circassian and Chechens. The establishment of the settlements of 
these two groups in the area of Jordan begun in the late 19th century for political and 
security considerations within the Ottoman Empire . •s These two communities had a 
role in the political life of the area of Jordan during Ottoman rule and since the 
establishment of the state. Despite the fact that these two communities consider 
themselves as Jordanian they kept important aspects of their identity, such as 
language and other important customs.47 In addition to their big population in 
46 See chapter 2. 
47 There different NGOs that are established solely to serve these two communities and to 
sustain a social context for them. For instance AI-Halii Club which is sport club in addition to be social 
venue for mainly for the Circassian community. Its regulations towards admitting members outside the 
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comparison to the other ethnic groups, there was recognition of these groups by the 
political system as a quota of seats in the parliament was reserved exclusively for 
the representatives of the two communities. Other ethnic minorities to be 
considered here are the Armenians and Kurds. These communities are of a small 
number, however, they largely kept their languages and a sort of political and 
identity affiliation with their larger communities in the Middle East.48 These ethnic 
communities are considered in the analysis of the bourgeoisie as part of the vertical 
dimensions. 
Religion: two main religious groups that could be taken into consideration 
due to the number of their members: Christian and Muslims. The Muslims make up 
the majority of the population and the Christians are the main minority in the 
country.49 Other religions exist in Jordan; however, on a nominal basis to the extent 
that some of which are not noticeable by the mass of the population of Jordan. 50 
The bourgeoisie members are to be studied in terms of their religion and trends 
within the bourgeoisie activities, if found, are to be subject to analysis. 
Country of origin51 : country of origin is a term used by the Jordanian citizens 
to refer to their original country that themselves or usually their ancestors came 
from. In this sense, holding the Jordanian nationality or/and the place of birth are 
irrelevant factors to categorize someone's country of origin. It is a commonplace in 
the Jordanian society that a certain community or segment of population or an 
individual refer to the country of origin of another individual or its family . It is also a 
common practice that one is to be asked in the context of social interaction about 
their origin or to mention their origin as part of introducing themselves. The content 
Circassian community could have been relaxed in the last 15 years, however, it controlled by the 
recommendations of number of members. The Circassian Charity association Chechen Society that 
has branch in Amman and Zaraqa is equivalent to the above mentioned with in the Chechen 
community. 
48 The Armenian community finds in the church in Jordan its centre to sustain and reinforce its 
language and identity. The Kurds have their own association that concentrated activities teaching the 
language, celebrating the cultural festivals, to promote the Kurd cause and sometimes financial 
support for the cause. 
49 There are no figures concerning the proportion of the Christian to the total population. 
However, 5.0%-10.0% is the possible percentage. 
50 Other religious groups exist in Jordan such as Druze, Bahii however, they are of nominal. 
Also there is a minority of Muslim shiat, however, is very trivial. 
51 This term that is used in different forms. However, it was coined as in its academic quality 
In this to the Center for Strategic Studies in the University of Jordan to refer to what the different 
communities within the Jordanian societies as the individual of these communities define their country 
of origin. See Hamarenh, M. (1995), The Jordanian Palestinian Relationship: the Internal Dimension. 
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of the concept derived, on one hand, from the perceptions of the community towards 
a certain individual or/and its family and on the other hand according to what that 
individual and its family conceive their original country to be. Therefore the meaning 
and usage of the country of origin can be flexible and loose in its definition. In fact, it 
is possible that the community's definition of somebody's country of origin is not how 
that individual defines itself. However, the importance of the country of origin 
concept lies in the fact that it adds another dimension to the person's identity either 
according to their perception or/and outsjde perceptions. Hence, the country of 
origin as an identity cannot be reduced or substituted by a person's kinship ties, 
region or religion despite that the latter dimensions are important in shaping the 
country of origin. 
It is not within the scope of this study to give genealogical account of the 
career of this division within Jordanian society based on the country of origin. 
However, it could be argued that this cleavage is rooted in the political development 
of the state. The fact that the early administrative on bodies of the state in the 
period of the British mandate were dominated by non-Jordanian employees 
especially from the British mandate of Palestine coupled with the demand of some 
educated Jordanians to be assigned the jobs of the people who were not originally 
from the country, could be the early roots of defining the citizen of the state by their 
country of origin. 52 Apart from the hired employees from the new born neighboring 
states, it is also important to mention that the new state of Jordan was under the rule 
of the Hashemite prince Abdullah who himself is not from Jordan. Also when prince 
Abdullah arrived to Jordan and was appointed as ruler. he was companied by some 
Hajazi figures that settled in the country and had an important role in its political 
system. This fact could have contributed to the idea of having citizens from different 
backgrounds. Even after the establishment of the state some of Jordan remained a 
destination for a limited and small immigration especially from Syria or Palestine. 
This immigration. that was either motivated by political or economic factors, added to 
the diversity of the Jordanian social texture.53 
The territorial expansion of the Jordanian state to include the west bank in 
1949 was a turning point in the composition of the country according to the country 
52 See Hamarenh, M. (1985). 
53 Note that the pre-state establishment Jordan was an area for the activities of merchants 
who come from different regions in Palestine and Syria . See chapter 2 
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of origin. On one hand the state with its new borders did not Jordanize the 
Palestinian population of the west bank, but it was conceived as a state that contains 
two national identities Jordanians and Palestinians or at least the Palestinians of the 
West Bank.54 On the other hand, all the refugees from the foundation of Israel in 
1948 became Jordanian citizens. This in itself was a legitimization for dual identity. 
The 1970s was the decade that institutionalized the concept in its current use. It 
was a black September, the peak of the confrontation of the PLO and the Jordanian 
state, that resulted in a division in the Jordanian society along the lines of identity 
and loyalty. Reducing the applications and meanings of identity and loyalty to the 
state to refer to the same thing certainly deepened and polarized the structure of two 
communities in the Jordanian society. The unwritten Jordanian state policy in 
suspiciously looking to the loyalty of its citizens of Palestinian origin and 
discriminating against them in its employment policies, especially in the security and 
military apparatus, was another step to give substance to such division.55 It was not 
only state polices that shaped the two communities, but also the rise of the 
popularity of the PLO factions among the Palestinian communities in Jordan. The 
great majority of these groups were not concerned with the political platform of the 
Jordanian society as much as with the Palestinian one to the, extent that the position 
of some of these groups towards the Jordanian rule and governmental polices was 
based on the position towards the Palestinian question generally and the PLO in 
particular. 56 
Another dimension of the problem that made it possible for the state to carry 
on with its employment policies and other types of policies without serious challenge 
54 There is enough evidence that the expansion of the Jordanfan state to include the West 
Bank was not coercive process, despite the fact that some of the political parties in the West Ban~ 
were against. The elections in the west bank for the first two banks parliament in 1950 in which the aU 
the political parties and figures even those who were initially against joining Jordan was almost as 
referendum concerning the future of the West Bank. Based on the archive of the parliament in the 
1950s and the political parties activities and literature rues the population of the West Bank that 
reviewed themselves as Palestinian part of the Jordanian state. See AI-Masrt, M. (1998), p70-79. 
55 The politically incorrect joke about the stuttering man, who blames the refusal of the 
Jordanian TV broadcasting to employ him because he is Palestinian does not refer only to the 
Palestinian hyperbole in the discriminations against them in the public sector jobs, but also it reflect 
the degree that the employment polices were discriminative against them. 
56 For instance, Fatah. the biggest PLO faction, was not concerned with the Jordanian politics 
as that latter as not related to the Palestinian problem. The Democratic Front for Liberating Palestine 
was the first group that advanced in the late 1970s a political arm concerned with the Jordanian 
society whose conditions dictate a separate apolitical program to that of the Palestinian one. The 
Popular Front for Liberating Palestine followed the Democratic Front example in establishing a group 
in Jordan in 1986. 
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was the boom in oil prices that opened the gates for the Jordanian people to seek 
work in the Gulf and allowed private sector activity to flourish and absorb a higher 
proportion of the Jordanian work force. The fact that the Palestinian who fell 
discrimination from the employment state policies could find other venues for jobs 
and careers especially in the Gulf States softened the impact of these policies. The 
fact that a great deal of Palestinians found jobs in the Gulf states and the Jordanian 
private sector resulted firstly in a kind of work division among the population, 
according to which the public sector was dominated by the citizens of Jordanian 
origin while the private sector was dominated by citizens of Palestinian origin . 
Secondly, this division coupled with polarization at the political level certainly 
deepened the gulf between the two communities at a social level and the associated 
economic culture. 
The fact that one can talk about two communities within the Jordanian 
context and it is commonplace that people refer to the country of origin when they 
review the other and themselves gave a revival to the country of origin concep1 
among the other segments of the society. Certainly the ties that were historically 
established with some members of communities like the Jordanians of Syrian origin 
kept a feeling of belonging to a certain community alive. However, the division 
among the greater proportion of the population into Palestinians and Jordanians 
contributed to the tendency of other communities to preserve their country of origin 
identity. The division between Jordanian and Palestine is one of the vertical 
dimensions that has importance, especially in political development and therefore, 
the analysis of the bourgeoisie will take into account this dimension to outline the 
extent to which it has a role in the structure and composition of the bourgeoisie. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE JORDANIAN 
ECONOMY (1967-1973) 
This chapter and the following one deal with the period of 1967-1973. It was 
argued in the introduction that the years between 1967 and 1973 had similar 
conditions at the economic and political levels that differ from those experienced 
either in pre-1967 or after 1974. On the basis of this argument the years between 
the 1967 war and the beginning of the big increase in the oil prices around the 1973 
war make together a period that is characterized as a transitional one bridging the 
country's transformation from one state to another. In this sense, the socio-political 
economic developments that took place during this period were elements in the 
process of de-linking with the pre-1967 conditions adjusting to what the war brought 
about and establishing new grounds on which the developments in 1970s and 1980s 
built. 
This chapter is devoted to analysing the surrounding environment in which 
the bourgeoisie function within. According to the framework and methodology of this 
study, this has to be achieved through looking at the main trends of the macro 
economy of Jordan within which the private sector, the bosom of bourgeoisie, 
function. The first section that follows a necessary overview of the impact of the 
1967 war on Jordan. is the state economic policy that is to be considered through 
the examination of the development plans and the budget. This is followed by two 
sections that deal with the structure of the economy and the economic performance 
as was indicated by major indicators such as GOP, GNP and their structures and the 
balances of services, trade and transfers. Section 4 is devoted to the state of the 
private sector during this period as was indicated by the private sector enterprises. 
The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the state's involvement in the 
economy at large and its particular involvement with the private sectors' joint 
ventures. 
Before going through the different sections, it is appropriate to examine the 
impact of the war on the economy as whole. Having an accurate estimate of the 
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impact of losing the West Bank on the Jordanian economy is not at hand, since pre-
war economic statistics were never provided at a regiona I level. The economic 
figures of the West and East Banks in the post war years cannot be a appropriate 
ground to deduce their performance before the war, due to the fact that each 
experienced completely different conditions that shaped their economic 
performance.1 However, It is important to mention that losing the West Bank meant 
depriving the country of one of its main territories. which had an input into all 
economic aspects and was well integrated into the economic structure. Hence, the 
occupation of the West Bank led to a process of deconstruction of the Jordanian 
economy and to its restructuring on the basis of the means of the East Bank, and 
according to new economic terms which arose after the war. In other words, the 
effect of the loss of the West Bank was severe in all aspects, regardless of the size 
of the economic contribution of the West Bank. 
According to the Jordan Development Board the contribution of the West 
Bank to the whole GOP was 38.0%2, while Kanvoskyl, claims that it was less than 
one third. At the sectoral level, the economy lost the participation of the West Bank 
in the output of economic sectors in different degrees. Before the war, the 
contribution of the West Bank in services was 55.0%, 43.0% in the wholesale & retail 
trade, 41 .0% in real estate and above one third in agriculture, construction and 
electricity & waterA. In the case of industry, Kanvosky estimates the loss of the 
economy at 18.0%5 while it was 10.0% according to the Development Board, which 
however emphasized the fact that 37.0% of the labor force in this sector was in the 
West Bank6 • The share of the West Bank in transportation was 7.0%. 
However, the impact of the war on the economic sectors went far beyond the 
contribution of the West Bank, since East Bank sectors lost around 40.0% of their 
local market, according to the estimates of the population of the West Bank to the 
1 The East Bank, for example, er'4oyed a massive increase in the transfers to the central 
government and suffered from abnormal population growth as well as from an unstable political 
environment. which affected its economic accomplishment. The West Bank. on the other hand, 
suffered from the occupation and its new economic conditions and regulations. 
2 Jordan Development Board (1967), Monthly Economic News Bulletin, p3. 
3 Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p25. 
4 Jordan Development Board (1967), Monthly Economic News Bulletin, p3. 
5 Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p29. 
6 Jordan Development Board (1967), Monthly Economic News Bulletin. p3. 
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whole population. 7 The contraction of the local market had a severe impact on all 
East Bank economic sectors which were functioning at the size of the whole market. 
For example, as Mazur notes,8 industry suffered the most from this development, as 
the production of refined oil, cement, electricity and others declined.9 The 
international transaction sector was also hit, due to the fact that the West Bank 
purchases deviated to Israel, and so did other sectors. 
The economy of the East Bank also suffered from the abnormal increase in 
population that resulted from the number of refugees who fled not only from the 
West Bank, but also from Gaza. Such a number ranQ'ed from 300 thousand 
according to Kanvosky10, to 400 thousand according to the Jordanian official 
figures 11 , while Mazur's estimate is closer to the Jordanian assessment. 12 The 
increase in population resulted in pressure on the economic sectors of the East 
Bank, especially on the service sectors. Mazur notes that the refugees who fled to 
Jordan raised the unemployment rate to unprecedented rate. Despite the fact that 
the increase in the size of the Jordanian armed forces and the Palestinian resistance 
movement absorbed some of the unemployed people,13 the unemployment rate 
remained high until 1973/1974, when the Gulf markets opened to Jordanian labor. 
The 1967 war indirectly affected the Jordanian budget by increasing defense and 
internal security expenditures, reversing the trend which had been witnessed in the 
years immediately preceding the war. This increase did not weigh on the domestic 
revenue, since it was financed by Arab aid. However, the increase in external aid, 
together with the impact of the war, established a new era in the structure of the 
Jordanian economy. 
7 Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p25, Jordan Development Board, 
(1 967), Monthly Economic News Bulletin, Vol. (9), p4. 
8 Mazur, M.P. (1979), Economic Growth and Development in Jordan. p212. 
9 Central Bank of Jordan (1 967), The Fourth Annual Report, p7. 
1° Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development In Jordan. p 36. 
11 Central Bank of Jordan (1967), Quarter1y bulletin, Vol. (3), p2. 
12 Mazur. M.P. (1979), Economic Growth and Development in Jordan, p 78 
13 Maz ur, M.P. (1979), p 78. 
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4.1 THE STATE ECONOMIC POLICY 
The focus of this section is to outline the main trends of state economic policy 
during this period. This is to be achieved through considering two important 
instruments, i.e. the development plans and the budget. The development plans 
could reveal the economic philosophy of the state and its economic priorities as well 
as its medium and long term development goals. The account of the budget should 
be able to reveal state policy in practical terms and contribute to understanding of 
the primary sources of its revenue. 
4.1.1 THE THREE YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1973-1975) 
The development effort that had come to a halt with the 1967 war and the 
internal instability that ensued, resumed in late 1971 , when preparation was made to 
draft a new development plan. In November 1972, the proposal for a 3-year 
development plan was completed and adopted by the Jordanian government. 
Despite the fact that this period covers only one year of the proposed plan, it is more 
suitable to consider it here, since its proposals, projects and finance were born in the 
economic and political context of this period. 
The three-year plan (1973-1975) can be considered the first one to be 
formulated exclusively for the East Bank. Its projects, aims and strategy were 
designed on the basis of the urgent problems and the country's socio-economic 
situation which either came as a consequence of the 1967 war or were deepened 
due to the war and political instability. The framework and the projects of the plan, 
however, were highly influenced by development philosophy and the performance of 
the Jordanian economy in the 1960s. Hence, it is possible to claim that the plan 
born in this transitional period was a plan of transitional character. In fact, Anani 
describes it as 'corrective adjustment114 or, as Mazur claims, its main purpose was to 
14 Anani, J. (1987). p130. 
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lay the grounds for long-term planning after the interruption of the events that took 
place between 1967 and 1971 .15 
The strategy of the plan revolves around two themes, each of which tackles 
one of the inherent factors characterizing and reinforcing the dependency of the 
Jordanian economy and constituting a serious problem that the economy faced at 
the time. The first theme that appears in the aims and projects of the plan is the 
dependency of the Jordanian economy in its relations to the outside world. Two 
main aspects of such a theme were addressed as fundamental problems and goals 
of the plan: the chronic trade deficit and the budgetary reliance on external financial 
support. The trade deficit was born with the birth of the modern state and was 
reinforced by the country's limited natural resources and by the British 'stand still' 
economic policy. However, it reached unprecedented levels over the years 1967-
1971 . In the course of tackling this problem, the planners were aware of the 
impossibility of erasing the deficit over the short life of the plan. especially since 
implementing the planned projects meant at least an increase in imports of the 
capital good. Thus, the main goal was to reduce the annual growth rate of the trade 
deficit from 11 .5% (during 1967-1971) to 6.4% in the plan term, which would 
decrease the deficit by the end of the plan (1975) to a lower level than before 1973. 
Such an ambitious goal would be achieved through an increase in commodity 
exports coupled with a reduction of the imports, especially in agriculture and mining. 
Agricultural income was to be increased by around a quarter16 by the end of the 
plan, at an annual growth rate of 6.4%, which would mean that Jordan had reached 
self-reliance in agricultural production , reducing its imports and subsequently 
expanding its exports of these products. Realization of such aims would be made 
possible through agricultural and irrigation projects: 15.5% of the total fixed 
investment would be spent chiefly on improving livestock, expanding land utilization, 
and increasing irrigated areas, especially in the Jordan valley and Southern Ghors. 17 
Solving fundamental problems that the planners associated with this sector such as 
low productivity, weak organization, incompatibility of production and marketing 
15 Mazur, M. (1979), p244-245. 
16 Agricultural income would increase by 20.2% or 28.5% when compared with 1972 and 
1971 respectively. 
17 Jordan Development Board, The Three Year Development Plan 1973-1975. p 11-12.21-22. 
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methods would also contribute to the increase in agricultural output. 18 Mining 
projects, which were allocated one third of the investments of the industrial sector19 
and concentrated mainly in phosphate production, would be the other main source of 
reduction of the trade deficit. 
As for the budget's dependency on external sources, the planners did not 
promise to bring it to an end; however, the plan envisaged an augmentation of the 
reliance of the government budget on domestic revenues, anticipated to increase by 
39.4% during the plan period. It would come to account for 57.4% of the whole 
current revenue in 1975, compared with 49.2% in 1972. Imposing new taxes and 
improving tax collection techniques were the methods that the planners suggested 
for increasing domestic revenue. 
The other theme around which the goals and projects of the plan revolved 
was unemployment, which had constituted a serious problem since the 1950s and 
had deepened after the 1967 war, reaching 8.0% of the labor force. The 
implementation of the plan would tackle this issue by creating at least 70,000 
temporary and permanent jobs. 
Achieving the plan's core strategy was possible, as the Jordanian planners 
asserted, through implementing the detailed projects that in their turn would result in 
a GOP annual growth rate of 8.0%; by 1975, GOP would have increased by 26.0% 
compared to 1972. Apart from the overall growth, the planners claimed that a 
change in the imbalanced sectoral economic structure was needed, since 2/3 of the 
national income was generated by the service sector. The planned projects would 
result in an increase in the relative importance of the productive sector's proportion 
of the GOP at the expense of the service sector, since the growth rate of the service 
sectors was planned to be 6.9% per annum against 9.9% of the productive sectors.20 
Apart from the above-mentioned contribution of agriculture, the industry and 
electricity sectors were supposed to be the bearer of this increase. Industry (mining 
and manufacturing) would grow at 14.0% annually, increasing its output by 47.9% by 
16 Jordan Development Board. The 3-year Development Plan 1973-1975. p 12. It is important 
to point out that agricultural exports were still dependent on certain vegetable and fruit crops and were 
seasonally based. 
19 By then, the industry sector consisted of mining, manufacturing and electricity. 
20 The Jordanlan Development Board, The 3-year Development Plan 1973-1975, p53-58. For 
more details on the service sectors see table 3/ Appendix 6. 
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the end of the plan and making a shift in its share of the GOP from 10.3% in 1971 to 
13.0% in 1975. The income of the electricity and water supply sector was expected 
to increase by 58.0% over the plan period, at an average annual growth rate of 
16.6%. 
Increasing exports would also expand the income in foreign currencies, in 
addition to the income earned in remittances from Jordanian workers abroad. The 
plan aimed to develop economic and social activities throughout the country, and 
especially in rural areas.21 
Industry would receive 14.6% of the investment expenditures and almost 
80.0% would be financed by the private sector (see table 3-3). Furthermore, one 
third of industrial investment was designated to mining projects and a further 10% 
was aimed at manufacturing projects that were dependent on mining. The electricity 
sector was allocated 5.5% of the plan investment and the private sector was 
expected to contribute slightly less than half of this amount. 
Although evaluating the plan lies outside the scope of the economic 
performance of this period, a brief account of its achievements will be given here. 
Evaluation is problematic, considering that the plan was drawn in November 1972, 
when it was not expected that a radical change in economic conditions was to take 
place two years later due to the oil boom. Jordan's economic performance did not 
owe the plan as much as it did to the boom22• Fixed investment, which totalled JD 
229.0 million, i.e. 27.9% more than e)(pected, reflected a dramatic increase in 
remittances and foreign aid. The capital expenditure of the private sector was 61% 
more than planned and the public investment was slightly more than the target.23 
2 1 Jordan Development Board, The 3-year Development Plan 1973-1975, p 27. 
22 Khader claims that soaring oil prices resulted in adverse effects on economic 
performance, since, the cost of living index doubled and the purchasing power of wages and 
salaries dropped. Inflation was further exacerbated by land speculation. Khader,8.(1989), Jordan 
Economy 1952-1989, p4. 
23 Transportation had the largest share of investment at 24.9%, followed by the housing 
sector at 21 .8% and industry at 19.7%. Amongst private investment sectors, housing received 
the highest share at 37.0%, followed by transportation (21 .3%) and industry (26%). In contrast, 
services and other construction sectors had the largest share of actual public investment at 
30.4%, followed by transportation (29.4%) and agriculture (22.6%). Five-Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development 1976-1980, p34-35. See also table 3/ Appendix 6. 
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However, Abu Jaber notes that public investment in real terms was short by 25% of 
the anticipated level, while private investment was only 10.0% short.2• • 
At the level of economic performance. the actual GOP and GNP growth rates 
(6.0% and 7.0% respectively) fell short of the planned ones (8.0% and 8.2%).25 Abu 
Jaber attributes this shortcoming to the fact that the plan was ambitious when 
considering the economic reality of Jordan.26 At another level, Khader claims that 
the actual growth rate during the plan was modest considering the effects of the 
soaring oil prices.27 
Concerning the sectoral structure of the economy, the figures indicate that 
the plan was not successful in improving the productive sectors contribution, despite 
the fact that the annual growth rate of industry registered 23.0%,28 exceeding by far 
the planned one (14.0%). The sector that lagged behind was agriculture, which 
declined in real terms by 1% yearly resulting in a dramatic drop in its share of GOP 
to 9.7% (planned 17.1%). This decline was attributed to the drought and frost that 
agriculture witnessed in 1973 and 1975.29 The remarkable performance of industry, 
which was in its turn attributable mainly to the expansion of phosphate production, 
partly offset the decline in agricultural production and was thus the main reason 
behind the growth in GOP. On the other hand, the industrial sector share of the 
GOP exceeded the targeted rates (13.0%), reaching 17.4% in 1975. 
Looking at the attainments of the plan's core strategy, one could simply argue 
that the plan achieved nothing, since dependency on foreign aid and trade deficit 
had deepened during the life of the plan. Even the unemployment problem was 
solved by virtue of the fact that the oil producing countries absorbed a considerable 
portion of the Jordanian labor power. 
24 Abu Jaber, Kamel, Shimizu M. {1984), p68. 
25 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1976-1980, p26-27. 
26 Abu Jaber, Kamel, Shimizu, M. (1984), p 68. 
27 Khader, 8.(1989), Jordan Economy: 1952-1989, p4. 
28 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1976-1980, p34-35. 
29 The contraction of the agricultural income and the inflation rate of agriculture, which 
was above the general inflation rate, led to a decline in the relative share of agriculture in the 
GOP, which reached 7. 9%. Aagricultural prices rose by 15% yearly during the period of the plan, 
while the general price averaged 10.0% growth per annum over the same period. The Five Year 
Development Plan, p27. 
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4 .1.2 THE BUDGET 
The central government budget is the other indicator that. together with the 
development plan , should highlight the state economic policy in this period. The 
governmental budget is not simply an important indicator to understand public 
finance, but it is also vital to obtain a better view of the structure and performance of 
the economy. Two sets of factors related to Jordan can explain the importance of 
the budget. The first is the dependency of the modern state since its birth on 
external financial aid. The expenditures that outline the state economic and social 
policy is partly drawn up on the basis of its internal economic resources, while the 
availability of external aid is also a fundamental factor in shaping it. 
The second set of factors is related to the growing role of the state in the 
economy. The fact that a respectable portion of the state budget was not tied to the 
country's economic reality gave the state extra room for adopting its economic 
policies. The modern state. since its establishment, has been a major economic 
player by virtue of being the main and largest employer. In this sense, the state 
contributed to a gradual change in the socio-economic structure by absorbing a 
remarkable portion of manpower from different social backgrounds. It gradually 
stepped in to become the main provider of social services and infrastructure. This 
meant that, at one level, the state enlarged its apparatus, while at another level it 
became one of the main sources of activities for the private sector. 
This section deals with the public finance as was revealed in the 
governmental budgets over the years of this period. It covers the structure of the 
budget according to the components of revenue and expenditures both current and 
capital, attempting to highlight the main state economic policies and the factors 
underlying them. 
The budget revenue and expenditures showed a rapid increase during this 
period. Revenue, regardless of its sources, increased from JD 70.2 million in 1967 
to JO 114 million in 1973, at an annual growth rate of 21 .9%. Expenditure indicated 
a similar expansion at a rate of 19.8% per annum, which was almost double the rate 
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that had been recorded in the former period. The size of the expenditures both 
current and capital rose from JD 68.2 million in the first year to JD 119.5 million by 
the end of this period. Unlike the other economic measures, the political factors-
especially the 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank - had a limited negative effect 
on the budget. Contrary to the other economic indicators, the budget revenue 
enjoyed a dramatic augmentation of the external budgetary aid as a direct result of 
the 1967 war. However, the effect of the 1967 war was seen mainly in the current 
expenditure section, taking into account the fact that this period showed an increase 
in the military burden at the expense of the other fields. The availability of external 
sources, though, made the budget capable of meeting the increase in defense 
expenditures. 
4.1.2.1 Revenue and Receipts 
As had been the case in the pre-war years, in all the years of this period 
domestic revenue was inadequate to meet the budget expenditure, which resulted in 
a continuous budget deficit that was largely offset by external receipts. In fact, the 
domestic revenue's proportion to the total expenditure was less than that of the pre-
war period. Its relative importance to the entire revenue averaged 39.2%, compared 
to 56.6% in 1962-1966. The decline in the share of the domestic receipts can . at 
one level, be traced back to its structure and the relative importance of each of its 
components. At another level, it is due to the outstanding increase in external 
budgetary aid, whose annual growth rate was around four times that of the local 
revenue30. 
Considering the structure of the domestic revenue and the performance of 
each of its components can highlight its modest expansion. During the entire period, 
the indirect taxes, which are one of the three categories that make up domestic 
revenue, were the main generator of local revenue. Their average annual proportion 
was 60.0% of the entire domestic revenue31 , followed by non-tax revenue at 29.9%, 
and finally the direct taxes at 10.1 %? The distribution of indirect taxes in its turn 
reveals that around half of their receipts came from import duties, around 30% from 
30 See table 4 and 5/ Appendix 6. 
31 This proportion reached almost two thirds of the domestic revenue in the first tnree 
years of the period. See table 7 and 8/ Appendix 6. 
32 See table 8 I Appendix 6. 
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consumption taxes and around 10.0% from licenses and fees. Not only did import 
duties dominate the indirect taxes, but they also provided the treasury with around 
30.0% of domestic revenue. In other words, the contribution of import duties was 
almost three times that of total direct taxes, almost four times income taxes, and was 
equivalent to non-tax income. Consumption tax was another significant indirect tax, 
which contributed 19.0% of the domestic revenue per annum, almost twice as much 
as the direct tax.33 
The inferior contribution of the direct taxes resulted in a domestic revenue 
being dominated by the indirect taxes and their sub-section, the import duties. This 
made it vulnerable to the fluctuations in the earnings of the latter categories. The 
decisive role of indirect tax receipts was seen in 1967 and 1968, when imports 
decreased as a result of losing the West Bank market, leading domestic revenue 
and the entire revenue to drop, despite an increase in earnings from other 
categories of local revenues.34 The scenario of a drop in domestic revenue was 
repeated In 1970 and 1971 , when imports were interrupted by internal conflict. The 
rise of 69.6% and 12.8% respectively in direct taxes could not offset the adverse 
impact of import duties. In 1972 and 1973, indirect taxes had again a strong impact 
on domestic revenue, but in the opposite way: their increase in these two years 
resulted in improving the ratio of domestic revenue to total revenue. 
It has been mentioned that the vulnerability of domestic revenue to the 
fluctuation of indirect taxes reflects the inferior contribution of direct taxes. The 
composition of direct taxes shows that the revenue of the income taxes constituted 
77.2% while the other direct taxes generated just 22.8%. Between 1967 and 1969 
the proportion of the income taxes to the whole direct taxes was almost 100%. 
However, from 1970 onwards the other taxes increased rapidly, making up slightly 
more than one third of the entire direct taxes. One of the factors that explains the 
poor direct taxes revenue is the fact that income from building tax, agricultural land 
tax and animal tax was stlll irrelevant. Another important factor is the insufficient 
taxation system both at the legal and practical levels. 35 The Jordanian government 
had been aware of the problems of the taxation system since the mid 1960s and had 
proposed a few reformation plans to improve the revenue that generated from such 
33 See table 8/ Appendix 6. 
34 See table 8/ Appendix 6 
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sources.36 In this period, the government continued to define the problem and to 
include plans either in its Budget Laws or in the three-year development plan to 
reform the taxation system by imposing new taxes and improving the tax collection 
mechanism.37 In spite of governmental concern , the poor tax revenue reflected, as 
Mazur notes, a lack of serious reforms.38 
Apart from domestic revenue, the figures show that external aid had the 
largest share at 46.2%. In the last few years before the 1967 war external aid , in 
absolute and relative terms, declined gradually; ever since 1963, it was expected 
that it would be eliminated by 197039. In contrast to that trend and to governmental 
predictions, external aid showed an outstanding increase as a result of the Arab 
support that was decided subsequent to the 1967 war.40 Arab financial aid and the 
budgetary support from the US41 and UK combined with that from UN agencies and 
other sources,42 increasing the share of external aid within the total revenue. 
recording more than 55.0% in the first two years of the period. However, since 
external aid was channeled to Jordan on political grounds, the political 
developments of this period resulted in its fluctuation from one year to the next. A 
consequence of the upsurge in the activities of the Palestinian resistance movement 
against Israel was a serious drop in western aid in 1969 and 1970. In fact, 
American aid reached its lowest level in 1970 and Britain completely stopped its 
financial support.43 These developments were reflected in the annual growth rate of 
the external revenue, which registered -4.5% and -7.8% respectively in 1969 and 
1970. The military operation conducted by the Jordanian army against the PLO 
guerrillas in September 1970 led to an increase in American aid, which reached the 
35 Central Bank of Jordan (1971), The Eighth Annual Report, p 10. 
36 See the proposals in the Seven -Year Development Plan (1964-1970) and the 
recommendations of the Fiscal Royal Committee. 
37 Central Bank of Jordan (1971), The Eighth Annual Report. p10. 
38 Mazur, M.P. (1979), Economic Growth and Development in Jordan, p 31 1. 
39 The Jordanian Development Board, 1964-1970 Development Plan, p 42. 
4
° Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p69 . 
.. 
1 See Brand, L. (1996), p23. 
42 Central Bank of Jordan (1967). The Fourth Annual Report, p 8, Central Bank of Jordan 
(1968), The Fifth Annual Report, p5. 
43 See table 9/ Appendix 6. 
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1967 level, and to the resumption of British aid.44 However, the events of Black 
September caused a drop in the size of the Arab aid to Jordan, with Kuwait and 
Libya suspending their contribution completely. The loss of the aid of these two 
countries was clearty reflected in the massive decline of the proportion of the 
external revenue, which reached its lowest level in 1971 . The external revenue 
showed an improvement in 1972 and 1973, when its share rose recording 44.2% 
and 40.0% respectively. This was due mainly to the fact that the Western financial 
aid continued at better levels than in 1969 and 197045 and that in 1972 Saudi Arabia 
raised its aid, compensating for the share of Kuwait , before the latter resumed its aid 
after the October war of 1973.46 
External budget support shows the extent of state dependence on this 
revenue at one level and the tight correlation between receiving such aid and the 
political stance of the regime at another level. However, the sources of external aid 
were more diversified compared to the pre-war years, which gave the regime room 
to manoeuvre and to choose the appropriate time to make shifts in its policies.47 
To conclude the revenue subsection, it is worth mentioning the introduction of 
two components that had only relative importance during this period but would be an 
important instrument in the hands of the state in years to come, namely external and 
internal loans. Despite the fact that both categories had already been presented in 
1963 as financial resources of the seven-year development plan, it was in this period 
that they started to appear in the budget accounts. External borrowing was 
established in this period as one of the main sources of governmental revenue. It 
grew at an average rate of 44.9% annually, which was four times as much as the 
rate of the domestic revenue. Its proportion to the entire revenue in the last three 
years of th is period averaged more than 9.0% annually, which was almost equal to 
the ratio of the direct taxes. External borrowing was an effective instrument to offset 
the shortage in external aid or in any of the other budget components . 
• u Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report. p18, Kanvosky (1976), 
Economic Development in Jordan, p70. 
•s Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p70-71. 
46 Central Bank of Jordan (1 973), The Tenth Annual Report, p13. 
47 A great deal of analogy between the choices of the regime in 1970 concerning the PLO 
and the regime's choices in 1957 concerning the radical political movement. In both cases, the. 
regime was losing the grip on the country and rescuing the external aid. 
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Domestic loans revenue was used for the first time in 1969, when it appeared 
in the budget accounts. Despite the late start of this component, its relative 
importance was immediately felt, averaging 6.2%. Moreover, domestic loans 
revenue showed the fastest annual growth rate among the other revenues, at 
48.9%. The composition of domestic loans took two forms: treasury bills and bonds, 
and direct loans from the local commercial banks. 41 
4.1.2.2Expenditures 
Expenditure showed a rapid increase during this period, its annual growth 
rate averaging 19.8%. The expansion of expenditure was experienced in all years 
over the period, except for 1970 and 1971 . In 1970, the expenditure dropped by 
8.7% compared to the 1969 level. Even though in 1971 it surpassed the 1970 level, 
It was still below what was recorded in 1969. This contraction in 1970 and partly in 
1971 was attributed to the political environment, which led to a decline in the size of 
all revenue components and particularfy in the external revenue. Nevertheless, 
expenditures showed a slight improvement in 1971 , followed by a rapid expansion in 
1972 and 1973. This rapid expansion was made possible because of the availability 
of external aid, especially that of the Arab countries. 
As far as the structure of the expenditure is concerned, in this period 70.0% 
of the entire budget was devoted to the current expenditure while the proportion of 
capital expenditure averaged almost 30.0%. However, capital expenditure grew at 
an annual rate of 27.4%, which was far faster than the growth of current expenditure, 
which averaged 17.4% per annum. Considering the structure of the expenditures, 
one could claim that the budget of this period could be characterized as a defense 
budget. since the proportion of defense expenditure to the entire expenditure was 
the largest, averaging 40.0%. If the share of the security and internal order budget 
Is included, such a ratio reaches 46.3%. The average share of defense and security 
was similar to that which had been experienced in the 1950s, when the majority of 
British aid was directed to the armed forces. However, the defense burden in the 
post~war period increased compared to that of the last few years of the former 
period, when it had showed a gradual decline. As Mazur mentions, the 1967 war 
48 See Ministry of Finance (1970) Qaanuun ai-Muuzneh al-'aamah (General Budget 
Law). Ministry of Finance {1972) Qaanuun ai-Muuzneh al-'aamah, p45-47. Ministry of Finance 
(1973) Qaanuun ai-Muuzneh al-'aamah, p. 48-51. 
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and its consequences led to an absolute increase in the size of the armed forces 
and of their armament, which resulted in an increase in the defense expenditure.49 
Rebuilding the army both at the level of the structure and at the level of equipment 
and arms became a necessity after the 1967 defeat. It was, at another level, 
important to increase the defense budget, since Arab aid that was provided to 
Jordan during this period was mainly aimed at improving the state of the Jordanian 
armed forces to meet the requirements of confrontation with Israel. 
At the level of current expenditure, two thirds of it was devoted to the defense 
and security section. The social services came second, receiving 13.7% of the 
entire current expenditure, followed by finance administration at a proportion of 
10.7%. Capital expenditure was distributed mainly into two major fields, that is 
economic development and finance administration. The two fields received around 
90.0% of the whole capital budget, 48.0% being employed in the economic 
development and 41 .0% in finance and administration. The budget of the first field 
reflected direct governmental involvement in the economic projects, while the 
expenditure of the second one included the financing of development and improving 
projects, which took place in public administration as well as in the economic 
projects. Apart from those two main fields, the budget of communication and 
transport services averaged 3.7% yearly, while that of social services was 3.5%. 
4.1 .3 THE MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
This section deals with economic development in the period 1967-73 by 
tracing the performance of the main macro-economic indicators, i.e. GOP at factor 
cost, GOP and GNP at market prices in nominal and real terms. It also deals with 
the performance of the different economic sectors. It does not attempt to give a 
detailed account of the economic situation; rather, it is limited to the main trends of 
the economy, highlighting the economic and political factors that had an impact on it. 
Observing the main economic indicators during this period reveals that 
economic performance was paced more slowly than in the previous period. The 
average GOP at factor cost in the last two years of the period grew by 32.8%, 
49 Mazur. M.P. (1 979). Economic Growth and Development in Jordan, p 231 . 
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compared to its average value registered in the first two years, 1967 and 1968. 
Similarly, the GOP and GNP at market price in the last two years recorded an 
augmentation of 34.7% and 36.6% respectively, compared with the average of the 
first two years50• Comparatively, during the period (1953-1966) the indicators above 
had showed an overall eJCpansion of more than 250.0% each. 
Taking into account the higher inflation rate in this period compared to the 
previous one, economic growth in real terms according to the same indicators 
showed a slower rate. Comparing the average value of the last two years to the first 
two, the GOP at factor cost, GOP and GNP at market price in real terms expanded 
respectively by 4.9%, 6.4% and 7.8%. During this period, the annual average growth 
rate of real GOP at factor cost registered 2.0% per annum, while in the previous 
period it was 9. 7%. Likewise, real GOP at market price grew annually at a rate of 
1.8% against 10.0% in the preceding period. Its average amount in 1972 and 1973 
reached JD 242.1 million. which was the same as that averaged in 1965 and 1966. 
Furthermore, the growth rate of GNP, which averaged 1.7% yearly, was far below 
the rate of 10.7% that had been encountered in (1953-1966). 
Even though the period is characterized by deceleration in economic growth, 
especially when compared to that of the 1960s, this phenomenon was in fact the 
result of a nominal growth rate or diminution in the economy in some specific years. 
In 1968, 1970, 1971 , and 1973, economic performance was at its worst when it is 
compared with the rest of the period's years or with the economic performance of 
the 1950s and 1960s, influencing the overall economic growth of this transitional 
period. This poor performance can be traced back to different economic and 
political factors. Whether these factors are external or internal, they can be 
classified into two broad categories, the first of which is contraction in agriculture, the 
main economic sector. The second is undoubtedly the unstable political 
environment, which did not only have a great impact on investment, but brought 
some economic activities to a halt for a period of time. 
In 1968, the slow down in agricultural income caused by poor rainfall was the 
main economic factor affecting the economy. In other words, the relapse that the 
economy experienced (see table 3-4) was largely due to the contraction of the 
agricultural income by 32.1 %, as a result of the climate conditions. Rain shortage 
50 See tables 10-14/ Appendix 6. 
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had such a great impact because it was coupled with another factor, i.e. the 
continuous military confrontation between the Palestinian resistance movement 
and/or the Jordanian army (in a later stage) on one side, and Israel on the other.51 
The Jordan Valley, which is the main irrigated area in the country, was the main 
theater for such a confrontation. This meant a drop in agricultural production from 
the area, leading rain fluctuation to be a significant factor in the agricultural output.52 
The confrontation did not only have a negative impact on agriculture: the fact that 
active military operations took place on the cease-fire lines of 1967 during the first 
three years of this period, asserting a state of 'no war no peace', brought about an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and instability which was hostile to economic activities, 
especially in certain sectors. For instance, an obvious setback was experienced in 
the wholesale & trade, transport and banking and financial sectors.53 The latter 
sector, which had just suffered from a decrease in the private sector deposits and a 
high demand on withdrawals as a direct effect of the 1967 war, continued to be 
affected by the political uncertainty brought about by the confrontation. 54 The scope 
of wholesale and trade, which had already shrunk by losing the West Bank market, 
had to reduce its activities taking into consideration the risks of the confrontation. In 
addition to the above mentioned impact, a decline in the number of tourists as a 
consequence of the occupation of the West Bank had a knock-on effect on some 
economic sectors that had close ties with tourism, such as transport, trade, banking 
and services. 55 
In 1970 and 1971 , economic development was highly damaged by the 
internal military conflict that broke out in the second half of 1970 and continued 
through part of 1971 . Particularly in the second half of 1970, instability and disorder 
combined with high uncertainty as to the outcome of the conflict led to an 
51 Central Bank of Jordan (1969), p18. 
52 The main military bases and camps of the Palestinian Resistance Movement up to 
1970/1971 were located in the Ghur. or Jordan valley. This area was the main target for the 
Israeli artillery and all other military operations, which led the population to flee to safer cities and 
towns and to bring the agricultural activities to a halt. For instance, the Battle of AI-Karmah 
between the Palestinian guerrilla and the Jordanian army on one side and the invading Israeli 
troops on the other in March/ 1968 took its name from AI-Karmah, the village that was the theatre 
of the battle. 
53 Central Bank of Jordan (1967), The Fourth Annual Report, p13. 
54 Central Bank of Jordan (1968), The Fifth Annual Report, P11 . 
55 Central Bank of Jordan (1968), Toe Seventh Annual Report. p8-9. 
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unfavorable environment for a large portion of the economic activities.56 Therefore, 
the activity of the private sector reached its lowest level, taking into account that 
functioning of different sectors were disrupted during the battles of Sept /1970 and 
some of the private sector enterprises, firms and other businesses experienced 
physical damage. 57 Additionally, there was paralysis in some of the fundamental 
services sectors, such as transportation, electricity and water supply, which lasted 
for more than one month and affected not only the productive sectors, but the 
economy as a whole.58 The above factors combined led to a reduction in the output 
of all economic sectors and a relapse in all economic indicators. 
Apart from political uncertainty, the inadequate rainfall of 1970 had a further 
impact on the economy at large and on the agricultural income in particular, which 
dropped by 23.0% with respect to the 1969 level. 59 More specifically, the income 
from grains & legumes, whose production was highly dependent on rainfall , declined 
by 56.0% compared to the 1969 level.60 The economy in general experienced one 
of its worst years and went through a phase of depression. In terms of figures, all 
economic indicators dropped at different rates. For example, the GNP went down by 
8.1%, while GDP and GDP at factor cost regressed respectively by 7.8% and 7.2%. 
Furthermore, in 1970 the performance of all economic sectors was below that of the 
first year of the period. Capital formation dropped from JD 74.2 million in 1969 to JD 
45.0 million in 1970. 
The Jordanian government was aware of the consequences of its conflict with 
the PLO on the economy. Restoration of the different economic sectors as they had 
been before the conflict had started was among the main priorities of the 
government to in order to stabilize the economic situation. That the regime had won 
the conflict and was in control of the country was also an important signal at the 
local, regional and international levels. Furthermore, it was essential for the state to 
win the private sector's confidence in the political atmosphere. Shortly after Black 
September, and despite the fact that the PLO military was still in the country, three 
56 Clearly, economic activities in the countryside were by far less affected by this conflict, 
since the theatre of the 1970 conflict was in the cities. 
57 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report, P1 . 
58 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report, P1-2. 
59 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report, p10-14. 
60 Department of Statistics, (1974), National Accounts. p23-27. 
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economic conferences were held at the Central Bank of Jordan in October 1970, 
which were attended by governmental and private sector representatives to discuss 
the economic situation and difficulties in the fields of industry, agriculture and trade. 
The recommendations of those conferences were studied in a meeting at the Royal 
Palace, 'presided over by the Crown Prince', before being turned into governmental 
decisions via the council of ministers and the Economic Security Committee. The 
decisions, aimed at compensating the damages and solving the problems that had 
been caused by the conflict in both industry and agriculture, increasing their 
productivity, are detailed in the section below. In the case of the trade sector, the 
government exempted the goods and commodities that were stored in customs 
warehouses and in the Aqaba port during the period Sep 1st -Nov 15th 1970 from 
storage fees. Furthermore, the customs duties on goods and commodities cleared 
between Oct 24th and Nov 151h 1970 could be paid in installments. 61 In the interest of 
the trade sector, the Central Bank instructed the local commercial banks to freeze 
the interest payments of the businessmen heavily damaged by the conflict until after 
they received due compensation. Additionally, the local banks were instructed to 
follow an easy policy in providing credit to the commercial sector and to keep the 
interest rate on credit facilities at the same level for one year, starting from 24th of 
October 197062• 
Even though the economy seemed to initiate a process of readjustment from 
the recession of 1970, the difficulties that it faced in the first seven months of 1971 
were very similar to those of the previous year. In fact, the political situation was to 
a large extent the same as in 1970, the main exception being the absence of the 
PLO from the central part of the country, and particularly from Amman, where the 
majority of economic activity took place. Additionally, the economy enjoyed a more 
stable political environment in the last five months of 1971 , following the expulsion of 
PLO militants from the northern part of Jordan into Syria. 
These developments were reflected in an overall increase in the economic 
indicators and in the income of the different sectors. However, this expansion, 
though exceeding the 1970 level, was still poor and far below the level of 1969 and 
1967, despite the increase in agricultural production due to the adequate rainfall. 
al Central Bank of Jordan (1970), Ttte Seventh Annual Report, p7-10. 
62 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report, p1 0. 
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The GOP at factor cost amounted to JO 213.3 million, recording an increase of 1.1% 
compared to 1970, and was 6.8% less than that of 1969. Likewise, the expansion 
rate of GOP and GNP was 0.7% and 0.6% respectively, while they were respectively 
7.2% and 7.6% below the 1969 level. 
The political decisions that were taken by the authorities in both Syria (for 
almost a year) and Iraq (for four months) to close its borders with Jordan in 1971 
had a negative impact on the economy.63 As a result, the foreign trade sector lost 
the Syrian and the Iraqi markets. The agricultural exports were among the hardest 
hit by this development; in order to explore new markets that could replace the 
Syrian and Iraqi ones, a cooperative organization was established in 1971 which 
specialized in promoting the agricultural products.64 The closures meant that Jordan 
temporarily lost its traditional export/import routes. Phosphate exports were 
significantly affected, because of their dependence on the port of Beirut after the 
closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. 
The contraction of 1973 was due to a combination of external and internal 
factors affecting all aspects of the economy. At the external level, the significant 
increase in demand for certain primary commodities, the vast expansion in 
international liquidity, the outbreak of the energy crisis, the rise in prices of many 
finished goods and raw materials and other elements, resulted in worldwide inflation 
and a monetary crisis. The small size of the Jordanian economy, its chronic trade 
deficit and its entanglement with the international economy, enhanced the impact of 
the international economic crisis. The immediate result of the international crisis 
was to accelerate the local inflation rate, which exceeded by far the average rate of 
the previous years.65 Taking into account the fact that a respectable proportion of 
the Jordanian exports and imports went via the Syrian and Lebanese ports66, the 
Oct 1973 war was the main regional factor affecting the economy in general and 
foreign trade in particular. 
63 The closure of the Jordanian borders was carried out by Syria and Iraq in order to 
protest against the military operation that the Jordanian rule had launched against the PLO in 
July, which resulted in the PLO being ousted from the country . 
64 Central Bank of Jordan (1971 ). The Seventh Annual Report. p8. 
65 Central Bank of Jordan (1971 ). The Seventh Annual Report. p1 . 
66 Kanvosky (1976). p83. 
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At the local level, the unfavourable climatic conditions (both drought and 
frost) that the agricultural season faced in 1972/73 resulted in a fall in agricultural 
production.67 Agricultural income dropped by 34.5% compared to the 1972 level and 
amounted to just half of that generated in 1965. This, together with international and 
regional factors, played a central role in rising domestic inflationary pressure and the 
cost of living . The cost of living in Amman , as was observed by the Central Bank, 
jumped by 10.4% from 129.4 points in 1972 to 142.9 m 1973, leading to an 
unprecedented growth rate in the living index.68 Owing to the high inflation rate, in 
1973 some economic sectors indicated negative growth rates in real terms, although 
they showed an increase in current price. 
In terms of figures, the GOP at factor cost declined by 7.8%, while GOP and 
GNP dropped respectively by 5.8% and 3.1% compared to the 1972 performance. 
The income of all economic sectors dropped at different levels with the exception of 
industry, construction and electricity & water supply. The increase in construction 
and electricity could be attributed to the reconstruction activities that took place in 
the areas which suffered from damage during the conflict of 1970 and 1971, taking 
into consideration that governmental money poured in as compensation for the 
private properties that had been damaged. In the case of industry, the modest rate 
of 3.5% in 1973 was due to an increase in the income of oil refinery and mining and 
quarrying. 
The above brief account of the macroeconomic performance shows the 
extent to which the Jordanian economy is vulnerable and dependent on regional and 
international economic developments, also revealing some of its important 
characteristics. The attention here is to be shifted to consider the structure of the 
economy during this period, as it was indicated by the industrial origin of the real 
GOP at factor cost. The figures show that the wholesale & retail trade had the 
largest proportion of GOP at 19.4%. Public administration & defense and agriculture 
followed, with a ratio of 18.7% and 17.5% respectively. Industry came after at 
11 .1 %, services at 1 0.2, transportation at 8.3% and ownership of dwelling at 6.9%. 
the least imprtant sectors in GOP were construction, banking and insurance, and 
electricity and water supply at 4.9%, 1.8% and 1.2% respectively. 
67 Central Bank of Jordan (1973), The Tenth Annual Report, p6-8. 
68 The growth rate of the living index was as low as 4.0% during the period 1967-1971 . 
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The contribution of the economic sectors to GOP shows that some changes 
took place over the years of this period with respect to the pre-war years. The 
contribution of agriculture slipped down by around 20% compared to that of the 
period 1953-1966. The decline was even more significant in the share of 
transportation, which dropped by one quarter. On the contrary, the share of industry 
during this period improved by 10% with respect to the 1953-1966 level.69 Similarly, 
the relative importance of the service sector in the GOP showed a significant 
increase, rising from an average of 7.8% in 1953-1966 to 10.2% in 1967-1973. 
This structural change in the relative importance of some economic sectors 
can be better seen through a comparison between the share of the productive 
sectors and that of the services. The productive sectors, agriculture and industry, 
made up an aggregated 28.6% of the composition of GOP. By broadening the 
concept of productive sectors to include construction, transportation, and electricity 
& water supply, using the Jordanian planners' termed 'commodity productive 
sectors', whose share was 43.2%. Accordingly, the average contribution of the 
service sectors to the GOP was 56.8%, by which they preserved a dominant role in 
the economy during this period, as was the case in the previous years. This 
dominance was actually increased in this period, by virtue of an increase of the 
services sectors from 53.0% (1953-1966) to almost 57% (1967-1973). 
As far as the growth rate at the sectoral level is concerned, the retreat of the 
whole economy was expressed in modest growth rates for some sectors and 
relapses for others. The fastest growth rate was recorded in the public 
administration sector, at 5.5%, followed by construction at 4.5%. The abnormal 
growth in population that was caused by waves of refugees fleeing to the East Bank 
after the 1967 war was the key factor in the expansion in construction activities in 
1968 and 1969. In fact, the majority of such activities took place in the residential 
construction.70 After experiencing a temporary recession in 1970 and 1971 .. 
construction picked up again in 1972 and 1973, showing a relatively high growth 
rate. The sector benefited from political stability and governmental compensation 
69 The actual increase was still higher, considering that, in the pre-war period, the 
industry sector had included the income of electricity, which had instead its own category in the 
period under consideration. 
70 See values in terms of meters for the different types of construction. be them 
residential and non-residential buildings, roads, public construction .... etc. Department of 
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disbursed to the owners of the buildings that had suffered damage during the 
internal military conflict.71 The services sector came third after construction, 
recording an average growth rate of 4.1% yearly. Transport and banking & finance 
were the only two sectors that declined during this period at 0.1% on average per 
annum. The activities of the transportation sector were highly disturbed by the 
consequences of the confrontation with Israel that took place in 1968 and 1969, and 
also by the internal conflict of 1970 and 1971 . In the latter two years th is sector was 
temporarily paralyzed, for a time that varied between a few days and one month. 
Similarly, the banking sector was hit by the loss of loans and credit that had been 
facilitated in the occupied West Bank. The lack of confidence that developed in the 
private sector and among individuals in the banking sector mirrored the political 
instability, which resulted in a contraction in the size of private deposits. Other 
economic sectors, such as ownership of dwelling and agriculture, expanded poorly 
at 0.2% and 1.3% respectively. In general, the growth rates of all economic sectors 
were far below those of 1953-1966. 
As was seen above, the performance of expenditures on the GOP at market 
price reflected the contraction of the whole economy. Consumption expenditure 
grew at a modest rate of 1.6% annually, which was almost the same as those of the 
GOP and GNP. Owing to the low growth rate of consumption expenditures, its 
proportion to the GOP averaged 108.8%, dropping from 114.2% in 1953-1966. 
However, the annual growth rate of public consumption at 5.3% was far faster than 
the rate of private consumption, which recorded 0.7% per annum. It is likely that 
private consumption was influenced by political instability and inflationary pressure, 
since its decline was in the years in which such factors were felt the most. The gap 
between the growth rates of private and public consumption shaped their proportion 
to the GOP. The proportion of private consumption to the total GOP averaged 
80.0%, compared to 88.0% in the previous period. On the contrary, the ratio of 
public consumption increased from 26.2% over the former period to 28.8% during 
this one. 
The performance of the gross capital formation was not exceptional when 
compared to the other economic indicators. Its annual growth rate averaged 10.3%, 
Statistics, (1968), The Annual Book p 386-388 . QepartmeAt-of-·Statistics, (1969); The Annual 
Book p 5. 
71 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report. p9, 
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which was around half of the rate it had recorded before the 1967 war. This 
component was affected by the end of the development projects in the West Bank 
and of some projects in the East Bank after the 1967 war. Besides, it was hit by the 
unfavorable investment climate that accompanied the political instability of 1969-
1971 . 
4.1.4 THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT 1967-1973. 
This section covers the balance of payment, highlighting the main trends of 
trade, services and transfer balances. The section aims to look at the main 
characteristics of the balance of payment's accounts, which in their turn conditioned 
and influenced the economic performance. As far as the balance of payment in 
general is concerned, it was positive in the current account between 1967 and 1968 
and between 1972 and 1973, but it saw a deficit between 1969-1971. The positive 
balance between 1967 and 1968 was due to the improvement in the trade balance 
and the huge increase in transfers - mainly to the central government - after the 
1967 war. However, there was a reduction in the service balance at the beginning of 
the period due to the 1967 war, which resulted in a travel deficit and a decrease in 
the absolute value of the remittances. The deficit in the current account in 1969-
1971 was due to a reduction in net transfers that could not cover the deficit in the 
trade and services balance. The positive figure of the balance of payments in the 
last two years of the period was due to the increase in transfers and service balance, 
which could easily offset the trade deficit. Besides the current account, there was a 
positive figure on the capital account, which increased by more than three times, 
rising from JD 2 million in 1967 to JD 6.5 million in 1973. 
4.1. 4.1 Trade Balance 
Contrary to the previous period, when the general trend was an increase in 
tb.e tr.ade deficit, at the beginning. of .this period sucb a_deficit decreased. It dropped 
from JD 56.8 million in 1966 to JD 42.9 million and JD 43 million in 1967 and 1968 
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respectively. The fall of the deficit was due to a slow growth in imports (23.7%) 
between 1967 and 1969, which was below the rate of the last few years before the 
war. The decline in imports and consequently the trade deficit was mostly a direct 
result of the occupation of the West Bank. The elimination of the trade barriers 
between Israel and the occupied territories. as well as the imposition of a high Israeli 
tariff on the imports to these territories, diverted the West Bank purchases from the 
East Bank and from over the world via Jordan to Israel. 72 This fact led to a 
contraction in the size of the Jordanian imports, which started covering the needs of 
the East Bank exclusively. Undoubtedly, imports dropped by less than the share 
that was assumedly imported for the needs of the West Bank in the pre-war period. 
This concludes that the actual absolute value of imports increased partly due to the 
abnormal population growth caused by the refugees that fled from the West Bank 
and Gaza. 
Apart from the contraction in the imports, the trade deficit was also reduced 
as a result of the increase in the exports, which rose at 11 .3% annually between 
1967-1969. According to the central Bank of Jordan, losing the market of the West 
Bank motivated some of the East Jordanian producers to find new markets, which 
led to an increase in the exports.73 However, Kanovesky relates the increase in the 
exports to the increase in production that was experienced after the war?4 
Moreover, he notes that the phosphate exports reached their peak in 1968, despite 
the closure of the Suez Canal.75 In fact, the increase in the phosphate exports was 
due to the expansion of the Saudi market, so that such exports were not affected by 
the closure of the Suez Canal. 76 
From 1969, however, this trend was reversed: imports grew and exports 
stagnated. As a result. the trade deficit grew; it rose from JD 43 million in 1968 to 
JD 87.7 in 1973, reflecting an increase of 94.65%. The deficit increased as a result 
of increases in imports, which grew faster than exports in absolute and relative 
72 Mazur, M.P. (1979}, Economic Growth and Development in Jordan, p118. 
73 Central Bank of Jordan (1967), The Fourth Annual Report, p 8, Central Bank of Jordan 
(1968), The Fifth Annual Report, p 19-20, Central Bank of Jordan (1969), The Sixth Annual Report, 
p7. 
7
A Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p 80. 
75 Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan, p 80. 
78 Central Bank of Jordan (1968), The Fifth Annual Report, p 20. 
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terms.77 In 1970 and 1971 the international transaction sector experienced a 
depression brought about by the internal conflict and its consequences. The 
slowdown and eventual stoppage in some economic activities was reflected in the 
decline of the rates of imports and exports. The private sector, which 'became more 
inclined to draw down than replenish their commodity stock', reduced its imports due 
to the September disturbance.78 The same political factor that affected the imports 
reduced the exports in the second half of 1970. The main Jordanian exports, 
namely phosphate, petroleum products and tomatoes, declined in 1970 by 28.8%, 
82.9% and 29.7% respectively.79 Furthermore, the closure of the Syrian borders had 
a severe impact on foreign trade and particularly on exports, bearing in mind that the 
Suez Canal had been closed since 1967. After 1971, foreign trade showed an 
improvement. However, imports grew faster than the exports and consequently the 
trade deficit increased. In the last half of 1973, exports suffered from the closure of 
the Syrian-lebanese borders in May 1973, as well as from the October war, which 
had an impact on the function of the port of Aqaba. 
In spite of the fact that the trade deficit declined in the first part of this period, 
over the whole period the imports grew faster than the exports, and the trade deficit 
expanded. Apart from the elements affecting the growth of exports and imports that 
were mentioned above, the increase in imports can be attributed to the following 
elements: 
-The rise in economic activity after the depression of 1970 
and especially as a result of launching the three-year 
development plan (1973-1975). 
-The massive increase in transfers, which had an impact 
on all economic activities. 
-The rising international prices of both raw materials and 
finished goods. 
-The increase in transportation costs due to the Syrian 
border closure.80 
-The increase in the levels of consumer spending. 
n See table 20/ Appendix 6. Kanvosky (1976), p 84. 
78 Central Bank of Jordan (1970). The Seventh Annual Report, p22. 
79 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report, p22-24. 
8° Central Bank of Jordan (1971 ), The Eighth Annual Report, p26. 
2 18 
4.1.4.1.1 Exports 
During this period, consumer goods -and especially current consumer goods-
constituted the biggest Jordanian export at 57.0% of the entire value of the exports. 
Agricultural products constituted the majority of the value that was generated from 
the exports of this section. Raw materials and other goods had the second largest 
share in the composition of the export value at 40.0%. In fact, the value of the 
export of th is section showed a rapid increase over the years of the period, and in 
1973 it was almost double that of 1967. The increase was due to a rise in the value 
generated from the construction materials, which in 1973 was thirteen times more 
than the 1967 level, thanks to a rapid increase in the cement exports in the last three 
years of the period.81 However, the exports of crude materials showed a decline in 
1970 and 1971 as a result of the contraction in phosphate exports. The decline in 
phosphate exports was due to the closure of the Jordanian-Syrian borders, as well 
as to the Indian boycott of the Jordanian exports. This latter hit the sales of 
Jordanian phosphate, as India had become its biggest buyer since the late sixties. 
Kanovsky notes that the composition of the exports was increasingly 
diversified. The sectors that grew in importance were cement and other 
manufacturing, such as pharmaceuticals, paper products, etc. By 1973-74 their 
volume in exports was greater than that of food exports.82 The cement share in 
exports increased from 5.0% in 1971 to 16.0% in 1972, and the increase in absolute 
value of the exported cement in 1972 was 309%. In the same year, exports of paper 
products and pharmaceuticals made up 6.2% of the entire volume of exports.83 
The geographical distribution of the Jordanian exports indicated that the Arab 
countries were the main markets for the Jordanian products, excluding phosphates. 
On average the Arab countries absorbed more than 70.0% of the export volume. 
The main phosphate buyers during this period were India and Japan, whilst 
Yugoslavia was a major buyer in the previous period. 84 
81 Central Bank of Jordan (1973), The Tenth Annual Report, P22-24. 
82 Kanvosky (1976), Economic Development in Jordan. p77. 
83 Central Bank of Jordan (1972), The Ninth Annual Report , p18. 
84 The share of the phosphate exports to Yugosiavla was reduced due to the closure of 
the Suez Canal after the 1967 war and to the closure of the Syrian-Jordanian border in 1971. 
Central Bank of Jordan (1972), The Seventh Annual Report, p22. 
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4.1.4.1.2 Imports 
The classification of the imports during this period indicates that consumer 
goods made up the largest proportion of their volume at 47.3%, of which 90.0% was 
the share of the current consumer goods and 10.0% that of durable consumer 
goods.85 However, the imports of durable consumer goods increased from JD 1.9 
million in 1967 to JD 6.4 million in 1973, at an annual growth rate of 17.8%. 
Kanovsky attributed the sharp increase in consumer durable imports to the rising 
living standards and to the increase in personal disposal income. 86 It is notable that 
the imports of food and live animals increased rapidly in absolute and relative terms, 
as the figures of the imports according to the commodity classification indicate.87 
Kanovsky points out that the import value of food and live animals in 1973 was 
seven times that of the exports of the same type, while it was just around three times 
in the first three years of the period.88 
The share of capital goods was the second biggest component of the imports 
at 22.2%, of which more than one third was the value of machinery and transports 
equipment. The imports of capital goods declined in 1967 and 1968, due to the loss 
of the West Bank market. They also declined in 1970, due to the contraction in 
investments resulting from the lack of political stability and the internal military 
conflict, before growing sharply after 1971 . A similar trend was experienced in raw 
material imports, which increased rapidly in 1972 and 1973 after a drop in 1970 and 
1971 . This increase in both capital goods and raw materials was mainly due to 
increased national investment and production,89 though it also reflected higher 
international prices in late 1972 and 1973.90 
85 Oeparmatment of Statistics, the Foreign Trade Annual Report (different issues). 
86 Kanvosky (1976). Economic Development in Jordan, p78-79. 
!1
7 Foreign Trade Annual Report (different issues). 
88 Kanvosk_y ( 1976), ~0!!9"!!_C?_g!JveJEpment in Jordan, p 7~-79 . 
89 Kanvosky (1976). Economic Development in Jordan, p81 . 
9
° Kanvosky (1976), p81, Central Bank of Jordan (1973), The Tenth Annual Report, p28. 
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4.1. 4.2 Services 
As was noted before, Jordan's positive service balance partially offset the 
trade deficit. This, however, was not always the case during the period, due to the 
1967 war and political instability, which caused a depression in both workers' 
remittances and travel.91 The service balance continued to decrease from the 1966 
level of JD 21 million to a deficit of -JD 10.8 million in 1969, from which it began to 
increase. Although it started to increase from 1970, in that year its level was still 
below half of that of 1966. Between 1967 and 1971 , both workers' remittances and 
travel incomes were reduced. As was noted by the Central Bank and shown in our 
figures, the workers' remittances dropped rapidly and were around half that of the 
level of 1966, while the income from travel showed a deficit after it had been in credit 
in the pre-war period.92 The 1967 war resulted in a massive decrease in the income 
of tourists. Only in 1967 and 1968, the economy lost more than 60.0% of the 
tourism earnings, due to the massive decrease in Western tourist visiting the 
country.93 Furthermore, the unstable political and economic environment after the 
war and during the internal conflict of 1970 was neither attractive for remittances nor 
for tourists; on the contrary, the expenses of foreign travel increased.94 
The service balance in 1972 and 1973 showed a rapid increase: in 1972 it 
amounted to JD 10.9 million, rising from JD 6.9 million, while in 1973 it was more 
than double that of 1972. This increase was due to a rise in workers' remittances 
and to a contraction in the travel deficit. The workers' remittances increased by 
25.0% in 1972 and doubled in 1973, when they surpassed for the first time in the 
period the pre-war years. However, Mazur notes that the official figures of the 
service account includes the share of the remittances which passed Jordan in their 
way to the West Bank.95 According to the Central Bank, the increase in the 
remittances after 1971 was a result of several factors: 
1- Increased confidence in the Jordanian economy 
motivated the workers to channel their remittances. 
91 Kanvosky (1976). Economic Development in Jordan. p84. 
92 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report. P25. 
93 Central Bank of Jordan (1968), The Fifth Annual Report, p21 . 
--- --
94 Central Bank of Jordan (1970), The Seventh Annual Report, p25-26. 
95 Mazur, M.P. (1979), Economic Growth and Development in Jordan , p119. 
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2- A decision was taken by the Jordanian authorities to 
allow the Jordanians working abroad to hold foreign currency in 
accounts in the local commercial banks. 
3- The upheavals characterizing the international market 
stimulated the Jordanian investors and workers abroad to invest 
in land and buildings in order to avoid exchange risks. 
4- The amounts transferred by the Jordanians working 
abroad increased due to the rising cost of living.96 
4.1.4.3 Transfers 
After a large increase of 58% between 1966 and 1967, the total amount of 
transfers declined between 1969 and 1971, going from JD 54.5 million in 1968 to JD 
36.6 million in 1971 . Kanovsky notes that, although the Arab countries increased 
their grants considerably between 1967 and 1969, US grants were heavily reduced 
and the UK stopped their grants.97 Thus, whilst in the previous years transfer 
payments were higher than the trade and service balance, between 1969 and 1971 
the transfers were lower, with the current account in deficit. As a consequence, 
there was also a decline in the gold and foreign exchange. From 1970, the civil war 
brought the withdrawal of Kuwaiti and Libyan grants, but these were offset by 
increases in aid from the US and other Arab countries. 
From 1972 transfers experienced a massive rise. They almost doubled, 
increasing from JD 36.6 million in 1971 to JD 68.3 million in 1972, and continued in 
1973 at a similar level. The increase experienced in 1972 and 1973 was mainly due 
to Saudi compensation for the suspension of Kuwaiti aid (JD 8.49 million) in 1972, 
before its resumption in 1973.98 Other transfers, such as ones from the UN 
agencies, continued at a high level in 1972 and 1973, while the aid received from 
the US increased slightly over the two years.99 
4,2 THE PUBLIC SECTOR CONTRIBUTION 
96 Central Bank of Jordan (1973), The Tenth Annual Report, p30-32. 
97 Kanovsky , ( 1976), p88, --
98 See tables 9-11/ Appendix 6. 
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If this period could be considered as a transition period at the level of the 
economic structure and development. it was certainly such at the level of the public 
sector role in economy. The political events starting with the 1967 war and its 
consequences, the confrontation with Israel, the political instability and the internal 
military conflict led to an increase in the role of the state in economic development 
as well as in economic decision making. The unexpected size of the transfers that 
channeled to the central government together with the increase in domestic and 
foreign loans strengthened the position of the state as an economic player. This 
development became more determinant taking into account the decrease in the 
balance of services and the relapse and hesitation that characterized some of the 
private sector activities due to the unfavorable investment environment. 
Directly after the 1967 war and in order to deal with the economic affairs that 
occurred as a consequence of the war and with those that related to the occupied 
territories, the Jordanian government formed the 'Economic Security Committee'. 
This committee, which was unconstitutional, gave the government the freedom and 
the power to put economics decision and regulation into practice regardless of their 
effect on the economy at large and on the private sector in particular. Furthermore, 
this committee became more important during the phase of political instability as an 
effective instrument to carry out the governmental economic policies. 
There are no available figures that break down the contribution of the private 
sector. The assessment of the contribution of the public sector in the economy 
during this period will be carried out by using the following measures: 
-The proportion of the total expenditures of government to the GOP. 
-The contribution of public capital formation in the gross capital formation. 
-the governmental share in the total loans provided by the local commercial 
banks. 
The proportion of the total governmental expenditures to the GOP at current 
prices which reflects the state's presence in the whole economy, averaged 40.0% 
during this period. This share indicated that the state gained more influence during 
this period compared to to the period of _1954-1966 when the share of the 
99 See table 10/ Appendix 6. 
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expenditure to GOP averaged 32.4 %. That was due to the modest GOP recorded 
in this period as well as the relatively high growth rate in the expenditures mainly as 
a result of the increase in external aid. 
At the capital formation level, the proportion of governmental capital formation 
to gross capital formation was even more striking since it averaged 60.8%. The 
figurer indicated that the proportion was very high in those years, which lacked 
political stability, which resulted in a massive decline in private investment. In 
addition to the decline in private investment, the liquid availability in the hands of the 
government enabled it to channel an increased proportion of its expenditures to 
development projects. According to the composition of governmental capital 
expenditures however, one could argue that around half of public capital formation 
was devoted to economic projects while the rest was channeled to administration 
and security projects. 
4.3 THE STATE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
This section attempts to provide an overview of the patterns of the private 
sector's activities during this period. The lack of data about the contribution of the 
private sector to the economy at large or detailed studies about its structure and 
characteristics led this study to use the available data concerning the private sector 
enterprises as the main source of this section. This study is aware that the 
enterprise data cannot reflect all of the characteristics of the private sector; however, 
it can give an overall picture of its structure and activities that will be valuable when 
the bourgeoisie is considered in the coming chapter. This section, therefore, covers 
the main trends of the private sector enterprises in terms of capital and number. It 
also shows the main trends of the sectoral and sub-sectoral structure of these 
enterprises. This section concludes with an overview of the geographical distribution 
of the enterprises in the country. 
4.3 .1 THE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISE TYPES 
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This study looked at the private sector during this period by analyzing 14,036 
private sector enterprises with a total capital of JO 165,290,193. These enterprises 
belonged to five different types, which were defined by both the Jordanian Company 
Laws of 1989 and 1996. The Individual Enterprise (IE) was the most frequent type, 
making up 79.7% (11 ,148) of the enterprises considered, followed by General 
Partnership (GP) enterprise at 16.8%, Limited Partnership at 2.1 %, Limited Liability 
(LL) at 1.3% and finally Public Shareholding (PS) at 0.53%. In terms of capital, the 
data showed that just 63 PS enterprises made up 33.5% of aggregate capital 
followed by GP at 29.0%, LL at 17.8%, IE at 12.5% and LP at 7.2%.100 The 
outstanding capital of PS compared to that of the other types was a decisive factor in 
determining the proportion of the entire capital that each enterprise type constituted. 
Excluding the capital of PS, thereby eliminating its biased effect, shows that GP 
made up 43.6% of the remaining capital , followed by LL at 26.7%, IE at 18.8% and 
LP at 1 0.8%. The distribution of capital and number among the different enterprise 
types coupled with the average capital in each category indicates some 
characteristics of the enterprise in each type. For instance, based on IE's average 
capital (JD 1,852.9), its being individually owned, and the proportion of the total that 
it constitutes both capital- and number-wise, it could be argued that IE generally 
consists of small size capital enterprises and self-employed businesses. These 
characteristics could be partly applied to the GP enterprises, whose average capital 
stood at JD 20,420.8. In contrast, the fact that the average capitals of LP and LL 
were more than 20 and 80 times respectively that of the IE, and their small 
proportion numberwise indicate that businesses in these forms were usually big. 
Despite the fact that the type of enterprise can be a good parameter to distinguish 
between big businesses and small ones, the high Standard Deviation of the capital 
in each type101 signifies that the mean capital is a weak indicator. For example, 
there are a number of enterprises of GP and IE forms with capital beyond the mean 
capital in these types102• A reversed trend can be found in LL and LP enterprises 
where some enterprises are of very small capital. 103 
100 See table 1/ Appendix 7. 
101 See table 1/ appendbc7. 
102 See table 1/ appendix?. 
103 See table 1 and 21 Appendix?. 
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Hence, the enterprise type is of fundamental relevance to the distinction 
between big and small businesses; however, the general characteristics of a certain 
type do not necessarily reflect the characteristics of each individual enterprise. 
Based on the private sector enterprises data, one could assume that there was an 
inclination among private sector participants towards having their businesses in 
forms of enterprises that are of a simple structure and that lack separation between 
management and ownership. In this context, the application of general trends of a 
certain type of enterprise to a particular enterprise should be constrained by other 
factors such as the capital of this enterprise, its main activities and whether its 
owners own other enterprises. This proposition permits the use of the general 
characteristics of each type without dismissing the particular characteristics of each 
enterprise. 104 
According to this proposition, it could be assumed that the enterprises of IE 
type are to a large extent self-employed enterprises, and therefore of petty 
bourgeois character. Such an assumption is viable if the capital of a given 
enterprise is in the vicinity of the mean capital of the IEs and the owner of that 
enterprise is not an equity holder in any other enterprises. This, certainly, could be 
extended to other enterprise types whose capitals lie in proximity to the IE mean 
capital. 
Based on the above and for the purpose of distinguishing the businesses that 
do not fit within the general characteristics of their types, it is useful to look at the 
enterprises in terms of capital intervals105• The data shows that the enterprises with 
a capital of JD 50,000 or more made up 79.0% of the total capital, representing just 
2.1% of all enterprises. In contrast, the majority of enterprises (92.9%) had 
JD 10,000 or less, which is less than the mean capital of all enterprises, JD 11 ,776. 
95.4% of all enterprises lay within the interval of capital JD 1-20,000, as do the mean 
capitals of IE and GP; these enterprises constitute 14.1% of the entire enterprise 
capital. 75.1% of the enterprises were of a capital less than JD 2,000 (close to the 
mean IE capital) of which 91.6% were of IE type, 7.6% GP, 0.6% LP and 0.2% of LL. 
104 some of the important enterprises considering-their capital and Its economic weight 
were among IE form such as Yuusif ai-M'ashar Shops, Shapred Hotel. 
105 See table 1 and 2/ Appendix?. 
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Excluding PS does not reverse the fact that capital was concentrated among 
a limited number of enterprises, since 48.0% of the total capital (excluding PS) 
belonged to 1.5% of the enterprises, whose capital was above JD 49,999. At the 
bottom of the capital scale the figures reveal a concentration of enterprises (72.9% 
of all enterprises) whose capital is below JD 2,000 and which make up 6.4% of the 
total capital (excl. PS). Furthermore, 91 .5% of the enterprises, whose capital is 
within the domain of the IE and GP average capitals, make up just a quarter of the 
total capital. 
This approach distinguishes between the enterprises of outstanding capital 
compared to their type's mean capital, and those whose capital is close to the mean 
capital of the same type. As the figures show, the majority of the enterprises of 
small capital were IE and GP, although there were some of LL and LP among 
them. 106 On the other hand, 457 enterprises of IE and GP types had a greater 
capital than the GP mean capital. The sectoral classification of these enterprises 
was 49.2% commerce, 21 .4% manufacturing, 15.7% construction, 9.0% 
transportation and 3.9% service. Less than 5.0% of these enterprises were in the 
agriculture, finance, and real estate sectors. Having enterprises in sectors such as 
manufacturing, construction, finance and transportation with a capital far larger than 
that of the GP mean is expected because of the nature of these sectors, whose 
activities dictate capital-intensive enterprises. The same can be said of the 27.5% of 
commerce enterprises above that are wholesale or import/export firms. However, 
the retail enterprises that constitute the remaining 72.5% do not have the small 
capital that characterises retail. In fact, the majority of these retail enterprises with a 
large capital were supermarkets 107, agents of foreign producers 108, car retailers, and 
car spare parts retailers. Some of these enterprises' owners109 were already owners 
or shareholders of other enterprises of different types, in different sectors. 
106 Apart from the IE, there were 885 enterprises whose capital within the average capital 
of IE. 14 enterprises were of LL 68 of LP and 802 of GP. 78 enterprises whose capital below the 
average capital of GP were LL and 219 were LP. 
107 Such as Amman New Shop that was of IE and its capital was JD 400000. 
108 For example, lsmaa'iil ai-Balbisii (IE) is the agent of Mercedes cars in the country, and 
Ami in Shakiir (IE) is an agent ·for seme ·pharmaceutical-cempanies: 
109 
such as Yuusif ai-M'asher Shop for fabrics whose owner was the main shareholder 
and founder of the Jordanian National Bank. 
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Concerning the growth rate during this period, the private sector enterprises' 
numbers grew at 42.4% per annum, while their capital growth averaged 8.8%. IE 
recorded the fastest annual capital growth rate at 64.2% followed by LP at 26.3%, Ll 
at 14.8%, GP at 8.0% and finally PS at 1.8%. IE also grew in number at the fastest 
rate, growing by 73.1% annually, followed by LP at 19.2%, GP 15.4%, ll at 6.7% 
and finally PS which showed the slowest rate at 1.2%. 
The growth rates in both capital and number were not consistent over the 
years of the period; in fact moderate rates were recorded in the years of 1967, 1968, 
1970 and 1971 compared to 1969, 1972 and 1973. The variation of the growth rates 
between these two sets of years corresponds to the political uncertainty and 
instability that the country experienced in the first set of years. The impact of 
political conditions on growth rates varied according to the enterprise types. 
Generally, one can argue that the impact was felt most among the big businesses. 
The figures show that the growth rates of PS, LL and LP both number- and capital-
wise were very low and negative in some cases. The small businesses as in GP 
and IE were less affected. 110 The growth rate of IE and GP reveals that the same 
conditions did not have the same impact on small businesses. IE in capital and 
number terms grew at remarkable rates after 1967 throughout the entire period. 
This trend could be attributed to several factors, one of which is the fact that small 
enterprises are usually self-employed businesses on which the owners and their 
dependents rely as their main source of income. Coupled with the previous factor, 
the fact that the majority of these enterprises are of high significance for the local 
communities, since they provide necessities such as food 111 , resulted in keeping 
them in operation, bearing in mind that there was no looting experienced even in the 
worst phases of the political instability. The limited capital and range of activities of 
these enterprises reduce the risk that is taken in keeping such businesses in 
operation. The unnatural population rise caused by the influx of refugees after the 
1967 war could have expanded the demand for these sorts of businesses which 
usually operate in IE form. It is also possible to attribute the increase in the small 
business numbers to the fact that some of the refugees, who became unemployed 
because of their status, became entrepreneurs in such fields. Finally, another 
important explanation for this phenomenon is that there were some existing 
110 See table 5 and 6/ App~ndix 7. 
111 Grocery shops, mini markets, bakeries. laundry shops, maintenance shops etc. 
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enterprises that had to reregister according to The Companies Law of 1964112 which 
could have inflated the rate of IE in particular, and to some extent that of GP. 
4.3 .2 THE SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 
This subsection analyzes the main trends of the sectoral structure of the 
private sector enterprises, though it does not claim that the patterns and characters 
of the economic sectors are confined to what the enterprises show. The sectoral 
distribution of the private sector enterprises shows that they were dominated by the 
commerce sector, since the latter constituted 81 .0% of all enterprises. Compared to 
commerce, the other sectors were less significant. Manufacturing, the second 
biggest sector, made up 8.0% of all enterprises, followed by services at 5.0%, 
construction at 2.3% and transportation at 2.2%. The rest of the sectors such as 
agriculture, mining, finance & insurance and real estate contained a small number of 
enterprises, since all together made up a proportion of less than 2.0% of all 
enterprises, while each one of them constituted less than 1.0%.113 
A rather different picture emerges when the sectors are compared in capital 
terms. Commerce had the biggest share of capital at 32.9% followed by 
manufacturing enterprises at 27.6%, construction at 9.4%, finance & insurance at 
9.1 %, services at 5.4%, mining at 5.1% and electricity at 2.6%.114 The sectoral 
distribution in capital terms shows that there is a gap between the share of each 
sector numberwise and its share capitalwise, as is the case in commerce, services, 
construction, finance, mining, electricity and manufacturing. The fact that some 
sectors require more capital intensive enterprises than others explains this gap at 
one level. At another, the nature of the activities of some sectors such as commerce 
112 There was some of the IE had been registered under the umbrella of the Ministry of 
Justice during the period before 1964 when the Companies Law was introduced confining the 
Ministry of National Economy to be the only entity in charge of all companies issues. That meant 
that the Ministry of Justice enterprises of which the majority of these enterprises were of small 
capital at large or IE in particular have to reregister according to the framework of the new low. 
This process was a gradual one, according to the convenience of the enterprises, that stretched 
over few years took few years and these enterprises that converted their registration were dealt 
with according to the date of the new registration without taking the trouble to keep the original 
record. (Interview with the Controller of Companies in September 2000 (Amman)). 
113 See table 10/appendix 7. 
114 See table 1 0/appendix 7. 
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and services and their early historical development compared with other sectors 
explains why they were more attractive to small entrepreneurs. In this perspective, 
capital distribution among the sectors excluding the SP capital shows a radical 
change in the relative importance of the sectors, shifting it to a state closer to that 
represented in number terms. The commerce enterprises' share increases from just 
32.9% to 55.5%, overshadowing the other sectors. Similarly, construction and 
services gain more relative weight. 115 In contrast, manufacturing loses almost half of 
its share, falling to 16.9%116 , while the shares of mining 117, electricity118 and finance119 
drop to almost nothing. 
The limited number of enterprises and the small proportion of the total capital 
that they occupy in the case of agriculture and real estate is mainly due to the 
development of these sectors in the context of the Jordanian economy in this 
period 120. The manner in which the mashaa' system was broken up by the 
implementation of the British land program in the first half of the 201h century, 
resulted in the agricultural121 activities' being conducted through cultivating private 
plots. Other activities like animal husbandry took place in the countryside on the 
margins of cultivations within the domain of the household and not in the form of 
enterprises. Hence, it is almost impossible to trace the trends and compositions of 
agriculture. At any rate one could assume that the majority of the private sector 
activities in this sector are conducted through self-employed forms of business. As 
for real estate, the small number of enterprises could be attributed to the high capital 
requirements and also to the fact that the housing sector was still carried out through 
direct relations between those who seek residence and the contractors. 
The limited number of enterprises in the sectors of electricity, mining and 
finance is mainly due to the high capital needed to establish enterprises and to the 
state economic policies in granting a monopoly to specific enterprises in some of 
115 See table 15/ Appendix 7. 
116 See table 13 I Appendix 7. 
117 See table 12/ Appendix 7. 
118 See table 14/ Appendix 7. 
119 See table 18/ Appendix 7. 
120 See table 2, and 20/ Appendix 7 .. 
121 Despite the lack of data, it is important to bear in mind that agriculture Is the leading 
sector in making up the GOP and absorbing the manpower during this period. 
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these sectors' subsectors such as phosphate mining. This interpretation explains 
the substantial capital of these sectors and their large mean capital in comparison to 
other sectors that outnumbered them.122 
Concerning the other sectors, commerce, historically, was the only sector that 
had existed in the area of Jordan alongside agriculture and nomadism since the 191h 
century and one of the few that had flourished under the British economic 'standstill' 
policy during the mandate period. This can explain the large number of commerce 
enterprises and their percentage of the entire capital , as can the fact that the 
commerce sector includes small retail businesses such as grocery shops. 
Enterprises of this kind. which are of substantial importance to their local 
communities, are of small capital investment, since 84.0% of the commerce 
enterprises were of IE type. Moreover, more than 78.5% of these enterprises have 
capital between JD 1 and 1,999123, or as the Manpower Survey indicated, they are of 
self-employed ownership 124 • 
The average capital of manufacturing enterprises was JD 43,214, however, 
as their distribution into capital intervals shows this sector contained enterprises 
which were among the smallest and largest in terms of capital. 125 In this context, it 
is important to mention that manufacturing enterprises that are analyzed here do not 
reflect all of the manufacturing activities. There are a number of small-size 
enterprises that carried out some manufacturing activities informally. A considerable 
proportion of food products, such as dairy, were manufactured in countryside 
households, for the household's private consumption and/or for selling purposes. 
These activities do not appear in the data of the manufacturing enterprises. 
The same phenomenon is to be found in transportation, since running self-
employed businesses of passenger or goods transportation does not oblige the 
owner of the vehicles to register with the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI); the 
only official requirement is to obtain a license from the Ministry of Interior Affairs. 
This meant a substantial amount of the transportation activities were not covered in 
122 See table 9, 12, 14 and 18 /Appendix 7. 
123 see table 41 Appendix 7. 
124 Department of Statistices, (1970), Survey of Manpower, p12. 
125 6.1% of the total enterprises whose capitaTJD -2000 or less are manufacturing ones, 
making 9.5% of the total capital of these enterprises within this range of capital. See table 9 and 
10/ Appendix 7. 
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the figures of the transportation enterprises, bearing in mind that during this period a 
great majority of the road transport enterprises were generally small and self-
employed. This consideration explains the high average capital (JD32,360) of 
transportation enterprises and their limited number. 126 The same thing could be 
applied to a lesser extent to contractors whose activities fall within construction 
without being obliged to register in the form of enterprise. 
The growth rate of the enterprise numbers in the different sectors did not 
indicate a decline; on the contraryt it showed a positive annual growth rate that 
ranged from 11 .6% in transportation to 48.3% in commerce. The high growth rates 
recorded for agriculture, mining, electricity and finance are less significant since 
these sectors had only a limited number of enterprises to start with. The rates in 
other sectors such as commerce, services and manufacturing were indicative of a 
large number of new enterprises. The rapid increase in manufacturing enterprises 
can be understood by considering that this sector had no historical foundation and 
the years of the 1960s and the early 1970s were its period of formation. The 
abnormal increase of population in this period can explain to some extent the rapid 
growth in the number of commerce and services enterprises, especially of the small-
size and self-employed firms. 
In terms of capital, all the sectors. apart from electricity,127 recorded a positive 
growth rate. Services recorded the fastest average annual growth rate at 34.0% 
followed by manufacturing at 16.2%, agriculture128 and construction at 18.6% and 
18.1% respectively. The high average rate of services was due to the remarkable 
rate of 1972 (142.9%) that in its turn was attributed mainly to the establishment of 
two hotels with large capital.129 The high rate in the capital of construction could be 
attributed to the boom that the construction sector experienced in consequence to 
the 1967 war to meet the demands for residential buildings for the refugees. 130 
126 See table 8 and 17/ Appendix 7 
127 The overall decline was due to the decline in 1973, when electricity enterprise with a 
major capital shut down. 
128 The high annual growth rate in agriculture is due mainly to the fact that capital 
invested in the form of enterprises prior to this period was limited to the extent that any new 
enterprise resulted in rocketing the growth rate. Also it was due to the establishment of the 
Jordanian Fish Com. In 1971 as private-state venture. 
129 The two hotels are Sh~prad and Grande place. 
130 Central Bank of Jordan (1967), The Annual Report, p13. 
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Between 31/3/1971 and 31/12/1973, 20 new enterprises of capital above JD 
100,000 were established, an unprecedented scale. Moreover, in 1973 the Housing 
Bank, a specialized bank in providing mortgage loans, was established. 
Before moving towards the sub-sectors composition, it is important to 
mention that the sectoral structure of the enterprises underwent some important 
changes during this period. At one level, and despite the overall dominance of 
commerce enterprises numberwise, this period experienced a rapid increase in the 
establishment of new enterprises in this sector to the extent that commerce 
constituted 80.0% of all enterprises. On the other hand, the proportion occupied by 
commerce capital declined to around 25% of total capital resulting in an increase of 
the relative importance of manufacturing, finance, mining and construction. These 
changes were due to the fact that the new commerce enterprises established during 
this period were of less capital than of the commerce enterprises that shut down.131 
In contrast, the capital of the new enterprises that were founded in other sectors 
exceeded the capital of the enterprises that ceased to exist. 
4.3.2.1The sub-sector 
The focus of this subsection is not to give a detailed account of the sub-
sector composition in each of the economic sectors 132 , but rather a brief review that 
shows the center of gravity in each economic sector and the main trends that the 
composition reveals. It was asserted in the previous subsection that economic 
sectors can be classified into two types according to the number of enterprises that 
they contain. This distinction is certainly extended to the sub-sector composition; for 
example. the number of enterprises in some sub-sectors of agriculture, finance, 
mining, electricity and real estate was small. 
Despite the fact that each of the economic sectors has its own distinct 
features and characteristics, the data reveals that they shared some trends to 
various degrees. One of these is the fact that some specific sub-sectors in a given 
131 It was only in 1971 when the share went below 2.0% recording 1.69%. This could be 
attributed to the closures of the Jordanian-Syrian borders and the Indian boycott of the Jordanian 
pho-sphate. (See Central Bank of- Jordan (1971 ), the Annoal· Report, p 6.) Also table 21 
/Appendix 6. 
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economic sector constitute the majority if not the great majority of capital in that 
sector, despite the fact that these same sub-sectors have the minority of that sector 
enterprises. This trend is felt more in some sectors than others; for instance, the 
phosphate sub-sector, whose percentage of all mining enterprises was 15.4%, 
constituted 84.7% of the mining capital, leaving 0.5% to stone crushing whose 
proportion numberwise was 69.2%.133 The electricity production and distribution 
sub-sector13<1 made up 99.7% of electricity capital leaving just 0.5% for the methylene 
gas sub-sector that contained the great majority of electricity enterprises.135 Banks 
and insurance sub-sectors 136 made Lip 98.5% of capital and 21 .8% of number versus 
1.5% and 78.1 in the case of financial institutions. 137 
The same trend is present to a lesser extent in construction, manufacturing, 
services and commerce. For instance, the partial construction percentage of 
construction's capital was 22.9%; despite the fact that its proportion in number stood 
at 42.3%, while non-building general construction constitutes 70.1% of the capital. 138 
The manufacturing sub-sector structure during this period reveals that the food139 & 
beverage sub-sector was the most numerous, constituting 26.4% of all 
manufacturing enterprises, followed by textiles at 14.0%, construction materials at 
13.4%, metal products (except machinery) at 12.6%, clothing and footwear at 6.7% 
and wood and cork at 6.5%. 140 The above sub-sectors that made up the great 
majority of the total manufacturing capital at around 70%, are sub-sectors that could 
132 For such a propose, see tables in Appendix 6. 
133 See table 27/ Appendix 8. 
1
3<1 There were two enterprises in this sub-sector are; Jordanian Electricity Company 
(JEC), a PS private enterprise with a substantial governmental contribution and lrbid District 
Electricity Company. The latter is a PS private enterprise that is owned by some of the local 
authorities in lrbid district and with a substantial contribution of JEC and the government. 
135 See table 33/ Appendix 8. 
136 All the banks and insurance companies were established prior to this period with the 
exception of ai-Moutahda Utaamiin (the United for Insurance) that was established in 1/1/1972 
and the Housing Bank that was founded in 1973 as an investment bank specialized in housing 
activities. 
137 See table 42, 43/ Appendix 8. The small proportion of financial institutions to finance 
capital does not undermine the fact that the capital of this sub-sector in absolute terms was 
substantial. This can be attributed to the fact that the main activity of the financial institutions is 
currency exchange, availability of capital and liquidity are vital requirements to establish and run 
an enterprise in such a sub-sector. 
138 See table 51 and 52/ Appendix 8. 
139 4.0% of the food manufacturing enterprises are involved in beverages activities. 
140 See table 23 and 24/ Appendix 8. 
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include a wide range of small-size enterprises'"'. The structure of the manufacturing 
sub-sectors according to their capital proportion shows that the petroleum and coaJ 
products142 made up the biggest part of the manufacturing capital at 19.2%, followed 
by food & beverages manufacturing at 17.0%, construction materials'' 3 at 14.2%, 
chemicals at 8.9%, the metal products at 8.5% and textiles at 7.2%. As in the case 
of the above-mentioned sub-sectors, petroleum and coal, paper and paper products, 
tobacco, chemicals and plastic constituted respectively 19.2%, 4.0%, 2.6%, 8.9% 
and 5.0% of the capital (together 40.0%), while the proportion of the number of 
enterprises that they constituted was respectively 0.27%, 0.7%, 0.27%, 3.4% and 
2.9% (together 7.5%). On the other hand, some sub-sectors such as wood & cork 
and clothing & footwear were widely spread: their proportions of the total 
manufacturing enterprises number were 6.5% and 6.7%. However their proportions 
capitalwise were respectively 1.8% and 1.7%. 
As far as the services sub-sectors are concerned, cafes & restaurants 
constituted 22.7% of services enterprises, followed by maintenance services''" at 
21 .8%, businesses services at 16.6% and hotels at 10.9%. Capitalwise, they 
constituted respectively, 26.4%, 15.6%, 35.8% and 13.8%145• Some services sub-
sectors constituted a large proportion of the sector numberwise and a small 
proportion capitalwise. For example, despite domestic and personal services146 
occupying an 11.2% proportion of the services sector. its proportion of the services 
capital was only 0. 7%.147 
141 For example, enterprises that produce Arabian sweets and candies, or small-size 
coffee mills, or milk dairy products enterprises that produce directly for the daily needs of the 
consumers. 
142 The outstanding capital of this sub-sector is mainly attributed to the SP Jordanian 
Petroleum Refinery Co. whose capital made up 98.3% of the capital of this sub-sector. A 
substantial stake in this company that was the only one of its nature is held by the state. 
143 Despite the fact that this sub-sector was one of the leading ones in numbers, the only 
cement producer was SP Jordanian Cement Factories Co. that constituted 89.7% of the capital of 
this sub-sector and the state was one of its main shareholders. 
144 Maintenance enterprises cover cars, garages, shops for fixing TVs. radios building 
and accessories etc. (Ministry of Trade the Registry of Companies Records 1967-1973). 
145 See table 59 and 56/ Appendix 8. 
146 The main enterprises are barber shops, taundrettes. photo development services etc. 
One enterprise specialised in public and building cleaning was Saalamah & Khwourii 
established in 1969. 
147 See table 59 and 56/ Appendix 8. 
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The commerce sub-sector's composition reveals that retail trade was the 
dominant activity constituting 92.7% and 69.8% respectively of commerce 
enterprises and capital. Despite the small proportion occupied by the wholesale 
trade numberwise (4.9%), its proportion capitalwise was 17.9%. Such figures can 
be understood by bearing in mind that retail trade is the most accessible and low 
cost business. 
Apart from the fact that this trend gives an overall character of the sub-
sectors structure in each economic sector, it is also important to show that some 
specific sub-sectors are more open than others to private sector participants whether 
they are newcomers or they have been already in the field. In other words, the 
reality reflected in the figures shows that penetrating some sub-sectors or 
maintaining business in them is harder than other sub-sectors, since the 
requirements in these sub-sector are conditioned by the overall character of the 
enterprises in this given sub-sector. The competitive advantage, in this case is not 
only conditioned by the number of enterprises, but the overall character of the 
majority of the enterprises. Hence, one can argue that the following four factors are 
adequate to explain the existence of such a trend in some certain sub-sectors. 
First of all, enterprises in any given sub-sector differ according to their size 
that in its turn is determined by several elements such as productive capacity, lines 
of production, number of stages of production, ... etc. In this context presence of 
large-size enterprises in a given sub-sector, in the small market of Jordan, can result 
in a limited number of enterprises in that sub-sector and/or concentration of capital in 
that sub-sector when it is compared to another whose enterprises are of small 
size.148 For example, 24.5% of chemical enterprises, 66.0% of the tobacco 
enterprises and 37.5% of paper and paper products had a capital of J0100,000 or 
more; on the other hand just 7.3% of food manufacturing, 4.5% of textile, 4.5% of 
road transport and 0.4% of the retail trade had such a capital. 
The second factor is that investments in some sub-sectors require large-scale 
enterprises149• According to the first factor. the size of the enterprise is conditioned 
148 For example, 24.5% of chemical enterprises, 66.0% of the tobacco enterprises, 37.5% 
of paper and paper proudest had capital of JD100000 or more, while the percentage was 7.3% of 
food manufacturing, 4 .5% of textile, 4.5%-of-road .transpor:t-and-0.4% of the retail trade. 
149 For example petroleum production, pharmaceuticals compared to food, wood, or 
paper manufacturing air transport, sea transports . 
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by subjective factors related to the entrepreneurs; here, the nature of the sub-
sectors dictate objectively the size of enterprises and their capital. This is the case 
in sub-sectors such as electricity production, phosphate, metal mining, 
pharmaceutical, banking, insurance, petroleum production and to some extent the 
wholesale trade and financial institutions where investments require large capital for 
capital goods or liquidity for the functioning of firms. 
Third, the state economic policy in either granting some enterprises a 
complete or partial monopoly over production in a certain sub-sector or encouraging 
sub-sectors or certain enterprises within a specific sub-sector becomes a decisive 
factor in determining the number and capital concentration of these sub-sectors 
compared to the others. The lack of private investment in air transport, for example, 
was due to the state monopoly of this sub-sector through Alia Co., the national 
carrier'50• Apart from the capital requirements, the fact that phosphate production 
was under a monopoly explains why this sub-sector contained only one enterprise, 
the Jordanian Phosphate Mines (JPM)151• The same situation exists for the 
Jordanian Refinery Co. (JRC). The direct governmental investment in some private 
sector enterprises resulted in them having a large capital when compared to other 
enterprises of the same or similar nature. The government directly and indirectly 
held equities in some enterprises, for example, 34.9% of the Jordanian Spa AI-
Hamah and 29.4% of the Jordanian company for press and publishing. Additionally 
the government had 65%152 of the shares in the Electronic Accountancy Co. and 
86.1% of The Jordanian Hotels and Tourism shares.'53 
Fourth, for reasons related to the economic development during this period or 
to the overall objective conditions of Jordan, some sub-sectors were not exploited or 
were at an early stage of private sector investment. Such factors also determined 
150 In 1973, however, there was an attempt to penetrate air transport activities by the 
private sector by establishing the Air Transport Company. Reviewing the names of the founders 
and their career by then indicates that the establishment of this company was made with the 
encouragement of the government, which could have been the decisive factor in dissolving the 
enterprise in 1975. The information about this company was taken from its files in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. 
151 A shareholding enterprise that was a joint venture between the private and public 
sectors was established In 1953 and had since a monopoly over the phosphate production and 
marketing. 
152 The government directly owned 35% of. the- shar:e- of this company., whilst 30% 
belonged to Alia the Jordanian airline. This enterprise was. however, dissolved in 1974. 
153 Over this period the five star hotels of Jordan was the only project for this company. 
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the number of enterprises and the capital invested in such sub-sectors. For 
example, the insignificant investment in sea transport was due to the small size and 
underdeveloped state of Aqaba, the only Jordanian access to the sea, as well as to 
the heavy dependency of Jordan's exports and imports on the Syrian and Lebanese 
ports. The same could be applied to the pharmaceutical, plastic, and publishing 
sub-sectors. Apart from the above-mentioned sub-sectors, others developed during 
this period, such as art, music and broadcasting, whose activities were triggered by 
the establishment of a National Television network in 1968 and the potential of 
marketing to some of the Gulf countries' television networks.' 54 
The above factors, which were fundamental in influencing the number and 
capital of some sub-sectors and the overall structure of the economic sectors, can 
also explain the patterns that some sub-sectors' enterprises took in reference to their 
types. Concerning the enterprise types in sub-sectors, it is vital to bear in mind the 
assertion made in the previous subsection, i.e. the inclination among the private 
sector participants to establish IE or GP forms of enterprises. An obvious trend, 
however, can be put forward relating the types of enterprises in a specific sub-sector 
and the number of enterprises and size of capital in that sub-sector. The sub-
sectors that were of few enterprises and had a substantial proportion of capital were 
usually dominated by enterprises of PS or/and LL types, as is the case in banks 155, 
insurance156, phosphate,157 electricity production,158 petroleum'59, tobacco160, hotels161 
and health 182• 
154 Apart from one all of these sub sector enterprises were established after 1969. 
155 All of the banks enterprises were either SP {99.8% of banks capital, 71 .4% of 
numbers) or LL. 
156 57.1% of insurance enterprises were SP making 99.1% of the capital. The only 
enterprise in these sub-sectors which is not a PS enterprise is the British Agency for insurance 
that was established in 1965 as an LL enterprise before it shut down ten yeas later. 
157 All of the phosphate enterprises were of PS type. 
158 All of the electricity enterprises were of PS type. 
159 33.3% and 33.3% of petroleum enterprises were of SP and LL make respectively 
91 .7% and 7.1% capital wise. See table 18 and 19/ Appendix 8. 
180 66.7 of tobacco enterprises were SP makes 99.8% capital wise. See table 18 and 19/ 
Appendix 8. 
16 1 1.3% and 5.2% of hotels enterprises were of PS and LL making up respectively 
58.6% and 17 .. 7% capital wise_.SeeJable.SJ_and 58/ Appendix.8. 
162 50.0% of health enterprises were of LL making up 93.9% capital wise. See table 57 
and 58/ Appendix 8. 
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In contrast, GP and IE types were dominant in sub-sectors such as stone 
crushing (88.9% and 57.4% respectively of number and capital) 163, financial 
institutions (88.0% and 77.5%)164, liquid gas (100%}165, food manufacturing (90% and 
20.5%), leather products (94.4% and 18.1%), textiles (93.0% and 60.0%), wood & 
cork (90.0% and 65.2%), furniture and fixtures (100%), jewelry (100%)166, 
maintenances services (98.0% and 19.5%}, domestic & personal services (98.3% 
and 99.5%), restaurants & cafes (95.6% and 13.8%)167 and road transport 
enterprises (77% and 61 .5%) 168 • In commerce, more than 85.0% of the enterprises 
in each of the sub-sectors were IE and GP.169 Certainly the capital requirements to 
establish or to run such businesses are the decisive factor in such a phenomenon. 170 
4.3 .3 THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
The geographical distribution of enterprises highlights that the majority of 
enterprises (90.9%) were concentrated in Amman, possessing around 89.7% of the 
capital. In terms of number, lrbid comes second at a proportion of 6.0%, followed by 
Zerqa and Balqa at 1.4% for each.171 The rest of the enterprises were scattered 
among the other governorates with a fraction of 1.0% each. The enterprise capital 
distribution demonstrates that the Balqa Governorate had the second biggest 
proportion after Amman at 4.3% followed by Zerqa and lrbid at 2.8 each . Again, the 
rest of the Governorates possessed less than 1% for each. It is interesting to note 
that lrbid, which had the second biggest share according to the enterprises, came in 
163 See table 25 and 26/ Appendix 8. 
164 See table 41 and 42/ Appendix 8. 
165 See table 33 and 34/ Appendix 8. 
166 See table 17 and 18/ Appendix 8. 
167 See table 57 and 58/ Appendix 8. 
168 See table 65 and 66/ Appendix 8. It should be mentioned that a substantial amount of 
this sub sector's activities was passenger transport connecting the population of the countryside 
with its urban centers and the urban centers to each other. Consequently, it was common that 
small enterprises were established at the level of the towns or villages for such a purpose. 
169 The IE and GP proportion of the total capital in each sub-sector was 40.5% in 
wholesale trade, 84.0% retail trade, 50.9% in imports and exports and 81 .0% service for trade. 
See table 9 and 10/ Appendix 8. 
170 See table 25, 26, 33, 34, 41 and 42/ Appendix 8. 
171 See table 10, appendix 7 
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the fourth position capital wise. This is ascribed mainly to the fact that Zerqa and 
Balqa continued PS enterprises, whose capital boosted their relative importance 
capital wise, such as the Petroleum refinery in Zarqa and Cement Factory Co. and 
the Arab Pharmaceutical Co. in Balqa. Correlation could be traced between the 
enterprise type and how widespread these enterprises are. The most spread 
enterprises are those IE or GP types, while PS or LL types, were high concentrated 
in Amman. This concludes that the decisive factors in the geographical spread of 
enterprises are the size of enterprises and their activities.172 
The concentration of the enterprises in Amman was a predictable result of the 
historical development of the city that was determined by the political decision 
choosing it as capital (1921 ). Being the capital, Amman urbanized at a quick pace 
and was privileged by having the priority of the infrastructure and the services that 
investments usually require. Apart from the competitive advantage of the 
infrastructure and services, it benefited from its geographical setting in the northern 
part of Jordan, being relatively close to the Syrian borders, which was the main 
access to the ports on which the Jordanian exports and imports depended during 
this period and before. The majority of the refugees especially the 1948 ones settled 
in Amman, becoming proletarianized by virtue of uprooting them from their context, 
supplied the private sector with the needed labour force that was to a large extent 
more skillful than that of the indigenous. Some of the refuges, moreover, became 
entrepreneurs establishing their own business to the domain of their resident. 
The distribution of the enterprises according to provinces highlights that the 
Central province 173 that contained three major cities Amman, Zarqa and Balqa 
possessed 93.7% of the enterprises and 96.8% of the total capital, followed by the 
Northern Province at 6.0% and 5.6% and finally the southern Province at 0.3% and 
3.1%. 
The geographical distribution of the sub-sectors was influenced by the nature 
of the sub-sector and number of enterprises in each sub-sector. Enterprises of food 
and beverages, printing, packaging, glass and glass products, leather products and 
rubber are widely spread among the different governorates. The rest of the sub-
172 This economic sectoral geographical distribution is to be considered in the next 
subsection. 
173 The province classification is socio-political one rather than geographical one. See 
chapter 3. 
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sectors' enterprises were concentrated mainly in Amman.174 The limited number of 
enterprises in these sub-sectors and the better infrastructure of Amman were the 
decisive factors in their concentration in the capital city. 
A detailed account of the enterprises' geographical distribution is beyond the 
scope of this subsection. 175 The date, however, shows that in addition to the 
concentration of manufacturing enterprises in Amman, I rbid 176 and Zerqa 177 started to 
be favorable locations in which to locate manufacturing enterprises.178 The 
preference of manufacturing activities for Zerga proceeded during the second half of 
the 1970s and 1980s benefiting from the cheap prices of land. 
In a similar fashion these sub-sectors differ from each other in their 
geographical base. The sub-sectors with few enterprises (Banks, insurance, ... e1c.) 
are concentrated in one governate or two and usually in Amman, while the other 
mIn fact enterprises producing petroleum and coal products, non-electronic, other metal 
manufacturing and tobacco were exclusively based in Amman. Tobacco manufacturing 
comprised 3 enterprises of which two are large-scale ones and of PS type, while the third is of 
medium size and is not involved in producing the cigarettes but producing tobacco. The 
characteristics of the tobacco sub-sector is applied to a large extent to the other sub-sectors that 
mentioned above. The first enterprise is the Jordanian Cigarettes Company, which has stayed as the 
only cigarette producer up to the early 1990s. The second biggest enterprise was the National 
Company of Tobacco and Cigarettes whose date of establishment goes back to the 1950s. However, 
it had undergone different sorts of difficulties: internal ones rooted ln the shareholders and external 
ones that related to the competition from the Jordanian Cigarettes Company leading It to convert from 
being PS to ll in 1975 before it was liquidized. 
175 It is important to mention that some governorates had relatiVely a decent proportion of 
specific sub-sectors. For instance, Zerqa district included 22.2% of beverages, 16.7% of iron 
manufacturing, 14.3% of transportation equipments, 12.5% of paper and paper products and 
5.6% of the leather products. The distribution of the sub-sectors capital wise is largely Influenced 
by the location of the PS enterprises, since 2/3 of the manufacturing capital is presented by their 
capital. Balqa, hence, contained 76.9% of the construction materials. Apart from the small and 
medium size enterprises that produce some construction materials, mainly bricks, the SP Jordan 
Cement Factory's capital boosted the Balqa proportion in the total capital of the this sub-sector. 
176 lrbid in the north of the country contained 20.5% of furniture and fixture enterprises, 
16.7% of packaging, 14.3% of glass and glass products 12.5% of electronic machinery, 10.8% of 
plastic and rubber, 9.9% of metal products (except machinery), 7.3% of the construction 
materials. At the capital level, it contained 30.9% of electronic machinery, 28.8% of glass and 
glass products, 13.8% of furniture and fixture 12.2% of packing and 6.7% of food manufacturing. 
177 Despite the fact that the actual petroleum refinery, which is the main component of the 
petroleum sub-sector, is based in Zarqa, it is considered according to the official figures 
considered to be in Amman, given that its headquarters have been in Amman ever since its 
establishment. This research follows the Ministry of Trade and Industry's geographical 
distribution. In the case of Zerqa, it held 68.4% of the beverages capital, 52.1% of paper and 
paper products, 43.3% of the chemical products and 17.0% of the textiles. 
-- -He The main enterprise with large capital in this suo-sector and located in at-Batqa is the 
Arab Pharmaceutical Factory that was established in 1964 with capital JD 250000, the first one of 
its kind, and its capital during this period. 
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sub-sectors are more spread among the cities and regions of the country. 179 In case 
of the Banks. branching acted as a substitute for concentration of the firms in 
Amman. 
179 See tables 29, 30, 39, 40, 47 and 48/ Appendix 8. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE BOURGEOISIE (1967-1973) 
This chapter aims to give an analytical account of the bourgeoisie over the 
first period of this study (1967 -1973). The trends and patterns of the bourgeoisie are 
to be analyzed by looking first at their enterprises and secondly at the members 
themselves. The bourgeoisie is going to be analyzed according to the economic 
power of its members. The third section deals with the fractions within the 
bourgeoisie, while the fourth section is devoted to analyzing the bourgeoisie 
members (BMs) according to the vertical variables. Before proceeding in such an 
analysis, it is important to show how the mechanism aims to locate the BM during 
the 1967-1973 period within the domain of the private sector. 
In order to put the mechanism that was elaborated in Chapter 3 in operation, 
this study looks at all of the enterprises that were established over this period (June 
1967 to 31st December 1973), in addition to the enterprises that had been 
established prior to June 1967 and were still operating during this period .1 These 
enterprises and their equity holders make up the domains of the private sector 
enterprises and private sector participants, from which the BM are to be extracted. 
According to this mechanism, the first stage is to separate the sector 
participant (SP) enterprises from the others. As was mentioned in the methodology, 
the BMs which are in each of the SP enterprises are the largest shareholders, 
possessing the first 60.0% of the shares. The BM in the SP were extracted 
according to this criterion. 
Concerning the extraction of the BM in the rest of the enterprise types, the 
first step was to define the amount of capital (x) that the methodology suggested to 
1 In this context, all enterprises that were established before this period and ceased to exist 
before June 1967 are not part of this period's private sector and consequently would not be part of the 
bourgeoisie. The enterprises that were established before or during this period and ceased to exist 
during the period were still considered as part of the private sector and of the bourgeoisie if they were 
qualifiea. Such a proposition is based on fhe fact that these enterprises and their owners were active 
in the period, and their closure is of significance for the analysis of the private sector and of the 
bourgeoisie. 
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be the figure that can distinguish between enterprises: owners who possess x or 
more are automatically considered as members of the bourgeoisie. Based on the 
average capital of the enterprise types,2 this study assumes that the figure should be 
JD 20,000, that is around the average capital of the GP enterprises (JD 20,420.8). 
Therefore, the owners of enterprises whose capital was JD 20,000 were 
automatically qualified to be part of the BM. The rationale behind choosing a figure 
close to the mean capital of GP rather than to that of other enterprise types was the 
inadequacy of the latter to constitute a representative figure. Using the mean capital 
of IE (JD 1 ,852.9), which is small compared to the mean of other types, would have 
resulted in a large number of private sector participants being considered as BM. An 
examination of these members revealed that a substantial number could be 
inaccurately considered as bourgeoisie. Opposite results were obtained when the 
chosen figure was close to the mean capital of LP or LL (JD 41,017.36 and 
160,550.10 respectively). The fact that the mean capitals of the latter types were 
large in comparative terms, led one to miss out some enterprises whose owners 
were clearly part of the bourgeoisie. In this context, JD 20,000 could be an 
appropriate figure to function as a dividing line, since it did not exclude, nor did it 
include, too many enterprises in its qualification of the bourgeoisie.3 Hence, the 
2 Using the mean capital of the enterprise types was not the only way that could have led to distinguish 
between two sets of enterprises and accomplish this stage of extracting the BM. For instance, this 
study examined the possibility of using the mean capital of all enterprises, that is JD 11,776. The 
outcome of this attempt was the inclus1on of a large number of enterprises, and therefore a large 
number of owners were automatically considered as BM. Further examination, however, led the study 
to conclude that a substantial number of these members were inaccurately included in the 
bourgeoisie. Another approach that was examined is the use of the mean capital of the enterprises in 
each economic sector, in the sense that the owners of an enterprise within a certain economic sector 
would be considered to be BM if the capital of their enterprise was above the mean capital of the 
enterprises in that economic sector. V\lhen this approach was put in function, the first problem that 
occurred was that the number of the enterprises, and therefore of their owners, was large, since the 
mean capital of commerce enterprises was JD 5550.906, and the great majority of the enterprises 
were in the commerce sector (see the section on the state of the private sector in chapter 4). This 
meant that some of the private sector participants were inaccurately considered as BM. The other 
problem of this approach was that it missed out some BM in specific economic sectors whose mean 
capital was large. For instance, the mean capital of finance and insurance enterprises stood at JD 
245,301 .3; this large mean capital was due in particular to the contribution of the banks, so that using 
it to distinguish between two sets of enterprises in this sector would have missed on important 
elements of the bourgeoisie who could be found in insurance and currency exchange. The same 
argument can be applied, though to a lesser extent, in manufacturing and transportation and mining. 
3 This study is far from claiming that the figure 20,000 is not going to miss out any of the 
bourgeois members or that it is not going to qualify some owners that are not bourgeois. However, the 
accuracy achieved by using this figure is far higher than that achieved by using others. Moreover, the 
possibility of missing out some elements of the bourgeoisie is reduced to a minimum by using other 
ways of extracting bourgeois members in the later stages of the mechanism, Based on the above, 
aAd for the purpose of di&tinguishing,tl:le-businesses that do not fit-within-the general characteristics of 
their types, it is useful to look at the enterprises in terms of capital intervals. (See table 1 and 2/ 
Appendix 5) The data show that the enterprises with a capital of JD 50,000 or more make up 79.0% 
of the total capital, representing just 2.1% of all enterprises. In contrast. the majority of enterprises 
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owners of any enterprise whose capital was JD 20,000 or more were considered as 
part of the bourgeoisie. 
Along the line of this mechanism, the private sector participants who had 
equities in more than one enterprise or possessed 0.1% or more of the total equities 
of the private sector and had not qualified to be BMs so far, are considered to be 
part of the bourgeoisie. 
The domain of the bourgeoisie that results from using the mechanism that 
was put forward in chapter 3 and its general application in this period consists of 
10,110 members, whose total equities are JD 111 ,141 ,584. The bourgeoisie's total 
equities make up around 60.0-65.0% of the total equities of the private sector in this 
period. In other words, around 10 thousand members, who are considered to be 
bourgeois, are in control of just below two thirds of the private sector capital invested 
in forms of enterprises. The capital, as was emphasized in chapter 3, is used as a 
parameter to reflect the control of the means of production, and consequently the 
appropriations of the surplus value in Jordan in this period. In this context, the 
bourgeois members are in control of the majority of the means of production. This 
control is greater than the percentage of the bourgeoisie's equities to the private 
sector's equities. In actual fact, as was pointed out in the previous section, the 
bourgeoisie's equities are invested in forms of enterprises that were put under the 
category of bourgeoisie enterprises, which means that the economic power of the 
bourgeoisie is not confined to what they themselves owned, but extended to the 
enterprises that contained their equities. This proposition is a valid one, bearing in 
mind that the bourgeoisie's equities made up 70.0% of the BE equities. 
5.1 BOURGEOISIE ENTERPRISES AND BOURGEOISIE 
MEMBERS: GENERAL TRENDS 
This section covers the main trends of the BE and BM. The concept of BE, 
as was indicated in chapter 3, refers to all enterprises in which the investments of 
(92.9%) have JD 10,000 or less, which is less than the mean capital of all enterprises, JD 11 ,776. 
~.4% Qf ~II enterprises lies within the interval of cap!taJ J_D 1.:2.Q •. OQO, as do the mean capitals of lE 
and GP; these enterprises constitute 14.1% of the entire enterprise capital. 75. 1% of the enterprises 
l'lave a capital of less than JD 2,000 (which is close to the mean IE capital); of these, 91 .6% are of IE, 
7.6% of GP, 0.6% of LP and 0.2% of LL type. 
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the bourgeoisie members are found.4 Hence, the data of these enterprises do no1 
only correspond to the data of the bourgeoisie members, but also to their partners 
who were not qualified as bourgeois. Indications about the number of these 
enterprises, their capital , types and economic sectors can lead to some conclusions 
about the economic bases of the bourgeois investments and about the general 
patterns of these investments, in spite of the fact that not every BE is necessarily 
fully owned by bourgeoisie members. This section was divided into three 
subsections, which cover types of enterprise, economic sectors and forms of 
ownership respectively. In order not to base conclusions entirely on the data of the 
BE, each subsection is designed to give an analysis of such data followed by one of 
the data of the BMs relative to each subsection. The importance of deducing trends 
and conclusions based on data of the BMs does not only come from the fact that the 
latter are the main concern of this study, but also from its empowering or contrasting 
the conclusions that resulted from analyzing the data of the BE. In each subsection, 
reference to the enterprise types, economic sectors or forms of ownership is 
followed by the analysis of the BMs. Hence, each of the subsections looks at the 
trends of the BE followed by what the BMs data indicates. 
5 .1 .1 BE AND BM ACCORDING TO THE ENTERPRISE TYPES 
The bourgeoisie enterprises constituted 92.0% of the entire capital of the 
private sector enterprises, while in terms of numbers they made up just 26.5% of the 
total.5 In other words, around a quarter of the private sector enterprises, which was 
partly or fully owned by the bourgeoisie, constituted the great majority of the entire 
private sector capital in terms of enterprises. At the level of the enterprise types, the 
data show that all of the PS were part of the BE, while 89.3% of the LL, 79.3% of the 
LP, 64.3% of the GP and just 15.8% of the IE were included.6 
" See the subsection on the BE in Chapter 3. 
5 See table (1), appendix 7. 
6 It is vital, however, to point out that the BE ratio to the total enterprises in each type cannot 
be taken as an accurate indicator of the bourgeoisie's preference towards one type rather than 
another. This ratio is largely determined by the popularity of certain types among the private sector 
participants, rather than among the BM. For example, the BE of IE type made up a small proportion of 
the ~ntlre IE, which does not mean.that th~ bourgeoisie shun_away froJ!l this type; on the contrary. th~ 
IE was still a popular form of enterprise among the bourgeoisie during this period. The low 
percentage, however, is due to the popularity of this type among the private sector participants at 
large. 
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In capital terms, as it could be expected. the percentage of the bourgeoisie 
enterprises capital to the total capital in each enterprise type was as large as 
100.0% of PS, 98.9% of LL, 98.7% of LP, 94.7% of GP and 66.0% of IE.7 In this 
sense. regardless the BE ratio to the number of private sector enterprises in a given 
type, they still constituted the majority - if not the great majority - of the capital of the 
private sector in that type, as the figures indicate.8 The proportion of the BMs 
equities to the total capital of the enterprises in each type confirms to some extent 
the above results. The proportion of the BMs equities was more than 90.0% of the 
capital of the enterprises in each of the GP, LL and LP and almost two thirds of the 
capital of the IE. The only exception were the PS, where the BMs' equities were as 
low as 20.0%. The fact that the small shareholders could have between them a 
substantial proportion of PS total capital is one factor explaining the low proportion of 
the BMs' equities. On the other hand, a respectable proportion of equities within the 
PS was in some cases owned by equity holders who cannot be considered BMs, 
such as the Jordanian state or other governments and governmental institutions. 
The distribution of the BE capital and of the BMs' equities can be considered 
as an appropriate indicator of the possession of means of production and of the 
distribution of surplus value. In light of the available data, it shows that the BE were 
generally in a position of control over the main stake of the means of production, and 
therefore their owners appropriated the majority of the surplus value. Such an 
assertion is highly faithful to the theoretical framework of this study. 
Figure 5 l: Ratio of theBEs' Number and Capital to the Total Enterprise Number & Capital 
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8 For example, the 84.2% and 35.7% respectively of the IE and GP total number - which are 
not part of the BE - correspond to only 34.0% and 5.3% respectively of the total capital of these two 
types. 
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The structure of the BE enterprises according to their types shows that the IE 
type made up the majority of the BE at 47.3%, followed by the GP type at 40.6%. 
LP, LL and PS enterprises made up 6.2%, 4.5% and 1.5% of BE respectively.9 
However, the distribution of the BE in capital terms reveals a rather different picture; 
the BE of PS type constituted the largest share at 35.6%, followed by the GP at 
29.0%, LL at 19.2%, IE at 8.7% and LP at 7.6%. 
The structure of the BE in regard to the enterprise types does not appear to 
follow a specific pattern. For example, the fact that the majority of the BE were of 
GP and IE types, and that the majority of the BE capital was in PS enterprises, does 
not in the least indicate that the bourgeois members excluded any of the enterprise 
types to carry out their activities. It is difficult, however, to advance a set of factors 
or rules that can accurately explain the popularity of one type rather than another 
among the bourgeoisie, especially since the choice of a certain type could be simply 
driven by subjective reasons. 
Looking at the distribution of the bourgeoisie members and equities among 
the different types of enterprises does not suggest any particular pattern. The data 
reveals that 39.3% of the bourgeoisie's equities was in GP enterprises. The second 
largest share of the bourgeoisie's equities was in LL enterprises, at 26.9%, followed 
by 12.3% in IE, 11 .1% in PS and 10.5% in LP .10 In number terms, GP had again the 
largest percentage of the bourgeois number at 40.5%, followed by PS at 19.5%, IE 
at 16.9%, LL at 12.4% and LP at 19.8%.11 Despite the fact that these figures 
suggest that the bourgeoisie's capital and number were more concentrated in GP 
enterprises - which shows that this type was more popular among the bourgeoisie -
the other types of enterprises were still significant for the bourgeois members. 
Some general patterns, however, can be deduced from reviewing the BE 
types. The fact that the enterprises differ according to their fields and main activities 
in their requirements for capital intensive can explain the variation in their types. It is 
rare to find enterprises whose activities require capital intensive and are of IE or 
9 See table (1}, Appendix 7. 
10 The discrepancy between the BMs' equities in a certain type and the capital of the BE in the 
same tY.Re is due to .t~~ fact that the capital of the BE refers to equities belonging both to the BMs and 
to their non-bourgeois partners, such as the state or the small' eqoity fiOiaers. - - - - - ----= 
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even of GP type. Usually, such enterprises were of LL or LP, if not of PS type. The 
opposite trend is also found to a large extent. 
The popularity of the IE among the BM can be attributed to historical reasons 
related to the development of capitalism, the private sector and the bourgeois class. 
The bourgeoisie stemmed from the traditional merchants, who practiced all sorts of 
trade in the late 191h and early 201h century. The majority of these merchants' 
businesses were owned and run individually or by families. Hence, when some of 
the merchants moved into the bourgeoisie in the period of the socio-economic 
transformation, so that their ownership of businesses expanded at the quantitative 
and qualitative levels, many of them kept the enterprises intact from which their 
activities had started. Despite the underlying reasons, these enterprises acted as 
headquarters for the management of the other businesses, apart from the activities 
that were carried out by the enterprises themselves. 12 
At another level, a correlation can be deduced between the type of a given 
BE and the kinship ties that bound its partners. There seemed to be a tendency 
among the partners of a nuclear family to choose the GP form to run their business. 
This tendency can also be seen, to some degree, when extended family ties exist 
among the partners. On the other hand, LL or LP types were favored when there 
were no kinship ties among some or all partners. Such a proposition will be further 
pursued when the bourgeoisie members are analyzed. 
Such a trend should be expected not just because of the nature of the 
activities of these enterprises, but also because the Company Laws13 imposed no 
restrictions on the capital of the IE, in contrast with the other types of enterprises, 
which made such a type desirable among the small businesses, in Jordanian terms. 
11 Within each enterprise type, the BMs owned the majority of equities in relation to the total 
capital. 
12 For instance, Yuusif ai-M'ashir, who started his business as the owner of a shop trading in 
clothes and fabrics, kept his shop in function despite the fact that his activities extended to cover 
imports and exports, manufacturing, banking and insurance. Muhammed Ali Badiir, who inherited a 
food trading shop from his father, ·keptthis shop in function-even-after his activities included. from the 
1930s and 1940s, electricity and construction 
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Figure S-2: The Ratio of the BMs' Number and Equities to the DEs' Number and Capital 
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5.1.2 THE BE AND BM ACCORDING TO THE ECONOMIC SECTORS 
Concerning the BE ratio to the total enterprises in each sector, the data 
reveal that it recorded its lowest percentages in the commerce and service sectors, 
at 21 .9% and 26.1% respectively. As regards the other sectors, the percentage of 
BE was around 50.0%; however. it reached 63.0% and 64.3% respectively in the 
case of construction and mining enterprises. 14 In terms of capita l, the BE capita l to 
the total capita l of the enterprises in each economic sector was above 91 .0% in most 
economic sectors. Transportation and commerce were the exception, with the BE 
percentage standing at 62.4% and 85.1% respectively.15 The high proportion of BE 
capital to that of the private sector enterprises can be used, as in the case of the 
enterprise types, as an indication that the majority of the private sector assets had 
fallen under BE control. 
The BE percentage to the enterprises in each economic sector, both in terms 
of capital and of number, was largely determined by the conditions of the private 
sector enterprises, rather than indicating specific features of orientation of the 
bourgeoisie mvestments. For example, the low proportion of BE to the number of 
enterprises in commerce and services 16 tells more about the concentration of the 
13 The reference here 1s to all the company laws that were Introduced in Jordan: The 
Company Law of 1966, The Provisional Company Law of 1989 and The Company Law of 1996. 
14 See table (3), Appendix 7 
15 The ratio of the BE capital in the different sectors was as follows: 99.7 tn mining and 
electricity & water. 99.2% in finance & insurance, 96.0% in manufacturing, 94.9% in agriculture, 92.6% 
in transportation, 92.6% In construction, 88.6% in real estate, 80.3% in services and 64.8% in 
commerce. See table (3). appendix 7. 
16 Despite the limited number of bourgeois enterprises in the commerce and services 
compared to the entire number of firms in each of the two sectors, they represented 85.1% of the total 
capital of the commerce sector See Table (3), appendix 7 
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private sector activities in these two sectors than about the importance of these two 
sectors to the bourgeoisie. Factors such as the low cost of specific businesses in 
commerce and services (e.g. corner shops, plumbers or maintenance enterprises, 
which are usually self-employing) resulted in a large number of private sector 
enterprises in these two sectors, and consequently in a low proportion of BE.17 
Other factors, which were analyzed in the pervious chapter, are related to the 
economic development of the country and to its natural resources. The state of the 
sectoral distribution of private sector enterprises can also explain the significance of 
the BE among the enterprises of each economic sector.18 ' 9 
The sectoral structure of the BE shows that more than two thirds of the BE 
were commerce enterprises, followed by manufacturing at 13.3%, construction at 
5.6%, services at 5.0% and transportation at 4.9%. The enterprises of sectors such 
as mining, electricity, agriculture, finance and real estate made up together 2.0% of 
the BE.20 The same factors that explained the small number of enterprises in these 
sectors compared to the other sectors, such as monopolies that were granted to 
some enterprises, state direct investments, large capital requirements and others, 
can also explain the low proportion of these sectors' enterprises to the total number 
of BE.21 The distribution of the BE among the economic sectors in terms of capital 
reveals that commerce enterprises still made up the largest share of BE capital, 
though at only 29.9%, followed closely by manufacturing at 28.8%, construction at 
10.2%, finance and insurance at 9.6%, mining at 5.7%, services at 5.6% and 
17 See chapter 3. 
18 This is the case of agriculture. real estate and services. See chapter 2 concerning 
agriculture; also see 'The State of the Private Sector' section in the pervious chapter concerning 
agriculture and the other sectors. This trend will change in later periods; for more details, see chapter 
7. 
19 These considerations do not imply the absence of large agricultural estates where laborers 
were hired. In ~his study, the use of the term 'agricultural estate' differs from that of 'land estate': while 
the former designates a productive estate, the latter refers to an estate that was not exploited for 
different reasons, such as its being uncultivable, or the high cost of its cultivation, or simply upon the 
owner's wish. This distinction is of high importance in the case of Jordan, since land estates, even 
when cultivable, were often acquired for future investment, mainly speculation. The fact that land 
prices in Jordan rocketed in different phases, and that the demand on land for residential purposes 
continued to rise according to the abnormal population increase or to the increase in remittances, 
made It possible for some to acquire land and keep it In an idle state. 
• - --- ---
2
° Finance and ·insurance-aH-:-7%-;-agrictJiture-at- 0:-7-7%;-real·-estate at (}.5i2%, electricity at-
0.3% and mining at 0.25%. 
21 See the section on private sector enterprises in chapter 4 
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electricity and transportation at 3.9% and 3.8% respectively The agriculture and 
real estate shares of the BE capital were as small as 0.96% and 1.7% respectively.22 
When the data of the BMs is considered, a similar trend can be observed. 
The majority of the bourgeois members (45.8%) were in commerce, followed at 
some distance by manufacturing at 22.8%, transportation and storage at 9.5%, 
finance at 8.0%, services at 5.9% and construction at 5. 7%. The proportion of the 
BMs in the remaining sectors - such as mining , electricity, agriculture and real 
estate - together made up less than 2.5%.23 The distribution of the bourgeoisie's 
equities among the economic sectors shows that commerce was the favorite sector, 
having 40.9% of the entire capital, followed by manufacturing at 22.4%, construction 
at 14.3%, services at 6.7%, transportation at 4.4%, finance at 3.6%, electricity at 
3.4%, and real estate at 2.4%. Agriculture and mining had the lowest portions of the 
bourgeoisie's capital at 1.3% and 0.5% respectively. 
Figure 5-3: The Ratio of theBEs' Number and Capital in Each Economic ector to the Total BEs' 
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Therefore, commerce was the main sector in which the bourgeoisie's 
activities took place, as indicated by the proportion of commerce BE to the total BE 
in number and capital terms, and by the BMs' equities proportion. The fact that 
commerce is , in a way or another, a cornerstone of the bourgeoisie's activities can 
22 See table 3/ Appendix 7. 
23 See table 4/ Appendix 7. 
be better understood knowing that the commercial sector was the one that gave birth 
to the bourgeoisie, as was shown in the second chapter. Moreover. the conditions 
of the Jordanian economic development during this period24 are the general 
conditions of a country whose poor natural resources and small market encourage 
activities in sectors of a service nature, such as commerce. banking and 
construction. 
The ratio of the BE capital in some sectors, such as mining, finance, 
electricity and manufacturing, made up more than 90.0% of the entire capital of the 
private sector. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of businesses in 
such sectors require a large-scale capital investment, as is the case in the sub-
sectors of banking or insurance. The above trend and the low proportion of the BMs' 
equities to the total equities in mining and electricity can be attributed largely to the 
same factors that explained the limited number of private sector enterprises in these 
sectors in chapter 4, such as the state's heavy involvement in specific projects within 
the mining and electricity & water sectors.25 The fact that the country is poor in 
natural resources and has a small market constrains, by virtue of the competition, 
the number of enterprises in some specific fields such as mining and electricity 
production. Such constraints become decisive, given that some specific enterprises 
were granted a concession and monopoly over specific products, as is the case of 
the Jordanian Electricity Co., which provided Amman, and then the rest of the 
country apart from the lrbid district, with electricity.26 The same can be said about 
mining, and mainly in the case of phosphate ores, whose exploitation was carried 
out solely by the Jordanian Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC). 
The limited number of bourgeoisie members and of their investments in 
agriculture can on the one hand be attributed to the fact that no data were available 
concerning the big landholders who were engaged in agricultural activities. On the 
other hand, it seems that the investments of the bourgeoisie in this sector had not as 
yet taken the legal form of enterprises. 
24 See Chapter 4. 
25 Except for the equities held by the Jordanian government, which is the major shareholder, 
data about the shareholders-of -the Phosphate Mines Co. and Jordanian Elec1ricity Co. could not be 
obtained upon the refusal of the two enterprises to provide them. 
26 See AI-Oustur, 23/2/1982 (interview with Mohammed 'Ali Badiir). 
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Figure S-4: Tbe Ratio of BMs' Number and Equities in Each Economic Sector to the Total BMs' 
Number and Equities 
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Despite the above overall review of BMs' investments and the BEs in terms of 
economic sectors, it is difficult to fraction the bourgeoisie in terms of economic 
sectors. At the theoretical level, it is accurate to assume that the similar conditions 
and the common ground that certain sections of the bourgeoisie share by virtue of 
the fact of belonging to the same economic sector, can be determining factors in 
shaping the interests of that section. Reviewing the BMs, however, shows that 
these are divided into two large sections from the outset. The first is the multi-
economic sector BMs that contains all the BMs whose activities are not confined to 
one specific sector. The second includes all the BMs whose investments were 
based in one sector or another. The majority of the equities of the BMs were in the 
hands of the multi-sector members. 
This division among the BMs can be seen in every economic sector, where 
the multi-sector BMs possess the majority of equities in that sector. In this sense, 
within a specific sector, two sorts of interest co-exist, each of which represents one 
group. The first is the interest of the BMs whose entire investments are placed in 
that sector. This interest is largely determined by the conditions of the economic 
sector. The other interest is that of the multi-sector BMs, which one can claim is 
merely the articulation of the interest conditioned by the same sector that is invested 
in by the first group and the other that is derived from conditions of other sectors in 
which their remaining investments are placed. For example, in the case of industry, 
the BMs are divided into solo-sector members and multi-sector members. Hence, 
the formation of fraction on the basis of the sector, saying that the identity of the 
industrial bourgeoisie and its maintenance is conditioned by how strong the interest 
that embraces the BMs in industry. The fact is that the one-sectoral group in an 
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industry has an interest that partly shared by other members in the same sector, 
however, the fact that some of their investments are in other sectors threaten the 
unity of the bourgeoisie in industry. In some cases, the interest of a one·sector 
group in a given sector stands in contradiction with the interest of some members of 
the same sector, which also. have an interest in other sectors. Staying with the 
boundaries of the industry, the exclusively industry BMs could have a different 
agenda concerning the protection policies with other members in the same industry, 
but some of their wealth comes from imports or being agents for some foreign 
products. Another typical example is the conflict that occurs between the industrial 
BMs and the Industrial banking BMs. 
In this sense, this study claims that fractioning the bourgeoisie according to 
economic sectors cannot be accurate and has no rewarding value. The bourgeoisie 
can be seen in terms of capita l finance that chapter 1 covered to refer to a fraction 
within the bourgeoisie class that is not one based in one sector, but rather based in 
the investments of its members in different economic sectors. The Jordanian 
bourgeoisie in this sense that was formed in a specific sector or another experienced 
some of its members moving beyond the boundaries of the one-sector base 
bourgeoisie. Rather than merging enterprises of different sectors and resulting in 
having cross-sector enterprises, what took place in Jordan was that investment 
webs of some BMs spread over different sectors, giving birth to a finance capital 
fraction. 
5.1 .3 THE BE OWNERSHIP TRENDS 
The ownership character of BE enterprises shows that individual control BE 
constituted the majority at 52.5%, followed by neutral control at 21 .4%; however, 
only 5.5% of the BE were of individual control & family support. The other category 
that made up a substantial percentage of the BE was nuclear family control 
enterprises, at 19.4%. Categories like extended family control and corporate control 
enterprises made up insignificant proportions at 0. 7% and 0.6% respectively .27 The 
distribution of BMs through forms of ownership shows that 45.6% of the bourgeoisie 
wer.e involved in neuj[al .. cQrttrol enterprises, follow.e..cLby 24.4% in nuclear famUy 
27 See table (7), appendix 7. 
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enterprises and 27.3% in individual control (22.3%) and family support (5.1%) 
enterprises. The extended family and corporate equity-holder control made up an 
insignificant 2.7% of the bourgeoisie numbers. 
In capita l terms, ownership character categories took a different order. For 
example, neutral control enterprises constitute the biggest proportion of the BE 
capital at 48.7%. Such a proportion can be understood bearing in mind that such a 
category contains all the PS, whose capital is usually far larger than other enterprise 
types. Individual control enterprises made up 27.8% of the capital (15.9% individual 
control and 11.9% individual control & family support). With a similar proportion to 
that of the BE number, nuclear control enterprises made up 20.3% of the BE capital. 
Reflecting their insignificant proportion in terms of number, extended family control 
and corporate body control enterprises made up 2.6% and 0.7% respectively of the 
BE capital.28 Concerning BMs' equities, 36.9% of the bourgeois equities were 
invested in individual control and individual control & fami ly support, followed by 
33.1% in neutral control enterprises and 25.6% in nuclear family enterprises. The 
proportions of bourgeoisie capital that were found in extended family enterprises 
(3.6%) and corporate equity-holder control enterprises (0.9%) were trivial compared 
to other forms of ownership. 
Figure 5- 5: The Ratio of BMs' Number and Equities in Each Ownership Form to the Total BMs' 
Number a nd Equities 
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Looking at the prevalent forms of ownership among the BE shows that these 
forms were not consistently spread over the economic sectors. For instance, 
individual control , individual control & family support and nuclear family control 
28 See table (6), appendix 7 
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enterprises were mostly found in commerce, since respectively 75.7%, 60.7% and 
66.1% of their numbers and 41 .1 %, 64.5%, and 40.9% of their capital were found in 
this sector. Manufacturing was the other sector that absorbed a substantial 
proportion of these enterprise forms. 10.0% and 13.5% of the number and capital of 
individual control, 17.4% and 11 .6% of individual control & family support and 17.2% 
and 35.2% of nuclear family control enterprises were found in manufacturing.29 In 
the case of neutral control enterprises, 55.6% of their number were in commerce, 
followed by 16.3% in manufacturing, 10.0% in transportation, 6.8% in construction 
and 6.2% in services.30 Capitalwise, 35.8% of the neutral control enterprises' capital 
was in manufacturing, followed by 19.6% in finance and insurance, 13.9% in 
commerce, 11 .6% in mining and 8.0% in electricity. 
This correlation between the ownership forms of businesses and economic 
sectors can also be seen when the BMs' number and equities are concerned. The 
great majority of the bourgeoisie number and equities in sectors such as commerce, 
services, construction and transportation, which were developed earlier than others 
and were less capital intensive. were in businesses of individual control or nuclear 
family control. For example, 72.9%31 , 42.3%32, 62.4%33 and 28.2% 34of the 
bourgeoisie number in commerce, services, construction and transportation were 
either in individual control or nuclear family control businesses. Furthermore, 
75.3%35, 67.6%36, 74.937 and 62.7%38 of the bourgeoisie equities in commerce, 
29 See table (4) and (5), appendix 7. 
30 See table (5), appendix 7. 
31 34.6%, 6 .6% and 31 .7% were in commerce businesses of individual control , individual 
control & family support and nuclear family control respectively. 
32 18.9%, 5.6% and 17.8% were in Services businesses of individual control, individual control 
& family support and nuclear family control respectively 
33 25.0%, 7.5% and 29.9% were in construction businesses of individual control, individual 
control & family support and nuclear family control respectively. 
34 
• 8.0%, 3.5% and 16.7% were in transportation businesses of individual control, individual 
control & family support and nuclear family control respectively 
35 23.7%, 25.7% and 25.9% were in commerce businesses of individual control, individual 
control & family support and nuclear family control respectively. 
36 43.7%, 16.6% and 7.3% were in services businesses of individual control, individual control 
& family support and nuclear family control respectively. 
37 40.9%, 17.2% and 16.8% were in construction businesses of individual control, individual 
·Gontrel-& .family support and-nuclear- family -control-respectively.---
38 17.0%, 8 .7% and 37.0% were in commerce businesses of individual control, individual 
control & family support and nuclear family control respectively. 
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services, construction and transportation respectively were either in individual 
control or nuclear control forms of business. 
A substantial proportion of bourgeoisie number and equities in some other 
sectors were in neutral control businesses, since such sectors had started to 
develop later than those mentioned above, and some of their projects required 
intensive capital. 92.1% and 99.5% respectively of the bourgeoisie capital and 
number in mining, 40.0% and 99.8% in electricity, 95.7% and 97.1% in finance & 
insurance and 59.7% and 37.7% in manufacturing were in neutral control 
enterprises. 
Apart from the correlation between some specific economic sectors and the 
forms of ownership that was deducted above and attributed mainly to the capital 
requirements of business, some other patterns can be highlighted. Firstly, there is a 
clear widespread use of individual control, nuclear family control and neutral control 
enterprises, as the data relating to the BE39 and BMs reveals that one of the 
bourgeoisie's investment strategies was conducting their businesses through 
enterprises. The late inception - even in Middle Eastern terms - of private sector 
activities at large and of the formation of the bourgeoisie in particular, coupled with 
the fact that the Jordanian formation is poor, can account for the bourgeoisie's 
preference for individual control and nuclear family forms. Moreover, the 
bourgeoisie, originating within the womb of the merchants' domain, carried out the 
same methods that the merchants used in establishing and running their business, 
which was either individual or family-based. The expansion and articulation of 
private sector activities at large and of the bourgeoisie's in particular did not require 
the abandonment of individual or nuclear family control enterprises, but rather a 
variation in the forms of the enterprises in which the bourgeoisie became involved. 
In other words, a gradual shift towards neutral control enterprises was necessary 
only for those projects that were beyond the means of nuclear family control 
enterprises, or when the small size of the Jordanian market could not tolerate a large 
number of businesses in the same fteld, obliging the bourgeoisie members to cross 
the nuclear family boundaries into neutral control enterprises. 
39 What the neutral control enterprises lacked in their percentage of BE number, was 
compensated for by their proportion of BE capital. Onthe other hand, the proportion of individual 
control and individual control & family S4pport enterprises, coupled with nuclear family control 
enterprises, constituted 48.2% of the BE capital and 77.0% of the BE number. 
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Therefore, the move towards neutral control businesses was not a radical 
transformation aimed to abandon individual or nuclear family forms of ownership 
because they had become inadequate for the businesses conducted by the 
bourgeoisie. In fact, the neutral form of ownership co-existed with the individual and 
nuclear control forms. As the figures indicate, individual and nuclear family control 
were still widespread forms of ownership among the bourgeoisie during this period. 
Apart from the historical factors that brought the nuclear family control of 
forms of ownership among the BMs, one could argue that the continuation of this 
form in particular during this period was due to the parallel relations that the nuclear 
family ties established along with the relations that were objectively born with the 
foundation of the enterprise. When the enterprise in question was of the family 
control form, the cooperation/contradiction relations that occurred between the 
partners of a given enterprise, determined by the equities that each partner 
possessed, were accompanied by another form of relationship dictated by the 
nuclear family kinship ties. Thus, two forms of relations co-existed: a legal formal 
one, which recognized the partners in regard to their assets, and an informal one, 
which was reinforced by virtue of the nuclear family kinship relations. The former, 
which was the dominant one, was based on the interest of the enterprise and 
consequently on the interest of its bourgeois members. The second one, originating 
in the family ties, made up another domain of cooperation/contradiction that could 
influence and even overshadow the first type of relations. It is important to stress 
that the family-based relations could reduce the importance of the other relations by 
putting forward a management committee that functioned under the family's home 
roof rather than in the workplace. The nuclear family relations reproduced within 
society could overshadow the supposed cooperation/contradiction relationship 
existing between the partners. Hence, in extreme cases, a patriarchal relationship 
tying father and children or males and females within a family could eclipse the 
requirements of the enterprises. Nevertheless, it is possible that some bourgeoisie 
members might have invested within the same nuclear family, making use of the 
family ties. 
The BE statistics reveal that the individual and nuclear control enterprises 
were corner stones in the bourgeoisie activities, in contrast the extended family 
control enterprises were of no significance. Family fies acted as a device to form 
enterprises within the limitations of the nuclear family. Extended family control 
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businesses attracted only a small number of bourgeois and a small proportion of 
their equities; they also covered only a small proportion of the BE number and 
capital. What is at stake here is not only the important lack of an even impact of 
family ties on the bourgeoisie's approach to investments. but rather the trivial role of 
the family in its extended or tribal dimension. The tribal dimension of kinship ties 
was a significant variable in the social relations of Jordanian society during this 
period. The tribe was a fundamental unit, in that it played a social role which 
included a wide range of functions in events such as marriage, death, inheritance 
and the organization of relations with other tribes within the local community, 
especially when a dispute broke out between two members who belonged to 
different tribes. Nuclear family ties, in this perspective, did not stand in contradiction 
with the tribal ones; on the contrary, consolidation of the tribal dimension of family 
ties required a reinforcement of nuclear family ties. Belonging to the tribe was not 
achieved individually, but through belonging to a nuclear family. During this period 
and in periods to come, the tribe also had a political role. The tribal dimension in 
social life was recognized by the political system through the application of the 
traditional juridical common laws and the institutionalization of the council of tribal 
leaders. Political participation of the individual was implemented through the nuclear 
family whose position was generally consistent with the tribal positions. The local 
government elections in villages, small towns and large ones were to a large extent 
tribal politics.40 In societies such as in Jordan, family and tribal ties of traditional 
form, accompanied by the dominance of the patriarchal system, are still in existence, 
and have even been reinforced. In contrast, tribal relations are not significant as a 
social variable determining the activities of the BMs, when compared to their role in 
social or political domains. In other words, the figures disclose that the bourgeoisie 
in the course of its economic activities were very far from taking into consideration 
extended family ties as a base for its possession or control over the means of 
production. Apparently, excluding the tribal dimension was the bourgeoisie's 
strategy, despite its use of nuclear family ties and the importance of tribal relations in 
other spheres of society. 
The assertion of such a trend in the bourgeoisie's strategy goes only as far as 
control over the means of production and appropriation of the surplus labour are 
concerned, and does not imply that tribal relations had no impact on the economic 
40 See Hamarneh, M. (1995), AI-Mujtama' AI-Madanii fii AI-Urduun. 
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activities of the BMs. In other words, the tribal dimension could be an important 
device in providing some of the extended family members with jobs in the 
businesses owned by other members of the extended family. Extended family ties 
could also be used to facilitate the activities of some of the BMs, when some of their 
extended family members were in a position to do so. 
Two possible factors can be the rationale behind the lack of a tribal 
dimension in the BE strategies to form businesses. The first is related to the rules of 
the capitalist system, while the other is rooted in the formation and development of 
the Jordanian bourgeoisie. One could argue that qualifying the tribal relations as the 
determinant factor in a BM's decision concerning the form of ownership would stand 
in contrast to the rules the capitalist system. In other words, a BM's decision to 
establish a business as an extended family would mean that the interest of this 
member, the conditions of the market and the control of the means of production 
have become secondary elements in the decision. The marginalization of these 
factors would lead to the socialization of control over the means of production at the 
extended family level, and/or to the bankruptcy of the businesses. Socialization and 
democratization of control over the means of production within the domain of the 
tribe, even under the assumption that each tribal member has an equal share of the 
assets, would advance a new system of production that not only would not be a 
capitalist system, but would stand in contradiction with it.41 The other factor, which 
is of a domestic nature and hindered even the historical possibility for a significant 
impact of tribal ties on the bourgeoisie's activities, is the fact that the Jordanian 
bourgeoisie was born from the merchants of Trans-Jordan, who were mostly from 
Syria, Palestine or Lebanon. These merchants, who became the nucleus of the 
bourgeoisie, were of a different social texture from the Jordanian. However, 
establishing businesses in Trans-Jordan did not involve a transfer to the area of their 
extended families, but only of their nuclear families as defined in this study. The 
injection of the Palestinian bourgeoisie into the Jordanian bourgeoisie after 1948 did 
not carry with it a tribal dimension like the one that existed in Jordan; this is in line 
with the argument of this study that the uprooting of the Palestinians hit the structure 
of the extended family . In this context, the impact of kinship bonds as a social 
variable on the way in which the bourgeoisie wielded its investments can be seen at 
41 As a matter of fact, such a system would be close to the anti-capitalist system that Marx 
and his adherents invoked. 
26 1 
two distinct levels. The first one, which was seriously taken into consideration by the 
BMs, lies within the boundaries of nuclear family ties. The second one, which had 
no significant impact, is that found outside the nuclear family, i.e. in the extended 
family ties. In other words, one cannot talk of a tribal factor in the businesses of the 
bourgeoisie in the sense in which the term can be applied in other social and political 
issues. 
5 .1.4 THE CORPORATE BODIES 
The bourgeois domain consisted of two main categories: the individual 
members, who made up the great majority of the bourgeois members' numbers at 
96.1 %, and the corporate bodies, which constituted just 3.9%. In capital terms, 
however, the corporate equity-holders had a share of around 11 .8%, as opposed to 
the 88.2% of the individual members. This sub-section will focus on the non-
individual BMs, i.e. the corporate bodies as a new limited phenomenon used by the 
individual BMs to conduct their businesses. 
Three main components made up the corporate bodies, the largest being 
Jordanian companies, which constituted around 11 .0% of the total bourgeois 
equities and 93.2% of the total capital of the corporate bodies. The second largest 
component was foreign companies, making up just 0.65% of the total bourgeoisie's 
capital and 5.5% of the corporate bodies' capital. The NGOs component was 
insignificant, since its percentages of the bourgeoisie's and corporate bodies' capital 
were only 0.09% and 1.3% respectively. 
As regards the distribution of the corporate bodies among the different 
economic sectors, finance and insurance, commerce and manufacturing possessed 
the largest number of corporate bodies at 29.3%, 19.8%, and 19.6% respectively. 
Transportation and storage came next, with a relatively substantial corporate bodies' 
percentage of 1 0.2%, followed by the services at 6.1% and electricity and water at 
5.6%. The other sectors, such as agriculture and construction and mining, had only 
a moderate percentage of the number of corporate bodies, which ranged between 
2.5 and 4.5%.42 The picture in terms of the corporate bodies' equities distribution 
was not very different. Finance was once again the leading sector, possessing 
24.2% of the total corporate equities, followeq QY commerce at 23.3% and 
42 See Table 9/ Appendix 9. 
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manufacturing at 16.6%. However, a sector such as electricity and water, which had 
a limited number of corporate bodies compared to the other sectors, absorbed as 
much as 12.7% of the corporate equities. The services, too, possessed a 
respectable proportion, namely 11 .2%. In contrast, transportations and storage, 
which had a reasonable proportion of the corporate bodies (1 0.2% numberwise), 
possessed a very modest percentage of 3.1% of the entire equities. Other sectors 
had a moderate proportion, which ranged between 1.1% in the case of constructions 
and 3.9%, as in agriculture and mining.43 
It was predictable that sectors like finance & insurance, manufacturing and 
commerce should attract the highest percentages of the corporate bodies and their 
equities. For the latter sector, this reality could be attributed to the fact that it was 
the oldest and most consolidated sector, as well as being the center of gravity of the 
private sector's economic activities at large, and of the bourgeoisie's in particular. 
As for the finance and manufacturing sectors, some of their enterprises, due to their 
economic activities, required capital intensive, which opened the gates for the 
corporate bodies to carry out their investments. 44 The fact that the majority of the 
finance and, to a lesser extent, of the manufacturing sector enterprises were of PS 
type made it easier for corporate bodies to hold equities in them, since the will of the 
shareholders in PS enterprises is far less relevant to the acceptance of new equity 
holders, contrary to other types of enterprises. 
Looking at the Jordanian companies in particular, the data shows that they 
were the most diversified corporate equity-holders, since they appeared in all 
economic sectors. 32.0% of them were in manufacturing, followed by 24.3% in 
commerce, 13.1% in finance and 11 .5% in transportation. Their presence in mining, 
agriculture, electricity and construction was very modest compared to the former 
sectors.•5 In capital terms, 34.0% of the equities of the Jordanian companies were 
concentrated in the commerce sector; electricity came next with 22.3% of the 
equities, followed by manufacturing at 18.4%, services at 8.1% and finance at 6. 7%. 
The figures show that the contribution of the Jordanian companies in the rest of the 
43 See table 12/ Appendix 7. 
44 Clearly, the Jordanian-Gover-nment had its own-reasoAS·, based .on its economic policy, for 
choosing a sector rather than another, which will be discussed separately. 
45 See table (20) for details. 
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sectors was merely nominal.46 Apart from historical factors and the fact that the 
structure of the Jordanian economy in that period, as was mentioned above, favored 
commerce, there seemed to be a trend for the Jordanian companies to direct the 
majority of their investments into this sector, as a simple comparison between the 
proportions of commerce and finance, or between those of commerce and 
manufacturing, shows.47 In terms of the number of the Jordanian companies that 
had equities in other enterprises, the figures show that PS enterprises were the main 
target, absorbing 38.2 % of the Jordanian companies, followed by GP at 29.6% and 
LL at 28.0%. In equity terms, 53.8% of the Jordanian companies' equities were 
invested in Ll, 37.6 in PS and just 6.8% in GP.48 
Jordanian companies that held equities in other enterprises were mainly of 
GP, LL, and PS types. 46.1% of the Jordanian companies that held equities in other 
enterprises were of GP type, followed by LL at 21 .8%, PS at 18.6%, LP at 9.9% and 
IE at 3.5%. In terms of the equities that these companies held in other enterprises, 
the figures show that 42.5% of these equities was held by companies of LL type, 
followed by 30.7% of GP and 21.5% of PS type. The share of the total equities of 
the Jordanian companies invested in IE and LL enterprises was only 4.1 %. 
Concerning the sectors of the Jordanian companies that held equities in other 
enterprises, the figures show a prevalence of sectors such as commerce, finance, 
manufacturing, electricity. 51 .9% of these companies were in commerce, followed 
by manufacturing at 17.6%, finance at 10.9%, transportation at 6.7% and 
construction at 4.5%. Companies of other sectors were of lesser significance. In 
terms of the equities that these companies held, the figures show once again that 
commerce companies held the largest share at 48.7%, followed by electricity at 
22.2%, construction at 10.8%, manufacturing at 8.1% and finance at 7.0%. The rest 
of the sectors held together 2.4% of the total equities of the Jordanian companies. 
Concerning the strategies that the Jordanian companies followed in their 
investment in other enterprises, one can distinguish between two strategies, along 
the line of the type of investing companies. The first is investment in the PS 
46 For more details concerning the other sectors, see table (8). 
47 Bearing in mind that there were no commerce PS enterprises. 
48 The shares of number and equities that were investe<fby Jordanian companies into other 
enterprises of LP and IE types were insignificant, making up 4.1% of the number of the Jordanian 
companies and 1.9% of their total invested equities. 
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enterprises, the second investment in companies of other types. PS companies 
invested in other PS enterprises more than 3 times as much as in other enterprise 
types. That is, the size of these investments in non-PS enterprises amounted to 
11 .7% of the investments in PS enterprises. By contrast, the investments of non-PS 
companies in other non-PS enterprises were almost three fold their investments in 
PS enterprises, while the value of these investments was more than three times that 
of investments in PS enterprises. Despite the fact that PS enterprises would seem 
more attractive for non-PS companies' investments than non-PS enterprises for PS 
investments, the trend of the investments of non-PS companies was directed to non-
PS enterprises. 
With regard to the PS investing companies, one can argue that the 
investments of each of them reflected the investment strategies of that specific 
company, which could vary from other investing PSs. Some common patterns, 
however, can be deduced about the entire PS investments. Almost half of the PS 
investing companies were banks, making up only 30.6% of the PS total investments. 
With one exception, all of the investments of the banks were in PS enterprises. 
Manufacturing and finance enterprises were the main target of the banks' 
investments, with 37.0% and 33.3% respectively of the number of investments and 
38.9% and 29.8 of the investments' value. 
More than a quarter of the investing PS and 15.4% of their investments' value 
were carried out by PS manufacturing companies, of which around one third were in 
non-PS enterprises, constituting 52.4% of the entire manufacturing PS investments. 
40.0% of the PS manufacturing investments were in manufacturing enterprises, 
followed by 26.4% in commerce enterprises, 18.5% in finance and 16.0% in mining. 
The noticeable proportion of the investments of the manufacturing PS in (mainly 
manufacturing) non-PS enterprises can be explained by the fact that some of the 
latter were satellite enterprises that specialized in manufactured goods used in the 
finished products of the investing companies, to the extent that the investing 
enterprise was in some cases a major shareholder. In specific cases. the 
development of the activities of a non-PS enterprise which would become a satellite 
enterprise of the PS had been the reason behind the foundation of the PS in the first 
place. In other words, the establishment of a PS enterprise was the brainchild of the 
no·n:ps-enterprise that would owe its· prospective existence· to ·the investments of the 
PS. In other cases, the enterprise in which a PS company invested operated in the 
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same field as, or close to the field of, the investing company. In some other 
examples, it seems that the driving force behind some of the PS investments in 
other enterprises - especially those of non-PS type - was the fact that some 
influential shareholders of the investing enterprises were major owners in the 
enterprises that received the investments. 
The Industrial Agricultural Commercial Co. had equities in three enterprises, 
all of which were non-PS and manufacturing enterprises. One of these non-PS 
enterprises the Jordanian for Fuel, including among its shareholders members of the 
AI-Iaahar family . The Industrial Agricultural Commercial Co. also held 20.0% of the 
Jordanian for Carpet Manufacturing shares, which was a joint venture between the 
Jordanian Material Construction Co. (Badiir enterprises), Bahjat ai-Hammsii Co. 
(18.0%) and Mathqaal, Shoukat and Saami 'A§fuur Co. (7.5%) and Abdalrahman 
Abu-Hasaan (10.0%). The Jordanian Company for Manufacturing and Printing 
Boxes was almost a satellite company of the Industrial Agricultural and Commercial 
Co., which controlled 45.0% of its shares plus 11 .0% of the shares belonging to the 
Abu-Hasaan family, in the person of Abdalrahman Abu-Hasaan. The Jordanian for 
Tobacco and Cigarettes manufacturing invested in a non-PS enterprise, the 
Jordanian for Printing and Packaging, in which it owned 97% of the share. It also 
owned 33.3% of the national Tobacco Co., 33.3% of whose shares was owned by 
the Cooperative Society. 
Concerning the characteristics of the investing companies of non-PS types, 
and apart from the above mentioned trend by which the majority of their investments 
were placed in non-PS enterprises, it seems that their investments were a device 
used by some bourgeoisie members to spread their investments from the enterprise 
with which they had started to others. In this perspective, one could argue that the 
investments of certain bourgeoisie members could take either the form of direct 
personal holdings in other enterprises or could be indirect, when his/her enterprise 
was the equity holder. Of the non-PS investing companies, only 15.2% were of 
neutral control ownership, constituting 7.8% of the investments' value. In contrast, 
the individual control and individual control with nuclear family support enterprises 
made up 32.1% of the non-PS investing companies and 35.9% of the investments' 
value. Regardless of the actual form of cooperation/conflict that determined the 
-de·cision-making of investing in other enterprises, tne c hoice 'boiled down to the 
subjective point of view of the controlling equity holder. In this sense, the 
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investments of such companies in other enterprises were nothing but another form 
of personal investment of the controlling equity holder ... 9 
Some of the above points concerning the investing individual control 
companies can be applied to specific cases in which the ownership of the investing 
enterprises was of nuclear family control type. In fact, the latter form was the most 
widespread among the investing companies, with 41 .7% of the number and 48.1% 
of the investments value. The bourgeoisie members of the same nuclear family were 
equity holders in other enterprises through their nuclear family enterprise, rather 
than each member having personal holdings. This was a way of expanding the 
investment web of the bourgeoisie members who were still completely or partly 
operative economically on a nuclear family basis. For instance, the Hammuudah 
family enterprise, with the Jordanian chemical Co., was the main shareholder in the 
National Hatching Incubation Co. 50 It was also the main shareholder in the Jordanian 
African for Commerce Co. (JAFCO), besides being one of the main equity-holders in 
the Manufacturing of the Bathroom Fitments. 51 
In other cases, the investments in enterprises, especially if new, were 
facilitated when they were carried out through the already established nuclear family 
companies. These investments were nothing but joint ventures or cartels of nuclear 
family businesses. For example, the Naqal Bothers Co. held equities in the Arab 
Factories of Sponge, which in its turn was a joint venture between the Naqal family 
and the Niinuo family. 
The data shows that some Jordanian companies holding equities in other 
enterprises were outstanding in terms of the number of enterprises in which they had 
equities or in terms of the size of the equities that they held. For example, the GP 
Mathqaal, Shoukat and Saamii 'A§.fuur Co. had equities in 12 enterprises, of which 
49 For example, the commercial enterprise Al-sa'uudii Co. was owned entirely by the BM 
Khairii Faaris Al-sa'uudii, and had equities in three other enterprises specialized in cars and electric 
retails. As for Fariid ai-Sa'd, a tycoon of the tobacco industries, his investments went through the 
Jordanian Investments Co., which was entirely owned by him. 
50 As a matter of fact, Fariid AI-S'ad, who was himself a tycoon at the Jordanian level. was 
also an equity holder. 
51 Another exatnp~ ~as the G~!1~ral Construc!i~n . a nuclear family business belonging to 
Raja'aii Al-ma'ashshar and his siblings. This company was an equity-holder in four enterprises,-two of 
which were partially construction enterprises, one was a construction materials retail enterprise, while 
the fourth was specialized in bricks and tiles manufacturing. 
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two PS were banks,52 two insurance companies, 53 one was in mmmg, one in 
commerce54 and the remaining 6 were all in manufacturing. 55 The commerce GP 
Mahmuud Abu-aldhahb & Sons Co. had equities in six enterprises, of which 3 in 
commerce56 and the rest in manufacturing.57 The commerce LL Jordanian 
Construction Material Co. was a partner in 6 enterprises, of which one was mining, 
two commerce and three manufacturing. However, two of the manufacturing and 
one of the commerce enterprises in which this company held equities were 
specialized in construction material. Likewise, the equities of the 'Abdallah ai-
Balbiisii Co. were distributed among five enterprises, including three in 
manufacturing, 58 one in kitchenware wholesale and one in transportation. 
Looking at the data concerning the other type of corporate equity-holder, i.e. 
foreign companies, one might distinguish between two types of companies that 
invested in Jordanian enterprises. The factors that determined foreign companies' 
investment in the Jordanian enterprises can be deduced from an analysis of the 
enterprises that they targeted: 86.4% of these were of the neutral control type. This 
trend could be explained on the basis of the fact that the neutral control form of 
enterprise ownership was more accessible than the individual or family control for 
the foreign enterprises. Moreover, this type of enterprises involved lower risk for 
foreign investments. This was particularly true of the PS enterprises, which were 
typically of the neutral control type, and which were ruled by clear regulations 
concerning the management and the rights of the shareholders, as well as their 
financial statutes. Hence. 72.7% of the enterprises with foreign companies' equities 
were PS. Almost half of the PS enterprises that contained foreign companies' 
investments were banks, one third manufacturing enterprises. Therefore, it was 
rare to find a foreign company which was an equity holder in a non-PS enterprise, or 
in an enterprise of individual or family control ownership. One such exception was 
the Jordanian non-PS enterprise AI-Kamak for Transportation and Tourism, 67.0% 
52 Cairo Amman Bank and The Industrial Development Bank. 
53 The Union Insurance co. and The Jordanian insurance Co. 
54 Shourbajii and 'A!fuur Co. and the General Mining Co. 
55 The Manufacturing enterprises included. 
58 One of the commerce companies was specialized in car trading, another one in 
kitchenware. while the third was in general trade. 
57 These companies·· were- specialized in radio, plastic· shoes, and paper and cardboard 
manufacturing. 
58 Specialized in plastic, paper and hardboard manufacturing. 
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of which was owned by a successful Syrian transportation company, as an extension 
or copy of which it had been established. The bridge to the Jordanian market was 
the bourgeois member Mohammed 'Ali Badiir, himself of Syrian origin. A similar 
example of a non-PS enterprise was the Union of Jordanian Contractors, which was 
controlled by Habiib Jariis ai-Sabaagh,59 who possessed 51 .0% of the equities; the 
rest of the equities, however, was owned by a Lebanese construction company. 
Other cases that brought foreign investments to Jordan were rooted in the fact that 
some bourgeoisie members - or simply Jordanian entrepreneurs - signed contracts 
with foreign enterprises, using their methods, technology or expertise to produce 
similar products for the Jordanian market, or even for the regional market. The 
foreign companies thus became involved in joint investments in Jordanian 
enterprises. For example, the equities of the non-PS enterprise Jordanian Dutch for 
Chicken Breeding were divided between the members of the Yaghnom family and 
the Dutch company Jager Schaffield, whose activities were in animal stocks.60 At 
the sectoral level, the majority of the foreign companies that held equities in the 
Jordanian enterprises were concentrated in finance and insurance (59.1% of the 
total number and 65.8% of the total equities) and manufacturing (13.6% number-
wise and 24.5% equity-wise). These in the finance and insurance sector were 
shareholders in PS enterprises. 
Concerning the nationality of these foreign investing companies, the data 
shows that the majority were Arab. In fact, less than 30.0% of these enterprises 
were non-Arab companies. Among the Arab companies, the majority were of 
Lebanese nationality. The liberal economic policies in Lebanon and Jordan 
compared with other Middle Eastern states could have encouraged the mutual 
movements of capital in both countries. The fact that Beirut was the base of some of 
the Jordanian BMs either for residential or investing purposes could have led to joint 
ventures in Jordan. Moreover, the powerful financial ability of companies from the 
oil producing countries had not as yet swept the region in this period. 
59 He was a bourgeois member of Palestinian origin (Haifa); it appears, from the Ministry of 
Trade·and Industry's records, that·he had a lebanese nationality -besides the Jordanian one. 
60 Khiir-al-diin's gate to the world of the bourgeoisie was his and his wife's investments in the 
chicken project as a joint venture with a Dutch enterprise. Interview with Subab.ii AI-M'aaniL 
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5.1.5 THE NON-BOURGEOIS EQUITY HOLDERS IN THE BE 
The focus here will be given to the equity-holders in the BE that were not 
qualified according to the implemented criteria as BMs, though sharing with the 
bourgeoisie the ownership of the BE. Some of these equity-holders are important, 
due the significance of the equities that they held. The most obvious example is that 
of the PS enterprises, of which only the large shareholders, who were a limited 
number compared to the totality of the shareholders in a given PS enterprise, were 
considered to be bourgeois. However, these shareholders are a significant element 
for the function of the PS enterprise, if not for its survival. Some other shareholders 
are important due to the significant number of shares that they possessed, but were 
nonetheless ruled out of the bourgeoisie by virtue of the fact that they could not be 
characterized as bourgeois elements. The most obvious example is the state, which 
had been involved since the 1950s in economic activities in partnership with the 
private sector, not to mention their solo economic activities, some of which were 
denied to the private sector, or in which the latter lacked an interest. The state or 
public sector cannot be part of the bourgeoisie according to the criteria adopted in 
this study, despite its participation in the bourgeois activities. Along the same line 
that excludes the Jordanian state, the foreign governments that held equities in 
private sector projects were excluded. Local governments' investments were also 
excluded from the bourgeoisie, and so were employee saving funds, despite the fact 
that, in some cases, these funds included bourgeoisie equity-holders, who generally 
occupied executive positions. The rationale for excluding the latter category is that 
the majority of the assets of these funds still belonged to the employees who had no 
assets in the businesses. 
During this period, all of the categories were equity-holders in the BE; 
however, two main categories can be distinguished by their outstanding proportion in 
BE capital in comparison to the others. namely the state and the individual. 
Individual equities were the largest, constituting 28.9% of the BE capital and 26.5% 
of the private sector capital; their ratio to the bourgeoisie's equities stood at 40.6%. 
The state proportion of the BE capital was 8.1% and 7.5% of the private sector 
enterprises, while its ratio to the BM equities was 11 .4%. The other categories were 
less significant, in that their ratio to the BM equities never recorded more than 
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fractions of 1.0%.61 However, due to the fact that the individual equity-holders 
cannot be confined in number or equities over all the years of the period, and on the 
other hand analyzing them means analyzing a large proportion of the private sector 
participants that is beyond the scope of this study, analysis will be confined to state 
involvement in these projects, and to a lesser extent to that of the remaining 
categories. 
The data of non-bourgeoisie corporate equity-holders (excluding the 
individuals) shows that the Jordanian state had the largest share of their total 
equities at 90.5%, followed by the foreign governments at 4.4%, local governments 
at 2.6%, autonomous governmental institutions at 1.8% and employee saving funds 
at 0.8%. The majority of the Jordanian government's investments in the BM were in 
manufacturing at 37.5%, followed by 27.3% in mining, 13.1% in electricity, 11 .9% in 
finance & insurance, 7.9% in services and, less significantly, 2.2% and 0.13% in 
transportation and agriculture respectively. In commerce, construction and real 
estate there were no governmental investments.62 The high proportion of investment 
in manufacturing reveals the economic policy of the state which, since the 1950s, 
had been becoming involved in the manufacturing activities. The rationale behind 
choosing manufacturing and mining in particular was due to two articulated factors. 
Firstly, the state chose to be involved in some particular projects, conducting which 
required capital intensive that was beyond the means of the private sector, such as 
the project of the petroleum refinery that was proposed in the first half of the 1950s. 
Other projects, investment in which was motivated by the same factors, were the 
Cement Factory Co., the Arab Pharmaceutical Industries Co. and The Paper and 
Cardboard Co. The other factor was more ideological: there was a perception in 
state economic decision making circles that industrialization could lead to a better 
economy and, ultimately, to the actualization of the economic independence of the 
country. Poor natural resources were an obstacle to extensive industrialization as 
was undertaken in other third world countries. Furthermore, the establishment of the 
Industrial Development Bank as a specialized financial institution provided industrial 
projects with a different type of aid. Some of the state investments in some 
manufacturing projects could not be explained on the basis of the above factors. 
61 See table 17/ Appendix 9. 
62 The fact that there was no governmental investment along the BM does not indicate the 
absence of state activities in these economic sectors. What is discussed here is the investments that 
the government had in the BE. 
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One could attribute state involvement in projects such as the chocolate factory, the 
Jordanian Tainting Co. or the Jordanian Ceramic Co. to the influence that some 
main shareholders had in the state economic decision making circles. 
State involvement in mining projects comes from two main factors, the first of 
which is the capital requirements of the projects in which the state was encouraged 
to take steps. The second factor was that the mining commodities that Jordan 
possessed became strategic commodities that the state would not want to lose 
control of, as in the case of phosphate. The importance of the Phosphate Mines Co. 
increased rapidly after 1967, as a consequence of the increase of the international 
price of phosphate, which resulted in sales of the latter being one of the main 
domestic contributions to governmental revenue. The Arab Potash Co., which was 
even beyond the means of the state, was an Arab governmental project. The other 
contributions of the state were highly selective; for instance, the involvement in 
finance was limited to two projects that the state initiated, that is the Industrial 
Development Bank and the Housing Bank. In services, the state paid some 
attention to the potential of tourism by being the main shareholder in the Jordanian 
Hotels Co. and the Hamah Spa Co. Tourism was again the motivation for its shares 
in the Jordanian Tourist Transportation Co., while its involvement in transportation 
BE enterprises was confined to its shares in Amman Union Buses, which ran buses 
along with other private sector enterprises in the capital city. It is worth noticing that 
the control that the state assumed over the media explains its shares in the 
Jordanian for Press and Publishing Co., which published the daily newspaper ai-
Dustuur. The equities of autonomous governmental institutions in the BE 
enterprises were mainly in electricity (40.2%) and manufacturing (32.2%), and 
followed closely the pattern of the central government. The investments of the Royal 
Jordanian Airlines (Alia), however, were divided among three enterprises, two of 
which were aviation enterprises,63 while the third was the Electronic Accountancy 
Center, initiated by the Jordanian airlines itself, by the Royal Scientific Society -
which in its turn was another autonomous institution - and by some private 
entrepreneurs. 
63 The first enterprise is the HoJy land Airline.~ •. which was established prior to 1967 and 
ceased to exist gradually by virtue of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The second is the 
Jordanian for the World Aviation Transportation that was established as joint venture between the 
private sector and the Royal Jordanian before it was shut down in 1975. 
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Concerning foreign governments' investments in the BE, the data shows that 
these governments were Arab ones ,fl.ol and that their investments were divided 
between 82.0% in mining and 18.0% in banking. Investments in mining were 
exclusively in the Arab Potash Co., which was initiated as an Arab governmental 
project, as was mentioned before. As for investments in banks, the majority of them 
went into the Arab Bank Co., and belonged to the governments of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Qatar, while the Industrial Bank had Qatar as one of its shareholders. 55 
Among the local governments' investments, one can distinguish between the 
municipalities of some towns and villages in the lrbid District, holding equities in the 
lrbid District Electricity Co., which was the provider for their electricity supply, and 
the more diversified investments in the case of the Municipality of Amman . The 
latter's investments ranged from three manufacturing enterprises to one services 
enterprise, in addition to its equities in the Jordanian Electricity Co. Noticeably, all of 
the investments of the Municipality of Amman were in enterprises in which the 
central government had investments too. The same point can be made about the 
employee funds, whose investments coincided with the investments of their 
enterprises. 
5.2 THE ECONOMIC POWERS 
In the previous sections, the context of the bourgeoisie and its main trends 
were the issues of concern. This section attempts to apply the power parameters, 
which were advanced and discussed in chapter 3, in order to explore areas 
according to which the BMs differ as well as to measure the discrepancy between 
the BMs' capacities to act according to the different assets that they possess. 
Applying these parameters achieves two goals: the first is to address the differences 
that occur between the BMs according to the variables that each parameter takes in 
consideration. The difference in proportion of each BM's equities relative to the total 
BMs' equities, for example, defines a ground according to which cleavages among 
the BMs occur. Based on the first, the second aims to make a distinction between 
fl.4 The focus here is not the involvement of foreign governments in the economic activities in 
the country, but contributions and grants from western governments towards development projects 
that the Jordanian government conducted. 
65 The government of Kuwait was one_of tbe main shar.eholders in The Housing Bank Co.; 
however, this contribution does not appear in the data since It dates January 1974. In fact, from 1974 
the Arab governments' contribution would start to become more significant as a consequence of the 
petrodollar revolution. 
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the BMs' capacities to act by recognizing the core group that results from applying 
each parameter. This is the group of BMs whose power points place them in a more 
influential position than the remaining BMs. Therefore, this section is designed to go 
through the power parameters one by one, highlighting their significance during this 
period and the results of their applications. 
5.2 .1 POWER A 
As was introduced in chapter 3, this parameter is based on what any given 
BM's equities make up of the total BMs' equities according to the below formula. 
Power A= 3*[(BM share/ Total BMs' Equities)%] 
To make sense of the importance of this parameter, it is enough to say that 
only 768 BMs (12.5%) possessed 81.3% of the total BMs' equities. The members 
whose equities made up 0.1% or more of the total BMs' equities were only 179. 
However. they possessed together 57.2% of the BMs' equities, leaving less than half 
to be shared among more than 5700 members. 
Applying power A to the BMs shows that there is a large discrepancy 
between the BMs' assumed power. For example, 91 .9% of BMs maintain power that 
ranges between 0.0 and less than 0.1, while only 26 BMs assume power that ranges 
between 3.0 and 12.6.66 Using the sum of all the BMs' Power A for comparison 
purposes shows that 99.3% of the BMs, whose power score ranges between 0.0 to 
less than 1.0 points, possess some 53.2% of power A, leaving a percentage of 
46.7% of the total power A for only 0. 7% of the BMs, i.e. only 40 BMs whose power 
A score is 1.0 point or more. In fact, the average power of each of these 40 
members was 2.4, which is equivalent to 134 times 0.08 points, i.e. the recorded 
average points of members whose score was less than 1.0. One could assume that, 
in regard to Power A, these 40 members make up the core of the BMs, where Power 
A is concentrated. 
Looking in depth at the composition of the core BMs according to Power A 
(the 40 members) reveals that there was nil presence of female BMs. As high as 
70.0% of the core's number was made up of members whose some NFs relatives 
were part of the BMs, sharing 77.8% of the core's total power A points. The core 
66 See Table 4/ Appendix 10. 
274 
members who had NFs relatives belonged to 20 NFs, whose power score sum made 
up 43.5% of the entire BMs' power A points. 61 
5.2.2 POWER B 
As was mentioned in chapter 3, Power B is a parameter that takes into 
consideration the proportion of a given BM's equities to the total equities of the 
enterprise in which that BM has an ownership, according to the formula below. 
Power B =Sum (1 .5*([BM equities/ equities of the enterprlse)/100) 
Applying power B to the BMs shows that 71 .3% of them had score ranges 
between 0.0 and 0.9, while only 6.1% had ranged between 3 and 7.9 points. The 
sum of Power B distributed among the BMs shows that 87.1% of the BMs. whose 
points on this scale ranged between 0.0 and 1.9, shared a total power of 50.6%, 
while the rest of the BMs (12.9%) had a score of 2 or more. In fact, the 368 
members who scored 3 points or more had more than a quarter of the power B 
points together. 
The core members' composition shows that the female members were a tiny 
minority at 1.0% number wise, possessing together 0.9% of the core's total power 
points.68 The overall weight of the members whose NF relatives were part of the 
BMs is less significant than that of the Power A core group, making up only 29.8% of 
the core number and 33.5% of the power points, and leaving the non-NF relatives to 
be the overwhelming majority. Some NFs, however, recorded remarkable scores, 
as in the case of Al-ma'ashar (14.5), Ruuhii Sha'shaa'ah (12.5), Abd-ai-Rahman Abu 
hassaan (12.2), Muhammad Abu Khjail (10.3), Sa'd Abu jaabir (9.2), Abd-ai-Faftaah 
Malhas(8.4) and Bashiir Hataahit (8.2).89 
87 Among these NFs, 4 registered a remarkable score: Shuukat 'A§.fuur (12.6 power points), 
Saamii 'A§fuur (11 .4) Muhammed 'Ali Badiir (8.8}, Muniir AI-Sakhtiin (6.4). Interestingly, all the three 
BMs who scored the highest points according to the Power A parameter were from the same family, 
the 'A§.fUur: Zuhiir 'A§fuur (12.6), Shuuqii 'A§fuur and Kamaal 'A§fuur (5.7 points each), and had been 
In some joint investments. See Table 11/ Appendix 10. 
-
68
-AII·female members belonged·to·NFs whose-male-members were among the core-group, 
69 Notice that in this group, which was part of the newcomer bourgeoisie, there was only one 
NF (Muhammad Abu Khjail). 
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5.2.3 POWER C 
Power C is a parameter that makes a distinction between the BMs according 
to the number of enterprises in which their investments are spread. In addition to 
what has been asserted in chapter 3 concerning this parameter, figures about the 
BMs of this period confirm its significance. Almost 2/3 of the individual BMs were 
equity-holders in only one enterprise; however. the proportion of their equities to that 
of the total BMs was slightly more than one third . 25.3% of the BMs, holding 18.9% 
of the BM equities, were equity-holders in 2 enterprises. In contrast, a small number 
of BMs were equity-holders in a large number of enterprises. For instance, just 176 
(2.9% of the BMs) were equity-holders in a number of enterprises that ranged 
between 5 and 9, while only 26 members held equities in 10 or more enterprises. 
The proportion of the equities of those who were equity-holders in 5 or more 
enterprises was 31.4% of the total BM equities, which is almost equivalent to what 
the one-enterprise equity-holders possess. As was mentioned in chapter 3, power C 
is calculated according to the below formula: 
Power C of a certain BM= 0.1 +(0.4"(n-1 )) 
(n is the number of enterprises) 
Figure 5-6: The Ratio of BMs' Number and Equities According to their Number of 
Enterprises to t he Total BMs' Number and Equities 
70.00 
60.00 
50.00 
40.00 
30.00 
2000 
10.00 
0.00 
IJ % OF Number • % of Equities 
1 enterpnse 2 enterprises 3 Or 4enterpnses >=5 <10 > =10 Enterprises 
enterpirses 
?.76 
Applying power C to the BMs shows that the majority of them at 62.6% had 
investments in one enterprise, while 25.4% had investments in two enterprises, 
leaving 12.0% of the BMs with investments in 3 or more enterprises. However, the 
amount of power that the BMs whose investments in one enterprise shared was only 
17.2% of the total power C, while the proportion of power that was shared among 
the BMs whose investments were in 3 or more enterprises stood at 47.8%.70 
Based on the distribution of power C and on the points that each BM scored, 
one could argue that 362 BMs occupy the core of the BMs according to the 
application of power C. The average power points that each of the 362 members 
has is 2.0 points, compared to 0.26 points that each of the remaining BMs obtains. 
This discrepancy between the averages of the two groups indicates that a BM in the 
former group had a capacity to act that was 1 0 fold than that at the disposal of the 
BMs of the second group. These members, who made up around 5.9% of the entire 
BMs and 32.7% of the total Power C points, are those who had investments in 4 or 
more enterprises. Analyzing the members within the core reveals some interesting 
trends. For instance, the great majority of them were males, since only 10.6% of the 
group's number was made up of women, who shared only 10.1% of its total power 
points. The members whose NF relatives were BMs obtain the great majority of the 
core number and power points (79.6% and 82.3% respectively) , while 17.4% of the 
group number and 14.2% of the power points are assigned to the non-NF relative 
BMs. Among these NFs, there were 24 whose members' power points sum was 6.5 
or more for each NF, making up together a significant 38.3% of the total power 
points.71 As for power A and power B, the members who had the highest score in 
70 The fact that a substantial proportion of the sum of power C points is concentrated in the 
domain of the BMs who owned investments in one enterprise or two is due to Power C being designed 
to give 0.1 points for the first enterprise and 0.5 for those whose investments were in two enterprises. 
Since the majority of the BMs are of this type, this led to inflating the Power points of these members. 
If the formula. for instance, had been based on giving one point to every enterprise in which the BMs 
had investments apart from the first one (whose presence is a condition for its belonging to the BMs 
domain), almost 2/3 of the power points would have ended in the hands of these 362 members. 
71 The NFs that scored the most points among the 24 families are Muhammad 'ali Badiir, NF, 
who recorded the highest score at 24.2, followed by Saamii 'A.§.fuur (20.6). Al-ma'ashar (20.2),Abd-ai-
Hamiid Al-adlbii (19.7), Mahmuud Abu al-dhahab (19.3), Abudallah ai-Bilbaisii (17.2), Husiin Abu al-
raagnils-(15.1), Yuusif Al-taahir (1'3.5}, Abd-al-haadii Hammuudah (10.5), Khaliil Manguu (10.1) and 
Sa'd Abu jaabir (1 0.0). All of these NFs apart from one belonged to the pre-1948 circres. The great 
majority of them appeared as the most significant families in the Power A and Power B core groups. 
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power C were mainly from the pre-1948 circles, and NF relatives in the bourgeoisie 
domain.72 They also appeared in the top core of power A, of Power B or of both. 
5 .2.4 POWER D 
Power D is a parameter that makes a distinction among the BMs according to 
the number of economic sectors over which their investments stretch. It was 
mentioned in chapter 3 that there is a correlation between the number of sectors, in 
which a BM has investments and the economic power of that member. Figures 
about the BMs of this period confirm such a proposition. For instance, 81.3% of the 
BMs have investments in only one sector. The percentage of the one sector BMs' 
equities to the total BMs' equities stood at 43.5%; however, some of these 
investments were in more than one enterprise. 73 Such a percentage is modest 
considering that less than 12.0% of the BMs whose investments were in more than 
one sector held 56.5% of the total BM equities. In fact, less than 1.5% of the BMs 
whose investments were in 4 sectors or more had 26.3% of the total BM equities. 
The differentiation between the number and equities of one-sector BMs and those of 
multi-sector BMs is not only an overall phenomenon. In each economic sector, the 
majority of the BMs are based in that selfsame economic sector; however, the 
equities of this majority are usually fewer than those belonging to the BMs of that 
sector that had investments in other sectors.14 Using the power parameters A. B and 
C shows that, in each economic sector, multi-sector BMs have double the score that 
sole-sector BMs have in that sector. As was introduced in chapter 3, Power D is 
calculated as follows: 
Power 0 of a given BM= (n)*(n}/10 
n is the number of the economic sectors and ranges between 1 and 10 
72 
·auunii .t!ajaazii1 (6.5), Juudat Sha'shaa'ah (6.1 ). Asbiiruu .t!adaad4 (6.1 ), Sha!laadah AI-
Iuuaat (6.1 ). Yuusif At-ma'ashar (5.3), Muhammad 'ali Badiir (5. 7) and his son 'l§.aam (5.3), 'Abd ai-
Majiid .t!ajaazii1 and Kamaat (5.3). 
73 More than a thousand BMs who were based in one sector had Investments in more than 
<:me-enterprise. This will be looked at in· details in the section that-deals with the composition of the 
bourgeoisie at the economic sector level. 
74 See table 3/ Appendix 1 0 
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Figure 5-7: The Ratio of the BMs' Number and Equities According to their Number of 
Sectors to t he Total BMs' Number and Equi t ies 
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Applying Power D shows that the maximum number of sectors that a BM was 
involved in was 6 sectors. Only 8 BMs had investments in 6 sectors together. The 
majority of BMs (96.1 %) had 0.1 or 0.4 points on this scale, corresponding to their 
mvolvement in one or two sectors. In fact, 81.3% of the BMs had one-sector 
investments, while the percentage of those whose investments were in two sectors 
was 14.8%. On the contrary, only 238 BMs (i.e. 3.9%) had investments in 3 to 6 
different sectors. These 238, who, this study argues, can be considered as the core 
group of the BMs according to Power D, share around 27.0% of the total power D 
points. A simple comparison shows that the average power D points that each of 
the 238 members has is 1.3, while it is 0.14 for each of the remaining members. 75 
Concerning the composition of the Power D core group, gender distribution 
was similar to that of the previous core parameters, where the female members 
were merely 22, making up 9.2% numberwise and sharing 8.9% of core total points. 
Generally, having NF relatives has a great deal of impact on the composition of the 
power D core group. Only 24 members, that is 10.0% of the core's total number, did 
not have NF relatives as part of the bourgeoisie, sharing 8.1% of the core's total 
power points. This indicates that the majority of the core's number and power was in 
the hands of the members who had some NF relatives among the BMs. 
75 The same reasons that were given to explain the concentratron of power C pornts can apply 
here. The fact that 0.1 points were given to any BM whose investments were of the sole-sector type is 
a necessary condition without which the member in question would not be considered a BM. In fact, if 
the formula had been based on giving one point to every sector that a BM had investments in apart 
from the first one, which is the condition for its belonging to the BMs' domain, 40 of the power points 
would have ended up rn the hands of these 238 members. 
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5.2.5 POWER E 
Power E, as was argued in chapter 3, was advanced to balance power D, 
which assigned a certain score to each BM according to the number of the sectors 
among which that BM's investments were distributed without any consideration for 
the proportion of these investments to the totality of the investments in that sector. 
Power E is calculated to give each BM a score based on the proportion of their 
investments to the totality in that sector. 
Power E= Sum (0.3*([BM equities/ equities of a sector]/100) 
Applying Power E shows that the great majority of BMs (99.1 %) had power 
points on the scale that range between 0.0 and 0.9, while only 56 members have 1 
or more points. These 56 members assume among themselves 68.5% of the sum of 
Power E points, which means that 99.1% of the BMs share only 31 .5% of the sum 
points of this scale. In this context. it is possible to assume that the group of 56 
members is dominant among the BMs according to the application of this scale. 38 
out of these 56 members belonged to 10 NFs, while the remaining 18 had no 
nuclear relatives among the same group. The core composition reveals that the 
members with NF relatives as part of the BMs were dominant: only 7.% of the core's 
number had no BM relatives, sharing a trivial 0.43% of the core's total points. 
5.2.6 THE ECONOMIC POWER (POWER I) 
The economic power 'Power il' is the sum of the points that each BM scored 
in all power parameters covered above. 
Power of BM = BM [Power A+ Power B+ Power C+ Power 0+ Power E] 
The power scale index shows a great deal of differentiation between the BMs 
according to the points that each of them scored on the scale. Whilst the majority of 
the BMs are concentrated around a score that ranges between 0.2 and 0.5 points, 
the scale shows that there are BMs whose Power points stretch between 10.0 and 
24.0 points. When these points are conceived as a measure to reflect the assets 
that each BM had, and therefore their capacity to act, the difference between those 
who lie at the bottom of the scale and those who occupy the upper part of the scale 
is clearly considerable. Drawing the line that can distinguish those who are more 
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influential from those who are less influential within the BM domain according to this 
scale appears to be a difficult task, since any power point can be chosen as a 
dividing line and any choice can be justified. Therefore, this study assumes that 
those who score the highest points when Power I is applied, and whose total points 
make up more than 50.0% of the BMs' total points, are the most powerful group 
within the BM domain.76 In this context, the Power scale can distinguish three main 
groups. The first group occupies the upper part of the Power scale and includes 
16.2% of the BMs; these share between them 50.7% of the sum of Power points, 
and their Power score ranges between 2.8 and 24.8. The second group contains 
the majority of the BMs at 59.3%; it is concentrated in the lower part of the scale, 
where each member scores between 0.2 and 1.0 points. This group shares 16.7% 
of the total Power points, that is around 1/3 of the percentage of the first group. The 
third group contains the BMs who occupy the middle ground between the first two, 
where the range of power is 1.1 to 2. 7 points. This group includes 24.8% of the 
BMs, sharing 32.6% of the total power points. Using such an approach to 
distinguish between these groups resulted in the first group containing a wide range 
of members, to the extent that the same group can be divided into subgroups. 
However, the generosity in including members whose score was far lower than 
others is motivated by a desire to avoid missing out any influential members. 
Despite such generosity, there was still a great deal of distinction between the 
groups. Firstly, most members are concentrated in the second and third group, 
where less power is shared between the members; while in contrast, in the first 
group a small number of BMs share a majority of Power points. The average power 
points that a member of each group assumes is 4.3 points in the first, 0.39 in the 
second and 1.8 in the third. A simple comparison shows that a member of the first 
group assumes a score or capacity to act equivalent to 11 times that of a member of 
the second group and 2.8 times that of a member of the third group.17 In other 
words, a first group member assumes an economic power equivalent to 2.8 and 11 
times a third and a second group member respectively. 
Analyzing the patterns of the first group, which is considered to be the Power 
I core group, the core members' distribution into economic sectors shows an almost 
76 See Table (10), Appendix 10 
17 For instance, 117 BMs scored between 6 and 24.8 points on the scale, making the average 
power of each of them 9.5, and as few as 41 BMs have a score of 10 points or above, with an 
average of 12.9 points, which is almost 33.6 times that that each member in the first group scored. 
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even division between those whose investments were in one sector and those 
whose investments were in more than one sector. 52.6% of the core members, 
holding 53.1% of the total core power I points, were those who could be considered 
as multi sector members. The distribution of one-sector members according to their 
economic sectors shows that the great majority of these members were commerce 
based. The proportion of each of the one-sector members to the core's number and 
power points apart from commerce (40.9% and 38.8% respectively) was 
insignificant. 78 This could be attributed to the fact that commerce was the bosom of 
the bourgeoisie activities and to the late development of other sectors in comparison 
with commerce, which led the commercial bourgeoisie to be the pioneers in the new 
emerging sectors. It indicates, moreover, that commerce was still a focal sector that 
could provide its members with economic power and with the ability to compete with 
multi-sector members. It was apparent that the multi-sector members scored far 
higher than their counterparts who were based in one sector. For instance, none of 
the above-mentioned core members79 was based in just one sector. Among the 195 
members with the highest Power I score, there were only 19 one-sector members, 
18 of which were in commerce. The highest score that a one-sector member scored 
was 7.4 points; this is the commerce BM Abdrabah Gharaaybah. 
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Figure 5-9 : The Rallo of One-Sector Power I Core BMs' Number and Power I Points in 
Each Economic Sector to that of One-Sector BMs 
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Gender composition shows that the great majority of the core members were 
males at 94. 7%, sharing 94.4% of the power points. The females' trivial contribution 
and the males' dominance in the core group can be seen through the fact that the 
average points that each of the 39 female members were 3.9, which is below the 
general average of the core. In fact, the maximum points that any of the female 
members scored was below 7.0 points80, compared to 72 male members whose 
score exceeded such a figure. The great majority of the female members had male 
NF relatives, such as fathers, husbands or brothers, in the core.8 ' This indicates that 
the NF connection could have been one of the factors that brought them around. 
For example, the members who scored the highest points among the females were 
Huda and Hand Badiir, daughters of Muhammad 'Ali badiir. Diiaana, daughter of 
Juudah Suuaadii, Aiily, daughter of Miishieal al-~uu§.ah and 'Abiir, daughter of Muniir 
ai-Sakhtiyaan. 
As was noticed in the core groups of the other parameters, the BMs with NF 
relatives were more influential. 44.9% of the core's members had NF relatives 
among the bourgeoisie, sharing 52.6% of the total power points.82 The average 
power score of the core BMs with NF relatives was 5.0 points, compared to 3.4 
bodies 
80 The majonty of the female members had scores of less than 5 potnts. 
81 Only 5 female members lacked NF relatives in the core. 
112 47.4% of the Power I points were shared by BMs with no NF relatives and corporate 
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points of those with no NF relatives. 83 Among those who had the highest score in 
Power I, only 40 members out of 195 had no NF relatives. The power points that 
they scored were below 9.0 points. Only four members with no NF relatives scored 
more than 9 points: 'Wnii Al-hijaazii1 (17.09 points)84, Mu!lammad Beni-Haanii 
(16.59) 85, Sabrii Hakiim2 (10.54) 86, Friij ai-Sha!laatiit (10.29). 87 On the contrary, 
there were 44 members who had some NF relatives among the BMs and scored 
more than 9 points. Among these are families like Mu!lammad 'Ali Bidiir (70. 7 
points & 6 members), Al-ma'ashar (55.7 & 6), Husiin Abu al-raaghib (47.7 & 7), 
Muniir ai-Sakhtiyaan (47.1 & 4), Saamii A§.fuur ( 45.6 & 6), Yuusif Al-taahir (38.0 &8), 
Sa'd Abu jaabir (37.4 &4) Abd-ai-Haadii Hammuudah (33.1& 5), Manmuud Abu al-
dhahab (32.1 & 5), Ruu!lii Sha'shaa'ah (30.3 & 2), Abudallah ai-Bilbaisii (30.1 & 8), 
Abd-ai-Rahman Abu Hassaan (28.2 & 3), Khaliil Manguu (26.0 &4). In addition to 
the conclusion that the BMs with NF relatives were more influential than those 
without, these NFs gave their members another dimension of power that was not 
available to those without relatives among the bourgeoisie.88 
5.2 .7 NUCLEAR FAMILY POWER 
NF power is a power parameter that was advanced to calculate the power 
points of individual BMs who belonged to the same NF. It is assumed that the NF, 
as a social entity that is used by the BMs to carry out their investments, can be 
considered as a structure serving their interest. As the application of the previous 
power parameters showed, the core groups can be subdivided according to whether 
their members had NF ties within the domain of the BMs. The task of this parameter 
83 37 out of the 83 families contained 2 members, 17 contained 3 members and 10 contained 
4 members. 
84 His economic base was in transportation; however, his investments stretched to cover 
manufacturing, construction, commerce and services. 
65 His main economic base was in the lrbid District electricity com., with further investments in 
commerce and finance. 
68 He was involved in manufacturing, commerce and transportation. 
87 He had investments in construction, commerce and services. 
68 This can be seen from the average power I points of each member of a certain NF, that 
was as high as 15.4 points in the case of the Ruu!J.il Sha'shaa'ah, 12.4 for each member of the 
Shuukat Asfuur and 11.8 in the case of the Muniir a/-Sakhtiyaa and Mu!J.ammad 'Ali Bidiir NFs. 
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is to distinguish the BMs who had the possibility of using NF ties as a ground for 
their interest from those who did not. 
NF Power: Sum Power BM1+ Power 8M2+ .... + Power BMn 
N Is the number of the members of a given NF 
Applying NF Power to the BMs shows that there were 760 NFs. A Simple 
majority (53.7%) of BMs' number was made up of those members whose NF 
relatives appeared in the domain of the bourgeoisie. These share 51.7% of the total 
points of power I. 
The power score of these families ranges from an insignificant score of less 
than 1.089 to more than 30.0 points.90 Using the sum of NF Power as an indicator 
shows that the majority of the families (465 families, 61 .2%) concentrate around 
scores of less than 4.5 points.91 Only 130 families (17.1 %) shared the majority of the 
aggregate power points (52.1%).92 Hence, almost % of NFs had a score of less than 
9 points, sharing less than half of the total power points. In terms of average, each 
of the NFs whose power points are 9 or more scored 17.7 points, compared to 3.4 
points for each family of less than 9 points, and only 2.3 points for each of those who 
scored 4.5 points or less. This clearly creates a great deal of distinction between the 
NFs, since the NF Power is a scale that measures the economic power of the 
families, i.e. their capacity to act. One can claim that a league of the 24 families are 
certainly out of proportion with respect to the remaining families in regard to their 
capacity to act and to the influence that they possessed within the bourgeoisie 
domain. 
Based on the fact that the families that scored 9 points or more made up the 
majority of the aggregate power points and the majority of the total equities of the 
NFs (82.0%), one can argue that these families are the core group of the NF power 
parameter. The pattern that reoccurs in the majority of the families is that 2 or 3 
members have a great deal of power I points, which leads to that family having high 
score, while the other members are of lesser significance. The power assumed by 
69 There were 93 NFs whose score ranged between 0.2 and 0.9 points. 
90 12 families scored above 30 points. the highest score being 73.4 points. 
i1 4.5 points-was the averageofthepower·l core-grot:Jp. 
92 These families scored 9 points or more, which is at least twice as the average of power r 
core group. 
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an NF is therefore generated by the high score of some members and by the 
relatively large number of family members. The ratio of the NF power points per 
family member rarely exceeds 4.5 points. For instance, though Muhammad 'Ali 
Bidiir's NF points are the highest at 73.6, the average NF power points that each 
member of the family has does not exceed 4.5, i.e. the average of the power I core 
group. 
The NFs who have the highest scores according to the NF power are 
Muhammad 'Ali Bidiir (73.6)93, Al-ma'ashar (63.6)94 , Yuusif Al-!aahir (55.6)95 , Husiin 
Abu al-raaghib (50.0)96 , Muniir ai-Sakhtiyaan (48.0)97 , Saamii A.§.fuur (46.5)98 , Sa'd 
Abu Jaabir (39.8)99 , Ruuhii Sha'shaa'ah (36.2)'cx\ Abd-al-haadii Hammuudah 
(33.4)101, Abd-ai-Ranman Abu !lassaan (33.3)102 , Mahmuud Abu al-dhahab (32.1 )103, 
Khaliil Manguu (31. 7)'0<1, Abudallah ai-Bilbaisii (30.1 ros. 
93 It consists of 16 members (9 females), 3 of whom were part of the Power I core group. It 
had 75 investments stretching over 22 enterprises and covering all economic sectors with the 
exception of agriculture and real estate. Their economic base was in electricity and wholesale, before 
it extended to insurance, construction and mining. 
94 It consists of 15 members (5 females), 5 of whom were in the power I core group. It had 67 
investments in 25 enterprises, covering all sectors except for agriculture, electricity and services. 
Originally, its economic base was wholesale, before it extended to manufacturing (mainly clothing), 
construction and banking. 
95 It consists of 27 members (9 females) , 2 of whom power I core group BMs. It had 71 
investments in 16 enterprises, and mainly in retails, beverage & chemical manufacturing, 
constructions, banking, road transports and hotels. 
96 It consists of 11 members (3 females), of whom 4 power I core group BMs. It had 46 
investments 1n 13 enterprises. Its economic base was laid in the 1930s in the retails sector, before it 
encroached on wholesale, construction, banking and insurance. 
97 It consists of 5 members (2 females). of whom 2 power I core group BMs. It had 18 
investments in 5 enterprises in chemical & food manufacturing, real estate and road transports. 
98 It consists of 7 members (3 females), 3 of whom power I core group BMs. It had 57 
investments in 15 enterprises in chemical, textiles, tobacco manufacturing, real estate, road 
transports, wholesale and banking. This family was active in trade in Trans-Jordan since 1920s. 
99 It consists of 10 members (3 females). 3 of whom power I core group BMs. It had 35 
investments in 22 enterprises based in food & beverages manufacturing, retails, hotels. construction, 
insurance and banking. This family had been active as large landholders, trade and money in Trans-
Jordan before the establishment of the state . 
100 It consists of 7 members (1 female}, 1 of whom power I core group BM. It had 33 
investments in 22 enterprises based in wholesale and retails trade, textiles, banking, insurance. Its 
economic activities went back to the 1930s in Trans-Jordan. 
101 It consists of 6 members (0 females), 5 of whom power I core group BMs. It had 28 
investments in 11 enterprises based in agriculture. food manufacturing, services, road transports, 
insurance, retails and export & imports. 
102 It consists of 1 0 members (4 females), 3 of whom Qower I core group BMs. It had 28 
investments in 15 enterprises based in construction materials, chemicals, textiles and food 
manufacturing, services, sea transports, wholesale, retails and insurance. This family was active in 
trade in Trans-Jordan since the 1920s. 
286 
5.2.8 POWER II 
The NF power made a distinction between those members who had NF 
relatives within the domain of the BMs and those who did not. It also shows that 
there are differences in the economic Power of the different NFs. The focus here 
shifts to the impact that NF ties had on the individual BMs. 
The Power II parameter allows one to calculate the power points of each BM 
taking into account the points of the NF that BM belonged to. Hence power II for BM 
whose NF relatives appear in the BMs domain is: 
BM Power II: 1/10*(NF Power Points- BM Power I points)+ BM Power I Points 
when the BM has no NF relatives, it is calculated as follows: 
BM Power II: BM Power I Points 
When the Power II parameter is applied, the power II points of almost half of 
the BMs who had no NF relatives remains the same as was recorded in power I. 
The Power II score of the remaining members who had NF relatives has improved 
compared to their Power I record. This improvement varies from one BM to another, 
and is conditioned by the NF power points and Power I points that each individual 
member recorded. The improvement was more noticeable when the power I of a 
given member was low, while his/her NF power points was high. The opposite result 
is obtained by the BMs whose power I points were high, while their NF power points 
were low. Interestingly, more than 100 members whose power I points were less 
than 2.8106 had a score of more than 4 points on Power II . 41 members, whose 
score in power I ranged between 0.2 and 0.9 points. benefited from the high score of 
103 It consists of 5 members (0 females), 3 of whom power I core group BMs. It had 52 
investments in 12 enterprises based in retails, plastic, clothing, paper and packaging manufacturing. 
This family was active in trade in Trans-Jordan since the 1920s. 
104 It consists of 17 members (9 females), 2 of Whom power I core group BMs. It had 28 
investments in 15 enterprises based in construction materials, chemicals, textiles and food 
manufacturing, services, sea transports, wholesale, retails and insurance. 
105 It consists of 8 members (4 females), 1 of whom power I core group BM. It had 49 
investments in 10 enterprises based in retails, plastic and chemical manufacturing and road 
transports. This family was aotive·in-tradein·TFans-Jordan since·the-1-920s. 
106 2.8 points or more was considered to be the line that qualified the BMs to be part of the 
power I core group. 
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their NFs jumping to more than 4.0 points in power 11.107 By contrast, the difference 
between the power I and power II points for the members whose power I scores 
were high was less significant.108 
The overall distribution of power II points among the BMs shows similar 
trends to that of power I. The variation in the distribution of power II points among 
the BMs was even larger than that of Power I. 45.1% of the BMs' score ranged 
between 0.2 and 0.9 points, sharing only 11 .7% of the total power II points. The 
same percentage of power points was held by 107 BMs whose score was 8.0 points 
or more. The average power II points of each BM of the latter group stood at 11 .8 
points which, when compared to the 0.05 point average of the former group, tells the 
entire story of the differentiation between the BMs' capacity to act. Some substantial 
proportion of the power points were concentrated in the hands of the BMs whose 
score ranged between 1.0 and 3.0 points; however, the concentration reflected the 
large number of members within the limit of this range. In fact, the average power II 
was only 2.2 points, that is less than the 2.8 points in power I. Hence. this study 
argues that the core group of BMs applying the power II parameter includes those 
members whose score was 4 points or more. These are 528 (8.8%) members, 
sharing almost one third of the power II points at an average of 6.6 points, which is 
more than three times the average points of the entire BMs. 
The composition of the core group indicates that the proportion of the female 
members, both in terms of power points and number, was almost 1/10 that of the 
males, i.e. 11 .7%. Although the male members had the upper hand, the female 
proportion of the core group of power II was three times more than that of Power I. 
The shift in their proportion can be entirely attributed to the points that some of them 
gained from their belonging to NFs with a strong family power score. 109 
107 Nadiim, (0.9 in power I & 7.2 in Power II), Nabiil (0.9 & 7.2), 'Amaad (0.9 & 7.2), Ramazii 
(0.2 & 6.5) and Faars (0.2 & 6.5) from the Al-ma'ashar brothers NF. Farnaan, {0.8 &4.7), Qiis (0.2 & 
4.2), Tim (0.2 & 4.2) and Marwaan (0.2 & 4.2) from Sa'd Abu jaabir. Nu'maan (0.9 & 5.5) from Saamii 
A!fuur. 'Aadii (0.8 & 5. 7) and tlusiin Abu aJ-raaghib. 'Auunii (0. 7 & 4.3) Ruuhil Sha'shaa'ah. Zakariiaa 
(0.5 & 6.0), Naajahl.0.4& 5.9), lbraheem ( 0.2 & 5.7), !:faamad (0.2 & 5.8) and tlusiin (0.2 & 5.7) from 
Yuusif Al-!aahir. Iaariq (0.2 & 7.5) and Yuusif (0.2 & 7.5) from Muhammad 'Ali Bidiir. 
108 These are members whose score at power I and power II were the highest. Zahiir 'A!fuur (24.8 & 
25.2), Fwaad Abu Jaabir (20.16 & 22.1) Juudat Sha'shaa'ah (1 9.62 & 21 .3), 'Uthmaan Bidiir (19.31 & 
24.7), Ghliaath AI-Sakhtiyaan (17.60 & 20.6), Munjd AI-Sakhtiyaan (17.01 & 20.1), Kamaal 'A!fuur 
(16.28 & 19.3), Shuuqii 'A!fuur (14.45 & 17.7). Shanaadah Al-tuwaal (15.69 & 16.3), Asbiirw Hadaad4 
(14\.42 & 14.5), Jack Al-khayy-aat2 (14.21 & 15.0), Alllas At~ma'!:fstfar-(19729 & 23.7). 
i09 Ghaadah (0.9 & 7.2), Huda (0.9 & 7.2) and Julie (0.3 & 6.6) from Al-ma'ashar borthers. Baasamh 
(0.7 & 4.6) and Miirii (0.2 & 4.2) from Sa'd Abu jaabir. Daarah (0.3 & 5.8), Ziin (0.3 & 5.8), Hanaa' (.3 
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Concerning the economic sectors, it is clear that the main component of the 
core was multi-sector based members. They made up the great majority of the core 
members (74.5%), sharing 79.8% of the power points, while the members who were 
based in one sector had 1/5 of the power points. Compared to the power I core 
group, the multi-sector members of this core group yielded far more power points. 
The average power points of a multi-sector BM was 7.1 points, compared to the 5.3 
of the sole-sector member. Only 11 of the one-sector members' power points 
exceeded 7.0 points, 9 of which belonged to the Muhammad 'Ali Badiir NF, which 
contained other members who were categorized as multi-sector. The other 2 
members were Abdrabah Gharaaybah (7.4) 110 and Sa'iid Malhas (7.3 polnts}111 • 
The overall distribution of the core group in the economic sectors shows that 
commerce (29.6% power points, 34.0% number) and manufacturing (21 .8% and 
22.6%) shared the main proportion of the power II points and number. The share of 
construction, finance, transportation and services was around 10.0% of the power 
points and number. The proportion of the core group in sectors such as agriculture 
real estate. mining and electricity was insignificant. The proportion of multi-sector 
members in both the number and power of the core was similar to that of the core 
distribution, while that of the one-sector members was of no significance. The one-
sector members who had the largest share of power points and number were those 
who were involved in commerce. In fact, around 2/3 of the power points (63.2%) 
and number (68.1 %) of the sole-sector members were in commerce. Manufacturing 
was the second sector, absorbing 13.1% and 11 .9% of the power points and number 
of the sole-sector BMs. The remaining 20-25% of number and power points were 
distributed among the different sectors. 
& 5.6) and Zakaa' (0.3 & 5.8) form Yuusif Al-!aahir. Haalah (0.2 & 7 .5), Ruuz (0.2 & 7.5), Najla' (0.2 & 
7.5), Miisam (0.2 & 7.5), Ranaa (0.2 & 7.5}, Diina (0.2 & 7.5) and Nada (0.2 & 7.5) from Muhammad 
'Ali Bidlir. Su'aad (0.2 & 5.2), and Amal (0.2 & 5.2) from tlusiin Abu ai-Raaghib. 
110 He had 4 enterprises based in commerce. 
111 He had 4 enterprises based in commerce and his activities stretches back to the pre 1948 
Jordan. 
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Figure 5-10: The Ratio of Power I and Power I I Core Groups BMs' Power Points and 
Number According to the Gender 
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On the top of the power I and power II core groups were the following BMs 
who scored the highest points in the two parameters and this study consider them to 
be the most influential BMs. Zahiir 'A2fuur (25.2 Power II & 24.8 power 1)112, Fwaad 
Abu Jaabir (22.1 & 20.2)113, Juudat (21.3 & 19.6) and Usaamah Sha'shaa'ah (13.3 & 
10.7r14, 'Uthmaan (24.7 & 19.3) 'l2aam (20.8 & 15.0), Mu!J.ammad (20.1 & 14.2), 
'Umar (16.5 & 10.2), Huda (13.5 & 6.8), Hand (12.1 & 5.2)115 , Aliias (23.7 & 19.3 ) , 
Yuusif (19.2 & 14.3 ), Sa'iid (13.4 & 7.9) and Jamiil (11 .8 & 6.1)116, Ghiiaath AI-
Sakhtiyaan (20.6 & 17.6), Munjd AI-Sakhtiyaan (20.1 & 17.0)117 , 'Wnii Al-hijaazii1 
(17.1 & 17.1r18, Muhammad Beni-Haanii (16.6 & 16.6)119, Kamaal (19.3 & 16.3) and 
112 He is part of the Shuukat Asfuur NF. His activities go back to the 1930s in commerce; 
however, his investments during this period were in 12 enterprises and covered also Manufctruing , 
Transportation and Finance. Muslim from Palestinian origin. 
113 He belongs to the Sa'd Abu jaabir family. This family had been active as large 
landholders, trade and money in Trans-Jordan before the establishment of the state. 
114 Ruuhii Sha'shaa'ah had 33 investments in 22 enterprises based in wholesale and retails 
trade, textiles, banking, insurance. Its economic activities go back to the 1930s in Trans-Jordan. 
Muslim from Palestinian origin . 
115 all of these members belong to Mu)}ammad 'Ali Bidiir. Their economic base was in 
electricity and wholesale, before it stretched to insurance, construction and mining. During this period 
Mu)}ammad 'Ali Bidiir himself was the chairman of the Jordanin Electricty Co. and big shareholder of 
the Jordanian Insurance Co. where he was on the board of directors. He was also the president of 
Amman chamber of commerce. Muslim from Syrian origin. 
116 Al-ma'ashar. Originally, the economic base was wholesale before it stretched to 
manufacturing mainly clothing, construction and banking. Christian from Jordanian origin. 
117 Muniir ai-Sakhtiyaan. He had 18 investments in 5 enterprises in chemical & food 
manufacturing, real estate and road transports. Muslim from Palestinian origin 
118 Wnli Al-hijaazii1 is part of the newcomers, his investments are based in construction and 
transportation. 
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Shuuqii 'A§fuur (17.7 & 14.5r20 , Shahaadah Al-tuwaal (16.3 &15.7) 121 , Asbiirw 
Hadaad4 (14.5 & 14.4), Jack Al-khayyaat2 (15.0 & 14.2)122, Tuufiiq Al-tabbaa' (15.0 
& 13.5)123, Ahamad Khuurmaa (13.2 & 13.1), 'Abd-ai-Majiid Al-hijaazii1 (13.0 & 12.3), 
Raduuaan ai-Hajaar (12.3 & 12.2)124, Farah Tamaarii (12.5 & 11 .9)125 , Hasaan 
Manguu (13.8 & 11 .8)126, Muusa ( 15.1 & 11 .2), 'Ali (13.2 & 9.1) and Khaliil Abu al-
raaghib (11 .5 & 7.3)127, Mamdwh (13.4 & 11 .2), Khaalad Abu Hassaan (12.4 & 
10.11)128, 'Abd-al-haadii Hammuudah (13.4 & 11 .2)129, Fariid ai-Sa'd (11 .1 & 10.8)130, 
Sabrii Hakiim2 (10.5 & 10.54), Muhammad (15.0 & 10.5) and Yuusif Al-!aahir (11.4 & 
6.5)131 , Aiiliiiaa Nuql (11 .8 & 10.3)132, Khaalad ai-Rifaa'ii1 (1 0.4 & 1 0.3) 133 , lbraheem 
Al-shaykh (11.1 & 10.3)134 , Friij ai-Shahaatiit (10.3 & 10.3), Raadii Al-kha§aawnah 
(11 .0 & 10.0)135, Tuufiiq Qataan (10.8 & 10.0)136, 'Aadal Abu Khjail (10.4 & 10.0), 
119 Muhammad Beni-Haanii economic activities is from 1950s. his main economic base is in 
lrbid District Electricity Co. Muslim from Jordanian origin. 
120 Saamii Asfuur. He had investments in 15 enterprises in chemicals. textiles, tobacco 
manufacturing, real estate, road transports, wholesale and banking. This family was active in trade in 
Trans-Jordan since 1920s. Muslim from Palestinian origin. 
121 Shahaadah Al-tuwaal, Christian from Jordanian origin, his activities goes back to the pre-
1948. his base is in transportation, commerce and banking. 
122 Jack Al-khayyaat2. Christian from Palestinian origin. 
123 Sabrll Al-tabbaa'. Muslim from Syrian origin. His activities dates back to pre-1948 Jordan. 
Economic base in commerce. Construction and services. 
124 Aaraf AI-Hajaar. Muslim from Syrian origin, his activities dates back to pre1948 in Jordan, 
his economic base is in construction and commerce. 
125 Wahba Tamaarli. Christian from Palestinian origin, his activites goes back to the mandate 
Palestine. His economic base commerce and insurance 
128 Khalil! Manguu. construction materials, chemicals, textiles and food manufacturing, 
services, sea transports. wholesale, retails and insurance. The main base for his economic activities 
was the real estate and housing company Rivko. Muslim from Palestinian origin. 
127 Husiin Abu al-raaghib. Its economic base began in 1930s with retails before it encroached 
wholesale, construction, banking and insurance. Muslim from Syrian origin. 
128 Abd-ai-Rahman Abu hassaan. based in construction materials chemical , textiles and food 
manufacturing, services, sea transports, wholesale, retails and insurance . This family is active trade 
in trans-Jordan since 1920s. 
129 Abd-al-haadii Hammuudah. 28 investments in 11 enterprises based agriculture, food 
manufacturing, services, road transports. insurance. retails and export & imports. 
130 Fariid ai-Sa'd Muslim from Palestinian origin, his economic power goes back to the 
mandate Palestine. His economic base in manufacturing and commerce. 
131 Yuusif Al-taahir had 71 investments in 16 enterprises mainly in retai ls, beverage & 
chemical manufacturing, constructions, banking, road transports and hotels. 
132 Qustandii Nuql. Christian from Palestinian origin. His economic base in commerce and 
manfuctaring. 
133 ai-Rifa~'ii1 .Borthers . Muslim from Palestinian orig,.:.:.in:.:... __ _ 
·--------------
134 Ahamd Al-shaykh. Muslim from Palestinian origin. 
135 Raadii Al-kha.saawnah. Musli;, from Jordanian origin. 
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Mwriis Al-~awaalhah (1 0.0 & 10.0)131, Fwaad Ianuus (1 0.4 9.7)138, 'Auunii Al-saakat 
(10.0 & 9.5)139 , 'Abduallah Malhas (10.7 & 9.3) 1~. Sabiih ai-Ma~rii (10.1 & 9.2).,., 
5.3 BOURGEOISIE FRACTIONS 
A Categorization of the bourgeoisie of this period into three main fractions 
based on the historical background of its members was advanced in chapter 3. It 
shows that 56.1% of the BMs' number were considered to be newcomers, while the 
proportion of pre-1948 Jordanian bourgeoisie and pre-1948 Palestinians made up 
21 .1% and 18.8% respectively. Where equities are concerned, the pre-1948 
Jordanians and Palestinians make up the majority at 36.6% and 18.0% respectively. 
The newcomers' proportion of the total equities was still substantial at 38.8%. 
Application of power I shows that the newcomers hold the majority of its sum points 
at 53.8%, followed by the pre-1948 Palestinians at 21.9% and the pre-1948 
Jordanians at 17.2%. However, the average power of each pre-1948 Jordanian BM 
stood at 1. 7 points, followed closely by that of the newcomers at 1.4 and pre-1948 
Palestinians at 1.2. The Power I core group majority was made up of newcomer 
bourgeoisie at 59.5%, sharing among them 53.2% of the power I points, while the 
pre-1948 Jordanian and Palestinian bourgeoisies constituted respectively 20.4% and 
18.0% numberwise and 25.4% and 18.6% pointwise. However, the core members 
with the highest score were non-newcomers.1" 2 
Looking at the bourgeoisie fractions in the core groups of each of the power 
parameters shows that the pre-1948 Jordanian and Palestinian bourgeoisie held the 
majority of the power A, C and D points at 74.2%, 74.3% and 71 .1%, curtailing the 
136 Tuufiiq Qataan his activites back to pre 1948 palestine. His economic base is in commerce 
and manufacturing. 
137 Lwiis Al-sawaalhah. Christian from Jordanian origin. His economic activities is based in 
commerce and services. 
138 Saliimaan Ianuus. 
139 
'Ali Al-saakat. Muslim from Jordanian origin. His activities in commerce and construction. 
140 Kaamal Malhas. Muslim from Syrian origin, his activies goes back to pre 1948 jordan. His 
economic base is in commerce, construction and services. 
141 Taahar Al-masrii. Muslim from Palestinian origin, his activites dates back to pre-1948 
palestine. Economic base Is In commerce and manufacturing. 
142 Among the members who scored 5 poiQts or m_or~ ~ce Zahiir 'A§fuur (24.8), Fwaad Abu 
Jaabir (20.2), Juudat Sha'shaa'ah (19.6), 'Uthmaan Bidiir (19.3), Alilas Al-ma'ashar (19.3), Kamaal 
'A§fuur (16.3), Sha!laadah Al-tuwaal (15.7), 'l.§.aam Bidiir (14.9), Shuuqii 'A§fuur (14. 5), Asbiirw 
.t!adaad4 (14.4), Yuusif Al-ma'ashar (14.3), Jack Al-khayyaat2 (14.2) and Muhammad Bidiir (14.2). 
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proportion of newcomers to around a quarter in each. On the contrary, the 
newcomers had 68.7% of the power B points, while the pre-1948 Palestinian and 
Jordanian bourgeoisies held 15.1% and 14.5% respectively. The distribution of the 
power E points among core group members was almost even between pre-1948 
Jordanian and newcomers bourgeoisies at 31 .4% and 35.8% respectively, leaving 
only 5.8% for the pre-1948 Palestinian bourgeoisie. 
The NF power core group distribution along the bourgeois fractions reveals 
the dominance of the pre-1948 Jordanian bourgeoisie, which made up 41 .7% of the 
core's number. This fraction's equities were 60.7% of the total core's equities and its 
power points amounted to 48.9% of the total NF powers. Although the pre-1948 
Palestinian and the newcomers were very close. the former came second making up 
30.7% of the NF number, 20.6% of its equities and 29.4% of its power points.143 The 
pre-1948 Jordanian fraction seems to have wielded the NF to be an effective device 
in its hands, increasing the capacity of its members to act: the average NF power of 
each Jordanian NF was 21 .1 points, compared to 17.2 for the Palestinians and 14.1 
for the newcomers. In fact, the Jordanian fraction NFs shared among themselves 
27.8% of the total BM equities, compared to 9.5% and 8.6% for the Palestinians and 
the newcomers respectively. 
The effective use of NF ties among the Jordanian fraction alters their fortune 
when power II is applied, overturning the dominance of the newcomers which was 
found in the power I core group in favour of the Jordanian fraction, which constitutes 
43.5% and 38.4% of the Power II points and number respectively. The Palestinian 
and newcomer fractions proportion of the power points is 26.8 each, and 
respectively 28.6% and 30.1% numberwise. The average power II points of a core 
group Jordanian member is 7.5 points, compared to 6.2 and 5.9 points for the 
Palestinian and newcomer fractions respectively. 
143 The newcomers made up 27.6% of the NF number, 18.7% ofthe equities and 21 .7% of the 
NF power points. A further indication is given by the break-down of the BMs with no NF relatives, 
showing that the great majority of their number (65.9%) were newcomers, holding the majority of the 
power I points at 72.9%. The pre-1948 Palestinians and Jordanians made up 8.0% and 12.3% 
numberwise and 8.0% and 11 .4% pointwise. Taking the proportion of BMs with NF relatives to the 
total of the BMs in each of .the .bou[geoisie fractions shows- that the majority of the pre-1948 
Palestinian and Jordanian bourgeoisie had NF relatives. 78.2% of the pre-1948 Jordanians had NF 
relatives sharing 81 .6% of the power I points; similarly, 74.0% of the .pre-1948 Palestinian bourgeoisie 
had NF relatives, sharing 70.6% of the power I points. 
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The low proportion in number and equities of the pre-1948 Palestinian 
bourgeoisie can be explained by the fact that some of the pre-1948 Palestinians 
were inaccurately placed among the newcomers. The fact that Palestinian refugees 
fled to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Gaza meant that some of the Palestinian 1948 
bourgeoisie had stalled in these countries, even if they later moved at least some of 
their businesses to Jordan. The low contribution of the pre-1948 Palestine 
bourgeoisie also shows that a substantial proportion of them (1948 is the year in 
which the state of Israel was founded) lost their economic base assets and business 
by virtue of being turned into refugees. 
Analyzing the bourgeoisie fractions along the lines of enterprise ownership 
shows that the newcomers concentrated into individual control (35.2% and 31 .2% of 
the newcomers' equities and number) nuclear family control (25. 7% and 23.5%) and 
neutral control (22.3% and 38.3%). The pre-1948 Palestinians' equities and numbers 
were concentrated into nuclear family control (46.0% and 28.9% respectively) and 
neutral control (25.9% and 49.2%). The pre-1948 Jordanians seem to be evenly 
distributed spread over the different types of ownership forms; however, it is obvious 
that their preference was towards individual control & family support (30.6% and 
6. 72%), nuclear control (24.5% and 27.0%) and neutral control enterprises (26.1% 
and 49.2%). This is reflected in the fact that 65.7% of the BMs' equities invested in 
the form of Individual control & family support was held by the pre-1948 Jordanian 
fraction, which held 31 .8% and 32.2% of the nuclear family control and neutral 
control respectively. On the contrary, the majority of the individual control equities 
60.8% and BMs 71.1% were in the hands of the newcomers. Interestingly, the 
highest proportion of the extended family enterprise, which was an irrelevant form of 
ownership for the BMs was in the hands of the newcomers, while the pre-1948 
Jordanian fraction had the great majority of the corporate bodies control equities and 
number wise at 74.1% and 53.2% respectively. Despite the fact that the overview of 
the bourgeoisie fractions did not show an extreme tendency towards one form of 
ownership rather than others, it is still possible to say that individual control , nuclear 
family and neutral control were the favorable forms for the relatively new fractions 
pre-1948 Palestinians and newcomers. 
A break-down of the fractions according to their economic sectors shows that 
the greatest proportion of each fraction's number and· equities were concentrated in 
commerce. 53.5%, 49.8% and 33.2% of the pre-1948 Jordanians', pre-1948 
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Palestinians' and newcomers' equities were in commerce. Numberwise, the 
proportions were 42.4%, 43.1% and 51 .2% respectively. The second sector that 
attracted a substantial proportion of each fractions' numbers and equities is 
manufacturing. Construction comes in third place, when the equities are concerned, 
while transportation is third numberwise. The variation between the break-down of 
the fractions into economic sectors is not very significant except when it comes to 
finance and insurance, where the proportion of the pre-1948 Jordanians' and 
Palestinians' equities in this sector was more than three times that of the finance 
newcomers proportion. 144 It could be also noticed that, in services, the pre-1948 
Jordanians' equities were a substantial proportion of the total pre-1948 Jordanians' 
equities at 9. 7%, while it was 6.9% for the newcomers and only 2. 7% for the 
Palestinians. 
The break-down of the BMs' equities in each sector reveals some interesting 
patterns. On the one hand the pre-1948 Jordanian fraction possessed the majority 
of the equities in sectors such as mining (52.2% of the sectors equities), service 
(51 .2%) finance (48.7%), commerce (43.9%), and was still in a strong position in 
manufacturing (31.4%), transportation (26.3%) and construction (25.2%), despite the 
fact that the newcomers were leading in the latter three sectors at 39.2%, 54.2% and 
53.5% respectively. The pre-1948 Palestinian fraction led only in agriculture, having 
34.9% of the agriculture BMs' equities, and had a proportion of around 20.0% of the 
BMs' equities in commerce, manufacturing and construction. Additionally, it was in a 
strong position- close to that of the pre-1948 Jordanians- in finance, by virtue of the 
proportion of the companies that were owned by members of this fraction, bearing in 
mind that this sector was almost closed off to of the newcomers. Numberwise, the 
majority of the BMs in each sector were from the newcomers' fraction , however, that 
of the pre-1948 Jordan equitywise undermines this overwhelming proportion. The 
Jordan fraction was still the dominant fraction in almost all sectors. If one is to 
assume that the pre-Palestinian and newcomers fractions had strategies to 
penetrate the earlier established bourgeoisie circle, i.e. the pre-1948 Jordanian 
fraction, these strategies that targeted sectors such as construction, manufacturing 
14<1 The small market of Jordan explains the lack of interest in establishing banks or insurance 
companies. Apparently in the previous period, the existing banks were sufficient to support the 
economic activity. Kha/iil a/-Saa/am, one. of the Jor.dar,LNational Bank and its dir.ector for 3 decades, 
reports that it was a huge risk to establish a bank in Jordan in 1950s when the market did not require 
new banks. such a conclusion was also advanced by the 'Abd-al-f:1.amiid Shuumaan the founder of 
the Arab Bank in Jerusalem in 1935 and its director up to 1968. 
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and transportation were more successful given the fact that these two fractions 
gained a strong foot hold there. Targeting commerce certainly is unavoidable taking 
into consideration its vitality in the private sector activities at large and the 
bourgeoisie in particular. 
The question that rises objectively here is to which degree did clustering take 
place among the BMs along the lines of their fractions? Despite the existence of 
sole fraction business along the side multi fraction business, the majority of the 
fractioned BMs were those who had investments in multi fraction enterprises at 
70.5% holding equities of 54.6% of the total individual BMs' equities spread over 
80.1% of the enterprises. On the contrary the sole fraction members made up 
29.5% of the fractioned BMs number holding 46.4% of the equities and 19.9% of the 
enterprises. It seems that all fractions had a substantial proportion of their equities 
concentrated in the hands of the sole fraction members ascending from 40.7% of the 
Palestine equities to 43.6% in the case of the newcomers reaching 49.7% of the 
Jordan's equities. The variation between the pre-1948 Jordanians and the other two 
fractions could be attributed mainly to the fact that this fraction existed in Jordan 
before 1948, while the others had to establish or re-establish themselves over the 
period of 1950-1973. Certainly the small number in the Jordanian fraction and its 
early establishment had created a favorable context to encourage its members to 
invest together. Reading the significance of the above figures concerning the 
equities of sole fraction can be misleading, since this study frequently stressed that 
investments in forms of individual and NF control business was the dominant pattern 
among BMs at large and in each fraction. In order to have accurate conclusions, 
examining the clustering of each fraction should exclude individual control and NF 
control enterprises and rather focus on neutral control enterprises. The sole fraction 
members of the neutral enterprises made up 6.1% having 4.3% of the fractioned 
BMs' enterprises and holding 5.0% of their total equities. Despite the lesser 
significance of these figures, it seems that the clustering was more noticeable 
among the newcomers.145 Looking at the neutral enterprises that witnessed a 
clustering shows that the majority of these were in sectors like commerce, 
145 The newcomers who clustered in neutral enterpr.ises of their own made up 8.2% 
numberwise and 5.5% and 5.1% enterprises and equity-wise. 81.0% of the neutral enterprises owned 
by sole fraction members were those owned by newcomers. Additionally, 72.3% of the sole fraction 
BMs in neutral enterprises were newcomers holding 43.1% of the equities. See table 5/Appendix 10. 
296 
construction, manufacturing and transportation.148 Reviewing the sub-sectors and the 
field of activities of each of these enterprise does not show that there was a trend of 
having two sole fraction enterprises that belonged to the same field and in 
competition with each other. 147 It is not possible to deduce the factors that led 
members of one fraction to cluster. In the case of the pre-1948 Jordanians, the 
business relations that were established prior to this period, friendships or other sort 
of relationships could be factors to bring some members of this group to invest 
together especially if the investments in mind required capital intensive. One of the 
most interesting examples is the alliance that two neutral enterprises that exclusively 
by the Jordan was owned by three bourgeoisie NFs; Muhammad 'Ali Badiir, Mala§ 
and Adlbii families who share between them the Syrian country of origin. In this 
sense. the Syrian background was an equal factor to that of being from the same 
fraction. 
Examining state investments in the BEs shows that they were not in any 
sole-fraction enterprise. Evidently, the state was not carrying out a biased policy 
towards one fraction in particular. Targeting multi-fraction enterprises was not 
necessarily based on a non-discriminative policy on the side of the state, but rather 
on its economic priorities during this period or the preceding periods. 
5 .4 THE VERTICAL DIMENSIONS AND THE BOURGEOISIE 
5.4.1 BOURGEOISIE AND GENDER 
The breakdown of the BMs' gender shows that 15.1% of individual BMs were 
females, possessing only 7.9% of the equities, and making up 7.7% of the power I 
and 13.0% of the power II points respectively. These figures and others concerning 
the insignificant figures of females' proportion in the core group of the various power 
parameters show that the BMs were overwhelmingly in favor of male members, to 
the degree that analyzing male members is almost giving an account of the entire 
1
.s The equities of the newcomers' sole fraction enterprises distribution among the sectors 
was: commerce 48.8%, manufacturing 22.3%, construction 14.2% and transportation 9.4 %. The 
equities of the Palestine' were: manufacturing 60.1 %, commerce 25.2% and construction 11 .9%. the 
equities of Jordan were construction 50.9%, commerce 16.3%, transportation 32.4%. 
147 For instance the commerce sole fraction enterprises in each of the 3 fractions that were 
assumed to be in competition with each other does not conclude that· but . another example is the 
road transportation enterprises .. A few of them were mainly in the newcomers' fraction and some in the 
other fractions. All of these enterprises are running their services on different routs which at least 
excludes the possibility of direct competition targeting the same customers. 
297 
BMs. This sub-section , therefore, is devoted to shed light on the female members of 
the bourgeoisie. Females are not only underrepresented in their presence and the 
size of equities within the domain of the bourgeoisie, but are also of lesser 
significance when compared individually to their male counterparts. In fact, equities 
per male BM stood at JD 19947.3, which is 2.5 times the equities per female, which 
recorded JD 7388.2. The power I points per female BM was 1.3 compared to 2.0 
points for their male partners. 
Pigure 5- 11 : The Ratio of Male and Female BMs ' Equ ities, Number and Power I and II 
points to that of the fndi vidual BMs 
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The majority of the female BMs were concentrated in businesses of PS type 
at 36.0% followed by GP at 28.2, LP at 19.6, LL at 14.8% and finally 1.5% in IE. The 
fact that the PSs are more accessible for equity-holders without the need for their 
services in management could explain the high proportion of the females in this 
type. 146 Another factor that explains the high presence of females in this PS 
business is the tendency for some male BMs to spread a certain proportion of their 
stake in the names of their chi ldren including the daughters or/and in the names of 
their wives. Contrary to PS businesses, which don't require management tasks of 
the equity-holders who are not at the committee of directors, IEs are generally run by 
the owners. This could explain the small number of females being involved in the 
IEs. which absorbed only 2.1% of the females. 149 The majority of the females' 
146 The female BMs' equities in PS to that of the total Individual BMs in the same type was 
only 6 5% 
149 The proportion of the female equities to the individual total equities in IE was as little as 
13% 
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equities (77.1%) were concentrated in enterprises of GP and LL type; however, the 
females' weight in these enterprises in comparison to that of the individual BM 
equities was still as little as around 1 0.0%. Moreover the majority of the enterprises 
of these types were of NF control , which meant the presence of NF male relatives as 
partners. 
Figure 5-12 : The Ratio of Female BMs' Number and Equities in Each Enterprise Type to 
that of Individual BMs 
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The presence of the females varies from one sector to another, the majority 
of them being concentrated in commerce and manufacturing where 32.9% and 
32.5% respectively of their number and 44.5% and 26.0% of their equities are. 
Concerning other sectors, there was an indication that the proportion of female 
members to the total number of females and their equities was insignificant in 
sectors such as real estate, mining, agriculture, while in electricity they were 
completely absent. As for the remaining sectors, despite the small proportion of 
their number in construction, their equities in this sector made up a noticeable 15.9% 
of the entire female equities. The opposite trend is to be found in finance, where 
11.4% of females had only 2.5% of the total female equities. The proportion of the 
female number and equities to the total individual BM and their equities in each 
sector does not indicate a significant variation. The females' equities as a proportion 
of the individual BM equities was below 10.0% in all economic sectors, while the 
females' proportion to the number varied slightly from one sector to another, 
recording its highest - above 20.0% - in finance and manufacturing and its lowest at 
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around 10.0% in commerce. These figures suggest a gap between what the female 
signify numberwise and what they make up equitywise. 
Pigure 5- 13: The Ratio of Female BMs' Number and Equities in Each Economic Sector to 
that of the Individual BMs 
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Assuming that the proportion of females' equities, which reached in some 
cases almost 10.0% of the individual BMs in some business types or in some 
economic sectors, reflects the same percentage of female control over the means of 
production is misleading . The great majority of the businesses in which female 
members were involved were under the control of male partners tied together in NF 
kinship. Apart from the fact that NF kinship relations (husband & wife, brother & 
sister and father & daughter) have an influence on the distribution of power in a 
given business, the fact that male partners possessed the majority of the equities in 
that business reduces the power of the female partners. 150 
Despite this assertion , there were a number of females who either owned a 
business exclusively or owned the majority of an enterprise's equities. Still , the 
number and equities of these females were small. For instance, they made up 8.0% 
of the female BM and 36.2% of the latter's equities, while their proportion to the total 
individual BM was 1.2% and 2.9% of the latter's equities. Despite their 
150 The female 8Ms of the power 8 (is the parameter that take into consideration the 
parentage that is held by 8M to the total equities of the enterprise) points was 4.1 %. While their 
proportion of power 8 core group was 1.0% and 0.9% number and equity-wise. Interestingly all the 
female members of power 8 core group were members of NFs. 
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insignificance, the majority of these female businesses or female-controlled 
businesses were of GP (57.6% of the female number and 63.2% of their equities), 
LP (20.3% & 15.9%) and IE type (18.6% & 5.7%). Sectorrwise, the majority of them 
were in commerce (64.4% of number and 60.8% of their equities), manufacturing 
(19.5% & 9.4%) and construction (6.8% & 25.0%), while their proportions in the 
remaining sectors were trivial. 15' 
The figures reveal without doubt that the cleavage among the BMs according 
to gender was of no relevance, to the extent that one can claim that the 
bourgeoisie's domain was homogeneous when gender as a non-class factor is 
applied in this period.152 
5.4.2 ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND 
This subsection deals with two of the main variables that can be the basis on 
which the people of the Jordanian society mobilise and contribute to their identity, 
i.e. religion and ethnicity. An account of the ethnic groups within the domain of 
bourgeoisie is to be covered first followed by analyzing the BMs in terms of religion. 
Among the individual BMs. the Arabs made up more than 96.0% of BMs' 
number, equities, power I and Power II points. This dominance can be understood 
knowing that non-Arab ethnic minorities' proportion of the entire population was 
trivial. The biggest minority to the other ethnic minorities, the Circassian and 
Chechens had around 1.5% of the BMs' equities, number and power points. The 
Kurds and Armenians, whose relevance population wise was of no weight, made up 
above 0.5% of the BMs accounts. The overall dominance of the Arabs did not 
preclude the presence of the Circassian & Chechens nor the Kurds in the power I 
and II core groups. The former minority had more than 1.0% of the power I core 
group number, power I and II points and around 0.8% when the power II core group 
is concerned. Kurds parentages of power I core group's number, equities and power 
151 The number of females who exclusively owned businesses was 3.6% of the female BMs 
possessing 5.8% of the female equities. The majority of these members and their equities were in 
enterprises of GP types at 57.4% and 64.8% respectively followed by IE at 40.7% and 35.1% in turns. 
The majority of their equities were in manufacturing at 38.3%, commerce at 26.1%, construction at 
20.7% and transportation at 10.3%. 
'
52 Taking the religion as a factor shows that Christian female BMs have a respectable 
proportion -of-the-total-female· BMs-and·their·equities ·at-24:5%-:-and-33:8%· resp~"Ctively-against71-:-5%- - -
and 64.5% of Muslims. Despite that the majority of the females BMs were Muslims, still the proportion 
--------- - -- . - -· --- - -.. --- ~· .. .. - -
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I and II points was slightly less than 1.0% each, however, these percentages jump to 
above 1.0% when power II core group is applied. The Kurds use of the NFs is 
explains this increase in the percentages from the core group of power I to that of 
power 11 .'53 
Concerning the distribution of the ethnic minorities into economic sectors the 
data revels that there was a concentration of Armenian equities in commerce and 
construction, leaving less than 8.0% in the other sectors. The concentration pattern 
can also be seen among the Kurd BMs: 94.8% of their equities were in commerce, 
manufacturing and services, while they had no investments in real estate, 
transportation, mining and construction. The Circassian and Chechens were more 
spread throughout economic sectors, however, substantial proportion of their 
equities were in commerce, construction and manufacturing. 
Reviewing each of the ethnic minorities' investments in the different 
enterprises did not show any evidence of clustering.'54 However, these minorities 
used efficiently the NF ties as blocks to carry their investments either through their 
NF control enterprises or even in the neutral control enterprises. In fact the 
proportion of Circassian and Chechens equities that were in NF control enterprises 
was 21 .3%, while it was 27.4% in the case of the Kurds.155 
Among these minorities, one can see BMs who were the center of power in 
some important enterprises. For instance, the Bank of Jordan since its 
establishment had a substantial presence of Circassian BMs 156 to the extent that it 
can appear to one as a Circassian bank. However, other founders and the main 
shareholders were from other ethnic groups including Arabs Muslims and Christians. 
This Bank stayed under the influence of the ai-Mufti family and even in the crises 
that led to their departure from the management of the Bank in 1970/1971 the 
of Ctmst1an female BMs number and equities exceeded that that of the Christian BMs to the entire 
BMs. 
1sa Only 30.0% of the Kurds BMs were of no-NFs relatives, it was 36.0% concerning the Ss 
and CH. Still both minority is below the overall percentage of the BMs 
1
S4 There was only one enterprise, The Engineering Company for Construction, that can be 
considered as ethnic base enterprise, since its two Circassian owners were not connected by any 
kinship ties. 
155 The majority of Circassian, Circassian and Kurds' equities were in individual control and 
lr:tc:lividual COAtraland NF·support·at-respectivety 46.2% and·60:1"o/o -
156 Such as the br.others Fauuzii and 'Az-at-diin ai-Muftii, N'iim Snuubar, MuQii al-dinn 
Bashquuii, Ab.amad Khuurmaa and S'iid al-Muftii 
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divisions among the main shareholders and the board of Directors of the bank was 
not on ethnic ground. 157 On the other hand, The Jordanian National Bank 
established in 1956 had among the founders and the main shareholders the 
Circassian NF of 'Abdai-Qaadar Taash in close partnership with the Christian NF of 
Yusiif ai-M'ashar. Another bank that had the influence of Hiidar Shakrii, another 
Circassian NF, was Cairo Amman Bank where the Palestinian NF of Ruuhii 
Sh'ashaa'h also had a leading influence alongside Cairo that is an Egyptian Bank. 
The point of these details about competing banks in Jordan during this period is to 
stress that in the cases where certain members of a minority were in position of 
influence and/or wielding power over an enterprise, that was not the basis of ethnic 
support or solidarity. 
Religion-wise, 76.6% of the bourgeois members were Muslim, while the 
Christian members made up 20.5%, with as little as 0.3% of unidentified religious 
background. The figures in terms of capital almost coincided with those in terms of 
numbers, since 76.2% of the bourgeois capital was held by Muslims. leaving 23.7% 
for the Christians. The share of the Christian BMs of power I and power II stood at 
above than 21 .0%. Power I and Power II per BM among Christian and Muslims was 
almost identical, however equities per BM among Christian stood at JD 11934, and 
was higher than that among Muslims whom recorded JD 10497. When it comes to 
the bourgeoisie of Jordanian origin, the percentage of the Christians records 35.4%, 
which is above the overall Christian proportion. 158 This percentage is even larger 
when the equities held by the Christians of Jordanian origin are considered; these 
are 49.9%, which is more than double the overall proportion of the capital owned by 
the Christians. There was more than 25.0% of power I core group who were 
Christian BMs. Among the leading 29 BMs whose power I points 1 0 or more, there 
were 11 Christian members. 159 
looking into the economic sector, there was no evidence that the Christian 
BMs were involved in one economic sector rather than other. When the ownership 
forms are concerned , certainly the Christian members, who were involved in all 
forms, used the NF ties in more effective fashion than their Muslim counterparts. 
157 The camp that led !:fuusnii Siiduu ai-Kurdii, who is a Kurd BM, and resulted In the latter's 
g~O!-!P taking over included Ci_rcas~?ian and Arab sh~Jeh.ot~J!rS. •. em~ Ge~ioJy the. c~mp of ai-Mufti 
brothers incorporated Arab members. 
158 See table 13/ Appendix 12. 
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In the question of clustering, there was no evidence of clustering among the 
Christian BMs.'60 Only Christian BMs enterprises exist however. where the partners 
are bound by NF. 
5.4.3 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
The distribution of BMs numberwise according to the country of origin shows 
that BMs of Palestinian origin were the dominant group making up 63.6%, followed 
by the BMs of Jordanian origin at .22.9%, BMs of Syrian origin at 10.3% and of 
Egyptian origin at 1.1 %. The proportion of Hajazi, Iraqis, Lebanese, royal family and 
others were respectively 0.14%, 0.12%, 0.12%, 0.15, 0.04%. '6 ' The BMs' distribution 
equitywise d1id not reveal a major difference from that of numberwise. the BMs of 
Palestinian origin still had the biggest share at 58.8%, followed with 5 points 
improvement in equities compared to their numbers by those of Jordanian origin at 
23.7% and Syrian origin at 15.2%. The minor contribution of the BMs of other sort of 
origins numberwise was repeated equitywise. The proportion of the Egyptian, 
Hajazi, Iraqis, Lebanese, royal family and others were respectively 0.43%, 0.02%, 
0.07%, 0.25%, 0.07%, 0.01 %. The share of the bourgeoisie fractions country of 
origin-wise of power I shows that the Palestinian origin BMs were dominant, yielding 
a majority at 63.9% of the power I points, followed by the Jordanians at 23.4% 
and 10. 7%. The proportions that were held by the BMs of remaining countries of 
origin were trivial, ranging between 0 .06% and 1.0%. The highest average power I 
points was 1.9 points of the Egyptians followed by the Syrians at 1.7, Jordanian at 
1.3 and then the Palestinians at 1.4 points. Despite the overall upper hand of the 
Palestinians when the sum of power I points is concerned, the capacity of the Syrian 
or Jordanian BM to act is 22.5 and 9.0 points better than that of the Palestinian. 
Power II points distribution was almost identical of that of power I; despite the 
trivial decrease of the Palestinians' share, they were still holding 63.0%. followed by 
the Jordanian at 23.1%, while the Syrian share jumped to 12.0%. Although the 
shares of BMs of other countries of origin increased, they were still insignificant. 
However. the change can be better seen in terms of the average power II points. 
For instance. the Syrians average that stood at 2.5 was 47.0% above of its average 
159 See table 10/ Appendix 10. 
'
60 Based on applying Chi-squared analysis. 
161 See table 14/Appendix 9. 
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in power I and recorded 1.4% of that the Palestinians Power II average that stood at 
1.8 points recording an increase of 28.7% of its power I average. A similar increase 
was seen in the Jordanian average recording 2.0 points that is 1.1 of the 
Palestinians average. 
The sort of variation in the shares and averages of power I and power II is 
indicative of the wide spread use of NFs by all BMs despite their country of origin. 
The majority of BMs and equities in each fraction were in the hands of BMs with 
NFs. However, the proportion of equities in the hands of NFs Jordanians was 
65.3%, reaching 70.8% among Palestinians up to 79.7% and 92.6% respectively in 
the case of Syrian and Egyptians. One can conclude that the NF was more used by 
bourgeoisie of Syrian and Egyptian origin than other fractions. Though the majority 
of the BMs' with NFs number, equities and power I points (around 60.0%) were in 
the hands of Palestinian BMs with NFs, the Syrians BMs with NFs proportion of 
equities, power points I stood at respectable figures of 17.6% and 14.4% 
respectively. In fact the 17.3% of NF power core group162 were of Syrian origin 
sharing 18.6% of the group power points, while the proportion of the Jordanian and 
Palestinians stood at 25.2% and 54.7% numberwise and 24.6% and 54.2% power 
points. 
Figure 5- 14: The BMs' Average Power I and Power IT According Lo their Country of 
Origin 
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182 The NFs that scored 9 points or more, see the subsection of the Nuclear Family power 
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Figure 5- 15: The Ratio BMs' Power I and Power II Points in Each Country of Origin to 
Lhe Total BMs' Power I and II Points 
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As the figures clearly indicate the main country of origin fractions were the 
Palestinian, Jordanian and Syrian that together make up 96.7% of the BMs number 
and 97.7% of their equities. Therefore, these three groups of the BMs will be given 
further analysis in order to bring out any trends or features that can be deduced 
along the lines of the country of origin. 
Concerning the religion profile among each of theses groups, the data shows 
that 65.0% of the Jordanian origin BMs were Muslims, 35.0% were Christian. In 
equity terms, however, what the Christian and Muslims held was almost the same at 
49.9% and 50.1% respectively. The proportion of Christians among the Jordanians 
exceeded the percentage of Christians the overall BMs number and equities. The 
Christian Jordanian BMs were of high significance in the make up of the Jordanian 
origin BMs and they held almost half of the Christian BMs' equities. Still a 
respectable proportion of the Palestinian BMs were Christian, i.e. 20.2% 
numberwise and 19.3% equitywise. In fact almost 60.0% of the entire Christian BMs 
were of Palestinian origin holding 47.7% of the Christian BMs' equities. Muslims 
were predominant when the Syrian origin BMs are concerned making up 99.4% and 
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97.2% of respectively equities and number.163 It is worthwhile mentioning that the 
only country of origin group, where the Christian BMs were prevalent was the 
Lebanese origin in which the proportion of Christians was 63.6% holding equities of 
93.9%. 164 hence, one could argue that the BMs of Palestinian and Jordanian origin 
were less homogenous compared to that of the Syrian BMs since the first two 
groups have the potential of cleavages along the line of religion. 
Figure 5- 16: The Rat io of BMs' Number and Equities in Each Country of Origin to t he 
Total BMs' Number and Equities 
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The distribution of the BMs among the different sectors reveals some 
important patterns concerning the first three groups; Jordanian, Palestinian and 
Syrian orig ins. On one hand these groups share that the majority of their equities 
are concentrated in commerce and manufacturing as 51.0%, 43.5% and 24.4% of 
the equities of the BMs of Palestinian, Syrian and Jordanian origins respectively 
were in commerce. In the same order, 21 .0%, 20.1% and 25.4% were in 
manufacturing. On the other hand , these fractions varied in importance between 
other sectors, for example a small proportion (between 0.0 and 1.5%) of Palestinian 
equities were in service, finance and electricity, while there were substantial 
proportions of Jordanian and Syrian equities in serv1ces at 14.8%. and 16.8%, and 
an indicative proportion of their equities in finance and electricity. The small market 
of Jordan certain ly dictated a limited number of enterprises in electricity and finance. 
The monopoly that was given to The Jordanian Electricity Co. that had been 
'
63 See table 8/Append1x 9. 
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established in the 1930 to supply Amman firstly and other regions later on, explains 
the absence of other competing enterprises and thus the low proportion of the BMs 
of Palestinian origin. 
The breakdown of the equities in each sector in terms of the BMs' country of 
origin, shows that there were some sectors that were dominated by one fraction 
rather than other. This was evident in agriculture and real estate where 97.1% and 
94.3% respectively of their total equities were in hands of BMs of Palestinian origin. 
Some similarity can be seen in other sector where the Palestinians were the holder 
of the majority of the equities such as in commerce (69.1%), construction (55.%), 
manufacturing (51.%0 and transportation (51 .%). It does not come as a surprise 
that Palestinians have a majority in these sectors' equities, since they had the 
biggest share of the total equities, but it does not necessarily mean that they were 
dominant in these sectors, since both Jordanian and Syrian still have substantial 
proportions of the total equities of these sectors. Jordanians, for instance, had 
13.3%, 30.7%, 27.6% and 32.4% of the equities of commerce, construction, 
manufacturing and transportation, while the proportion of the Syrians were 15.4%, 
10.7%, 13.7% and 9.6% respectively. Despite the fact neither Jordanians nor 
Syrians made up the majority of any of the sectors equities, their proportion in 
sectors such as electricity, finance and services were substantial and even dominant 
in electricity and services where the Palestinian shares were insignificant. It is 
important to bear in mind that these sectors that fall under one fraction or another 
were not leading sectors in the make up of the BMs wealth and economic power and 
that the state was heavily present in some of these sectors' activities such as 
mining and electricity. Looking at these fractions in terms of economic sectors 
shows that none of these fractions was entrenched in one specific sector or sectors 
and its activities negated form others. Some sectors showed that a fraction could 
have a strong position without necessarily being dominant by the virtue of the 
insignificance of the shares of the other sectors. 
The regional distribution of the bourgeoisie reveals that 34.5% of its members 
were form the West Bank, followed by 26.8% from Palestine '48, 23.4% from the 
central part of Jordan, 7.2% from northern Jordan and 3.6% from southern Jordan. 
Members from Gaza represented the smallest proportion, with 0.23%, considering 
164 See Table 19/Appendix 9. 
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that 2.6% are unidentified/ unknown. The fact that all of the categories, apart from 
the Palestinians and the Jordanians, were considered to be part of the central part of 
Jordan, as was mentioned in the methodology chapter, led to inflating the proportion 
of such a region. In this perspective, and in order to avoid any misleading reading of 
the regional distribution, it is relevant to talk about the regional distribution just for 
the bourgeois who are of Jordanian or Palestinian origin. The majority of the 
bourgeois of Jordanian origin were from the center, at a proportion of 49.5%, 
possessing 59.5% of the equities. 165 The northern Jordanians come in the second 
place, at 32.2%, having 23.6% of the equities, while the southerners made up 16.1% 
of the bourgeois members of Jordanian origin, holding 16.6% of their equities. 
Among the bourgeois of Palestinian origin, the number was almost evenly 
divided between the ones from the West Bank (55.1 %) and those from Palestine '48 
at 43.0%. The proportion of their equities was even closer, since 50.9% were held 
by West Bankers, 48.2% by Palestinians '48. Such an even division was possible in 
the former two regions because of the insignificant proportion of the Palestinians of 
Gaza. 
165 See tables 20 and 21/ Appendix 9. 
309 
CHAPTER SIX 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY 
(1974-1989) 
This period makes one unit because of its political and economic 
characteristics. At the economic level, the oil boom from 1974 until 1982 and the 
decline of its prices from 1983 had a fundamental effect on the Jordanian economy. 
In the boom phase Jordan's economic ties with the oil-producing Arab countries 
were strengthened to the point that the Jordanian economy was highly dependent 
on these countries. 
6.1 MACRO ECONOMY OF JORDAN (1974-1989) 
6.1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
This section deals with the development effort during this period as it was 
represented throughout the governmental development plans. Therefore, it covers 
the three successive five-year development plans. This section covers the main 
goals of each plan and its sectoral aims as well as its main planned projects. It also 
covers the share of the private and public sectors in the projects of each 
development plan. Furthermore, it assesses the extent to which the main goals of 
each plan were achieved primarily by referring to statistics capturing the (economic) 
situation at the end of each plan and secondarily by the evaluation of the Jordanian 
planners and the other literature. Although the fourth plan was scheduled to be 
completed by the end of 1990 one year after our period, it was suspended in 1989 
and replaced by the economic adjustment program. 
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6.1.1.1The First Five-Year Development Plan (1976-1980) 
The studies that covered this plan described it as an ambitious plan, 
ambiti.ous in its goals, framework, its projects and finance. In fact thJs description 
was not far from reality especially when the targets and the projects of this plan are 
compared to those of the former one. However, the political and economic 
conditions that determined the design of the three-year plan were totally different to 
those which influenced the shape of this one. Jordan enjoyed a high level of political 
stability during the four years prior to the plan accompanied by better relations and 
understanding with the neighbouring Arab countries. Moreover, the economic 
environment that benefited from political stability was further strengthened by the 
implementation of the three-year development plan. This enhanced the confidence 
of the private sector both locally and abroad in Jordanian economic prospects. 
Apart from the factors above the Jordanian planners were encouraged by the impact 
of the oil boom on financing economic development in Jordan in two ways: firstly, the 
increase in Arab aid to the government that would allow the government to expand 
its role in the development projects. Secondly, the Jordanian workers in the Gulf 
resolved the unemployment problem and their increased remittances were partially 
used to finance private sector development projects. These appealing conditions 
encouraged the planners to propose an ambitious plan. 
The five-year plan aimed to increase the volume of real GOP by 75.0% during 
the plan period or at an average annual rate of 11 .9%. According to the Jordanian 
planners, this growth would be achieved by changing the structure of the economy 
to concentrate on the commodity producing sectors. The plan aimed to increase 
their share of the GOP from 35% in 1975 to 44% in 1980. 
The overall volume of fixed investment during the plan period was estimated 
at JO 765 million, which would be divided into 75.8% for the productive sectors and 
24.2% for the social sectors1• The ratio of ftxed investment to GOP would be 36.4% 
compared to 32.0% in the previous development plan. 
As for the projected economic growth of the commodity productive sectors, 
the mining and manufacturing sectors. according to the plan goals, would have the 
highest growth rates with an increase in income of 220% in 1980 compared to the 
--------------------·------------- -~ -- -
--·--·-, Fi~~~Year Pi~n for. Economic and Social Development 1976-1980, p78-80 - ---- --- ·--
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1975 level of an annual growth rate of 26.2% on average. This growth rate would 
increase the relative share of industry in GOP from 17.4% in 1975 to 28.3% in 1980. 
As a result, this sector would have the biggest relative share in the GOP by the end 
of the plan period. Moreover, the planned rate showed that industry would play the 
main role in achieving Jordan's development strategy of increasing the relative share 
of the productive sectors in relation to the service sectors. Nevertheless, expanding 
the production of import-substituting and export-oriented industries as well as the 
production of phosphate, petroleum products and cement would generate the 
increase in the industry sector income. Additionally, new mineral enterprises such 
as phosphate fertilisers and copper would be established2• As the plan indicated 
and Kanvosky noted the chief focus of the planners was on industrf. 
The income of the agricultural sector was projected to increase by 40.0% 
relative to 1975; in other words, at an average rate of 7.0% annually. Hence, the 
relative importance of agriculture in GOP would drop to from 10.3% in 1975 reaching 
8.3% in 1980. This aim went along with the plan policy that did not consider 
agriculture as the principal sector for economic growth as had been the case in the 
previous plan. Increasing agricultural productivity, expanding irrigated areas in the 
Jordan Valley and Southern Ghor and augmenting livestock would make 
achievement of the planned rate possible. Hence, agricultural production would 
meet the increasing proportions of local food requirements•. 
The electricity and water supply sector would grow by 120% compared to its 
1975 level at an annual growth rate of 17.1 %, the second highest growth rate after 
industry. This growth would be attained by the planned expansion of power 
generation for production and household uses. A large majority of the water projects 
was directed to irrigation rather than household uses. The average growth rate of 
the construction sector was projected at 5% per year. However, the Jordanian 
planners noted that the income originating in this sector would rely on the quantity 
and type of investment in each years. 
2 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1976-1980, p80-83. 
3 Kanovsky, E. (1976), p125. 
4 Five-Year Plan tor Economic and Social Development 1976-1980, p84-86. 
5 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1976-1980, p83-87. 
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The relative importance of the service sectors (including transport & 
communication, trade, financial institutions. ownership of dwellings, public 
administration & defence and other services) in GOP was projected to drop from 
64.8% in 1975 to 55.9% in 1980(see table 6-3) . Nevertheless, the overall growth 
rate of services would record 51 .1% over the plan period at an annual growth rate of 
8.6%. The financial institutions would show the best annual growth rate at 17.1% of 
the service sectors followed by the ownership of dwellings sector and the transport & 
communications sector at an average growth rate of 12.0% and 10.6% respectively 
(see table 5-3) . The planners mentioned that expansion of some of the service 
sectors would be due to an upsurge in mineral and industrial production, particularly 
those sectors are linkd to the mineral activities, such as transportation. 
In addition to the sectoral goals above, the plan highlighted two of the main 
problems that the Jordanian economy was suffering from: firstly, the chronic trade 
deficit and secondly, the reliance of the government budget on external revenues. In 
order to confront the former, reducing the trade deficit would be possible by 
increasing the volume of exports particularly phosphate and chemical fertilizers. 
Therefore, the plan anticipated that the value of exports in 1980 would be 238% 
above the 1975 level. The plan did not rely on limiting the import rate but rather 
relied on increasing exports, due to the fact that investment project requirements 
would keep the rate of imports relatively high (8.0% per annum) in order to meet the 
Investment requirements as well as the requirements of consumer goods. In 
conclusion, reducing the trade deficit would exclusively bear down on increasing the 
exports. 
In the latter case, the plan aimed to augment domestic revenue by 115% 
during the plan period in order to finance 91 .5% of the recurring expenditures in 
1980, compared to 61 .5% in 1975. Finally, the plan aimed to distribute development 
gains among the various regions of the country, particularly rural areas. 
Turning to the plan investment and subsequently its indications of the policy 
that the planners followed, the plan estimated a fixed investment for the whole plan 
period of JD 765 million divided between the economic sectors (75.8%) and the 
social sectors (24.2%). The mining and manufacturing sector received the majority 
oLtbe investment with a r.elativ.e. share of (29.9%). followed by transportation and 
communications and information (.18.7%), water (12.7%) then housing and 
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governmental buildings (11.3%). Apart from the main gaols of the plan mentioned 
above. the distribution of investment among the different sectors (see table 4-3) 
revealed that the priorities of the Jordanian planners were: 
• Firstly. to develop the mining and manufacturing sector which was 
essential to achieve the basic changes in the structure of the national 
economy, in other words, the main goal of the plan. This sector also 
included phosphate production, which has become the main Jordanian 
exports since 1974. 
• Secondly, to establish and build the infrastructure that was required for 
all development activities. 
Almost one fifth of the entire fixed investment was allocated to the housing 
and governmental building sector. This high relative share can be explained by the 
demand for housing construction witnessed in previous plans as a result of the 
tremendous increase in the size of remittances since 1974. Khader noted that the 
plan's investment indicated that the Jordanian development strategy in this phase 
concentrated on big projects. In particular, one third of this plan's investment was 
allocated to eight big projects. He agreed with Mazur's interpretation6 that the 
reason behind adopting this option might have been the ready availability of foreign 
assistance7• Or, as he expressed it later, "big is beautiful" was the fashion8• Other 
reasons explain the strategy of "big projects", such as that the development projects 
were oriented to exploit the country's natural resources. Moreover, the fact that the 
mining and industry sector showed good results in the previous plan and indicated a 
promising future with an increased price of phosphate in the 70s drew the Jordanian 
planners into proposing big projects mainly in this sector or in related ones. 
As far as private sector involvement in plan investments was concerned, the 
plan proposed to attain its aims on the condition that the private sector would 
continue to respond to the development effort and play its role in the development 
plan by mobilising its savings and channelling them towards direct investment and/or 
extending loans to the public sector. It estimated that the private sector share would 
5 Mazur, (1979), p252. 
7 Khader,B.(1987). Targets and Achievements, p179. 
6 Khader,B.(1989), Jordan Economy: 1952-1989, p6. 
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be 50.1% of the total fixed investments. Though the plan did not show the 
distribution of private investment amongst the different sectors, it indicated its 
sources of finance, which mainly consisted of the current account surplus, loans and 
contributions from the government and net Arab and foreign loans. 
Regarding the public sector, the plan assumed that the government would 
finance its projects by using the expected surplus increase on the current account. 
Furthermore, the planners presumed that the Arab and foreign countries would 
continue their financial budget support at least to the level JD 61 million per year 
from 1976 to 1980. 
Turning to the plan's achievements, the performance of the plan was 
successful in attaining some of its targets. but failed in others although it showed 
better growth rates in the various economic indicators compared with the previous 
plan. The real GNP grew on average by 11 .0 % yearly against the targeted rate of 
11 .5%, while the actual annual growth rate of the real GOP was 8.5% compared to 
the targeted rate of 11 .9%. 
On the sectoral level some of the key projects in the agricultural sector were 
not implemented by the end of the plan period. Despite successive drought 
seasons, the relative share of agriculture was 8.5% slightly more than the planned 
one. However. the real annual growth rate of this sector was 5.7% yearly while the 
targeted rate was 7%. Likewise in the previous plan industry showed the highest 
annual growth rate amongst the other sectors at 13.6%, even though this rate was 
just around half the targeted rate (26.1 %). This shortfall in the growth rate of 
industry was due to the fact that a number of industrial projects not implemented 
such as the fertiliser project as well as a reduction in phosphate productions9 • In 
contrast the actual growth rate of construction ( 13.1%) far exceeded the targeted 
rate (4.1 %). 
The relative share of the service sectors of the GOP was still dominant at 
(61 .2%). Thus meant that the plan had failed to a large extend to increase the share 
of the commodity producing sectors at the expense of the service sectors. 
Subsequently the predicted change in the basic structure of the economy, the main 
goal of the Jordanian planners during this period, did not take place. 
9 Khader,B.(1989), Jordan Economy 1952-1989, p6. 
3 15 
Correspondingly the share of the commodity sectors was 36.8% by the end of the 
plan term despite having been planned to reach 44.1%. Concerning the realisation 
of targets and the performance of the plan, Abu Jaber claimed that on the whole the 
plan had strengthened confidence in the stability of the country and its economy for 
the private sector at home or abroad. 
In terms of capital fixed expenditure, the size of investments amounted to JD 
643.7 million at constant prices, 10% more than the anticipated figure. The share of 
the private sector including the project financed jointly with public sector was 59% of 
the total investment. Weiss claimed that private investment in small-and medium-
sized businesses played a greater role than what was expected , while governmental 
investments were directed towards capital-intensive and large-scale projects in the 
different sectors 10 • 
The realisation ratio of the investment on the sectoral level was far exceeded 
in the housing sector (216.2%); transportation (144.3%) and the industry sector 
(104.5%). In addition, these sectors received more than three-quarter of the capital 
expenditure, while the other sectors were close to the anticipated figures, except 
agriculture, which received only 49.7% of the estimated investment. 
6.1,1.2 The Second Five Year Development Plan 1981-1985 
This plan was prepared during the golden years of the Jordanian economy 
and in the light of promising and encouraging conditions that indicated the Jordanian 
economy would have the potential and capability to actualise remarkable growth. 
Furthermore, the planners were encouraged that the Jordanian economy would 
benefit from the flourishing regional economic situation. In particular, oil prices were 
still high, thus ensuring that financial support would continue to flow into the 
Jordanian economy from the Arab oil producing countries. This was especially so 
after resolutions of the Arab summit in Baghdad, which promoted to support the front 
line countries after the Egyption Israeli peace treaty. Moreover, the Jordanians 
would continue to work in the Gulf countries and their remittances would be 
circulated in various economic activities in Jordan. 
10 Weiss, 0 .(1977), Development Plans, p152. 
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In the encouraging atmosphere of the domestic and regional economies, the 
expectations of this plan as well as its aims were optimistic. However apart from 
magnifying its objectives, it was not essentially different to the previous plan. To a 
large extent, the plan aimed to achieve the same goals of the previous one Amin 
claimed that repetition in the aims was due to the failure of the previous plans to fulfil 
their main goals. '' 
The main goal of this plan was to increase the GOP by 69.0% at an annual 
real growth rate of 11 .0%. This growth rate would be possible throughout the 
different sectors, which are displayed below. Likewise the plan estimated the overall 
increase of the GNP by 67.7 or at a real growth rate of 10.9% per annum. 
The aim of changing the structure of the Jordanian economy was to enhance 
lts reliance on the producing commodity sectors at the expense of the services 
sectors. This aim would be achieved by raising the contribution of the commodity 
sectors to GOP from 38.8% in 1980 to 46.0% by the end of the plan period. In 
contrast the share of the service sector would drop from 61 .2% to 54.0%. This 
modification would come about by achieving an annual growth rate of 14.9% for the 
commodity sectors against 8.4% for the services. Despite the fact that increasing 
the contribution of the commodity producing sectors in GOP was the central goal in 
the Jordanian planners agenda, the share of these sectors was just 50.0% of the 
total plan investments. In other words, the same amount was allocated to the 
service sectors. 
In order to cover recurrent expenditure and to realise a surplus to be 
channelled to finance the developing expenditures, the plan aimed to increase the 
ratio of domestic revenue to recurrent expenditures from 70% in 1980 to 100.4% in 
1985. Likewise, the plan aimed to reduce the trade deficit ratio in the balance of 
goods and services. Thus the plan expected that imports of goods and services 
would increase at an annual growth rate of 13.5% against a growth rate of 17.8% in 
exports. Hence the ratio of the trade deficit to the GNP would drop from 51 .9% in 
1980 to 40.7% in 1985. 
The plan aimed to develop the labour force by extending compulsory 
education, vocational training and increasing women's participation in the labour 
11 Abdallah, K.A. (1994) The Development Strategy in Jordan from 1950s-1990s, p 75-78. 
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market. In particular, the plan intended to increase the number of students in 
vocational training so their ratio to the total number of enrolled students would rise to 
reach 30.0% in 1985. Similarly the ratio of the age group in compulsory education 
would reach 95.0% at the end of the period of this plan. 
Finally, satisfying basic needs and narrowing disparities among the different 
regions of the country was one of the main goals of this plan. 
The plan envisaged economic growth of the following sectoral targets: 
1- Agricultural income would increase by 43.6% or at an annual growth rate 
of 7.5%. That increase would be possible by improving agricultural 
techniques and extending irrigated areas in the Jordan Valley and 
Southern Ghors. The plan expected that the utilisation of the waters of 
the Maqarian Dam for irrigation purposes would begin before 1985, the 
last year of the plan. The planners emphasised that implementing the 
Maqarian Dam project would play a major role in reaching the targets of 
this sector. However, any tardiness in the implementation of this project 
until after the plan term would seriously affect the planned growth rate of 
this sector. 
2- The income from manufacturing and mining was planned to increase by 
127.3% or at an annual growth rate of 18.0%. This increase would be 
possible as a result of completing the projects started during the previous 
plan as well as establishing new projects such as chemical industries and 
expansion cement productions. Hence, the relative share of this sector in 
the GOP would rise from 21 .8% in 1980 to 29.3% in 1985. 
3- The service sector would show an increase of 49.4% during the plan 
period or a real growth rate of 8.4% per annum, although its relative share 
in GOP was planned to decline as mentioned above. 
4- Other sectors: the growth rate of the electricity and water sector was 
planned to be 18.9% per annum which would increase its relative share in 
GOP from 1.1% in 1980 to 1.6% in 1985. The annual growth rate of the 
construction i~CO!f1_e was expected to_ b~ 1?.6%, which would increase the 
ratio of this sector of the GOP from 7.4% in 1980 to 7.9% in 1985. 
- . -
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Regarding the success of this plan and comparing it to the first five-year 
development plan, all economic indicators indicated that the actual performance fell 
far below the plan's projections. The real annual growth rate of the GDP at factor 
cost was 4.2%, whilst the real GDP at market price averaged 5.3% yearly; 
correspondingly the rate of GNP recorded 4.8%. These growth rates were less than 
half the rates the Jordanian planners envisaged reaching during the plan. At the 
sectoral level, the growth rate of the agricultural sector registered 7.0% per annum. 
close to the planned rate of 7.5%, which was not the case for the other sectors. The 
actual annual growth rate of industry including mining did not exceed 4.9%. which 
was less than one third of the targeted rate. The Jordanian planners ascribed this 
shortfall to the underutilisation of the productive capacity of a number of large new 
industries including potash, cement and fertilisers. 
Three factors affected the performance of the Jordanian economy and 
subsequently the realisation of this plan: Firstly, the reduction in the size of transfers 
from the Arab countries to the central government (see the section on the balance of 
payments). Secondly, the fall in the growth rate of remittances after the first year of 
the plan 12• And thirdly, the decrease in the growth rate of exports and re-exports 
compared with growth rate during the previous plan or the anticipated rate for this 
plan. In this matter, Khader noted that 1983 witnessed a decline in the value of the 
Jordanian exports to the Iraqi market, and subsequently the value of the industrial 
exports dropped from JD 42.7 million in 1982 to JD 13.5 million in 1983. 
Furthermore, the phosphate income declined in the last three years of the plan 
although the total production increased13• 
It is important to note that the above factors were external, and those regional 
economic elements rather than domestic ones affected the performance of the 
Jordanian economy. 
12 The foreign aid and remittances started to drop In 1981 forwards Abu Jaber noted that the 
performances of the economy initle·first·yearof the planwas-high'erthan the targeted before declined 
drama!ically in 1981 the second year of the plan. Abu Jaber. Kam~I, ~Shimizu. M (1984), p.70,71. 
13 Khader,B.(1987), Targets and Achievements, p187. 
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6.1.1.3The Third Five Development 1986-1990 
The aims and objectives of this plan were designed under the new 
circumstances of the economy of the Middle East, which suffered from the decline in 
oil prices and the continuation of the first Gulf war. Subsequently the recession in 
the economics of the Middle East affected Jordan directly in two of its main 
economic pillars: the remittances and foreign aid. Both these revenues showed a 
dramatic decline in 1983. Thus the objectives of this plan were not ambitious and 
were more reasonable in comparison with the previous plans. Furthermore. this 
indicates that the Jordanian planners took into consideration the poor achievements 
of the previous plan due to the gradual drop in external payments. Hence, the main 
theme of this plan was to develop the economic independence as Feiler outlined14• 
The goals of this plan were as follows: 
1- The Plan aimed to increase GOP during the plan period at 
an annual growth rate of 5.0%, a modest rate compared 
with the projected growth rate in the previous plans. The 
plan also aimed to achieve an average growth rate of GNP 
at 5.0% per annum'5 . 
2- The plan intended to create 97,000 new employment 
opportunities through out the investment projects. 
Furthermore, the plan predicted the availability of another 
104 thousands jobs, 50,000 of them by substituting for the 
foreign labor, 29,000 jobs to replace retirement and 25,000 
jobs could be available for the Jordanian workers abroad. 
The aggregate employment in 1990 would be 703 
thousands of which 12% were expatriateS16• It is important 
to outline that such a goal, which was not included in any of 
the plans since the three-year development plan 1973-
1975, indicated that some Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf 
countries came back to Jordan. Also, the demand for 
14 Feiler, G. (1994) Jordan's Economy 1970-1 990: The Primacy of Exogenous Factors, p51 . 
15 Ministry of Planning. The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1"990), p80. - - --
16 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan .for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p80. 
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Jordanian labor in the Gulf countries was not as much as it 
was during the second half of the 70s and the early 80s. In 
other words, the era that was characterized by labor 
shortage and lasted for almost one decade turned into a 
period of labor surplus and subsequently, Jordan had to 
face a growing unemployment rate and to suffer from the 
foreign labor burden . 
3- The plan aimed to reduce the public and private 
consumption expenditure in order to reach a GOP growth 
rate higher than the rate of consumption. Thus the ratio of 
consumption to GOP would drop from 111 .0% in 1985 to 
99.0% in 1990. Moreover, the domestic revenue would 
cover the current expenditure by curbing the increase of 
current expenditure and increasing the domestic revenue in 
the main time. 
4- The plan aimed to reduce the deficit in the balance of 
goods and services17• 
5- The plan aimed to reach its goals by achieving sectoral 
targets which were designed as follows: 
(A) Agriculture: the average annual growth rate of this sector was planned 
to be at 7.8% so the agricultural contribution to the GOP would rise 
from 8.2% in 1985 to 9.4% in 1990. This target would be attained by 
introducing advanced agricultural and irrigation techniques, 
augmenting irrigated land in the Jordan Valley region, developing 
animal resources and leasing out the state land to be exploited by the 
private sector. The plan allocated 9.4% of its fixed investment to 
agriculture excluding irrigation investment. 71 .6% of them would 
provided by private sector.18 
11 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p80-8~ . 
16 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p87·88. 
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(B) Mining and quarrying: the plan envisaged increasing the income 
generated from this sector by 45.6% at an annual growth rate 
averaged at 7.8%. The phosphate and potash would constitute 71 % 
and 18.0% respectively of the added value of this sector by the end of 
the plan. According to the planners, expanding the activities of this 
sector would create 1600 new jobs19• 
(C) Manufacturing industries: the plan designed to increase the real 
income of this sector by 39.5% at an average growth rate of 6.9%, 
yearly which would increase its share in the GOP from 12.3% in 1985 
to 13.4% in 1990. The anticipated growth rate would create 11 ,000 
new jobs and the aggregate employment in this sector by the end of 
the plan period would count for more than 63 thousand workers, or 
about 10% of the labor force20• Both the manufacturing and mining 
industries were anticipated to receive 12.6% of the plan investment. 
(D) Electricity and water: the average growth rate of this sector was 
planned to be 4. 7% per annum, which would be attained by the 
expansion of water distribution and recycling projects, in addition to 
power generation, transmission and distribution projects21 • 
(E) Construction: the projected increase of this sector's inc-ome was 
21 .8% during the plan period or an average annual growth rate of 
4.3%. The projects of this sector would cover housing to serve low 
and limited income groups as well as the construction of roads and 
bridges22• 
(F) Service sectors: the plan envisaged to increase the income generated 
from services by 23.3%, at an annual growth rate of 4.3%. In order to 
reduce the share of these sectors in favor of the productive ones, the 
19 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p88. 
20 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p86-89. 
21 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
~·990);-p89. 
22 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p89. 
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Jordanian planners gave priority to developing the service sectors 
connected to the commodity producing sectors. Transportation would 
show the highest annual growth rate averaged 5.6% followed by 
government services, trade and the rest of the service sectors by 
4.3%, 4.0% and 3.6% respectively. The total fixed investment of 
services was planned to be JD 1223.6 million, which represented 
39.3% of the plan's investment23. However, this amount was less than 
that actually planned since the plan categorized sectors, for instance, 
transportation and telecommunication as infrastructure sectors. The 
share of the service sectors, including transportation and 
telecommunication, would reach 56.9% of the entire investment. 
As far as the investment of plan and private sector involvement are 
concerned, the plan estimated its investment at JD 3115.5 million, 47.6% to be 
provided by the private sector and the rest by the public sector. The central 
government would contribute 29.6% and the autonomous institutions would provide 
28.8% of the total investment. The share of the private sector according to this plan 
is the lowest compared with the previous plans. Agriculture and industry would 
receive more than one third of the private sector investment. In addition to 42.6% of 
its investment allocated to the housing, construction and transportation. On the one 
hand, housing and construction received more than one fifth of the anticipated 
investment, which was almost equivalent to the share of the productive sectors 
industry and agriculture and was slightly more than the share of telecommunication 
and transportation. The plan did not show how the private sector would finance its 
share; in contrast it showed the finance of the public sector. 
The plan was not implemented because of the emergence of the economic 
crisis that brought the IMF into the circle of the economic decision-making and 
therefore the economic adjustment program was introduced replacing this plan. This 
program was introduced in late 1988 and will be discussed in the section of the 
macroeconomy of the 90s. 
23 Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986-
1990), p89. 
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6.1 .2 THE BUDGET 
This section deals with public finance, studying the main trends that the 
central government budget experienced during this period. It covers the main 
components of the public revenue from both domestic and foreign sources. Besides 
analyzing the performance of the revenue, it attempts to reveal the political and 
economic factors that had an impact on such performance. Furthermore, this 
section covers the main trends of the governmental expenditures both capital and 
current, showing the cardinal themes of the governmental policy in this respect with 
special emphasis on the military budget as well as on the public administration 
spending. 
Over the years of this period, the public revenue showed a remarkable 
expansion: it rose from JD148.9 million in 1974 to JD 1083.5 million in 1989 
augmenting by more than nine times, and its annual growth rate recorded 16.4%. 
Correspondingly, the expenditure increased at an annual growth rate of 15.6% and 
in 1989 it reached JD 1102.3 million, rising from JD 146.6 million in 1974. The 
expansion that was recorded in both expenditure and revenue took place mainly in 
the first eight years of the period. 
Regional political developments during the 1970s resulted in an unexpected 
increase in budgetary support from the Arab countries. Arab aid, which had already 
been established according to the Khartoum summit resolution, underwent a further 
increase from 1974 as a result of the Rabat summit resolutions. Such an increase 
followed the Jordanian official recognition of the PLO as the only legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. In the late 70s, the budget benefited again 
from the rise in the Arab aid to the frontline countries as was stated in the Baghdad 
summit meeting subsequent to the peace process between Israel and Egypt. In the 
Baghdad meeting the Arab countries committed to transferring to the central 
government of Jordan an amount of $ 1.2 billion per annum over a period of 10 
years starting in 197824 • The main aim of this financial aid was to support Jordan's 
defence capability and to help it to enhance its development efforts25• The oil boom, 
24 Feiler. G. (1994 ), Jordan's Economy, 1970-1990: The Primacy of Exogenous Factors, p49. 
25 Hammad, K. (1987), p25. 
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which resulted in a huge amount of petrodollars being amassed by the oil producing 
Arab states made this kind of aid conceivable up to the early 80s. Moreover, Jordan 
continued to receive aid from the US and various other countries, though the aid 
from the latter was not continuous26• Apart from the role of budget support in 
accelerating the growth rate of both external revenue and expenditure, the oil boom 
affected the budget in another way. It resulted in a huge increase in the Jordanian 
workers' remittance, which, together with financial aid, had a crucial role in the 
economic prosperity that Jordan experienced particularly in the first half of the 
period. Economic expansion, combined with the increase in the consumption 
patterns, resulted in an increase in public revenue and subsequently in expenditure. 
Moreover, and taking into account that domestic revenue bore down on the income 
that was generated from custom duties, the augmentation of the import abilities for 
both investment and consuming purposes led to an increase in the public revenue. 
The economic recession, which was caused chiefly by the decline of foreign 
aid and of remittances, hit the budgetary revenue and expenditures. In the second 
phase, the entire revenue grew by 7.6%. However, domestic and external revenues 
suffered the most since their growth rates were merely around a quarter of that 
achieved in the first phase. On the other hand, the growth rate of the external loans 
declined by just less than half while the domestic loans grew annually by 26.0%, 
which was almost twice its rate in the first eight year. This differentiation in the rates 
of the public revenue components reveals that the government pursued a borrowing 
policy to offset the inadequacy of the other public revenues. The growth rate of 
expenditure receded by two thirds in comparison to that of the first phase. The rate 
of capital expenditure was 5. 7%, which was even less than that of the current 
expenditure, recording 8.5%. 
This period revealed that governmental policy at the public finance level was 
not well set during the first few years of the period. It seems that the government 
indulged in increasing its expenditure in these years benefiting especially from the 
aid that came from the Arab countries. During the second phase this policy suffered 
from continuous variation, precisely when the government had to face the recession 
and its consequences. However, the Budget documents contained three main and 
general governmental principles all over the period. These were as follows: 
26 Hammad, K (1987), p26-27. 
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1- The budget aimed to strengthen "Jordan's steadfastness and 
defence capability'27 • 
2- The budget aimed to meet the governmental commitment 
towards supporting people in the occupied West Bank28• 
3- The budget fulfilled governmental policy in supporting the 
social and economic development momentum of particularly 
providing a good standard of basic service and maintaining the 
price of the basic food items29 • 
Indeed the principles above were fulfilled to a large extent. The defence 
expenditure increased rapidly during the whole period, and even in the difficult years 
of the recession it kept a respectable growth rate pace, contrary to the other 
expenditure categories. Starting from 1974 onwards, the government gradually 
followed a subsidy policy for basic food elements in order to protect the consumers 
by controlling the price of a wide range of food products and vegetables. This trend 
was strengthened by the foundation of the Ministry of Supply and of the military staff 
and civil servants markets. Furthermore, the government expanded its health and 
education services as well as the expenditure that was allocated to infrastructure 
projects such as roads, bridges and building construction. 
The budget also emphasised that, throughout the period, external loans 
revenue was channelled to finance development projects while the government 
relied on internal debts to offset the budget deficit30• Apart from the above-
mentioned principles, government policy in the first few years of the period was 
widely based on enjoying the ability of increasing the expenditures in all fields. 
In 1976, according to the framework of the first five-year development plan 
(1976-1980), a new strategy was adopted to reorganise public finance. According to 
this policy the government would curb current expenditure and simultaneously 
27 Central Bank of Jordan (1982), The Nineteenth Annual Report p51 . This aim and the others 
were stated in all annual reports of the Central Bank of Jordan with the exception of the 1969 report 
when the economic relapse dictated emergency measures. 
28 It is worth mentioning that the two first principles were important to maintain yearly since 
they were the main justification of. receiving the Arab aid. __ 
29 Central Bank of Jordan, Different Annual Reports (1979-1988). 
30 Central Bank of Jordan, different annual reports (1979-1988). 
326 
increase the domestic revenue. This would ultimately enable the latter to cover 
current expenditures. Despite the fact that this policy was emphasised yearly, its 
achievement was small particularly in the first half of the period when the domestic 
revenue covered just 67.0% of the current expenditure. The weak point was the 
increase in the current expenditures, since domestic revenue showed a rapid 
increase due to the economic boom. The current expenditure increased as a result 
of an expansion in the size of the public sector and of the public administration 
expenditure. In the mid 80s while reviewing the budget trends, Saket and his 
colleagues called for an urgent search to be carried out to reduce the bureaucracy 
and the waste in the public sector in order to decrease spending31 . The government 
continued its policy in subsidising some products such as fuel and basic food, 32 
regardless of the high rate of inflation in the late 70s and early 80s. 33 It also 
increased the wages and salaries of its expanding army of employees in 197934 , 
198135 and 198336• 
That policy became more relevant after 1982, as a governmental response to 
the challenges dictated by the contraction of the revenue. The continuous recession 
that prevailed in 1986 and 1987 and affected the entire economic performance 
necessitated the replacement of the above policy with a new policy based on 
increasing expenditure. This new strategy assumed that expanding governmental 
expenditure would stimulate economic activityY By the end of this period Jordanian 
government policy was restructured under the supervision of the IMF to face the 
economic crisis, which opened a new chapter in the development of the Jordanian 
economy. 
31 Saket, B. , Asfour, B .. Assaf, G. (1985) the Economy of Jordan Over the 70s and 1979-A 
Bird's Eye View, p84. 
32 See the Central Bank, Different Annual Reports. 
33 Saket, B. , Asfour, B., Assaf, G. (1985) The Economy of Jordan Over the 70s and 1979-A 
Bird's Eye View, p82. 
34 Central Bank of Jordan (1979), Annual Report, p70. 
35 Central Ban!< of J,or~(1981) , Annual Report, p41 . 
36 Central Bank .of Jordan (1 983), Annual Report, p43. 
37 Central Bank of Jordan (1986), The Twenty Third Annual Report p37, 
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6.1.2.1 Revenue and Receipts 
As was mentioned earlier on, public revenue expanded rapidly during this 
period, although in general terms its composition and structure did not show a 
fundamental change. The structure of the public revenue as it had been in the 
former period indicated that domestic revenue was still inadequate to cover 
governmental expenditures, which had to rely on revenue from external sources. 
However, and in contrast to the previous period, domestic revenue was the biggest 
component providing the treasury with 50.6% of the entire receipts. 
At the level of external sources, the share of the budget support coming 
mainly from the Arab countries, averaged around 29.0%, far less than 47.3% 
recorded in the previous period. However, the decline in budget support in relative 
terms was a result of the rapid increase in external loans and the improvement in 
receipts from domestic revenue and did not reflect a drop in its absolute value. 
External aid, which grew at an annual rate of 22.2%, was not steady throughout the 
period; its fluctuation reflected political developments as well as economic 
developments mainly in the oil producing countries. The oil boom in the first half of 
the period made it possible for the gulf countries to increase their financial aid to 
Jordan subsequent to the Rabat summit meeting. 
A similar trend was witnessed after the Baghdad summit meeting of 1978, 
which was held subsequently to the peace process between Israel and Egypt. 
Hence, external aid reached JD 58.8 million in 1974, jumped to JD 100 million in 
1975 and in 1979, 1980 and 1981 it recorded around JO 200 million yearly, which 
was 150.0% more than in 1978. Over the first half of the period the growth rate of 
financial aid recorded 34.0% annually and constituted 37.1% of the budgetary 
receipts. 
The decline in the international oil price from 1982 onwards and the ongoing 
Iraqi-Iranian war had an adverse impact on financial aid. During the second half of 
the period (1982-1989), external aid grew at an annual rate of 10.0%, which was 
less than one third of growth during of the first half of the period . Moreover, its 
contribution was just 20.9% on average and in 1984,1986, 1987 and 1988 it reached 
its lowest level at around 15.0% of the total public revenue. Between 1982 and 
1988 the size of external aid did not meet the Jordanian annual share of Arab aid, 
which was committed in the Baghdad summit meeting. The governmental policy 
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that aimed to offset this fall in the size of financial aid was based on augmenting the 
revenue generated from local sources including the internal debt revenue. 
Additionally, the government expanded its borrowing policy from external sources. 
The relative importance of the foreign loans increased rapidly and averaged 
13.5%, which was almost twice that in the former period. External loans had the 
fastest annual growth rate at 32.9%. which was almost twice that of the domestic 
revenue. Borrowing from external sources was a method followed by the 
government to finance its expenditures, especially capital expenditure. The 
expectations of receiving a steady or increased amount of foreign aid according to 
the Arab commitments together with increased public spending and ambitious 
development projects resulted in accelerating the external loans. Furthermore, in 
the first half of the period the ability to borrow from the oil producing countries as 
well as from the Arab regional funds eased the borrowing policy of the Jordanian 
government38• The decrease in external financial aid in the last half of the period 
drove the government to finance its expenditures39 -especially development 
expenditure- from external loans, which were provided mainly by international funds 
and industrial countries40 . The total contribution of receipts from external sources, 
including both financial aid and loans was around 43.0%. 
The performance of domestic revenue during this period was not exceptional 
to the whole accomplishment of the other economic indicators. It was affected by the 
ascending accomplishment of the economy in the first half of the period and by the 
economic slump in the latter half. The contribution of domestic revenue averaged 
50.6% over the period, while it was just 44.5% in the earlier eight years of the period 
when foreign aid showed its best figures. Coinciding with the decrease in the foreign 
aid in the latter phase of the period the share of the domestic revenue jumped to 
56.6%. However, this increase in the second phase reflected the decrease in the 
proportion of the external revenue rather than an increase in the absolute value of 
the domestic revenue. In fact, the growth rate of the domestic revenue between 
38 By reviewing the different loans that were withdrawn during this period as was appeared in 
the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Jordan (1974-1981). 
39 See King Hussian's statement that Jordan relied on the external loans in order to finance its 
arms import due to the fact that Arab countries did not meet their financial obligations towards Jordan. 
Satolff, R.B. (1985}. Troubles on The East Bank: Challenges to The Domestic Stability of Jordan, p20 
- -
40 During the second phase the western commercial bank~. the industrial countries and the 
international funds became the main source of the Jordan loans as can be seen in the Annual Reports 
of the Central Bank of Jordan ( 1982-1989). 
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1982 and 1989 was just around one fourth of that recorded in the first phase. In 
other words. the figures indicated an obvious correlation between the performance 
of the revenue and the external transfers. The increase in foreign aid and 
remittances in the first phase were reflected in an increase in local receipts and vice 
versa in the second phase. The composition of domestic revenue could to some 
extent reveal this correlation . 
Due to the fact the taxation system of Jordan had no broad-based tax such 
as a national value-added or sales tax'11 , the tax revenue bore upon the indirect 
taxes as is the case in other developing countries. Indirect tax revenue made the 
biggest contribution among the other components at 55.3% of the local receipts 
while the share of direct taxes stood at 16.8% and non-tax revenue was 27.9%. 
Even though the indirect tax share showed a decline in this period compared to the 
former period as result of the better rate of the direct tax and non-tax revenues, it 
was still the dominant and the most influential component. More specifically, import 
duties generated more than half of the indirect tax revenue. i.e. 29.6% of the entire 
local revenue, twice as much as direct tax revenue and slightly more than non-tax 
income. 
Tracing the performance of indirect taxation in general, and import duties in 
particular over the two phases of the period reveals that the indirect tax income in 
1981 was five times more than that which was recorded in 1974. It grew at an 
annual rate of 26.6%, while its share averaged 60.0%. In the same phase the import 
duties income showed a rapid increase at an annual rate of 32.0%, which was 
swifter than the rate of the whole indirect tax. Furthermore, its share was almost 
35.0% of the total domestic revenue. We assume that the increased value of foreign 
aid and remittances accelerated the growth of the economy, expanded investment 
and augmented the ability to import (especially consumer products). which resulted 
in raising the income of the import duties and consequently the entire indirect tax 
Income. This became apparent in the second phase, when remittances and foreign 
aid diminished and imports duties income relapsed. In statistical terms. import 
duties revenue grew by 1.6% annually, while its share in the domestic revenue 
contracted to 24. 7%. This contraction was consequently reflected in the relative 
importance of the indirect tax income. Furthermore, the crucial role of import duty is 
41 Saket, B. , Asfour, B., Assaf, G. (1985) the Economy of Jordan Over the 70s and 1979-A 
Bird's Eye View, p95. Kanvosky,E. (1969), Jordan's Economy From Prosperity to Crisis, p27, 
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more noticeable when taking into account that other components showed a slight 
difference between their share in the second phase and that of the initial phase, 
though, their growth rate in the latter phase largely contracted. 
In addition to the direct influence of the recession, the governmental policy 
that increased the tariff rates on various finished products from 1982 onwardS42 and 
imposed a ban on importing some luxury products from 198843 reduced the income 
from duties. On the other hand this policy raised the income that generated from the 
consumption tax. The collapse in the price of the Dinar in 1988 and then its 
devaluation in 1989 resulted in a decline in imports in these years. 
The performance of other domestic revenue components did not indicate a 
big structural change. As was mentioned above, the rapid expansion of the different 
components in the first eight years slowed down during the second phase. 
Consumption tax revenue was the exception, showing an increase in the recession 
phase. This was likely to be due to the increase in the tariff on imported finished 
goods, which diverted the local purchase towards local products. 
The direct tax contribution showed only a slight improvement during this 
period: it remained insignificant compared to the other components. The direct tax 
share was lower than that witnessed in Syria or Egypt and was much higher than 
that in the Gulf States. As Owen noted, the direct tax income in Jordan suffered 
from the administrative disability of finding out the details of private earnings,44 even 
though the law was well developed in this respect. 
Non-tax revenue showed the fastest growth rate during this period. In the first 
three years {1974·1976), this revenue benefited from the flourishing profits that the 
government received due to the international boom in phosphate price. Moreover, 
the income of the post and telephone services increased rapidly, registering an 
annual growth rate of 30.2%, which was the highest among the rates of the sub-
42 Central Bank of Jordan (1982), The Nineteenth Annual Report, p34-37. Central Bank of 
Jordan (1983), The Twenty Annual Report. p47. Central Bank of Jordan (1984), The Twenty First 
Annual Report, p43. Central Bank of Jordan (1985}, The Twenty Second Annual Report, p41 . Central 
Bank of Jordan (1986), the Twenty-Three Annual Report, p 41 . Central Bank of Jordan (1987}, The 
Twenty-Four Annual Report. p41-42. 
43 Central Bank of Jordan-(-1988), The Twenty-Five Annual Report, p40-41 . Central Bank of 
Jordan (1989), The Twenty-Six Annual Report. p3. 
44 Owen. Roger. (1985), p8. 
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components. However, the income generated from the profits of the Central Bank 
operations still constituted the majority of the non-tax revenue4e-.. 
As was said in the introduction of this section, in 1976 the government 
followed a policy aimed to augment the revenue from local sources in order to cover 
the current expenditure46• This policy was stressed in the budget laws year after 
year, and specifically in 1980 the government committed itself to actualizing this goal 
by 198547 • Notwithstanding the above, the government failed in fulfilling its policy 
and precisely in 1985, before it completely changed its policy, domestic revenue 
covered just around 70% of the current expenditure. However, in the last few years 
the domestic revenue covered around 80.0% of the current spending. 
The period showed a big effort to reform the taxation system in order to 
enhance tax revenue and to modernize its legal framework. Therefore, new taxes 
were imposed, new laws replaced old ones and new legal regulations were 
introduced to improve the efficiency of the tax collection. Due to the fact that the tax 
revenue bore on the indirect tax component, the increased and the new taxes 
concentrated on customs, fees, excise and the like. However some reformation took 
place at the levels of direct taxes. For instance, a new income tax law was issued in 
198548 stating a progressive rate according to income. One year later, a regulation 
was enacted to deduct the income tax from the wages and salaries of private sector 
employees49• The indirect taxes increased broadly during this period: the tax on the 
local production of cigarettes was increased in 197750 and another increase was 
imposed in 197851 • The fees on issuing new passports were increased to reach 
JD15.0 in 1978 and the validity of passports was reduced from 5 to 3 years52 • Other 
fees and taxes were also increased, such as the annual fees on taxicabs. public 
45 According to the annual reports of the Central Bank, the share of the CBJ in the 
composition of the profits was dominant particularly in the 70s and early 80s. 
46 It is important to mention that the fiscal policy of the early 60s aimed to cover the whole 
expenditure both capital and current by using the domestic revenue. 
47 Central Bank of Jordan (1980), The Seventeenth Annual Report, p44. 
48 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-two Annual Report, p41 . 
49 Central Bank of Jordan (1986), The Twenty-three Annual Report, p41 . 
50 Central Bank of Jordan (1977), The Fo1,1rteenth AnnJ.J.al R~port, p85. 
51 Central Bank of Jordan ~1978), The Fifteenth Annual Rep~rt, p82. 
52 Central Bank of Jordan (1978). The Fifteenth Annual Report. p82-83 
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works, insurance companies, telephone installation, optometrist license53. Fees on 
nationality and citizenship rose 54 and so did flights fees,55 accompanied by the 
imposition of a departure ta,r'. Some of the excise and licenses, such as the T.V 
license and the excise on soap, cement. iron bars57 and alcoholic drinks were also 
increased 58• Land registration and real estate, which provided the treasury with a 
respectable amount of revenue were subject to an increase in 198559• 
As for the changes that were witnessed customes, there were three main 
factors that motivated them. The development and modernization of the measures 
and regulations of the import duties were one of the fundamental reasons to issue or 
amend the existing laws and tariff rates. In this respect, the custom duties law no. 16 
was enacted in 1983 to unify the different measures and regulations that were 
imposed on imported products and to reconsider the tariff rate of others. For 
example, the duties on imported motor vehicles were estimated according to the 
date of make rather than to their weight<>. On the other hand, augmenting revenue 
from the duties was another reason to change the regulations increasing the tariff 
rate on some imported products. This factor was crucial after 1982, when the 
government tried every avenue to offset the decrease in the external aid . Therefore, 
the duties increased on high quality bakery products6 ', fruits, nuts, silk textile62, 
alcoholic drinks, loud speaker equipment, textiles and cheese63. This policy of 
increasing tariff rates to enhance the local revenue aimed to curb imports in the last 
three years of the period in order to keep conservation of the foreign currency as 
high as possible. Hence, in the last two years of this period the policy was literally to 
ban importing a wide range of products64. 
53 Central Bank of Jordan (1977), The Fourteenth Annual Report, p85-86. 
54 Central Bank of Jordan (1 978), The Fifteenth Annual Report, p84. 
55 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-second Annual Report, p41. 
56 Central Bank of Jordan (1 987), The Twenty-fourth Annual Report, p41 . 
57 Central Bank of Jordan (1987), The Twenty-fourth Annual Report. p41-42. 
58 Central Bank of Jordan {1985), The Twenty-second Annual Report, p41 . 
59 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-second Annual Report, p41 . 
60 Central Bank of Jordan (1983), The Twentieth Annual Report, p47. 
61 Central Bank of Jordan (1986), The Twenty-third Annual Report, p41 . 
62 Central Bank of Jordan (19§~).!. The Twenty-first Ao_nygj ~QQrt. p41 . 
63 Central Bank of Jordan (1987), The Twenty-fourth Annual Report, p41-42. 
64 Central Bank of Jordan (1988), The Twenty-fifth Annual Report p41. 
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The third factor was the protection policy that the government followed widely 
during the late 70s and early 80s encouraging the products of local industries. This 
policy took two forms: lifting tariffs on the raw and intermediate materials that were 
imported for industry and increasing that on the imported products that had a local 
substitute. Hence, the custom duties were increased on the following imports: dairy 
products, vegetable and animal oil , chemical products & preparations, detergents, 
pesticide, electronic appliances, some construction materials65, carpets, pack 
threads & ropes, chocolates, chemical condensation66 , semi manufactured wood, 
zinc products, rubber, stove heaters, cookers and aluminum heaters67 
6. 1.2.2 Expenditures 
Expenditure during this period expanded in all aspects and at a rate that was 
similar to that of the revenue. As was noted earlier, expenditure showed a rapid 
increase in the first half of the period growing by 24.1% yearly, benefiting from the 
flourishing of the receipts. In the latter half, the growth rate slowed down to 7.1% 
per annum as a consequence of the drop in the revenue. 
In general terms, the categories of the public spending both capital and 
current showed that the finance administration received the biggest share of the 
entire budgetary expenditure at 31.1%. Defense and internal security came next at 
28. 7%, followed by economic development services at 21 .1 %, and social services at 
4.2%. Culture service, international affairs and general administration shared around 
3.0% of the entire expenditure. The categories that showed the fastest growth rate 
over the whole period were finance administration at 23.4%, communication and 
transports services at 21 .4% and social services at 17.5%. However. the otber 
categories also expanded at a high rate, that is more than 12.0%. 
Three main pillars, i.e. capital, defense and public administration spending, 
characterized expenditures during this period . Capital expenditure grew at an 
65 Central Bank of Jord_an. (19.85), The Twenty~Second Annuai.Report, p41 . 
66 Central Bank of Jorda~ (1~~~~. The Twenty-third Annual Report, p41 . 
67 Cent ral Bank of Jordan (1987), The Twenty-fourth Annual Report, p41 . 
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annual rate of 17.7% and was slightly faster than the current rate, which recorded 
16.0%. However, the capital expenditure rate can be attributed mainly to the 
expansion which took place in the first eight years, when it grew by 30.0% compared 
to the 23.4% growth rate of current expenditure. This trend was reversed in the 
second phase, when the capital spending grew by 5.8%, a lower pace than that of 
the current one, which recorded 8.5%. 
Over the whole period, capital expenditure received on average around 
36.0% of the entire governmental expenditure revealing a considerable increase 
from the level of the former period level (30.0%). The distribution of capital 
expenditure among the different fields shows that slightly more than half of it was 
devoted to economic development services. Finance administration came next with 
a share of 34.7%, followed by the communication and transports services (6.9%). 
Around 6.0% of the rest of the capital budget was distributed among the other 
categories, such as social services or internal security. These categories showed a 
decline in the second half of the period with the exception of the internal security 
services and finance administration, whose growth rate continued to increase. 
The official economic classification of the capital budget revealed the nature 
of this type of spending and the governmental conception of capital spending. 
Capital spending was mainly of a constructive character taking into account the 
striking ratio of the spending on the lands, buildings and construction68 to the entire 
capital spending, which was around half. This character was more dominant taking 
into consideration that around 20-30% of the entire capital spending was channeled 
to cover the settlement of loans and obligation. The third main component was 
loans and investment, which varied between 15% to 20% and covered the different 
economic activities that the government was involved in either solely or jointly with 
the private sector. Hence, the capital budget was characterized by being a public 
work or construction budget that covered development projects of irrigation in the 
Jordan valley or the opening of new roads or improving the existing ones, in addition 
to constructing governmental buildings, social services buildings and others. 
The military and internal security budget was one of the main categories of 
governmental expenditure since the creation of the Jordanian state. In the former 
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periods defense and security took a substantial proportion of the total public 
spending . Financing such a high allocation had been always possible in the 50s and 
60s through British aid and American aid afterwards. In the previous period financial 
aid from the Arab countries had enabled the government not just to maintain a high 
defense budget but even to increase it. This trend remained during this period as a 
result of the increase in the value of the aid transferred from the rich Arab countries. 
This aid which was committed mainly in order to help Jordan covering its defense 
expenses was reflected in the budget policy that emphasized that maintaining the 
defense and security ability was its top priority. In terms of figures, this policy was 
largely implemented by devoting 28.7% of the total expenditure to defense and 
security. The proportion of defense and security expenditure in this period was 
lower when compared to the previous period . However, this decline in proportion 
reflected an increase in the expenditures allocated to other categories rather than a 
decrease in the absolute value of what was devoted to defense and security. 
Furthermore, Kanvosky noted that the figures of financial aid that were 
displayed in the budget account did not correspond to those of unrequited transfers 
to the government that were included in the balance of payments, but that they were 
inferior, as our figures indicated. Kanvosky claimed that this differentiation between 
the figures of the two accounts was presumably due to the fact that the military 
expenditure that covered arms purchase was unpublished 69• Kanvosky later 
supported his suggestion by comparing the official figures of military spending in the 
early 70s and 80s to those which were published by the US Arms Control 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The figures of the latter were about three times 
those of the officials. The military spending according to the ACDA figures, was 
divided into two sub-categories: arms import and military expenditure70• The latter 
figure was close to the military expenditure of the budget account though still more 
substantial. The differentiation between the magnitude of the military spending 
according to ACDA and that of the governmental budget did not equalize the 
discrepancy between the transfers to the government in the balance of payment and 
the foreign aid in the budget accounts. This fact led Kanvosky to suggest that there 
68 This phenomenon and consequences in boom in the construction sector between 1979-
1982 was noted in Saket, B., Asfour, B., Assaf, G. (1985) The Economy of Jordan Over the 70s and 
197_9-A Bird's Eye View, p82. 
69 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: will it persist?, p382. 
7° Kanvosky,E. (1989), Jordan's Economy From Prosperity to Crisis, p44. 
336 
was an Arab aid financing the arms purchase which was neither published in the 
balance of payment nor in the budgef1 • Even though this interpretation might have 
a strong foundation, it is likely that the government relied on the military external 
loans to finance the inadequacy of the foreign aid to cover the whole value of the 
arms imports. In this respect, in 1983 king Hussain stated in 1983 that Jordan had 
to rely on the Commercial Banks72 to maintain the necessary finance for its arms 
imports since the Arab countries did not meet their obligations13. 
In conclusion, although budget accounts did show military expenditure to 
substantial, it is more crucial to acknowledge that a certain proportion was made off-
budget. The fact that there was an unpublished figure of the military budget 
covering the purchase of arms is important because it was confined to a limited and 
certain group of people within the regime. Presumably these figures were in the 
palace, in the army head quarters, in the intelligence services and the cabinet, as 
well as some figures within the business community. This group was in charge of 
deciding the types of military equipment to be imported, the country of manufacture, 
the prices and the ways of payment. Therefore, this group was entitled to control a 
huge amount of transactions that might have had an impact on the composition of 
the upper class in Jordan. This could be discussed later. 
6.1.3 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Jordanian economic performance during this period showed positive growth, 
particularly in the first half. The GOP at current prices reached JD 2372.1 million in 
1989, which was almost seven times its volume in 1974; the overall growth was 
515%. Additionally, the GNP at current prices grew in its entirety by 452.0% 
compared with the 1974 level. In real terms, the growth rate of GOP at 1990 market 
prices averaged 4.22% yearly. Also its volume amounted in 1989, the last year of 
this period, to almost twice what it had been in 1974. Along with the GOP, the real 
71 Kanvosky,E. (1989), Jordan's Economy From Prosperity to Crisis, p46. 
72 See ai-Nabalsi. M. (1994) The Debt and The Adjustment Program, p169-170. 
73 Satolff, R.B. (1985), Troubles on the East Bank: challenges to the Domestic Stability of 
Jordan, p20. 
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GNP demonstrated a positive growth rate averaging 3.85% per annum and reaching 
J02642.6 million in 1989, almost three times the 1974 figure74. This growth rate of 
GOP was reflected in the growth rate of real GOP per capita, which averaged 0.83% 
annually during the period. In 1989 it amounted to JO 639.6, 19.0% more than the 
1974 level. 
However, the figures show that real GOP and real GNP recorded their best 
annual growth rates in 1976 at 12.6% and 13.3% respectively. Similarly, in 1980 the 
growth rate for each was 12.6%. The highest real GOP per capita was witnessed in 
1981 when it recorded JO 846.0 and increased by 58.0% more than it had been in 
1974. 
In spite of the fact that the different economic indicators above showed that 
the economy generally grew during the period, this growth was neither constant nor 
continuous. Moreover, the figures indicate that the period of 1974 to 1989 could be 
divided into two phases with regard to the performance and growth rates of the real 
GOP and GNP75• The first, covering the first eight years from 1974 to 1981 can be 
considered as the golden years of this period or even the golden age of the 
Jordanian economy in the last half of the century, when the economy was expanding 
and increasing rapidly. Between 1974 and 1981 the real GOP and the real GNP 
showed a rapid increase in their annual growth rate when they averaged 8.3% and 
8.5% respectively. Correspondingly, the growth rate of GOP per capita in 1981 
reached twice as much as it had been in 1974, with an average annual growth rate 
of7.32%. 
In contrast, the annual growth rate of real GOP during the latter eight years of 
this period (1982-1989), was 0.64%. Moreover. the annual growth rate of real GNP 
averaged a negative rate of -0.82% per annum. The value of real GOP and real 
GNP in the last two years declined by more than 15% and 20% of their respective 
values in 1987. This decrease led real GOP and GNP in 1989 to equalise at their 
1981 levels. Subsequently, GOP per capita dropped by 3.67% yearly on average, 
reaching in 1989 17.81% less than in 1982, and equating to the 19771evel. 
1~ The big difference between the growth rate figures at constant prices and the ones at 1990 
fixed prices indicates that the inflation rate during this period was relatively high. 
75 Most of the studies covered the economy of Jordan during the 60s and 90s distinguish 
between the two phases. However these 'studies did not agree on one year to be the turning point. 
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The gap between the growth rates of the first eight-year period and the 
second can be explained by the fact that the Jordanian economy, to a large extent, 
depended on external revenue. The increase in the size of transfers to the central 
government and the remittances channelled largely through the private sector would 
positively affect the growth rate of the economy, which was the case in the first few 
years. Otherwise the economy would have suffered from contraction, as had been 
the experience of the last eight years. In this regard Chatelus claimed that any rise 
or fall in foreign revenue would have a greater effect on the Jordanian economy than 
a sharp increase in the output of the productive sectors such as agriculture and 
industry. This primordial role of external revenue is due to the fact that the added 
value by the productive sectors was far less the than the volume of foreign revenue 
during the late 70s and early 80s76 • In addition, foreign aid and remittances, either 
channelled to the central government or to the private sector, circulated in different 
economic activities and were largely used to finance investments in the various 
economic sectors including the productive ones. This can be seen in the section of 
the development plans. 
Furthermore, by applying an econometric model to foreign aid in order to 
determine its effect on economic development in Jordan, Khatib noted that there 
was a positive correlation between foreign aid and the economic growth rate. Any 
Increase in the volume of foreign aid would raise the economic growth rate. 
Moreover, Khatib simulated the impact of a reduction in the foreign aid on the growth 
rates of some economic indicators. In this regard, he discovered that the growth 
rate of real GNP would have been 2.2 per cent below its actual level if foreign aid 
had been reduced by half of its actuallevel77• 
The Central Bank of Jordan observed the performance of the economy during 
the period. It stressed that the achievements of the first years were largely 
attributable to the climate of stability as well as the favourable circumstances that 
attended the economic boom in the Arab region. This boom affected the Jordanian 
economy, and enabled it to expand and grow remarkably, by increasing the demand 
Some argued that it has to coincide with the decline of oil prices, others, however, dated the period 
with the years in which the Jordanian economy was directly affected. 
7
·
6
-ai-Nsuur, M'. (2000) Foreign Aid and Economic Growth In Jordan, p84-86. 
77 Khatib, F. (1991), Foreign Aid and Economic Oevlopment in Jordan: An empirical 
Investigation, p68. 
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for Jordanian goods and services and led correspondingly to an increase in exports 
and remittances as well as the role of Arab aid78• 
Regarding the economic recession experienced between 1982 and 1989, the 
Central Bank of Jordan claimed that the Jordanian economy was vulnerable to 
economic developments in particular in the Arab region and in the world economy at 
large. This was because the Jordanian economy was just developing and so 
relatively smaiF9 • The Central Bank of Jordan specified the factors hitting the 
economy as the contraction of the export market and the drop in remittances and 
Arab aid80. The Jordanian Government was aware very early of the recession and 
took some measures to adapt to the new circumstances, despite the fact that these 
measures were subject to continuous change from the government itself. 
Nevertheless, the economy continued to slow down and entered a serious crisis 
from 1987 onwards. The failure of the adopted policies also indicated that the 70s 
had established to a large extent the dependency of the Jordanian economy on 
external resources. 
Awad-alla claimed that the limited resources of Jordan and its small economy 
was the decisive factor determining that the Jordanian economy had to be linked 
and connected generally to the world economies and specifically to the Arab ones. 
This fact drove the economic and financial structure of the country to be highly 
sensitive to and affected either positively or negatively by the changes in the world 
economy at large and in particular to the regional economy. Thus, the Jordanian 
economy benefited from the economic boom in the oil producing countries in the 70s 
and suffered from the recession witnessed there in the 80s81 • 
On the other hand, Touqan and ai-Anani presented a different perspective to 
explain the reverse performance that the economy witnessed during the 80s. They 
claimed that the state exercised an intervention policy during the 50s and the 60s to 
provide the infrastructure and the institutions, which were necessary for developing 
the economy. This policy and its consequences led to a distortion in the Jordanian 
economic structure, particularly expanding the role of the state or the public sector, 
78 Central Bank of Jordan (1983), p1 . 
79 Central Bank of Jordan (1 983), p1, Central Bank of Jordan (1984), p1 . Central Bank of 
Jordan (1986), p1 . 
0° Central Bank of Jordan (1.983), p1-2. 
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weakening the role of the private sector and failing to increase the saving rates or to 
channel these savings into developing activities. According to this interpretation, 
Touqan and ai-Anani suggested that the Jordanian economy was supposed to 
experience a dramatic crisis during the 70s, which in fact did not take place due to 
the financial support and the remittances flowing into Jordan after the oil boom. 
Therefore the external revenue was not a fundamental factor in the crisis of the 80s, 
but rather postponed the crisis for a few years to the mid 80s instead of the 70s62• 
Despite the fact that the roots of the 80s crisis might be in the 50s or 60s, the 
external revenue was always a substantial factor in the Jordanian economy since 
the establishment of the state. Furthermore this external revenue, whether British, 
American or Arab, allowed the state to take a greater role in the economic activities. 
Finally the oil boom affected the structure of the Jordanian economy and established 
new social and economic patterns that had not existed before 1974. The Jordanian 
economy failed to mobilise and channel the remittances towards investment 
purposes especially since the government did not act to produce such outcome. On 
the contrary , the majority of the remittances were used for consuming purposes, 
which resulted in rapidly increasing the imports and accelerating the inflation rate, 
especially in the real estate sector. Furthermore, the government reacted in a 
similar way regarding the management of the transfers that . were received in the 
70s. It increased its expenditure, expanding the size and the spending of public 
administration and military spending. The governmental response, which lacked a 
steady economic philosophy and was based on the availability of cash, indirectly 
encouraged red tape, and waste in the public sector. Therefore, one could argue 
that the management of the external payments deepened the weakness of the 
Jordanian economy and its sensitivity to economic trends at the regional level. 
Furthermore, the measures that the government tried to adopt in the recession 
period were based on keeping its expenditure as high as possible, relying on the 
external borrowing, which burst into the debt crisis in 1988 and 1989. 
Analysing the components of GOP expenditures will be useful to deepen the 
understanding of economic performance in this period and the causes of the 80s 
recession. The figures show that aggregate final consumption expenditure, both 
81 Awad-alla, B. (1996), p21. 
62 Touqan, 0 . ai-Anani, J (1996),p 5 
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private and government, constituted a substantial proportion of GOP during the 
period and averaged 111 .0% of GOP.83 The proportion of investment, both fixed 
capital formation and change in stock, averaged 30.3%, while the relative 
importance of the net external transactions averaged -41 .7%. However, the gross 
fixed capital formation showed that the highest growth rate was 9. 7% followed by 
private consumption and government consumption at 6.1% and 5.5% respectively. 
Despite the fact that the fixed capital formation showed the highest growth rate, it 
was still less than the aggregate governmental consumption. 
The economic boom experienced during the first eight years of the period and 
the recession during the last eight years were reflected in the growth rates of the 
different components of GOP expenditure, particularly the gross fixed capital 
formation. Investment. in real terms, increased rapidly between 1974 and 1981 at an 
average growth rate of 39.9%. Moreover. in 1981 it reached almost six times its 
volume in 197 4 and its relative importance in real GOP rose from 25.5% in 197 4 to 
43.2% in 1981 . On the other hand, the investment growth rate declined to 6.5% a 
year during 1982-1989. Subsequently, the ratio of investment to real GOP averaged 
26.3% and in 1989 it was just around half of its figure in 1981 and even less than the 
1974 level. The sharp decline in investment since 1982 paralleled the decline of 
external revenue indicating that the main source of fixed capital formation was 
external revenue rather than domestic. 
Marashadeh noted that gross domestic saving suffered from a chronic 
shortage and therefore domestic investment did not rely on it84• Furthermore, 
domestic saving had shown negative figures since 1974 and during the period, with 
the exception of 1988 and 1989 when it recorded JO 45.3 and JO 131 .6 million 
respectively and was unable to cover the investment. Therefore, Jordan had to fill 
the gap between investment and saving by depending on external revenue such as 
foreign aid and remittances, as claimed by Kassasebh85, Marashadeh86 and 
Mc0ermott87• Marashadeh added that the Government created a large budget 
83 See table 1 and 2 of Appendix 15. 
84 Marashadeh (1994), p14-15. 
85 Kassasebh, H. (1994), 470. 
86 Marashadeh (1994 ),p15. 
87 McDermott, ·c. (1996), 14-15 
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deficit by overspending relative to total domestic revenue in order to meet the 
investment required. 
The decline in the transfers to the central government in the 80s affected 
investment and reduced its share in GOP88 as seen above, and, as noted by 
Kassasebh89, despite governmental polices to keep the investment level as high as 
possible90. In spite of the fact that investment dropped under recessional conditions, 
it was still relatively high considering the drop in the external revenue and the 
modest domestic saving. The Jordanian government started borrowing heavily from 
both domestic and foreign commercial banks to fill the gap between its capital 
expenditures on one side and the total of inadequate domestic saving and 
decreased external payments on the other side. This was in order to maintain the 
development process on the one hand and to sustain a large military expenditure on 
the other11 • According to Callatay and Mansur, this policy led to the debt crisis in 
1988 and its consequences92. 
The decline of the investment was one of the main issues that the 
government tried to treat through introducing some monetary measures, despite the 
fact that some of these measures were changed more than one time. In 1984 the 
Central Bank requested the commercial banks to invest at least 4.0% of the Dinar-
denominated deposits in treasury bills and in public and development bonds93 . This 
demanded ratio was increased to 9.0% in 1986, but one year after it was lowered to 
5.0%94• Likewise, in order to stimulate the economic situation the Central Bank 
decided that the banks had to invest not less than 15.0% of their capital and reserve 
in the shareholding companies95 , this ratio was reduced to 9.0% in 198796• In the 
same matter, the Central Bank decided to raise the ceiling of the interest rate 
88 McDermott claimed that during the first few years of the recession in Jordan the 
governmental fixed formation dropped in the main time the private sector fixed capital formation kept 
steady. McDermott, C. (1996}, P.15. 
89 Kassasebh , H. (1994), 470-471 . 
90 The Central Bank of Jordan{different issues), see also Chapter 7 
91 Kassasebh, H. (1994), 471-472, Callatay, E. Mansur, A. (1996), P 21-22. 
92 Callatay, E. Mansur, A. (1996), P 21-22. 
93 Central Bank of Jordan (1984), the Twenty-First Annual Report, p2. 
94 Central Bank of Jordan (1987), the Twenty-Fou.rt!"l ~11nual R~ort. p2. 
95 Central Bank of Jordan (1984), the Twenty-First Annual Report, p2. 
96
. Central Bank of Jordan (1987), th~ Twe.nty-Fourth Annuai-Rep~rt. p2. 
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imposed by the financial companies on the direct credit facilities in order to 
encourage the residents to provide more credit that would be channelled to 
investment purposes97• Additionally, it was decided to cut the maximum proportion 
of funds that the commercial banks were allowed to keep abroad from 25.5% to 
15.0%98• 
With regard to the other components of GOP expenditure the figures show 
that the final consumption was affected by the prosperity of the economy in the first 
half of the period. The annual growth rate of the private consumption and the 
government consumption averaged 12.7% and 12.5% respectively In the first eight 
years and their relative importance jointly reached 115.5% of the GOP (82.8% for 
private and 32.7% for government). The economic boom established new 
consumption trends at the governmental level along with the private sectors. Day 
noted that this period witnessed the development of consumer society and the 
emergence of the "middle class", which was due to the enormous increase in 
remittances 99• Furthermore, Share claimed according to the results of two surveys 
conducted in the early 80s, that a large part of the remittances was directed to 
consumer purposes rather than investment100• 
In contrast to the first phase, the annual growth rate of government 
consumption and private consumption averaged -1 .4% and -0.6% respectively 
between 1982 and 1989. However, the relative importance of consumption in GOP 
did not drop as much as the investment did. In spite of the restrictive fiscal and 
monetary measures adopted to curb the share of consumption in GOP, private 
consumption formed more than 80.0% of the GOP expenditures. This was just 2.0% 
less than its level in the first eight years, while the investment share dropped by 
around 20.0%101 • 
Marashadeh claimed that the 70s and the 80s showed high consumption and 
Jordan's per capita consumption was higher than the average for third world 
countries and far exceeded the average for neighbouring countries such as Egypt, 
97 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-Second Annual Report, p1 -2. 
96 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-Second Annual Report, p1 -2. 
99 Day,A. (1986}._pc..:..;10=3~. __ _ 
100 Share .. (1987), p39. 
101 Central Bank of Jordan. (1983), p 5. 
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Tunisia, Morocco and Syria. Furthermore, such a high consumption level affected 
the whole economy by generating an imbalance between aggregate demand and 
supply, which in tum created inflationary pressures. Moreover it increased imports102 
As far as the industrial origin of GOP at factor cost is concerned, all economic 
sectors grew positively during the period. The average annual growth rates of the 
different sectors ranged between 19.0% for mining and quarrying and 1.1% for the 
other service sectors. In spite of the fact that the different sector showed increase, 
at different levels or rates, the figures show that the performance of these sectors 
reflected clearly the boom and the following recession that the economy experienced 
during this period. Further more, studying the average rates for the whole period 
could be misleading in determining the sectoral achievements because these 
average rates were due to remarkable growth and increase in all of the economic 
areas in the first half of the period . Subsequently this increase offset the decline of 
the second half and affected the average rates. 
The average annual growth rates of the economic sectors during the years 
1974 and 1981 ranged between 25.3% for mining and quarrying and 1.9% for the 
finance, real estate and business service sector. With the exception of the latter 
sector the rates of the others exceeded 8% annually. Apart from the mining sector, 
some other sectors showed an outstanding annual growth rate, above the annual 
rate of GOP such as electricity and water (19.3%) transport and communications 
(13.1), manufacturing (12.6%), wholesale & retail trade (11 .5%), and construction 
(11 .3%). 
In contrast, during the second half of the period the average annual growth 
rates of the output of these sectors slowed down rapidly and ranged between 12.7% 
and -7.8% for the mining and quarrying sector and the construction sector 
respectively. In addition to the negative rate of construction , few sectors recorded a 
negative annual growth rate, for instance -7.8% for the other service sector, -6.0% 
for wholesale & retail trade and -1 .3% for manufacturing. Moreover, the annual 
growth rates of agriculture and transports & communications between 1982 and 
1989 were just around a quarter of their rates during the first eight years (1974-
1981 ). However, the growth rate of the finance, real estate and business services 
102 Marashadeh, p16. 
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sector was the exception, since its annual growth rate during 1982-1989 averaged 
3.7% versus 1.9% between 1974 and 1981 . 
As seen above, the boom and the recession the Jordanian economy 
experienced affected the growth rate of the output at the sectoral level. Building on 
that, the fluctuation of the external revenue had an impact on the sectoral 
performances particularly due to the deficiency of domestic alternatives since local 
saving was always far below the requirements to maintain the development and 
expansion of the economy. 
The relative share of the economic sectors in the real GOP at factor cost 
indicated that changes took place in the structure of the economy during this period. 
Despite governmental polices to enhance the contribution of the commodity 
producing sectors, the service sectors were still dominating the economy by 
contributing two thirds of the GOP. One third of the GOP was the relative 
importance of commodity producing sectors, which consisted of the agriculture 
forestry and fishing sector, the industry sector, the electricity & water sector and the 
construction sector. The years between 1979 and 1984 witnessed an increase in 
the share of the commodity producing sectors, when it reached more than 35% of 
the GOP. However, this increase was nerther steady nor consistent but was due to 
the temporary outstanding growth rate of construction caused mainly by the 
augmentation of remittances. 
According to the figures, the structure of the economy had been changed to 
some extent during this period . Some of the sectors showed an increase in their 
relative importance in the GOP, such as the share of transports and communications 
that averaged 13.4% compared with 9.6% in 1974. Furthermore, the contribution of 
industry averaged 15.2% compared with 10.9% in 1974. It was noted that the 
relative share of the agriculture sector averaged 7.8% while it was 16.6 in 1974. 
Nevertheless, the producers of the governmental services sector had the highest 
average relative share in the GOP at 19.3%, followed by finance, real estate & 
business services at 18.0% and industry at 15.2%. In spite of the fact that the 
electricity and water sector had the lowest average relative importance at 1.6%, its 
share increased rapidly during the last five years of the period and in 1989 it was 
2.5% compared with 0.9%Jn-1.974.. 
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6.1.4 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1974-89 
This section deals with the performance of the balance of payments, covering 
the main trends it underwent during this period. It highlights the economic and 
political factors, both at the local and at the regional level, that affected and 
influenced the balance of payment or one of its components. It covers mainly the 
current account by analysing the trade balance, services balance and transfers. 
Special emphasis is given to the exports and imports of goods due to the fact that 
the international transaction sector was not discussed before. 
Like in the case of the other economic indicators, the analysis of the balance 
of payment will be divided into two sections. The first section will focus on the phase 
of the high oil price (1974-1981) and its effects on the balance of payments, the 
second, on the balance of payments after the fall of the oil prices. In 1988 the 
current account deficit and the overall balance deficit were JD 105.5 and JD 72.2 
million receptively. This was part of the economic crisis which brought in the IMF. 
As noted by the IMF, the crisis of the balance of payments seriously undermined the 
prospects for economic growth. These imbalances were a result of a lack of 
adjustment of the economy after the declining oil prices, which Jed to reduced 
workers remittances, grants and loans from neighbouring oil exporters103. 
As can be seen by our figures and as noted by the Central Bank, between the 
years of 1974 and 1981 the balance of payments went through a favourable period. 
In the majority of these years the balance of services and the transfers could offset 
most of the deficit104• The credit in the current account grew JD 2.9 million at the 
beginning of the period to J0111 .6 in 1980. During the years in which the current 
account was in deficit, the surplus on the capital account showed that there was a 
surplus on the basic balance of payments. In fact, the basic balance increased from 
JO 13.8 million in 1974 to JO 56.6 million in 1981 (after a peek of JO 144.9 million in 
1980). 
In 1982 the situation changed dramatically: between 1982 and 1988 every 
year the current account was in deficit due to the reduction in the service account 
'
03 Maciejewski, E and Mansur, A (eds) (1996) Strategy for Adjustment and Growth, p5. 
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and transfers, even though the situation of the trade balance improved. The IMF 
noted that as a result of the fall in remittances and foreign aid, which in turn was 
brought about by the relapse in oil prices, the government responded in two ways. 
Firstly, it borrowed from external commercial banks and domestic banks, which 
increased the large budget deficit. Secondly, it maintained domestic price stability 
trough the control of administered prices. The result was an increase in the debt 
burden105• In 1989 the current account saw a positive figure; this was partly due to 
the governmental policy of devaluing the Dinar, which helped reduce imports and 
boost exports, as well as to other measures to increase exports108. The improved 
position in the current account was also a result of a substantial rise in unrequited 
transfers. These transfers came from the Gulf countries as emergency measures to 
support the central government in its management of the economic crisis, especially 
by controlling the exchange rate of the Dinar'07• 
The basic balance was in deficit in all the years of the period. As will be 
argued later, the deficit was due more to a reduction in remittances and aid as a 
result of the recession in oil dependant countries. The Central Bank noted that for 
1989108 the basic balance was in deficit but this was the result of the rescheduling of 
most of the external debt repayments109 . Thus financing (of JD 434.7 million) was 
available to push the balance of payments from a deficit of JD 107.2 million to a 
positive figure of JD 327.5 million. 
6.1. 4.1 Trade Balance 
The trade balance during this period can also be divided into two sections 
according to its performance. During the phase between 1974 and 1983 the trade 
deficit increased from JD105.9 million to a peak of JD 891 .4 million. From 1984 this 
trend was reversed and the trade deficit reduced in size from JD 891.4 million to a 
deficit of JD 585.3 million. 
104 Central Bank of Jordan (1993), The Thirtieth Annual Report, p59. 
'
05 Maciejewski, E and Mansur, A (eds) (1996) Strategy for Adjustment and Growth (1996), 
p7. 
108 EIU, (1969), Country Report Vol (3), p14; Central Bank of Jordan (1989), The Twenty-sixth 
Annual Report, p45. 
107 AI-Malki, A (1996), The 9_e_n!ral_ Bank of Jordan and tt)e_M..9n etary Policy, p 276-27?. 
108 A similar trend was seen in 1990 - where the basic balance was in deficit but as a result of 
financing the overall budget was in credit. 
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Between 1974 and 1983, exports grew by 321 .6% whilst imports grew by 
607.7% and it is important to note that exports at the beginning of the period started 
with a lower base. The main factor that stimulated the exports resulting in a general 
increase was the high demand from oil producing countries for Jordanian agricultural 
products, which could compete with the market of these countries mainly because of 
the geographical location of Jordan110• The increase in the range and quantity of the 
industrial products resulted in an increase in the exports11 1 • Additionally, the 
increase in the international price of phosphate as well as in the demand for it, led to 
a rise in its exports, and consequently in the entire exports112• On the other hand, 
the studies outlined some of the main reasons why there was such an increase in 
the imports during the first phase. 
• The limited productive capacity due to Jordan's lack of resources. 
This meant that imports had to satisfy a growing demand113• 
• Different needs for the country as consumption patterns changed 
according to the increased income growth 114 • 
• An increased capacity to import due to increased workers' 
remittances, aid and capital borrowing 115• 
• The economic development e.fforts that exerted at both governmental 
and private level boosted the importation of capital goods and raw and 
intermediate materials 116 • 
109 Central Bank of Jordan (1990), The Twenty-Seventh Annual Report, p57. 
11
° Feiler, G. (1994) Jordan's Economy 1970-1990: the Primacy of Exogenous Factors. p49. 
111 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: Will It Persist?, p383 
112 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: Will It Persist?, p383, Central Bank of 
Jordan (1982), The Nineteenth Annual Report, p70 .. 
113 Share (1991), p105,106 
114 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: Will It Persist?. p383, Central Bank of 
Jordan (1982), The Nineteenth Annual Report, p70 .. Kanovsky, E. (1976) , p84. Share (1991), 
p105,106 
115 Share (1991), p105,106. 
116 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: will it persist?, p383, Central Bank of 
Jordan (1982), The Nineteenth Annual Report, p70. Kanovsky, E. (1976) , p64, Central Bank of 
Jordan (1981), The Nineteenth Annual Report. p71 . 
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•Jordan's liberal trade policy which encouraged imports117• 
Between 1984 and 1989 the trade deficit reduced in size. This was partly due 
to a decrease in imports from 1984 until 1986. The EIU noted that this could be 
ascribed to a number of reasons, such as the fall in raw material prices and crude oil 
prices and the consequent fall in Jordan's oil imports 118, and a fall in the capital 
goods as a result of the recession in Jordan. Another factor noted by the Central 
Bank of Jordan was that the downward trend in inflation in the industrialised 
countries (which are the major suppliers for Jordan's imports) meant reduced 
prices1' 9 • Additionally, the increase in customs duties during the 80s and the ban on 
importing luxury products resulted in a substantial reduction in imports120• The 
exports did not play any role in reducing the trade deficit between 1984 and 1987 
because the exports themselves declined. This decline was due mainly to the 
decrease in demand from neighbouring Arab countries (especially oil countries) as a 
consequence of lower oil prices. It was also a result of the drop in the price of 
phosphates due to sluggish world demand. However. the increase in the exports by 
the end of the period (1988-1989) was an essential factor in reducing the trade 
deficit. The huge rise in exports (37%) from 1988 and 1989 was a result of the 
devaluation of the Dinar. It was also a result of measures to promote exports, such 
as advances to exporters at favourable interest rates and policies to support the 
industrial and agricultural sectors 121 • The IMF added that from 1988 Jordan 
embarked on a reform of its trade and tariff system, which gained momentum in 
1990122• 
Exports 
53. 
117 Share (1991), p105,106. 
118 EIU (1987) Country Report, No.(3), p15. 
119 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-Second Annual Report. p49. 
120 See the section of the budget. 
121 Central Bank of'.:Jordan (1·989), The Twenty-Sixth Annaat~Report, p45. 
122 Maciejewski, E and Mansur, A (eds) (1996) Strategy for Adjustment and Growth (1996), p 
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A fundamental change in the export composition took place during this 
period, as both Kanovsky123 and Share12" noted: our figures indicate that the 
importance of manufactured exports increased rapidly, so that they became the 
major exports category. In the previous periods they constituted between 10.0% 
and 18.0% of the entire exports, while they reached around 44.0% by the end of this 
period. Exports according to the items classification showed a new range of 
manufactured products, such as detergents & soap, pharmaceutical, textiles, 
varnishes, batteries, steel pipes, cement blocks and pipes125• This trend was a direct 
result of the development that the industrial sector underwent. Kanovsky added that 
the boom condition in the Gulf countries expanded the Jordanian export 
opportunities126. The break out of the Iraqi-Iranian war in 1980 was another 
important reason for the continuous flourishing in the manufactured exports, as 
Baram noted127 and our figures confirmed. 
The share of the agricultural exports, which was around 44.0% of the entire 
export in the former periods. declined to around 20.0% in the early 80s and it 
reached less than 10.0% by 1988 and 1989126• Even though th is decline was a 
result of the increase in industrial exports, one could argue that this phenomenon 
reflected the transformation in the economic structure from being chiefly based on 
agriculture towards a multi-sectoral base. 
The other main export was phosphate, which constituted one third in the 
previous periods and declined to around 30.0% in the early 80s after a peak in 1974-
1976 due to the boom in its price internationally129• By the end of this period 
phosphate exports made up around one quarter of the whole exports. The potash 
123 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: Will It Persist?, p383. 
124 Share (1991), p108-109. 
125 Central Bank of Jordan (1981), The Eighteenth Annual Report. p77-78. Central Bank of 
Jordan (1987), The Twenty-fourth Annual· Report, p80. 
p127. 
126 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: Will It Persist?, p384. 
127 Baram, Amatzia. (1994) , No New Fertile Crescent: traqi-Jordanian Relations 1968-1992, 
128 Central Bank of Jordan (1989). The Twenty-Sixth Annual. ~~port, p56. 
129 Central Bank of Jordan (1989), The Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, p47. 
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production that started in the early 80s constituted a remarkable share of exports at 
20.0% in 1988 and 1989130 increasing from just less than 5.0% in 1983131 • 
The Central Bank of Jordan132 showed a similar view to Share133, when they 
mentioned that consumer goods were the main component of the exports, followed 
by interim goods (which include raw materials) and thirdly capital good. Capital 
good had a high growth rate at the end of the period mainly due to the increase in 
exports of machinery & equipment and building materials. 
The main destination of the exports was the Arab countries, which absorbed 
more than half of the entire exports. Up to 1983, the Gulf countries and especially 
Saudi Arabia were the main buyers. The Economic boom in these countries 
boosted the Jordanian exports. However, the sales to these countries from 1984 
onwards were stagnant due to the reduction of the oil price as Kanvossky noted134. 
In the late 80s, the exports to Gulf markets were negatively affected by the fact that 
these countries started to produce a similar range of industries as Jordan did. The 
Jordanian exports could not compete with these industries owing to the fact that they 
were highly subsidised135• Furthermore, the competitive advantage of the Jordanian 
industrial exports that were based on cheap labour was not relevant any more not 
just in the Gulf markets but in the Jordanian market for some products. 
The factor above combined with the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war 
boosted the Jordanian exports to Iraq. The Iraqi imports from Jordan moved from 
insignificant importance in the 70s to a rapid increase in the 80s reaching in 1988 
14.0% of the entire Jordanian exports, which ranked Iraq as the biggest single 
importer136• Furthermore, according to Barmar three quarters of the industrial firms 
were functioning primarily to export to lraq 137• The Eastern European countries (the 
130 Central Bank of Jordan (1989), The Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, p47. Central Bank of 
Jordan (1988), The Twenty-fifth Annual Report, p49. 
131 Central Bank of Jordan (1983), The Twentieth Annual Report, p47. 
132 Central Bank of Jordan (1989), The Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, p47. 
133 Share, (1991), p11 1. 
13<1 Kanvosky,E. (1989), Jordan's Economy From Prosperity to Crisis. p34. 
135 Wilson, Rodney (1985) The Role of Commercial Banking in the Jordanian Economy, p6. 
136 Share, (1991). p111 . Baram. Amatzia. (1994), No New Fertile Crescent: lraqi-Jordanian 
Relations 1968-1992, p1-21. · 
• 
137 Baram, Amatzia. (1994), No New Fertile Crescent: ·lraqi-Jordanian Relations 1968-1992. 
p127. 
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socialist block) came after the Arab countries according to their share of the exports 
followed by the countries of the ECC138. By individual countries and after Iraq, India 
was the major importer due to its buying of phosphate, followed by Saudi Arabia, 
which was the main market for the agricultural exports such as fruits and 
vegetables'39. As share noted and our figures indicated, it is important to highlight 
that exports to Japan rose from a neglected figure in 1973 to around 5.0% by the 
end of this period140• 
Imports 
As was mentioned above, imports increased rapidly during the economic 
boom years as a direct result of the rise of remittances and transfers. However, it 
declined in the recession phase. 
Over the whole period, consumer goods was the major component 
constituting 36.6% of the entire imports. The crude materials came next by 32.8% 
followed by the capital goods by 28.3%. The relative importance according to the 
economic classification indicated a structural change in the composition of the 
Imports when compared to the pervious period. The relative importance of 
consumer imports declined by 22.5% compared to that of the former period. On the 
contrary, the relative importance of crude materials and capital goods rose 
remarkably by 54.4% and 27.7% receptively. Such a change indicates the increase 
in income and the expansion of investment especially in the industrial sector. 
Looking at the two phase, the share of the crude materials in 1982 -1989 
was the biggest to 38.9% of the entire imports, while in the first phase it was just 
26.7%. This increase in the latter half was attributed to the required importation for 
the industrial firms that were mainly established in the 70s and early 80s. The 
capital goods share decreased from 34.7% in the first half to 21 .8% in the second 
and its rate relapsed from 50.9% per annum in the first phase to -1 .7% in the last 
eight years. I.e. is an evident reflection of the economic boom that was followed by 
the recession that characterized sluggish investment activities. 
138 Central Bank of Jordan (1985), The Twenty-Second Annual Report, p41 . 
139 Share. (1991 ). p111 . 
140 Share, (1991 ), p111 . 
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The main sources of imports at the end of the period (1989) came from the 
EEC (29%) followed by ACM (20.4%), USA (13.9%) and the other Arab countries 
(7 .1%) 141 • Although Share 142 noted that in relative terms (compared to 1967) 
Western Europe and EEC declined in their share, the US maintained their share, the 
share of the eastern bloc was almost halved and Japan doubled its share form 3. 7% 
to 6.3% between 1967 and 1985. 
6.1.4.2Service balance 
Over the 60s and during the previous periods, the service balance had played 
a fundamental role in crediting the current account in particular and the overall 
balance in general. To a large extent, the service balance, the Jordanian workers' 
remittances specifically, offset the chronic trade deficit. During this period, the 
service balance partly offset the trade balance deficit, however, in the first few years 
it could cover the whole trade deficit and resulted in a credit in the balance of 
services and trade. This trend did not continue after 1978 owing to the outstanding 
growth rate of the trade deficit. Again the performance of the service balance can be 
divided in two phases. The first course covers the years 197 4·1983, when the 
service balance grew rapidly from JD 22.1 million in 197 4 to J D 455.1 million in 
1983. This expansion was mostly attributable to the increase in remittances, which 
rocketed from JD 24.1 million in 1974 to JD 475 million, i.e. they increased nearly 20 
fold. The importance of the remittances can be illustrated by the quote below from 
the IMF,.3: 
• "From the early 1970s until recently, Jordan's strategy was to develop 
itself as a provider of skilled manpower and trade-related services for the 
Arab countries in the region. Accordingly the authorities had chosen a 
strategy aimed at educating Jordan's youth to prepare them for 
employment in and around the region. At the same time, with the 
sizeable amount of workers' remittances and aid received from abroad, 
Jordan was able to maintain income and consumption at levels that 
exceeded those that could be expected from the production capacity in 
the domestic economy." 
141 Central Bank of Jordan-(1989), The Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, p48. 
142 Share, (1991), p116. 
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The official figures above reported just the remittances that were transferred 
through the banks, but it was believed that the actual figures of the remittances were 
higher'.,.. Kanvosky referred to an unofficial figure assuming that the remittances 
were 50~ 1 00% higher than what was reported by the banks. Furthermore, he 
claimed that the official figures skipped the value of imports in kind that the 
Jordanian workers brought back into the country. He concluded that the remittances 
would be at least 60.0%145 more than what the government reported'46• Adding the 
unreported remittances is highly important to reveal the overall picture of the exports 
and imports of services, but it is still difficult to estimate this figure on an annual 
basis. Such an estimation would be even more complicated, taking into account that 
a proportion of the remittances that Jordan received through the banks was again 
transferred to the West Bank as Mazur noted. Moreover, the published transfers of 
the foreign lobour in Jordan to their countries were just the ones that went through 
the banks, so that the actual ones must be higher. Therefore and due to the 
complications of such a calculation we continue to deal with the published figures, 
though being aware of the fact that these figures were lower than the actual ones. 
It is Important to note that the balance of services started to show workers 
remittances payment only from 1977. This meant that Jordan began importing 
labour, which indicates that there were domestic shortages of manpower. As 
Seccombe noted, this trend was partly due to the increase in construction of urban 
residential properties as a consequence of the return of workers remittances and of 
the increased aid and budgetary support after the Arab Summit meetings in 1974 
and 1978147 • An indicator of the increased demand for labour is the rise in wage-rate 
inflation between 1973 and 1976. Seccombe continued by noting that these 
increases were particularly high in the financial services, utilities and the 
construction sectors148• The figures indicated that remittances payment grew quickly 
between 1977 and 1984, when it reached its peak amounting to JD 97.5 million. 
However as Kanovsky noted and our figures reveal up to 1983 and 1984 the 
143 IMF (1996), p5. 
144 Day,A. (1986), p99. Share . . (1987), p36. 
1
•
5 There were various estimations of the remittances that were transferred outside the banks 
channels. For instance, Day reported that the unpublished remittances could be double the official 
figures according to the estimation made by leading Amman bankers. Day,A. (1986), p99. 
1416 Kanvosky.1E. (1-989), Jordan!s Economy From Prosperity to Crisis, p38-39. 
147 Seccombe (1987), p121 . 
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remittances payment had a limited impact on the accounts of import and export 
services since its ratio to the remittance receipts did not exceeded 20.0% 1~9 • 
In spite of the fact that it was greatly out-weighed, the net travel income 
showed a credit in 1975 after it having been in debt since 1967. It increased from 
JD -0.1 million in 1975 to its peak. in 1983 amounting to JD 50.3 million. This 
increase reflected a flourish in the tourist sector as Kanovsky noted 11i0. Indeed the 
figures of the central Bank confirmed this claim showing that the number of 
foreigners (non-Arabs) who visited Jordan rose from 48.1 thousands in 1973 to 
204.9 thousand in 1974, and since then this number ranged between 200 and 300 
thousand yearly15 1• Hence, Jordan could manage to activate the tourist sector after a 
period of stagnation as a result of losing the West Bank tourist potentialities. 
Moreover, the tourist income benefited from the increase in Arab visitors from the 
Gulf countries as Kanovsky mentioned152• Presumably, the breakout of the civil war 
of Lebanon in 1975 diverted a respectable proportion of the Gulf tourism to Jordan. 
Travel payment also increased rapidly during this phase rising from JD 17.3 million 
in 1974 to JD 180,8 million in 1981 . As mentioned by the Central Bank and 
Kanovsky these expenditures reflected the increased number of Jordanian studying 
and visiting abroad and of those travelling for health reasons 153• 
From 1983 and 1984 res:pe.ctively the service balance and workers 
remittances started to decline until 1988. Between 1983 and 1989 the service 
balance decreased by 30% and between 1984 and 1989 the remittances declined 
by 32.5%. In 1989 they both increased as result of the devaluation of the currency. 
The decrease of the remittances and consequentially the service balance negatively 
affected the current account. The decline of both the transfers and remittances 
receipts and the economic recession were reflected in the gradual decline in travel 
and remittances payment between 1984 and 1989. 
148 Seccombe (1987), p121 . 
149 Kanvosky,E. (1989), Jordan's Economy From Prosperity to Crisis, p38-39. 
11i0 Kanovsky, E. (1985), Jordan Decade of Prosperity: Will It Persist?, p385. 
151 Central Bank of Jordan, The Annual Reports (1973-1983). 
152 K11novsky, E. (1985). Jordan Decade of·Prosperlty: Will'lt Persist?, p385. 
153 Kanvosky,E. (1989), Jordan's Economy From Prosperity to Crisis. p40. Central Bank of 
Jordan, several Annual Report,. 
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6.1. -1.3 Transfers 
Transfers also showed a similar trend, a result of the fall in oil prices. 
Unrequited transfers increased from JD 86.7 million in 1974 to (JD 430.8) in 1981 154 , 
i.e. nearly five fold. There were particularly high increases between the years of 
1974 and 1975 (61%) due to the agreement of the Rabat summit in 1974, when 
Arab aid to Jordan was increased. There was another an increase in 1979 (195%) 
and 1980 as a direct result of implementing the Baghdad summit resolutions. It is 
important to highlight that Arab aid was decided in Baghdad as a result of the 
temporary solidarity between the Arab countries due to the development of the 
Egyptian~lsraeli peace process. This political solidarity did not survive the political 
development which took place just in the following two years. Hence, the Arab aid to 
Jordan, which was divided into shares between the rich Arab countries suffered from 
the new political set up in the region at large, and particularly from the position of 
Jordan with respect to the different alliances. Therefore, shortly after the Baghdad 
summit Algeria and Libya did not pay their share of the Arab aid to Jordan. 
However, these shares were partly covered by the Gulf countries for a while. The 
continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war and the decline of the oil price, though had a 
role in changing the political and economic priorities of the Gulf countries. Political 
developments and the nature of the aid drove some of the Gulf countries to stop 
offsetting the unpaid shares of Algeria and Libya before reducing their own shares to 
below the amount which was committed. This was reflected severely on the 
transfers accounts from 1982 to 1987, when it decreased from JD 430.8 million to 
JD 199.3 million respectively. The transfers of 1987 were almost at the same level 
as in 1976-1978 and far below the amount that the Arab countries committed 
themselves to. The increase that was indicated in 1988 and 1989 was attributable to 
the devaluation of the Jordanian currency as well as to the emergency transfers 
made by some of the Gulf countries and by Iraq in order to help to stabilize the 
monetary position of Jordan. 
154 Except for 1978. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. THE BOURGEOISIE (197 4-1989) 
This chapter aims to provide an analysis of the bourgeoisie over the period of 
197 4-1989. This chapter is giving an account of the private sector as an introduction 
for the analysis of the bourgeoisie. The trends and the patterns of the bourgeoisie's 
investments are to be reviewed. Bourgeoisie will be analyzed according to the 
economic power of its members and the fractions occurrence within its domain. The 
final section is devoted to analyzing the bourgeoisie members (BMs) according to 
the vertical variables. 
7.1 THE STATE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
This section provides an overview of the patterns of the private sector's 
activities during this period. This study uses the available data concerning the 
private sector enterprises as the main source in this section, due to the lack of both 
data about the contribution of the private sector to the economy at large and detailed 
studies about its structure and characteristics. I am fully aware that enterprise data 
cannot reflect all of the characteristics of the private sector; however. it can give an 
overall picture of its structure and activities, which will be valuable when the 
bourgeoisie is considered in the following chapter. This section, therefore, covers 
the main trends of the private sector enterprises in terms of capital and number. It 
also shows the main trends of the sectoral and sub-sectoral structure of these 
enterprises, before concluding with an overview of the geographical distribution of 
the enterprises in the country. 
7.1 .1 THE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISE TYPES 
This section looks at the private sector during th is period by analyzing 
--- -
106,143 enterprises with a total capital of JD 2,415,620,673, which makes the 
number of enterprises and their capital respectively 7.8 and 14.6 times bigger in 
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comparison with the previous period. The distribution of these enterprises among 
their different types shows a similar picture to that of the previous period; IE 
enterprises were the most frequent type making up 75.3%, followed distantly by GP 
at 19.8% and with trivial percentages for LP (2.9%), LL (1 .9%), SP (0.16%) and Arab 
State Cooperative Companies (0.02%).1 In terms of capital, the data showed that LL 
had the biggest share of the total capital , followed closely by PS at 25.4 and, at 
some distance, by the Arab states' enterprises at 16.9%, GP at 15.5%, IE at 11 .7% 
and finally, with the smallest share, LP at 4.4%.2 
Certainly the PS's outstanding proportion in terms of capital in the previous 
period was balanced out in this period by the high proportions of the other types, 
especially those of LL and the Arab states' enterprises. However, insights about the 
enterprises can be deduced from their types. There was a large discrepancy 
between the enterprise types where the average is concerned. IE average capital 
was still the smallest, standing at JD 3,534.3; next, but five times bigger, came that 
of GP, at 18,002.1. Both the IE and GP averages came short of the combined 
general average of the enterprises, i.e. JD 22,758.2. Apart from the average of LP, 
which recorded JD 34,524.8, IE and GP, LL, SP and the Arab state enterprises 
recorded an average that exceeded a quarter of a million, i.e. JD 310,451 .6, JD 
3,670,486.4 and JD 25,537,773.8 respectively. The respective proportion of the IE 
of the total capital was a direct result of the large number of enterprises of this type, 
which was definitely the most popular among the private sector participants during 
this period, as it was in the period before. 
Based on the IE's proportion of enterprise numbers & capital and on its 
average capital during this period, it is still correct to argue that the great majority of 
these IEs, which were individually owned, were small-size self-employed 
enterprises. The same assumption can be partially applied to the GP enterprises. 
In contrast, the figures of LP and LL indicate that businesses of these types were 
usually big, and that there were certain management arrangements between the 
owners that guaranteed a separation between management and ownership. The 
1 Almost the same percentages were recorded during the previous period, although the 
Arab States Cooperative Companies was not present. The rationale for including this type of 
enterprises in the private sector is, on the one hand, the fact that they were open for the private 
sector: enterprises to ha'ie equities .in them. On the other hand, they were run on the basis of the 
private sector enterprises. 
2 See table 1/ appendix 15. 
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use of the enterprise type as a parameter should draw a line between big and small 
enterprises, since the data indicates a large variation in the capital of the enterprises 
in each type, resulting in a high Standard Deviation. For example, there are a 
number of GP and IE enterprises which had a capital beyond the mean capital in 
these types.3 A reversed trend can be found in the LL and LP types, where some 
enterprises exhibited a very small capital. 4 
Based on the above, and in order to make more sense of the capital as an 
Indicator, one can look at the enterprises in terms of capital intervals. This shows 
that only 1.2% of the total enterprises had a capital of more than JD 200,000, whilst 
they shared the great majority of enterprise capital at 78.4%.5 The great majority of 
the enterprises (93.7%) were those whose capital was 19,001 , which is still below 
the general mean capital of the total enterprises and within the domain of the IE and 
GP capital average;6 however, they made up only 12.1% of the entire capital. The 
intervals show that there was a number of IE and GP enterprises whose capital 
exceeded the average of their types. 
This approach distinguishes between the enterprises of outstanding capital 
compared to their type's mean capital , and those whose capital is close to the mean 
capital of their type. 13.1% of the GP enterprises recorded a capital higher than the 
GP average, sharing between them 78.4% of the total GP capital. 82.8% of the IE 
capital was shared by enterprises whose capital was above the IE capital average, 
despite the fact that they made up only 19.1% of the total number. 0.2 and 1.6% 
respectively of the IE and GP numbers were enterprises whose capital was more 
than JD 200,000. Undoubtedly, such enterprises did not share the characteristics of 
the majority of the GP and IE enterprises. Certainly, factors related to the field or 
sector of these enterprises can explain their outstanding capital compared to the 
average in that type/ though this does not change the above-mentioned proposition 
3 See table 1/ appendix 15. 
4 See table 2 and 3/ Appendix 15. 
s See table 1 and 2/ Appendix 15. 
6 In fact, more than 2/3 of the enterprise number had a smaller capital than that of the IE 
capital average, constituting less than 10.0% of the total enterprises' capital. 
7 31.4% and 30.2% of the IE whose capital was above JD 10,000 were in manufacturing 
and construction re_SR~9tl'{ely , ha_ying_U ,2% a.nd 39.2% of these IEs: totaLcapital. Apart from the 
-IEs, there were 885 enterprises whose capital was within the average IE capital. 14 enterprises 
were of the LL, 68 of the LP and 802 of the GP type. 78 of the enterprises whose capital was 
below the average capital of the GP were LL and 219 were LP. 26.1% and 50.2% of the IEs 
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that they are not of another strand of enterprises. The reverse phenomenon is to be 
found in the LP and LL enterprises, 92.2% and 57.5% of which exhibited a capital 
which was below their recorded average, though they made up only 16.8% and 
1.2% respectively of the capital of each type. Hence, the enterprise type, which is 
of fundamental relevance concerning the size of the business and its activities, does 
not necessarily reflect the characteristics of each individual enterprise. Based on the 
above observations, one can conclude that the inclination, among the private sector 
participants, towards having simple structured enterprises and a lack of separation 
between management and ownership, which was a dominant feature of the previous 
period, is less prevalent in this period, despite its existence as a trend. 
Concerning the growth rate during this period, the private sector enterprises' 
number grew at 12.9% per annum, while their capital growth averaged 14.9%. In 
terms of capital , the Arab state enterprises recorded the fastest annual growth rate 
at 23.9%, which can be explained by the fact that the number of this type was small 
and usually the newly established enterprises were of larger capital. The second 
fastest annual rate was recorded by the IE (18.4%), followed closely by the LL at 
17.6%, the PS at 14.9%, the GP at 14.3% and finally the LP at 11 .1%. The Arab 
state enterprises also recorded the fastest rate in terms of number (29.0%), followed 
by the LL at 17.3%, the LL at 15.9%, the GP at 13.2%, the IE at 12.7% and the PS 
at 6.4%. The annual rates for both capital and number fluctuated from one year to 
the next. For instance, in the years 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978, the number of 
enterprises grew by 19.7%, 22.3%, 15.4% and 16.7% respectively, while the rate 
was around 10.0% in 1984 and 1986 and less than 10.0% in 1988, reaching a 
trough of 5.0% in 1989. In capital terms. the variation was even more noticeable, 
since it was as high as 48.8%. 41 .1% and 21 .4% respectively in the years 1976, 
1975 and 1979, dropping to around 5.0% between 1984 and 1988 and reaching its 
lowest in 1989, at 2.1 %.8 This comes as no surprise, considering that in those years 
the Jordanian currency started to drop against the dollar and other international 
currencies. 
The economy of Jordan was .generally a tale of boom and decline of foreign 
aid and remittances. An overview of the macro-economy of this period links these 
whose capital was above 100,0QO were in manufactufing and construction, having 24.6% and 
43.9% of the capital respectively. 
8 See table 6 and ?/Appendix 15. 
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two conditions to the fluctuation of international oil prices. As was argued in the 
previous chapter, this period can be divided into two phases as regards Jordanian 
economic performance and the state's economic policies, one of which reflects the 
boom in oil prices and its consequences in foreign aid and remittances and covers 
the years between 1974 and 1982, whilst the other goes from 1983 to 1989, 
reflecting the decline in oil prices and hence the dramatic drop in direct and indirect 
transfers. The private sector enjoyed the benefit of the first period and suffered the 
consequences of the second. This is reflected in the variation of the growth rates in 
the first phase compared to that during the second. Whilst the enterprises' capital 
grew by 22.1% per annum during the first phase, It recorded only 5.7% in the second 
phase. As would be expected, the PS enterprises were most hit by the decrease in 
volume of the remittances and of the direct oil producing countries' private sector 
investments, coupled with the cuts in state spending on economic projects. Their 
growth rate during the second phase was 1.1 %, compared to 18.1% in the first 
phase. The LL and GP capital rate was a modest 8.6% and 7.3% respectively, 
compared to 24.7% and 12.6% in the first phase. Despite the fact that in the 
second phase, the IEs' rate almost halved in comparison to that of the first phase, 
they were still least affected by the country's recession. The fact that enterprises of 
such a type do not require capital intensive can be the main reason for their being 
the least affected, in addition to the fact that some of the expatriates who had to 
return to Jordan from the Arab oil producing countries as a consequence of the 
decline in oil prices were driven to or chose to invest some of their savings into self 
employed businesses, especially since the unemployment rate was on the increase 
in those years. 
7.1 .2 THE SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 
This subsection analyzes the main trends of the sectoral structure of the 
private sector enterprises, though it does not claim that the patterns and characters 
of the economic sectors are confined to what the enterprises show. Numberwise, 
the sectoral distrib.ution_oUI:le_prbLate sector enterprises. .shows that commerce was 
the qominant sector at 5.6. 7%.; services and manufacturing. had. around one third of 
362 
the commerce percentage, i.e. 18.7% and 17.8% respectively. Construction and 
transportation had 3.5% and 2.0% respectively, while the remaining sectors had a 
proportion of less than 1.0% each.9 The dominance of commerce numberwise can 
be attributed to its inclusion of a wide range of small size businesses serving local 
communities, such as mini markets and grocery shops, especially since 
supermarkets and departmental stores had not been introduced to Jordan. Despite 
the prevalence of commerce, its relative importance dropped dramatically compared 
to the previous period, when it was above 80.0%. All other sectors improved their 
proportion in this period: the services' proportion grew by more than three and half 
times, while manufacturing was twice as much as in the previous period .10 
A rather different picture emerges when the sectors are compared in terms of 
capital. Manufacturing had the biggest share of capital at 33.0%, followed by 
commerce enterprises at only 19.1%, construction at 12.9%. finance & insurance at 
10.5%, services at 8.7%, and agriculture at 6.4%.11 The sectoral distribution in terms 
of capital shows that there was a gap between the share of each sector numberwise 
and its share capitalwise, as is the case in commerce, services, construction, 
finance, mining, electricity and manufacturing. The variation in the economic 
sectors' requirements for capital intensive projects can clearly explain this gap. As 
was mentioned above, the wide range of activities that commerce includes results in 
inflating its proportion numberwise, but does not affect the capital rates. The 
average capital of an enterprise can be a more insightful indicator in this issue. The 
capital of finance enterprises averaged around JD % million, while it was Y.. million in 
mining, 60,000 in construction, 50,000 in transportation and 32,000 in 
manufacturing; however, it was only JD 5,700 in commerce. 
Another important factor that stems from the peculiarity of the Jordanian 
economy is the development of the economic sectors. Manufacturing, as was 
argued in chapter 2, was not rooted in the Jordanian social formation: its emergence 
dates back only to the 1950s and 1960s. Its development during this period was, 
more than anything else, a response to the availability of capital, the increase in 
consumption rates and the opportunities to export to neighboring countries. Hence, 
9 See table 7/appendix 15. 
_ • 
10 In the previous-period ·the share ef services and manufacturing stood at 5.0% and 
8.0% respectively. 
11 See table 8 and 10/appendb< 15. 
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manufacturing leant towards small and medium size, rather than mini and micro 
size, industries. The inflow of petrodollars and the rise in consumption rates 
enlarged the services sector to provide services that were not known before in 
Jordan.12 In terms of capital, agriculture recorded the fastest average annual growth 
rate at 152.6%.13 The lack of enterprises in this sector during the previous period 
and the increase of investments, especially in livestock breeding, led to the high rate 
in this sector. 1 ~ Apart from the outstanding rate in agriculture, all other sectors 
recorded a positive growth rate. Sectors such as finance, real estate, services, 
construction, and manufacturing were the fastest to grow at annual rates of 31.4%, 
23.3%, 21 .3% and 19.0% respectively.15 Construction and real estate growth rates 
were direct results of a respectable proportion of the remittances going in to the 
purchase of land and/or construction of residential houses. The civil war in Lebanon 
shifting some of the banking and insurance activities to Amman , coupled with the 
availability of capital from either domestic investors or those from the gulf countries 
(indigenous and/or Jordanian expatriates), led to a boom in this sector. In regard to 
services, in addition to the impact of general economic growth on the rate of this 
sector, areas that were new in Jordan were exploited, such as the educational 
services. Private schools opened at a greater pace during this period compared to 
the 1950s and 1960s, private community colleges providing further education were 
established widely during the second half of the 1970s, whilst private universities 
were founded in the second half of 1980s. Private hospitals, which provided more 
time efficient health services compared to the governmental ones, were founded to 
serve the segments of the Jordanian society which are financially able, bearing in 
mind that not all of the residents in Jordan were covered by state health insurance.16 
Commerce, mining and electricity, which grew at respectable rates, were still less 
than the above-mentioned sectors. The variation in the growth rate of the sectors, 
due either to its response to the overall economic changes during this period or to its 
12 The change in the relative importance of the economic sector capital wise underwent a 
change compared to the previous period, for instance, commerce had the biggest share of the 
enterprises capital. See chapter 5. 
13 See tables 11/ Appendix 15. 
14 It was mentioned in chapter 5 that the great majority of agricultural activities were 
taking place outside the legal enterprise form of business, and were still conducted at the level of 
the countryside household. See chapter 4. 
15 See tables 13, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20/ Appendix 16. 
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internal development, led to a change in its relative importance. Manufacturing 
enterprises occupied the biggest share of all sectors' enterprise capital in this period 
at 37.5%. Finance comes next at 18.2%, commerce at 14.7% and construction at 
8.5%. Compared to the previous period, manufacturing and finance improved their 
relative importance, whilst commerce dropped by more than 10.0 points. In fact the 
drop in commerce and gradual increase in manufacturing, finance and construction 
can be seen year by year. Apart from the fact that these sectors were dominant 
based on their shares in the capital of enterprises, the share of other sectors 
underwent changes. For instance, agricultural enterprise improved its share in the 
last few years of this period to have an overall average of 4.5% compared with 0.5% 
in the period before. The mining and electricity proportions were less than those of 
the previous period.17 The fact that phosphate and potash production in mining and 
electricity generation were under the monopoly of The Jordanian Phosphate Mines 
Co., the Arab Potash Co. and The Jordanian Electricity Co. made investments 
outside these companies impossible. It is important to highlight that the growth rates 
of all sectors varied in the first phase (1974-1982) of this period compared to the 
second (1983-1989). For instance, the growth rate of mining in the second phase 
was 0.5% compared to 11 .6% in the first. Average annual rate in finance in the 2d 
phase was around 0.5/101h of the first, while it was 1/91h in real estate, 1/t h in 
transportation, 1/61h in manufacturing and less than half in construction. The impact 
of the recession was felt in all sectors. However, commerce and services were less 
affected despite the dramatic drop in their rates in the second phase. One could 
argue that the impact would have been more severe on the enterprises in all sectors. 
if it had not been for partial dependency of the Iraqi market on some specific sectors 
in Jordan during the Iranian-Iraqi war (1980-1988). 
The number of enterprises in the different sectors showed a positive annual 
growth rate, which ranged from 8.2% in finance to 23.0% and 21 .9% in real estate 
and manufacturing respectively. The high rates in sectors like agriculture, mining, 
electricity, real estate and finance are less significant, since these sectors had only a 
limited number of enterprises to start with. In the case of mining and electricity it 
was in the fields of quarrying and steam production. Certainly, in commerce, 
18 For instance the private sector employees were not under the state's health care 
_sy.stem. The professional unior:~s such as lawyers, engineer-s, etc, had· their own voluntary health 
insurance schemes regardless of whether the member of a given union was a state employee. 
17 See tables 12 and 14/App~·ndix 16. 
365 
manufacturing, services and transportation, the rates were indicative of a large 
number of new enterprises. The structure of the sectors, numberwise, changed over 
the years of this period at the expense of commerce and in favor of the other 
sectors, such as manufacturing, transportation and services. '8 
71.2.1 The Sub-sectors 
The focus of this subsection is to give not a detailed account of the sub-
sector composition in each of the economic sectors19, but rather a brief review that 
shows the center of gravity in each economic sector and the main trends that their 
composition reveals. Despite the fact that each of the economic sectors has its 
distinct features when its sub-sectors are concerned, they can be divided into two 
groups. The first group covers sectors such as agriculture, mining, electricity and 
finance, the great majority of whose capital is concentrated in one specific sub-
sector despite the fact that the number of enterprises in that sub-sector was limited. 
For example, phosphate and potash, which made up 2.9% of the mining enterprises, 
had 86.2% of their capital. Fishing, whose enterprises made up 1.6% of agriculture, 
had 55.6% of its capital. The same applies to electricity production , with 9.8% of the 
enterprises and 99.25 of the capital. and banking, with 7.7% and 34.4% respectively. 
The second group includes the sectors in which the distribution of capital and 
number among their sub-sectors is more balanced. For example, road 
transportation has the great majority of enterprises in transportation (80.6%) and 
also the biggest share of the sector's capital (66.9%). 20 The same could be applied in 
the retail trade and export and import enterprises, whose proportion of enterprise 
number stood at 81 .2% and 13.8% respectively, while the share capitalwise was 
31 .6% and 55.8%. Similar trends can be seen in manufacturing, where the sub-
sectors of food manufacturing, metal products, wood cork, construction materials, 
clothing & footwear, having a proportion of 18.7%, 16.7%, 16.7%, 14.6% and 13.3% 
respectively, also made up the majority of the manufacturing capital at 24.5%, 8.4%, 
2.3%, 15.1 and 3.9%. Overall, the manufacturing sub-sectors' proportions 
numberwise correspond to a certain degree to their proportion capitalwise. The only 
18 See tables 13, 15, 16, 17 and 19/ Appendix 16. 
19 For such a purpose, see tables /appendix 16. 
20 The proportion of sea transportation, air transportation and transportation were, 
respectively, 5.0%, 0.3% and 13.0% numberwise, and 14.6%, and 15.2% capitalwfse. 
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exception is the chemical products, whose proportion of capital (21 .9%) outnumbers 
its share in terms of number, standing at only 2.4%. Undoubtedly, the 
pharmaceutical enterprises that were established during this period with large capital 
had rapidly increased the share of this sub-sector. Concerning the services, there 
were some sub-sectors whose proportions numberwise and capitalwise were within 
the same range, such as art, music & cinema (4.9% numberwise and 2.1% 
capitalwise), business services (8.3% &11.4%) and even maintenance services 
(35.4% &12.7%). On the contrary, the hotels' proportion of the sector's capita l was 
32.0%, followed by education services at 16.8% and health services 9.0%, though 
their proportions of the enterprise number stood at 2.0%, 1.4% and 0.6% 
respectively.21 It was during this period that the 4 and 5 stars hotels were 
constructed, while there was a quantitative and qualitative enhancement in both 
health and education services. A few factors may have explanatory power as 
regards the variations between the sub-sector structure in each of the two sets of 
sectors generally and the structure of the sub-sectors in each sector in particular. 
Firstly, enterprises in any given sub-sector differ according to their size, which in its 
turn is determined by several elements such as productive capacity, lines of 
production, number of stages of production, ... etc. The presence of large-size 
enterprises in a given sub-sector can result in a limited number of enterprises in that 
sub-sector, and/or in a concentration of capital in that sub-sector when it is 
compared to another whose enterprises are of small size. Such a factor becomes 
highly influential when one takes into account the capacity of the Jordanian market, 
which is characterized as being small. 
The second factor is that investments in some sub-sectors require large-scale 
enterprises.22 According to the first factor, the size of an enterprise is conditioned by 
subjective factors related to the entrepreneurs; here, the nature of the sub-sectors 
dictate objectively the size of enterprises and their capital. This is the case in sub-
sectors such as electricity production, phosphate, metal mining, pharmaceutical, 
banking, insurance, petroleum production and to some extent the wholesale trade 
21 Whilst the share of restaurants and cafes was 31.3% numberwise, its share of the 
services entire capital stood at 5.2%. Reviewing the enterprises of this sub-sector shows a large 
number of small-size coffee houses, which were an important outlay entertainment and social 
places for the local communities. 
22 For example, petroleum production and pharmaceuticals compared to food, wood, or 
paper manufacturing, road transportation compared to air and sea transports. 
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and financial institutions, where investments require large capital for either capital 
goods or liquidity for the functioning of firms. 
Third, the state economic policy in either granting some enterprises a 
complete or partial monopoly over production in a certain sub-sector or encouraging 
sub-sectors or certain enterprises within a specific sub-sector becomes a decisive 
factor in determining the number and capital concentration of these sub-sectors 
compared to the others. The lack of private investment in air transport, for example, 
was due to the state monopoly of this sub-sector through Alia Co., the national 
carrier.23 Apart from the capital requirements, the fact that phosphate production 
was under a monopoly explains why this sub-sector contained only one enterprise, 
the Jordanian Phosphate Mines (JPM}.24 The same applies to the Jordanian 
Refinery Co. (JRC). The direct governmental investment in some private sector 
enterprises resulted in them having large amounts of capital when compared to 
other enterprises of the same or similar nature. 
Fourth, taking into account the relatively late development in various 
economic sectors and/or the overall objective conditions of Jordan. some sub-
sectors were exploited until a later stage. The fact that a private sector entrepreneur 
did not exploit some business fields until during this period determined the number 
of enterprises and the capital invested in such sub-sectors. For example, the 
insignificant investment in sea transport was due to the small size and 
underdeveloped state of the Aqaba port, which did not flourish until the reopening of 
the Suez canal in 1975. The same could apply to the pharmaceutical, plastic, and 
publishing sub-sectors. 25 
23 The earliest attempt to establish a private air-line In Jordan was in 1973, ceasing in 
1975. In that year. two enterprises were established: the Arab Wings Airline, which was 
completely owned by the Royal Jordanian Airline, and the Holy Lands Airline, which never 
operated. The Archive of Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
24 A shareholding enterprise that was a joint venture between the private and public 
sectors was established in 1953 and had since a monopoly over the phosphate production and 
marketing. 
25 For instance, prior to 1975 the Jordanian market was heavily dependent on the 
publishing houses in the ·neighboring countries especially in [ebanon. The civil war in Lebanon 
did not only trigger the industry in_ Jorqan, but some the publishing. houses opened branches in 
Amman for Its operations. 
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7.1.3 THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
The geographical distribution of the enterprises highlights that the majority of 
the enterprises (70.7%) were concentrated in Amman, possessing around 87.1% of 
the capital. In terms of number, lrbid comes second at a proportion of 14.3%, 
followed by Zerqa and Balqa at 10.2% and 3.3% respectively.26 The rest of the 
enterprises were scattered among the other governorates with a fraction of 1.0% 
each.27 Compared to the previous period, the shares of the other governorates 
improved at the expenses of Amman, whose proportion stood at 90.9%, i.e. 20 
points above its share during this period. Despite the overall improvement of the 
share of the other governorates, the pecking order was almost the same as had 
been in the previous period. The enterprises' capital distribution did not undergo a 
dramatic change as that of the number did; for instance, the proportion of Amman in 
the enterprises' capital was only 2.0 points lower. The dominance of Amman when 
capital distribution is concerned was reflected in small proportions for the other 
governorates: lrbid came second with a proportion of 4.9%, followed by Zerqa at 
3.3% and Balqa at 2.9%.28 The proportions of the other governorates were of no 
significance. The percentages of Zerqa and Balqa can be ascribed mainly to the 
fact that both had PS enterprises, whose capital boosted their relative importance 
capitalwise, such as the Petroleum refinery in Zarqa and the Cement Factory Co. 
and the Arab Pharmaceutical co. in Balqa. A correlation could be traced between 
the enterprise's type and its being more or less widespread. The most widely 
distributed enterprises were those of IE or GP types, while those of PS or LL type 
were highly concentrated in Amman. Amman had the biggest share of the 
enterprises in each economic sector. The proportion. however, was lowest in 
transportation and commerce, at 54.9% and 69.15 respectively. Sectors such as 
commerce, transportation, manufacturing and services were more equally distributed 
numberwise than other sectors. The fact that it is vital that some of these sectors' 
sub-sectors be spread over the different communities resulted in less concentration 
in Amman. For example, 35.0% and almost 50.0% respectively of retail trade and 
26 See table 18/ appendix 15. 
27 See table 18 &19/ appendix15. 
28 In lhle pervious period Balqa had the second biggest share of capital followed by lrbid 
and Zerqa. See chapter 4. 
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road transportation enterprises were outside Amman.29 Almost a third of the 
enterprises in food, construction materials and metal products manufacturing sub-
sectors and in restaurants, maintenance and tool renting services sub-sectors were 
located outside Amman. The other sectors were less distributed according to the 
governorate by virtue of their fields. All the banking and insurance enterprises' 
central offices were based in Amman. This is also the case for the phosphate and 
potash enterprises, and for The Jordanian Electricity Co., despite the fact that the 
latter's activities cover the great majority of the country, while the actual plants and 
activities of the other two are nowhere near Amman . In spite of the fact that the 
distribution of the enterprises in some sectors was less concentrated in Amman, the 
capital distribution shows that Amman was still dominant in attracting the great 
majority of the big enterprises with a larger capital to be based in its vicinity. 
Undoubtedly, Amman was the center of the economic activities even in an 
imbalanced fashion. Apart from having all of the Arab state cooperative enterprises, 
it had above 85.0% of the capital of the PS and LL, which were the largest among 
the enterprises. Amman benefited from being the capital, thus having better 
infrastructures compared to the other regions, and the center of the state 
administration, thus attracting a great deal of businesses. During this period the 
population of Amman increased rapidly, first by the internal immigration from the 
countryside and in the late 1980s by virtue of the fact that it was the main destination 
for the Jordanian expatriates who returned home on the wake of the decline of oil 
prices. Therefore, Amman attracted more and more businesses within its domain in 
order to serve its continuously growing population. 
The distribution of the enterprises according to the provinces shows that the 
Central province,30 containing the three major cities of Amman, Zarqa and Balqa, 
possessed 93.7% of the enterprises and 96.8% of the total capital, followed by the 
Northern Province at 6.0% and 5.6% and finally the southern Province at 0.3% and 
3.1%. 
The geographical distribution of the sub-sectors was influenced by the nature 
of the latter and by the number of enterprises in each of them. Enterprises of food 
and beverages, printing, packaging, ·glass and glass products, leather products and 
29 See table 32/ Appendix 15. 
30 The province classification is a socio-political one rather than a geographical one. See 
chapter 3. 
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rubber are widely spread among the different governorates. The rest of the sub-
sectors' enterprises were concentrated mainly in Amman. 31 The limited number of 
enterprises in these sub-sectors and the better infrastructures of Amman were the 
decisive factors in their concentration in the capital city. 
A detailed account of the enterprises' geographical distribution is beyond the 
scope of this subsection. 32 The data, however, shows that, in addition to the 
concentration of manufacturing enterprises in Amman, lrbid33 and Zerqa34 started to 
be favorable locations in which to locate manufacturing enterprises. 35 The 
preference of manufacturing activities for Zerqa continued during the second half of 
the 1970s and 1980s, benefiting from the cheap prices of land. 
In a similar fashion, these sub-sectors differ from each other in their 
geographical base. The sub-sectors with few enterprises (Banks, insurance, ... etc.) 
31 In fact, enterprises producing petroleum and coal products, non-electronic, other metal 
manufacturing and tobacco were exclusively based in Amman. Tobacco manufacturing 
comprised 3 enterprises, of which two were large-scale ones of the PS type, while the third was 
of medium size and was not involved in producing cigarettes but in producing tobacco. The 
characteristics of the tobacco sub-sector applied to a large extent to the other sub-sectors that 
were mentioned above. The first enterprise is the Jordanian Cigarettes Company, which remained 
the only cigarette producer up to the early 1990s. The second biggest enterprise was the National 
Company of Tobacco and Cigarettes, whose date of establishment goes back to the 1950s. However. 
it had undergone different sorts of difficulties: internal ones rooted in the shareholders and external 
ones that related to the competition from the Jordanian Cigarettes Company, leading It to convert from 
being PS to LL in 1975 before it was liquidized. 
32 It is important to mention that some governorates had relatively a decent proportion of 
specific sub-sectors. For instance, the Zerqa district enclosed 22.2% of beverages, 16.7% of iron 
manufacturing, 14.3% of transportation equipments. 12.5% of paper and paper products and 
5.6% of the leather products. The distribution of the sub-sectors capitalwise is largely influenced 
by the location of the PS enterprises. since 2/3 of the manufacturing capital is represented by 
their capital. Hence, Balqa contained 76.9% of the construction materials. Apart from the small 
and medium size enterprises that produced some construction materials, and mainly bricks, the 
SP Jordan Cement Factory's capital boosted the Balqa proportion with respect to the total capital 
of this sub-sector. See table I appendix 6. 
33 lrbid, in the north of the country, contained 20.5% of furniture and fixture enterprises, 
16.7% of packaging, 14.3% of glass and glass products, 12.5% of electronic machinery, 10.8% of 
plastic and rubber, 9.9% of metal products (except machinery), 7.3% of construction materials. At 
the capital level, it contained 30.9% of electronic machinery, 28.8% of glass and glass products, 
13.8% of furniture and fixture 12.2% of packing and 6.7% of food manufacturing. 
34 Despite the fact that the actual petroleum refinery, which is the main component of the 
petroleum sub-sector, was based in Zarqa, it was considered, according to the official figures, to 
be in Amman, given that its headquarters had been in Amman ever since its establishment. This 
research follows the Ministry of Trade and Industry's geographical distribution. In the case of 
Zerqa, it held 68.4% of the beverages capital, 52.1% of paper and paper products, 43.3% of 
chemical products and 17.0% of textiles. 
35 The main enterprise wifh large capital in this sub-sector and located in ai-Balqa was 
the Arab Pharmaceutical Factory that was established in 1964; it was the first one of its kind, and 
its capital during this period stood at JD 250000. 
371 
are concentrated in one governorate or two and usually in Amman . while the other 
sub-sectors are more spread among the cities and regions of the country. 36 In the 
case of banks, branching acted as a substitute for concentration of the firms in 
Amman. 
7.2 LOCATING THE BMS 
This section aims to locate the BM during the 197 4-1989 period within the 
domain of the private sector, according to the mechanism that was put forward in 
chapter 3. It also aims to analyze the trends and patterns of the bourgeoisie by 
looking first at their enterprises and secondly at the members themselves. Before 
proceeding in such an analysis, it is important to show how the mechanism was put 
in function. 
In order to put the mechanism that was elaborated in chapter 3 in operation, 
this study looks at all of the enterprises that were established over this period 
(January 1974 to 31st December 1989), in addition to the enterprises that had been 
established prior to January 1974 and were still operating during this period .37 
These enterprises and their equity holders make up the domains of the private 
sector enterprises and private sector participants, from which the BM are to be 
extracted. 
According to this mechanism, the first stage is to separate the SP enterprises 
from the other types. As was mentioned in the methodology, the BM who are in 
each of the SP enterprises are the largest shareholders, possessing the first 60.0% 
of the shares. The BM in the SP were extracted according to this criterion. Because 
of the establishment, in 1978, of the Amman Stock Market, where the shares of the 
PS were traded frequently and therefore their value was subject to continuous 
change, the mechanism was slightly adapted to take into account the market value 
36 See table 29, 30, 39, 40, 47 and 48/ Appendix 17. 
37 In this context, all enterprises that were established before this period and ceased to exist 
before January 1974 are not part of this period's private sector and consequently would not be part of 
the bourgeoisie. The enterprises that were established before or during this period and ceased to 
exist during this period were still considered as part of the private sector and of the bourgeoisie if they 
were qualifit}Q. Su..ch a PJQp_QS.lti.oo is_ based on the fact that these enterprises and their owners were 
active at that time, and their closure is of significance for the analysis of the private sector and of the 
bourgeoisie. However, any enterprise that was established during this period and never operated was 
excluded from the domain of the bourgeoisie even if it was qualified. 
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of shares that the equity holders had.38 The fact that the market value of some PS 
shares was greater than that of their book value resulted in extracting the biggest 
equity holders, who constituted up to 85.0% of the capital in the case of a few 
enterprises. 
Concerning the extraction of the BM in the rest of the enterprise types, the 
first step was to define the amount of capital x that the methodology suggested to be 
the figure that can distinguish between enterprises: owners of enterprises whose 
capital was x or more were automatically considered as members of the bourgeoisie. 
Based on the mean capital of the enterprises in each type and taking samples of 
enterprises in each type,39 this study assumes that the figure should be JD 35,000 
that is around the average capital of the LP enterprises (JD 34524.8). Therefore, the 
owners of enterprises whose capital was JD 35,000 were automatically qualified to 
be part of the BM. The rationale behind choosing a figure close to the mean capital 
of the LP rather than to that of other enterprise types was the inadequacy of the 
latter to constitute a representative figure. Using the mean capital of IE or GP 
(JD 3534.3, 18002.1 respectively), which is small compared to the mean of other 
types, would have resulted in a large number of private sector participants being 
considered as BM. An examination of these members revealed that some of them 
would be inaccurately considered as bourgeoisie. Opposite results were obtained 
when the chosen figure was close to the mean capital of LL (JD 310451 .5). The fact 
that the mean capitals of the LL or Arab state cooperative were large in comparative 
terms, leads to missing out some enterprises whose owners were clearly part of the 
bourgeoisie. In this context, JD 35,000 could be an appropriate figure to function as 
a dividing line, since it did not exclude, nor did it include, too many enterprises in its 
qualification of the bourgeoisie.40 Hence, the owners of any enterprise whose capital 
was JD 35,000 or more were considered as part of the bourgeoisie. 
38 The market value of the share of each enterprise was taken on the monthly average, 
and the yearly average was calculated before an overall average for the entire period was put in 
place. 
39 Using this figure as the dividing line for the enterprises that were owned by BMs and those which 
were not took into consideration the mean capital in each economic sector, making sure that each of 
the sub-sectors is represented. For more details concerning other possible approaches and the 
benefits of this one, see chapter 3 and 5. 
40 This study is far from claiming that the figure 35,000 is not going to miss out any of the 
bourgeois members or that it. is .not going to qualify some .owners that are not bourgeois. 
However, the accuracy achieved by using this figure is far higher than that achieved by using 
others. Moreover, the possibility of missing out some elements of the bourgeoisie is reduced to a 
minimum by using other ways of extracting bourgeois members in the later stages of the 
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Along the lines of this mechanism, the private sector participants who had 
equities in more than one enterprise or/and possessed 0.1% or more of the total 
equities of the private sector and had not qualified to be BMs so far, are considered 
to be part of the bourgeoisie. 
The domain of the bourgeoisie that results when applying the mentioned 
above mechanism during this period consists of 47,221 members, whose total 
equities is JD 1 ,254,448,056. The ratio of the BMs to the total population during this 
period is less than 1.2%, while their ratio to the entire equity-holders in enterprises 
was around 10.0%.4' However, the BMs' equities made up 51.9% of the total capital 
of all enterprises that the country contained during this period, including the equities 
of non-bourgeoisie equity-holders. The ratio of the BMs' equities to the total equities 
of the private sector participants, excluding those of the state and state agencies, 
was 77.9%. These figures indicate that, despite the small number of the group that 
makes up the bourgeoisie domain in respect to the population and to the private 
sector participants, they possessed the great majority of the private sector equities 
and the majority of the private sector equities including the state ones. Since 
equities and capital are used by this study as measures reflecting control over the 
means of production. this limited number of members are shown to control the 
majority of the means of production, leaving less than a quarter of these in the hands 
of the remaining participants owning means of production, i.e. the non-wage 
earners. 
7 .2.1 THE NON-BOURGEOIS EQUITY HOLDERS IN THE BE 
The focus here will be given to the equity-holders in the BE that were not 
qualified according to the implemented criteria as BMs, though sharing with the 
bourgeoisie the ownership of the BE. Certainly, there are a large number of equity 
holders who share or had shared for a certain period the ownership of the BE with 
the BMs. Covering all of the non-bourgeoisie equity-holders is perhaps unattainable 
and certainly beyond the scope of this study. For example, among the non-
bourgeoisie equity-holders were those shareholders in PS whose number of shares 
was too small to be qualified to be BMs or were shareholders for only a short period 
mechanism. Based on the above, and for the purpose of disting~shing the businesses that do 
not fit within the general cnaracteris{ics of their types, it is useful to look at the enterprises in 
terms of capital intervals. (See table 11/ Appendix 16). 
374 
of time by virtue of being market speculators. Such equity-holders amount up to 
hundreds of thousands during the boom of Amman Stock Market during the first half 
of the 1980s.42 However, some of these equity-holders are vital to look at, due to the 
significance of the equities that they held on one hand and due to their importance in 
their own right such as the Jordanian state or its autonomous agencies. 
The non-bourgeoisie equity-holders that are covered in this sub-section are 
the corporate equity-holder: the Jordanian state, governmental agencies, Arab 
governments,~3 local governments and the employee saving funds.« The number of 
investments that these categories have during this period is 505, while their total 
equities are JD 373,466,965 which makes up 18.2% of the total capital of BEs.45 
The biggest share of the equities of these non-bourgeoisie equity-holders was the 
Jordanian central government at 43.0% followed by Arab governments at 36.4%, 
autonomous governmental institutions at 19.2%, while the proportion of the local 
governments and employee saving funds were only 0.1% and 1.3% respectively. In 
this sense, the government and its autonomous institutions had the majority of these 
holders' equities at 62.2%.46 
The distribution of the equities into economic sectors shows that almost half 
(47.6%) were in manufacturing, 22.6% in mining, 11 .6% in finance, 7.2% in 
transportation and 5.5% & 4.4% in agriculture and services respectively. In fact the 
non-bourgeoisie corporate equity-holders possess more than two thirds of the 
mining BEs capital , slightly less than one third of the capital of the electricity 
(30.8%), transportation (29.3%) and manufacturing (23.7%) enterprises. In other 
sectors, their equities are still making up a notable proportion of the BEs at 19.0% in 
agriculture, 12.4% in finance and 10.0% in services. The sectors in which there 
41 See table 1 & 4/ Appendix 16. 
42 Based on the data of the PS enterprises data in The Annual Public shareholding 
Companies, various issues (1980-1989}. 
43 There were no foreign governments' investments. The foc us here is not the involvement of 
foreign governments in the economic activities of the country such as contributions and grants fmm 
western governments towards development projects that the Jordan ian government conducted. 
44 See chapter 5 for rationale behind excluding these categories from being considered 
as bourgeoisie. 
45 See table 22/appendix 16. 
46 Compared to the previous period, there was a decline in the share of the central 
government versa to the· other categories shares. The decline was due to the increase of the 
other categories shares rath~r t.nan the decline in the absolute te~ms of the governmental 
investments. 
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were no or insignificant investments were commerce, construction and real estate. 
Central government investments during this period were mainly in two economic 
sectors manufacturing (46.8% of its equities) and mining (34.7%). 7.6%, 5.7% and 
2.8% of its equities were respectively in services, transportation and finance, while 
its investments in the remaining sectors were insignificant.'17 This high proportion of 
state investment in manufacturing and mining is to some extent a legacy of the 
previous periods when the state had chosen to be involved in particular projects that 
were beyond the means of the domestic prjvate sector to establish. However, such 
projects were of importance to the actualization of the economic independence of 
the country as economic policy makers envisaged.48 This was the case in projects 
such as petroleum refinery, the cement manufacturing, pharmaceutical industries 
and phosphate mining. Phosphate in particular, the only natural resource in the 
country, was considered as a strategic commodity49, so that the state granted a 
monopoly over its production to the Jordanian Phosphate Mines Co., where the state 
was the major equity-holder. Undoubtedly. the unprecedented transfers to the 
central government during the first half of the period did not only enhance the state's 
expenditures, but also made it possible to invest within the domain of the private 
sector enterprises. 
The Autonomous Governmental Institutions, which had 19.2% of the non-
bourgeoisie corporate equity-holders and 3.5% of the BE capital , followed almost the 
same sectoral pattern of the government's investments. 56.3% of its investments 
were in manufacturing, 13.1% in mining, 10.0% in transportation, 6.8% in finance 
and 4.9% and 4.6% respectively in services and agriculture.50 It seems that the 
connection between the government's investments and those of its autonomous 
institutions is not limited to the same economic sectors. Apart from 3 enterprises,51 
wherever the government has an investment, there was also one or more 
investments belonging to its governmental institution(s). This trend questions the 
47 See table 23/ appendix 16. 
48 See for example the aims of the 7 year development plan (1964-1970) and the 3 year 
development plan (1 973-1975). 
49 The importance of the Phosphate Mines Co. increased rapidly after 1967, as a 
consequence of the increase of the international price of phosphate, which made the transfers 
from phosphate exports to be substantial pre-1974 era. 
50 Likewise the government its investments in the re'Tlaini119 ~ectors either was inexistent 
or insignificant. See taole 23/Appimdix 16. 
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degree of autonomy that some of these institutions have. The General Institution of 
Social Security almost religiously followed the government's investments in every 
enterprise. The strong influence of the government over this institution might come 
from the fact that the latter has evolved to be a more autonomous institution from the 
womb of the Civil Servants Pension Fund only in the 1980s. Additionally the 
government has a continuous and strong presence on the board of this institution. 
The Institution of Managing and Investing the Orphans Assets was another one that 
followed the governmental investments' steps. 52 
The Arab governments' investments in this period were mainly through the 
Arab state cooperative enterprises, where 83.6% of total equities has been replaced. 
In this sense, the Sectoral distribution of these investments was largely determined 
by the sectors of the Arab state enterprises. The largest proportion of these 
investments were in manufacturing at 43.9% followed by 23.8% in finance. 14.4% in 
mining, 10.2% in agriculture and 7.7% in transportation.53 The leading countries in 
the size of their investments were Syria with 19.9% of the total Arab government's 
investments followed by Egypt at 13.2% and Kuwait at 12.4%. The size of the 
investments and their distribution among sectors and enterprises seems to show 
that the Arab governments, especially the oil producing ones, shun away from 
investing within the domain of the private sector enterprises. Most investments were 
channeled through the Arab state cooperative projects. Only the Kuwaiti and Qatari 
governments had substantial investments in private sector enterprises outside the 
Arab state cooperative enterprises. 54 The investments of Kuwait and Qatar, which 
were more diversified, do not reflect any strategy in the behaviour of the two 
countries. It seems that the two countries' investments came through connections 
between some Jordanian enterprises' founders or managers and some figures and 
officials in the governments of these two countries. 
51 These enterprises are The Jordanian for Candies and Chocolate Co., The Jordanian 
for Industries and Mach and The Jordanian Tourist Transportations companies. 
52 This department that is tightly connected to the Department of Qaagii ai-Qugaah, i.e. 
the sharia' juridical administration body, which is in its turn a governmental department. 
53 There were no investments in the remaining sectors. See table 23/ Appendix 16. 
54 Qatar had investments in 3 banks (Arab, Industrial d~v~tpprt)ent, Arab Investment and 
Blit ai-Tamwiil' banks), ai-Qads for Insurance, the Jordanian Media Corporation. Kuwait's 
investments covered The Jordanian Phosphate Mines, Arab and the Housing Banks and The 
Jordanian Insurance Co. 
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The employee funds' investments, which made up 1.3% of the total non-
bourgeoisie equities, were stretched over 165 enterprises. All employee funds, 
which were funds of PS enterprises, had investments in their own companies and 
followed the patterns of their enterprises' investments. Since, none of the funds' 
investments were in enterprises in which their companies had no investments, one 
could argue that these funds acted as investing arms to their companies and a tight 
relationship existed between the funds' managements and their companies' 
managements. 55 
Local governments' investments compared to the remaining categories were 
small. In fact 97.2% of their investments were in electricity and 1.4% in each of 
manufacturing and mining. Apart from the investments of the Municipality of 
Amman, which were more diversified, the other local governments that had 
investments during this period made them in the lrbid District Electricity Co. that 
supplied electricity to their areas. 
7.3 INDIVIDUAUCORPORATE BMS 
The bourgeois domain can be divided into two main categories: the individual 
members, who are female and male, Jordanian and non-Jordanian individuals who 
held equities in the private sector and were qualified as BMs. The corporate bodies 
on the other hand consist of all the Jordanian companies and non-Jordanian 
companies, in addition to the NGOs and unions that were qualified as BMs. The 
section's focus is to analyze these two groups. The individual investments made up 
the great majority of the BMs' investments at 95.1 %, and the corporate bodies, 
which constituted just 4.9%. In terms of equities, however, the corporate BMs had a 
share of around 23.7%, versa 76.3% of the individual members. The total number of 
the corporate BMs was 1058 compared to 26015 individuals. The distribution of 
power I points, which measures the assets in the hands of the BMs and reflect their 
capacity to act, 95.5% of power I points were in the hands of individual BMs 
compared to 4.5% in the hands of the corporate bodies. Equities per corporate body 
stood at JD 273474, which was almost 7.5 times of that per individual BMs that were 
recorded at JO 36849. The discrepancy between the equity per member in the two 
categories shows the stronger position that the corporate bodies have in comparison 
55 Despite the fact .. that this point is interesting, investigating the relationship between the 
two managements is beyond the scope of this study. 
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to that of individuals. Power I points per member among individuals was 1.17 
compared to 1.35 amongst corporate.56 
7 .3 .1 INDIVIDUAL BOURGOISIE MEMBERS 
The analysis of individual BMs will first focus on individuals in terms of 
gender. In the previous period, it was concluded that the bourgeoisie was male 
dominated. Despite the fact that the proportions of females in this period improved, 
it is still appropriate to describe the bourgeoisie domain as made up mainly of male 
members. The proportion of investments held by female BMs during this period was 
16.7%, compared to 83.2%, held by males. In equity terms, the proportion of the 
females stood at 11 .9%, the males at 87.6%? The total number of females in the 
bourgeoisie domain was 4979, which is almost 20.0% of all individual BMs. 58 The 
discrepancy between the female BMs and their male counterpart can be seen also in 
the fact that the equities per female stood at JD 22,949 which is slightly more than 
half of the equities per male. 59 The distribution of total power I points according to 
gender shows that female members had only 10.0% of the points, while the power I 
per female stood at 0.6 point. compared to 1.3 points for males. 
Due to the overwhelming male dominance in the bourgeois domain , the 
patterns of the females' investments will be the focus here, since analyzing the male 
BMs would be equivalent to giving an account of all the BMs. It seems that, up to 
the end of this period, the female BMs' investments and strategies were still closely 
tied up to that of their male counterparts. There is no evidence that the female BMs 
had developed investment strategies that were autonomous from the male ones. On 
the one hand, there were no formal or informal organizations that were concerned 
with the investment bonds of the female BMs.60 Throughout the data, no trend can 
56 Undoubtedly, the importance of the corporate BMs during this period increased rapidly 
compared to that of the previous period. where their share numberwise had been slightly less. 
however, their share of equities was only 11.8%. This is to be attributed to two factors, which to 
be covered below; the first is the tendency of the individual BMs to invest indirectly through their 
other enterprises, as opposed to the 88.2% of the individual members. 
57 15.1 o/o of the BMs were females possessing only 7.9% of the equities during the 
previous period. 
58 Each BM had at least one investment. 
59 See table 7/ Appendix 16. 
60 
·rhTs was found by reviewing all females and busfness associations, and also through 
the interview with Subhiia ai-M'aanii. There are charitable orgar:tizatior.~s that included some of 
the female BMs; however, these organizations never developed into being business oriented. 
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be detected of female BMs clustering in certain economic activities. Moreover, it was 
noted that the majority of the females' equities were in NF controlled businesses 
where male BMs were partners with a certain proportion of the business equities, or 
possessing the majority of the shares. Based on the data of the previous period and 
that of this period, one can argue that the great majority of female BMs up to the end 
of this period came into the domain of the bourgeoisie through their NFs. The 
females' possession of equities in enterprises were usually with NF relatives as 
partners who were either their fathers or husbands or, to a lesser extent, their 
siblings. In fact, 54.2% of the female equities were found in NF control enterprises. 
Another 6.8% of their equities were in individual control and NF support businesses, 
of which the majority was under the control of male partners. 51 
Reviewing the neutral control enterprises, which absorbed a substantial 
proportion of the female equities at 32.9%, shows that the majority of the females 
who held equities had NF relatives within the same enterprises. The pattern is that 
there were NF members who invested in these enterprises, including female ones. 
Detailing all the females who had equities in the neutral control enterprises is not 
conceivable in the terms of this study. Looking at the female equity-holders with the 
biggest number of equities in the neutral control enterprises shows that the great 
majority of these were accompanied by equities held by NF male relatives.62 Even 
when the females with the most equities or/and the most frequent investments are 
in question, the data shows that their investments followed investments of the NF 
6
' In fact there were 18 enterprises that were under the control of female partners, 
however, the share of the equities of these females who were in control of these enterprises to all 
of the female equities in the enterprises of individual control and NF support is only 15.1 %. 9 of 
these enterprises were of LL, where appointed management is required , and none of the females 
were mangers, although they possess more than 50.0% of the equities in each enterprise. It is 
also apparent that these females who possess more than 50.0% of the equities were wives of 
partners in the same enterprises. In fact some records detailed the names of the female partners 
by their first name followed by 'zuujat' wife of the husband, which is unusual in the Jordanian 
regulations where the wife keeps its name after marriage. These undoubtedly mean that the 
great majority of individual control and NF support enterprises where the female equities are to 
be found were under male partners' control. 
62 Widaad whose equities in The Jordanian for Wooden Manufacturing is one of the 
biggest females' single stake in any enterprise is the wife of 'Adaal Qab'iin who is a main 
shareholder in the same company, other members of the family are big shareholders. The same 
applies to the equities Aamal, Riim and Hnd Abu-Na!lal in The Investing Company for the 
Jordanian Expatriates.- where their-fathers, is main -shareholder as· well as their bothers. 
Intestinally the shares of the brothers in the latter company is almost double their shares. Vuuliit's 
equities in The Modern Company for Manufacturing Vegetable Oil l_s ~QD_g the sid~_ 9Lh~r 
husband-Aibair· Suurlijli~Najaat'sequitiesin'Tfie Ice and Soda cdtn. Was amongst the stake 
held by her father lbr~McrL~!:.~iin am;!_llt~( pJo.tber:s_who_se_equities-individually was more-than-
-ne·rs~ 'Thereare still plenty of examples. 
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relatives.63 Based on what was said above, one can conclude that the path for 
female BMs into the domain of the bourgeoisie was through the NFs under the 
orientation or/and along the direction of their NF male relatives. Up to the end of this 
period the majority of the female BMs' investments were still tied up closely with their 
NF male relatives, regardless of the improvements in the size of their stacks. The 
overall dominance of the males at the macro level of the bourgeoisie or at the micro 
level of the enterprises even where females' substantial equities are to be found 
does imply that there were no female BMs who were part of the bourgeoisie domain 
and in full control of their assets, independently of their NF male relatives. There 
were 189 female BMs who were equity-holders in 176 enterprises in which no males 
were present The equities of these females were trivial in proportion to that of the 
entire female equities and almost equal to nothing compared to that of the BMs in 
general. The great majority of these enterprises were of IE type and of individual 
control and NF control forms of ownership. The two main sectors absorbing the 
great majority of these female enterprises and their equities were, in this order, 
commerce and manufacturing. The overwhelming proportion of these females 
came to the bourgeoisie domain through their NFs, as their broad investments 
indicate.&4 This does not mean that these businesses were not under prime control 
of these females.65 Concerning the general distribution of the female BMs' equities 
among the economic sectors, whilst it was slightly above the overall proportion in 
manufacturing. commerce and services, making up 15.6%, 13.0% and 13.2% of the 
Individual BMs equities, it was above their proportion of investments held by 
63 Taahanii and Rubhiih ai-Qaara ' whose equities were the biggest among the Female 
BMs were equity-holder in the manufacturing enterprise. Faaiiz ai-Qaara' com. In which their 
father Faaiiz ai-Qaara' and brothers were partners. Najuuh ai-Maa.Q.ii is another big equity-holder 
whose equities appeared in enterprises along her father Muhammad ai-Maa.Q.ii and her brothers 
before the g~avity of her equities shift to be a partner with her husband Sabiih ai-Ma~rii. Despite 
the fact that Najuuh ai-Maa.Q.ii possessed 10 % of equities in Amman/Cairo Bank and Amman 
Investment Bank, she is never been on the board of any of these two banks, instead her husband 
who is equity-holder with less equities than her was member on both boards. Najuuh ai-Maa.Q.ii's 
NF one of the leading bourgeoisie families as well as her husband. Nauuaal is another example 
whose investments in terms of equities and number were leading, however. all came along her 
husband Fuuaad Oa!aan investments. The same applies on Suhiir and Norma 'Asfuur, the 
Badiir's sisters ... . etc. 
s-t Princess Wajdaan 'Ali, a second cousin of King Hussein, businesses activities have 
started In food manufacturing on her own. Sabhiiah ai-M'aanii who had started her business 
activities alongside her husbaoq,_took the.role of.managing.the businesses in consequence to·the · 
suaCferi death of her. husband in 1981. Against the will of their business partner, she reports that 
she dictated this decision by virtue of her shares and that of her husband she inherited. 
-·-
65
-For instance~ttfe.,.joint ventUfeonl'liflli'luhammad ai-Iaahar sisterS, which was initi;ted 
by their father and turned to be a s_uQ~El§§.fyl_business. story, .. r.evoives-around -establishing-the- - -
-~private Amriian Schook 
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individual BMs in manufacturing (17.9%), services (17.8%) and finance (19.3%). 
The proportion of investment number and equities held by females in each of the 
economic sectors, however, was not that different to their general proportion. Four 
sectors absorbed the great majority of investments held by female BMs: 30.5% of 
the females were in manufacturing, followed by 19.7% in construction, 17.5% in 
finance and 16.4% in services. leaving around 15.0% spread among the remaining 
sectors.66 The females' equities were also concentrated in specific sectors. 39.3% 
of them were in manufacturing, 20.5% in commerce. 13.6% in finance and 11 .6% in 
construction. The above distribution of the females' equities does not indicate a 
preference for one sector over another, but rather the strategies of the NFs of which 
the female partners were part. As for the rest of the individual BMs, however, at a 
greater scale there was an elite of female BMs whose equities and power I points 
was almost% of those belonging to females. For instance, there were 512 female 
BMs whose proportion of the total female equities was almost 75.0%. Around 1500 
females, including the above-mentioned 512, had more than 70.0% of the power I 
points, which means that there were around 3500 female BMs sharing less than 30 
.0% of the female equities and power I points. In fact, only 233 female BMs, by 
virtue of their power I points, had a capacity to act between 4 and 60 times that of 
each of the remaining female BMs. 
7.3 .2 THE CORPORATE BODIES 
As was mentioned above, the corporate bodies consist of Jordanian Arab and 
foreign companies, NGOs and unions. The Jordanian companies were the most 
frequent corporate BMs during this period, at 84.4% and 71.4% of the number and 
the equities of the corporate bodies. The Arab companies came second at 7.9% of 
the number and 20.9% of equities, followed by foreign companies at 4. 7% and 6.4% 
respectively. The NGOs and unions were of less significance making up 
respectively 1.5% and 1.8% numberwise and 0.4% and 0.8% equitiywise.67 The 
make up of the corporate bodies' equity structure during this period dramatically 
changed since the share of the Jordanian companies declined by more than 20 
points in favor of the Arab and foreign companies whose share improved from 5.5% 
in the previous period reaching 27.3% in this period. The increase was seen in the 
66 See table 8 & 9/appendix 16. 
67 See table 11/appendix 16. 
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contribution of both Arab and foreign companies. The unions, on the other hand 
had no investments during the previous period. 
The majority of the corporate BMs' investments were in enterprises of PS and 
LL types: 62.6% and 29.2% of the investments number and 55.8% and 32.7% of the 
investments equities. The presence of the stock market and the separation between 
management and ownership in these types (usually due to their large capital) are 
factors explaining why they got the majority of the corporate bodies investments. In 
fact the share of foreign companies' equities in PS and LL stood at 95.5%, while the 
share of the Arab companies' equities was 85.4% in PS and LL in addition to 13.8% 
in Arab state cooperation enterprises. 
Among the NGOs, two had the majority of the total NGOs number of 
investments and equities. Queen 'Aaliih Fund for social Development had equities 
·in 4 enterprises making up around 33.3% of the total NGOs equities.68 The 
Economic and Social Institution for retired military personnel is the second NGO that 
had investments in 7 enterprises making up 39.2% of the total NGOs equities. 
The investments of Institutions and union category were dominated by 
professional unions69• In fact, the 24 investments of the Engineers Association 
amounted to 91 .6 % of the total union equities which made it clear that this union in 
particular was the most active investor in this category. Despite the fact that, the 
majority of the Engineers Association's investments were in manufacturing 
enterprises, its investments stretched to cover 3 banks, 2 insurance companies and 
4 transportation enterprises. In fact, the majority of its equities were in The National 
Islamic Bank. 
68 This fund was established in 1978 and chaired by Princess Basamah, King Hessian's 
sister. It is considered one of the most active NGOs providing help and assistance to women in 
deprived areas in the Jordanian countryside. Its investments were mainly in The National Islamic 
Bank and The Arabian Seas for Insurance. 
It was established in 1981 by some ex-army officers as an economic organization 
services its members of the retired army career. Its economic activities developed rapidly in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s to cover some retail shops and transportation enterprises. During 
this period, its investments were in manufacturing enterprises and one fishing companies. 12.5% 
of The Protein Food Products were owned by this organization. 
- · ·
69
· Sucn as engineers, aoctors, ptiarmacists, .~et=-c-. t-:-:-he "7tr-ad~e unions for instance has no 
investm~[tts any private sector. _enterprises. The fact .that the professional unions have an 
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As regards the distribution of the corporate bodies among the different 
economic sectors. manufacturing, finance & insurance, services and commerce 
possessed the largest number of corporate bodies at 31 .1%. 25.7%, 15.1%, and 
10.3% respectively. Transportation & storage, real estate, agriculture and 
construction together absorbed less than 17.0% of the corporate bodies at 6.2%, 
3.9%, 3.2% and 2.9% respectively.70 
The picture in terms of the corporate bodies' equities distribution was in some 
ways very different. Manufacturing was once again the leading sector, possessing 
42.4% of the total corporate equities, followed by finance at 18.9%, services at 9.2%, 
transportation at 8.4 % and of commerce and mining at 6.9%. The remaining 
sectors such as electricity, agriculture, real estate and construction had less than 
10.0% of the corporate bodies' equities.71 Certainly the structure of the corporate 
bodies' equities during this period underwent a dramatic change compared to the 
previous period. An almost three fold increase in the proportion of manufacturing did 
not only cause the latter to be the leading sector in terms of size of the corporate 
bodies investments, but also reduced the share of finance by one fourth and the 
commerce by three quarters.72 Undoubtedly, while commerce benefited from the 
competitive advantage of being the leading sector during the previous period, it 
certainly suffered from the development of other sector during this period including 
with respect to its share of the corporate bodies' equities. 
Looking in depth at the Jordanian companies that held investments in other 
companies, the data shows that the great majority of these companies were of PS 
type at 38.2% followed by LL at 26.2% and GP at 22. 7%. In terms of the equities 
that were invested by these companies, PS had the biggest 49.9% followed by LP at 
20.0%, GP at 13.0%, Arab State cooperation at 10.3% and GP at 5.9%. In this 
sense, Jordanian enterprises that had investments in other companies were mainly 
economic ability to invest in the first place is their laws that dictate that every professional has to 
join its profession professional union to practice their economic activities. 
70 The distribution of the corporate bodies into the economic sectors duri.ng this period 
was very-similar·to ·that·of the ·previous- periaa,-·hoviever, the~ share of the services during this 
period increased to (bypass) overtake that of commerce and transportation. 
_ .. -~SeeJable_1.2LAppendix-1,6.--- --~- · - --
72 During the J:!!:~_yious ~rio_d financ.e_had_the. biggest- shar-e- of- the-corporate· bodies~ 
equities at 2-4.2%, followed by commerce at 23.3% and manufacturing at 16.6%. See chapter 5. 
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of PS and LL type.73 This can be explained bearing in mind that these enterprises 
were the biggest in terms of capital and assets. 
The sectoral background of these investing companies shows undoubtedly 
that the finance companies were the leading sector at 34.2 of the number and 33.1% 
of the equities. In fact the finance companies were mainly banks. During this 
period, banks expended their investment policies to be directed at investors in a 
wide range of projects. Being a direct investor was not a new approach for the 
banks74, however, its rate was unprecedented. The high liquidity during the years of 
the oil boom made these investment policies possible on one hand. On the other 
hand the encouraging signs of the expansion of the Jordanian economy especially in 
manufacturing, finance and services was an incentive to expand its investment 
policies. Apart from these factors, some banks invested heavily in other enterprises, 
as in the case of the Islamic Bank that had large investments in manufacturing 
enterprises. This was also the case with the Petra Bank whose investments were 
stretched over a large number of enterprises in various sectors. Petra Bank, in fact, 
established its own projects and businesses, which private sector participants were 
invited to invest in. 
7.4 BOURGEOISIE ENTERPRISES AND BOURGEOISIE 
MEMBERS:GENERALTRENDS 
This section covers the main trends of the BE and BM. The concept of BE. 
as was indicated in chapter 3, refers to all enterprises in which the investments of 
the bourgeoisie members are found.75 Hence, the data of these enterprises do not 
only correspond to the data of the bourgeoisie members, but also to their partners 
who were not qualified as bourgeois. Indications about the number of these 
enterprises, their capital , types and economic sectors can lead to some conclusions 
about the economic bases of the bourgeois investments and about the general 
patterns of these investments, in spite of the fact that not every BE is necessarily 
73 See table 15/ Appendix 16. 
74 For instance the Arab Bank had investments into the PhosRhate Mines Co. anct.th_e_ 
- ---::Jordanian--Oii- Refinery. Amman-Calfc)Baiik. was the main inveStor i_n .. Amman United 
_"fr~ortation CO. also all theJL~o,l<s_IJ.ad_equitie.s. io_the.lndus~riai.Oevelopment.Bank.-
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fully owned by bourgeoisie members. This section was divided into three 
subsections, which cover types of enterprise, economic sectors and forms of 
ownership respectively. In order not to base conclusions entirely on the BEs' data, 
each subsection is designed to give an analysis of such data followed by one 
concerned with data about the BMs. The importance of deducing trends and 
conclusions based on data about the BMs does not only come from the fact that the 
latter are the main concern of this study, but also from the capability of such data to 
confirm or contrast the concl.usions that resulted from analyzing the data of the BE. 
7.4.1 BE AND BM ACCORDING TO THE ENTERPRISE TYPES 
The BE made up only 10.0% of the total private sector enterprises, however 
its capital ratio to the total capital of the private sector enterprises stood at 85.0%.76 
1/101h of the private sector enterprises, which was partly or fully owned by the 
bourgeoisie, constituted the great majority of the entire private sector capital, while 
the great majority of enterprises that were in the hands of petty bourgeoisie had tiny 
portions of the enterprises capital. In other words, the great majority of the means of 
production that lay within the domain of the private sector manifested in enterprises 
was under the control of the bourgeoisie by virtue of their ownership in the BE. 
This control over the majority of the means of production runs through all the 
enterprise types. The proportion of the BEs capital to the total capital in each of the 
types was as high as 99.2% in PS, 92.1% in LL, 90.4% in Arab state cooperation 
enterprises, 83.5% in LP and 73.3% in GP. The only exception was in the IE, where 
the capital of the BE to the total capital stood at 46.7%.77 The bourgeoisie had 
access to control over the majority of the capital of each of the enterprise types, 
leaving small proportions of that capital in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie or other 
non-private-sector elements. As the figures of the enterprise types show, the 
proportions of the BE was highest in PS and LL, while it was moderate in LP and 
GP, reaching its lowest in IE at 5.8%. The figures indicate that the enterprises of the 
IE type, and to a lesser extent of the GP and LP types, were the ones in which the 
petty bourgeoisie carried out their businesses. Such a conclusion can be seen in 
the distribution of the BE along the enterprise types, where the BE of IE, GP and LL 
75 
.See_tbe_subsection.onJbe. BE in .Chapter 3 .. 
-~6 See table 18, ap!;!endix 16. 
386 
types made up almost 1/41h of the total BE capital, whilst the proportion of BE, PS 
and LL types climbed to reach 57.5%.78 The structure of the BE numberwise shows 
that 40.5% of them were of GP type, followed by IE at 40.4%, LL at 10.9%, LP at 
6.8% and PS at 1.4%. 79 
The proportion of the BMs' equities to the total capital of the private sector 
enterprises stood at 51 .1 %, while it was 61 .1% of the total capital of the BEs.80 
Although these proportions show that the majority of the means of production were 
under BM control, they can be misleading. The fact that the BMs were equity-
holders in the BEs means that they had access to wielding ~ certain level of control 
over the entire means of production, or at least that they were in the decision-making 
core circles of these enterprises. The proportion of their equities to the total BE 
capital reflects the proportion of capital or means of production that was legally 
owned by them. Comparing the equities that were held by the BM to the capital of 
the BE or the private sector enterprises distinguishes them from those who are not 
BMs and those who are not private sector elements, though they own equities in 
private Sector enterprises. The equity holders who are not BMs are not problematic 
because either they are petty bourgeoisie or they occupy a contradictory location 
within class typology. The concern is with the equity-holders that possessed 
equities - and sometimes a substantial amount of these - in BEs in particular and in 
private sector enterprises generally, although they cannot be considered to be even 
part of the private sector. This category includes the Jordanian state or the 
Jordanian state agencies' stack as well as other governments in some private sector 
business. By no means is it possible to consider a comparison between the equities 
of the latter category and those of the BMs. Therefore, the proportion of the BMs' 
equities to the total equities of the private sector participants (excluding that of the 
non-private-sector elements) jumps to reach 77.6%. 
77 See table 18/ Appendix 16. 
78 The proportion of the BEs of PS type to the entire BE capital stood at 29.6%, followed 
by LL at 28.2%, Arab state cooperation at 18.0%, GP at 13.4%, IE at 6.4% and LP at4.3%. See 
table 1/ Appendix 17. 
79 A change in the structure of the BE took place during this period. During the previous 
period The BE distribution among different types was 47.3% in IE. 40.6% in GP, 6.2% in LP, 4.5% in 
LL and 1.5% ln PS. CaP-italwise, the_es __ ty,pe constituted. the- largest. share·-at .35,6% -of.the·BEs' 
capitaCfollowed by the GP at 29.0%, LL at 19.2%. IE at 8.7% and LP at 7.6%. 
80 see table i 11 Appendix 16~ 
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The structure of the BMs according to the enterprise types shows, in contrast 
to the previous period, that the majority of the BMs came from the PS at 41 .3%, 
followed by GP at 22.7%, LL at 19.2%, IE at 9.9% and LP at 6.9%.81 In equities 
terms, the biggest share of the BMs' equities were in LL at 36.6%. followed by PS at 
23.5%. GP at 20.9%, IE at 10.5%,LP at 6.9%82 and finally the Arab state enterprises 
at 1.6%.83 Despite the fact that the figures show that the BMs did not exclude any 
type of enterprise to place their investments, a transformation in the relative 
importance of the types compared to the previous period can be detected. The fact 
that a great deal of PS enterprises containing Jordanian expatriates' investments 
were established during the oil boom period, and the establishment of the Amman 
stock market made investments in PS more attractive and more accessible. The 
decline of the IE relative importance as a form for bourgeoisie investments could 
have been a result of the stretching of the BMs' investment to different fields and 
sectors where requirements for big investments made the IE type less compatible. 
7 .4.2 THE BE AND BM ACCORDING TO THE ECONOMIC 
SECTORS 
Concerning the BE ratio to the total enterprises in each sector, the data 
shows that it recoded its lowest in services and commerce at 7.6% and 8.4% 
respectively, while its highest was in finance at 73.0%. The fact that commerce and 
services contained a large number of self-employed enterprises, which were usually 
small capital and petty bourgeoisie ones, led to the BEs' small proportion. In other 
words, the proportions of BE in these sectors were determined by the number of the 
private sector enterprises at large, not by the bourgeoisie shunning away from 
businesses in such sectors. In fact, 43.9% and 13.0% of the BEs were in 
commerce. In contrast, the limited number of enterprises in finance, which contains 
banks and insurance, and generally capital-intensive, companies, resulted in the BE 
high proportion in this sector. 
61 In the· previous-period·; the-proportion of BMs among ttle enterprise types were GP at 
40.5%, followed by PS at 19.5%, IE at 16.9%, LL at 12.4% and LP at 19.8%, 
_ _ _ 
82 seeJable.2:1LAppendix_1.6.- - --·· 
_ __
83 The bourgeolsie's~.QJ.Jlties.,.rustrlb.YttorLaO)ong_the-enterpr:ise-ty.pes- in . the pervious-
period was 39.3% in GP, 26.9% in LL, 12.3% in IE, 11 .1% in PS and 10.5% in LP. 
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With regard to other sectors, the percentage of BEs varied according to the 
internal factors that condition the number and activities of enterprises in each of 
these economic sectors. For instance, the BEs' proportions in agriculture, mining 
and electricity were relatively high, since the main projects in the latter two sectors 
required capital intensive investment or were under monopoly, as in the case of 
potash, phosphate and electricity distribution.84 In agriculture, projects in the form of 
enterprises did not come until the late 1960s; the majority of these were on a large 
scale, i.e. non-petty bourgeoisies ones. The BEs' proportion in the remaining 
sectors, i.e. manufacturing, transportation and real estate, were less than 25.0% 
each.85 
In terms of capital, the BE capital to the total capital of the enterprises in each 
economic sector was above 80.0%, indicating that the majority of the capital or 
means of production in each sector were in enterprises on which the BMs had 
control. However, in commerce and transportation the BEs' proportions were only 
61.0% and _73.7% respectively. The fact that retail trade was one of the main sub-
sectors in which the petty bourgeoisie was greatly involved -especially in the small 
retail enterprises - explains the low proportion of the BE in commerce. The same 
applies to some enterprises within road transportation.86 On the contrary, in mining, 
electricity and finance the BEs' proportion were above 99.0% of the total capital of 
the private sector enterprises. The above-mentioned factors, such as intensive 
capital requirements, monopoly over some sub-sectors and the state heavy 
involvement explain the tiny proportion of non-bourgeoisie enterprises and hence the 
high proportions of BEs.87 
84 The proportions were 34.2%, 40.0% and 34.0% respectively. 
85 See table 22-27/ Appendix 16. 
86 This sub-sector contains some large enterprises, each of which has a large number of 
vehicles. Small enterprises, though, existed, especiany where passengers road transportations 
are concerned. Many of these enterprises consisted of one vehicle (bus or car) that transported 
passengers between different areas within the country or between different parts of one specific 
city according to what the enterprise licence dictated. Usually, these types of enterprise were 
self-employed in the sense that the driver was owner of the vehicle. Not all information about 
these enterprises was available, since vehicles that were individually owned and self-employed 
workers did not require registration on the MIT. They had to be licensed by the Ministry of 
Interiors, -who however-refused-to-provide ·information about· the-licences· and-their-holders: This 
Jnformation is based on a number of interviews with some drivers and license holders. 
----87 See table 24-28/ Appendix 16. 
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When the data of the BMs is considered, different trends can be observed, 
one of which is that the ratio of the BMs' equities to the capital of the private sector 
enterprises in each economic sector is moderate compared to that of the BEs' 
capital to the entire private sector enterprises. The proportions of the BMs ' equities 
to the enterprises' capital in each sector varied from one sector to another; it was as 
low as 19.5% in mining, 23.3% in electricity, 25.5% in agriculture and 40.5% in 
finance. The proportion was higher in other sectors, such as commerce (57.3%), 
manufacturing (49.5%), services (65.8%), real estate (78.4%) and construction 
(84.5%). These figures do not only reflect the ownership of non-bourgeoisie 
elements in the private sector, but also the equities of non-private sector equity-
holders in the private sector enterprises. This can be noticed by looking at the 
proportions of the BMs' equities to the capital of their own enterprises, i.e. the BEs. 
The proportions of the BMs equities to the BE capital in agriculture, mining, 
electricity and finance varied between 19.0% and 40.0%. The fact that the 
Jordanian government and/or its agencies and other Arab states had large amounts 
of equities in some enterprises in these sectors resulted in undermining the 
proportion that the BMs had. In the remaining sectors, the limited presence of non-
bourgeoisie equity holders led the BMs to be dominant in their equities.88 What is at 
stake here is the role of the non-private sector equity-holders undermining the 
control of the BMs in some specific sectors. When the BMs equities, however, are 
compared to the total equities exclusively held by private sector holders, a pattern 
emerges similar to that noticed in the proportions of the BE capital, where the 
majority of the private sector equities in each economic sector were in the hands of 
the BMs, leaving small proportions in the hands of non-bourgeoisie private sector 
classes or social groups such as the petty bourgeoisie. The variation in the 
proportion from one sector to another is determined by the conditions of each sector 
and to which degree each one is open to self-employed or petty bourgeoisie 
businesses during this period. The sub-sectors such as retail trade, passengers 
road transportations, cafe and maintenance services are typical examples in which 
petty bourgeoisie enterprises are widely found during this period. 
The sectoral structure of the BE shows that the majority of BEs were 
C<?mmerce enterprises (43.9%), followed by manufacturing at 23.3%, services at 
--- - -
88 The lowest proportion ofthe BMs; equities to the 8ES' capital among these-sectors was 
tn manufacturiog at 55.7%, wl:lile .it.was 68.8% In transportation. 81 .0% in services, 88.9%-in real 
estate, 93.8% in commerce, and 98.8% in construction. 
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13.0%, construction at 10.4% and transportation at 4.9%. The enterprises of sectors 
such as mining, electricity, agriculture, finance and real estate made up together less 
than 4.0% of the BE.89 The same factors that explained the small number of 
enterprises in these sectors compared to the other sectors, such as monopolies that 
were granted to some enterprises, state direct investments, large capital 
requirements and others, can also explain the low proportion of these sectors' 
enterprises to the total number of 8Es.90 The BE economic sectors' structure in 
terms of capital reveals a different picture to that of the enterprises' numberwise. 
Manufacturing had the biggest share of the BEs' capital at 36. 7%, followed at some 
distance by finance at 17.0%; commerce, in spite of its large number, came third at 
10.4%, construction at 9.8% and services at 8.0%. The remaining sectors had 
together a share of less than 17%. 
The structure of the BMs according to the sector shows that 1/3 of the BMs 
during this period were those who came from manufacturing businesses, followed by 
commerce at 21 .1%, finance at 15.9%, services at 11.4%, construction at 7.3% and 
transportation at 5.1 %. An almost identical order is found when the structure of the 
BMs' equities is in question. 33.0% of the BMs' equities is to be found in 
manufacturing, followed by commerce at 16.0%, construction at 15.8%, finance at 
11 .3%, services at 10.6% and 5.0% in transportation. The small proportions of 
mining, agriculture, electricity and real estate, which amounted together to less than 
6.0% number- and equitywise, can be attributed to the heavy involvement of the 
state as well as to the late interest of the bourgeoisie in investing in some sub-
sectors. 
To conclude, the majority of the private sector assets or means of production 
lay within the domain of the BEs in every economic sector. Despite the fact that the 
BMs had control over the majority of the means of production almost in every sector, 
their control in some economic sectors was undermined dramatically by virtue of the 
heavy involvement of the state in the private sector enterprises. In every private 
sector enterprise in which non-private sector equity-holders are found, the BMs are 
also equity-holders. meaning that the BMs still have access to the control of the 
means .of..pr:oduction in such enterprises. Where- the equities-of the private sector 
- ----"
89 Finance-and-insurance-at -1: 5%·, · agriculture ·at 0~9%--;-real-estate-at- 1'~1 :52% ;-electricity-at- -
0.1% and mining at 0.2%. 
------------· - -----:-- - - - · - -----
90 See the section on private sector enterprises. 
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equity-holde~rs are concerned, the figures undoubtedly show the overwhelming 
BMs' control of the majority of the means of production in each of the economic 
sectors. The proportions of the petty bourgeoisie equities compared to those of the 
BMs are very small in some sectors and almost inexistent in others. Compared to 
the pervious period, the structure of the BE and the BMs according to the economic 
sectors shows a radical change. In capital terms, the dominance that commerce 
had to the total BE capital was lost in this period in favor of manufacturing and 
finance, which improved their proportions dramatically. The proportions of the 
services, transportation and agriculture BEs also improved during this period. What 
was said about commerce being the cornerstone of the activities of the bourgeoisie 
during the pervious period is not applicable in this period. It is true that commerce is 
still a vital sector in the bourgedsie activities, but along side others such as 
manufacturing, finance, construction and services. This could be seen more clearly 
when taking into account that during this period only 21 .1% of the BMs came from 
commerce, compared to 45.8% in the previous period. On the other hand, 32.5% of 
BMs were from manufacturing, compared to only 22.8% in the previous period. The 
proportions of the BMs from sectors such as finance,91 services92 and construction93 
have improved rapidly. The change that took place in the BMs' number was also at 
the level of their equities. The dominance that the commerce BMs had by virtue of 
controlling 40.9% of the BMs' total equities during the previous period was lost. 
recording only 16.0% and leaving the first place to the manufacturing BMs as far as 
equities are concerned. 
In chapter 5, it was asserted that is not adequate to analyze the bourgeoisie 
in terms of economic sectors, since there was a division within each economic 
sector between those who were one-sector base and those who were multi-sector 
BMs.94 Reviewing the BMs in terms of this trend shows that such a phenomenon had 
deepened. For instance half of the equities of the BMs' were divided between the 
one-sector fractions and multi-sector fractions, as well as the number of 
investments. However, the equities per BM averaged JD 32,645 in case of the one 
91 it is 15.9%, compared-to 8.-0% in the previous period. 
92 It is 11 .4%, compared to 5.9% in the previous period. 
--=
9
:::-
3 
-It Is 7.3%, compared t~ 5.7% in-the previous period. 
- 94See chapter 5-.--------- ----- ---------------
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sector fraction, while it was JD 84869 in the multi sector fraction.95 When the 
economic power parameters were applied, these parameters points were in favor of 
the multi-sector BMs. The leading BMs according to their equities and assets were 
those who were multi-sector BMs or capital finance. In short, there are fractions 
along the line of the economic sectors, however, these are not based on the 
economic sector, but rather on the basis of on one hand, the finance capital and on 
the hand, the one-sector fraction. Throughout the coming section, the bourgeoisie is 
to be analyzed in terms of these two fractions. 
7.4.3 THE BE OWNERSHIP TRENDS 
This section deals with the various forms of ownership in which the BMs 
investments were to be found, regardless if these forms were initially constructed as 
they are or settled in these forms after they had undergone certain development. 
This section aims to analyze the general patterns of ownership forms that the BMs 
used to carry out their businesses, which in its turn contributes to an overall 
understanding of the BMs' investments strategies and therefore the structure of the 
bourgeoisie. On the other hand, it examines the role of the tribal dimension as a 
vertical factor in the structure of the bourgeoisie and its investment strategies. This 
section is designed to look at the various ownership forms in the BEs followed by a 
break down of the BMs into the different forms of ownership. 
The ownership character of the BE enterprises shows that individually 
controlled BE constituted the majority at 46.6% (42.9% individual control and 3.7% 
individual control & NF}, followed closely by neutral control at 40.8%, and nuclear 
family control enterprises at 11 . 7%. Categories like extended family control, 
corporate control enterprises and non-bourgeoisie corporate bodies control made up 
insignificant proportions at 0.2%, 0.6% and 0.2% respectively.96 In capital terms. the 
ownership categories took a different order. For example, the neutral control 
enterprises constitute the biggest proportion of the BE capital at 56.3%. NF control 
enterprise had the second biggest proportion at 15.5% followed by individual control 
and non-bourgeoisie corporate bodies control at 13.7% and 12.7% respectively. 
95 See table 20-26/ Appendix 16. 
96 See table (22). Appendix 16, 
393 
Reflecting their insignificant proportion in terms of number, extended family control 
and corporate body control of enterprises made up 0.2% and 1.8% respectively of 
the BE capital.97 The high proportion of neutral control and non-bourgeoisie 
corporate bodies capitalwise can be explained by the fact that the great majority of 
the later form was of either PS or Arab state cooperation types which are large 
capital bodies. The fact that the majority of the PS enterprises are of a neutral 
control form resulted in the boosting of the later form's proportion of the BEs' capital. 
The BMs' number distribution does not correspond to that of the BEs. The 
great majority of the BMs (62.7%) were equity-holders in neutral control businesses, 
followed by 16.6%in nuclear family enterprises, while individual control made up 
15.1% (individual control (12.1 %) and individual control & family support (3.8%)). 
The BMs who were in extended family, bourgeois and non-bourgeois corporate 
bodies control made up insignificant proportions of 0.4%, 1.1% and 3.2% 
respectively.98 The distribution of the BMs' equities took the order of that of the BMs, 
44.7% of the bourgeois equities were invested in neutral control enterprises followed 
by 25.4% in nuclear family and 19.1% in individual control and individual control & 
family support. The proportions of the bourgeoisie equities in extended family, 
bourgeoisie and non-bourgeoisie corporate bodies control together made-7.8%. 
The distribution of the BEs and the BMs in terms of number and equities 
shows that the relevance of businesses of the individual control form declined in this 
period compared to the period before.99 The neutral control business improved its 
proportions of the BEs and BMs' number and equities during this period and was the 
main winner from the decline of the individual control businesses. The growth of the 
neutral control and the decline of individual control as means for the BMs to conduct 
their businesses can be attributed to the capital availability that resulted in an 
increase of direct transfers and remittances. The establishment of The Amman 
Stock Market was another boost to the high growth rate in the PS enterprises that 
are usually of neutral control and the flexibility of trading equities. The decline of 
individually controlled businesses was dictated by certain developments in the 
Jordanian economy. This form of business continued to be part of the main 
97 See table (23), appendix 16. 
98 See table 24, Appendix 16. 
,.. .,.__ -
99 See chapter 5. 
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component of the private sector especially among the petty bourgeoisie elements, 
however, this period shows that it was less attractive to the BMs. 
Apart from the individual and neutral control businesses, the nuclear family 
control, that slightly improved its proportions of the BMs and BEs number and 
equities, continued to be one of the main forms that the bourgeoisie used to carry 
out their investments. With the increase of the role of the neutral control, the nuclear 
family ties found another venue to express their importance in the domain of neutral 
control businesses. For instance, analyzing the relations among the equity-holders 
in the PS enterprises shows there are clusters of partners based on the nuclear 
family ties. 100 
Factors related to the historical development of the private sector at large and 
the bourgeoisie, in addition to the fact that the bourgeoisie stemmed from the 
merchants were factors advanced to explain the widespread of the NF and individual 
control forms in the previous period. These factors can still be taken into account in 
looking at the efficient use of nuclear family ties, since they laid a ground on which 
the bourgeoisie can be active. Undoubtedly, the persistence of this form of 
ownership and slight growth of its proportion of the BMs' equities and number as 
well as the use of the nuclear family ties within the scope of the neutral enterprises 
shows that this device was rewarding when the interest of the bourgeoisie is 
concerned. Use of the nuclear family ties in face of the increased importance of the 
neutral control form, affected the proportion of the individual control forms especially 
when the source of the capital from outside the domestic market was at its greatest 
peak coinciding with the oil boom and the increasing importance of the Iraqi market, 
and emphasized the importance of NF ties. In this perspective it is correct to argue 
that the shift to the neutral control forms did not lead to an abandonment of nuclear 
family control. In the circumstances where the requirements of a certain project 
were beyond the means of the nuclear family or where the small size of the 
Jordanian market could not tolerate a large number of businesses in the same field , 
this could oblige the bourgeoisie members to cross the nuclear family boundaries 
into neutral control enterprises. However, they did so without liquidizing their other 
enterprises, these of nuclear. family -control and--were~certainly clustered within the 
domain of the neutral control businesses. 
- ------
100 See table /appendix 17. 
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Accordingly one can argue that the use of NF ties within the framework of the 
cooperation/contradiction relations that arose objectively by virtue of the legal 
ownership of equities are serving the interest of the BMs who are using them. 
Addressing the different possible scenarios of the possible function of the two 
relations is beyond the scope of this study, however, it is possible to argue that NF 
ties play a reasonable role in delivering the interest of the members whose NF 
relatives are in investments together. In this sense, contradiction between the two 
forms of relations was not widespread leading to an abandonment of this sort of 
relations in favor of that arose objectively. This assumption should be coupled with 
the fact that all the sorts of relations that connect members within one NF can be 
transmitted to determine the relations between them within the businesses terrain . 
One of the application is the fact that any change that is led by the children of a 
specific family concerning the investments' strategies or the management of NF 
enterprises takes longer to be put in place when the father is the head of the family 
investments or enterprise.101 Contradiction between generations within the same NF 
concerning its businesses strategies is common. In some cases, NF enterprises 
witnessed a white coup concerning their management. 
In contrast to nuclear family control, which was the most important form after 
neutral control, extended family control that was insignificant during the previous 
period declined in proportion during this period to be of even less significance. As 
was asserted in chapter 5, there is an uneven impact of the family ties on the 
bourgeoisie approaches carrying out their investments. On one hand the strong 
position of the nuclear family ties lies in contrast to the near absence of the influence 
of the kinship ties in its extended or tribal form on the bourgeoisie. The tribal 
dimension as one of the main vertical dimensions that is considered to be a 
cornerstone in analyzing political, economic and social structures in Jordan and 
which has a role in social and political spheres is of nil impact on the bourgeoisie in 
the course of producing and re-producing itself as the controller of the means of 
production and the appropriator of surplus value. The factors that mentioned in 
chapter 5 concerning the emergence of the bourgeoisie in the context of Jordan and 
the incompatibility of the tribal dimension in the ownership of the means of 
production are Valid facf6Fs for tfleabsence oflts rofe. -The·-absence of tribal kinship 
- · 
101 For·instance~tnetool< over oflhe ch-ildren of Muhammad AliBadii~ tt;;t -hapPe~ed on 
the will_ o..!_ tn~ !C!therJe~Jtuc.turing_too~ . place~ in -the. al-.!::f.akmah, pharmaceutical-enterprise, --
- management led to sidelined Samii!l Daruuza the founder in favor of the took over of his children. 
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ties on the bourgeoisie structure should lead to a dramatic reconsideration of the 
tribe's role in all aspects of the Jordanian social formation at large and especially the 
economic .one. Another important issue is not the role of in the tribe in the 
bourgeoisie activities, but the role of the bourgeoisie in using the tribe as a ready 
built social construction for its own interest. 
Looking at the distribution of enterprises according to their ownership forms 
between the economic sectors shows that construction , manufacturing, commerce 
and services absorbed the great majority of individual control BEs capital at 35.5%, 
24.3%, 19.1% and 9.4%,102 while the shares of the same sectors in individual control 
with NF support of BEs' capital were respectively 28.6%, 26.3%, 19.2% and 
16.3%.103 In this sense, the proportion of individual control with or without famil'y 
support is dependent on the sector. The same pattern reoccurs where BMs equities 
are concerned, 35.4% of individual control equities were in construction, followed by 
manufacturing at 24.3%, commerce at 19.2% and services at 9.5%.104 In the same 
order, the ratio of individual control and family support were respectively 29.2%, 
26.2%, 18.9% and 16.0%.105 The forms of ownership of the enterprises' distribution 
was influenced by the economic sector. The economic sectors themselves were 
largely dominated by the neutral control form. For instance· 93.2% of finance, 74.7% 
of electricity, 63.2% of transportation, 56.8% of real estate, 56.7% of manufacturing 
and 51 .1% of services enterprises were of neutral control enterprises. The neutral 
forms proportions were below 50.0% only in construction and commerce. The great 
majority of the enterprises of these two sectors were of individual and nuclear family 
control. Based on the above one can argue that individual and NF control forms of 
ownership were concentrated in specific economic sectors. Neutral control 
102 The remaining sectors less than 12.0% of the Individual control capital. In fact 49.3% 
of the individual control BEs number was in commerce, 20.6% in manufacturing, 15.2% in 
services and 9.5% in construction. The remaining sectors had only 5.3% of the individual control. 
103 The remaining sectors shared less than 10.0% of the Individual control and NF 
support capital. numberwise 29.2% of Individual control with family support BEs number was in 
construction 23.6% in manufacturing, 22.9% in commerce and 10.0% in services, while the other 
sectors had together less than 15.0% .. See table 11 and 13/ appendix 17. 
104 46.4% of BMs who were in individual control were in commerce, 20.8% in 
manufacturing, 15.2% in services and 10.5% in construction, whHe less than B.O% of BMs in this 
form of ownership were in the remaining sectors. 
105
. 27.8.% of BMs who were- fn individual control and NF suppo rt were iti manufacturing, 
26.1% in construction, 24.8%.1n commerce, .9.2% in services, -while less than 13% of BMs in this 
form of ownership were in the remaining sectors. 
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ownership is the most dominant form almost in every sector where the BEs' capital 
and BMs equities are concerned. 
Looking at the prevalent forms of ownership among the BE shows that these 
forms were not consistently spread over the economic sectors. For instance, 
individual control , individual control & family support and nuclear family control 
enterprises were most found in commerce, since respectively 75.7%, 60.7% and 
66.1% of their numbers and 41 .1 %, 64.5%, and 40.9% of their capital were found in 
this sector. Manufacturing was the other sector that absorbed a substantial 
proportion of these enterprise forms. 10.0% and 13.5% of the number and capital of 
individual control , 17.4% and 11 .6% of individual control & family support and 17.2% 
and 35.2% of nuclear family control enterprises were found in manufacturing.106 In 
the case of neutral control enterprises, 55.6% of their number were in commerce, 
followed by 16.3% in manufacturing, 10.0% in transportation, 6.8% in construction 
and 6.2% in services.107 Capitalwise, 35.8% of the neutral control enterprises' capital 
was in manufacturing, followed by 19.6% in finance and insurance, 13.9% in 
commerce, 11 .6% in mining and 8.0% in electricity. 
7.5 THE ECONOMIC POWERS 
This section deals with the differentiation between the BMs according to the 
assets that each fraction assumes. As was argued in chapter 3 and applied in 
chapter 5, there are two main parameters taking into account several factors that 
differentiate the BMs' capacities which are included in power I, while power II takes 
into account the NF power points in calculating the capacity of each BM. The focus 
of this section is on outlining the differentiation in the assets of the BMs, and 
therefore the differentiation of their capacity to act. It also aims to define the core 
group of the BMs according to their economic power. 
106 See table 26-32/ appendix 16. 
·-- -· -;07 See table 24-27/ appendix 16. 
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7.5.1 THE ECONOMIC POWER (POWER I) 
The economic power I is calculated as the sum of the points of five economic 
parameters: power A. power B, power C, power D and power E. Each parameter 
measures the assets that the BMs have according to a specific criterion. Advancing 
these different parameters was not based on the assumption that they could 
differentiate between the economic capacity that each BM assumes, but rather on 
the empirical evidence that cleavages among the BMs took place according to the 
equities and number of investments. As was the case in the previous period, the 
bases of each of these parameters are strong factors in distinguishing the BMs in 
terms of their assets. 
For instance, there is strong evidence that the BMs differentiate widely 
according to the size of the equities that each BM has, which is the basis of power 
A.108 Only 674 BMs possessed almost 50.0% of the total BMs' equities, with an 
average equity per BM more than JD 900000, while 25487 members shared the 
other half of the equities at an average of JD 24616. A simple comparison shows 
that the average of the first group is more than 36 fold the average of the second 
group. Applying power A shows that 26344 BMs possessed between 0.0 and less 
than 0.2 power A points , while only 183 BMs possessed from 0.2 up to 4.0 points. 
The power A points are more concentrated in the hands of few BMs than was the 
case in the pervious period. Likewise, applying power 8 109 results in a discrepancy 
between the power B points in the hand of each BM. The great majority of the BMs 
(90.8%) shared among themselves 52.7% of the power B points, leaving only 47.3% 
for 23945 BMs. The average power B points of the former group stood at 2.7, 
compared to 0.25 points for the latter group. Assuming that the most influential 
group of BMs are those who scored 3.0 points or more results in 726 BMs whose 
power B points per BM stood at 4 .0, compared with 0.4 points for each of the 
remaining BMs. 
When applying power C110, where the number of investments are the relevant 
factor, it is important to men·tion that 16242 BMs (61 .0%) were those who had 
investments in only one enterprise, while 23.3% had investments in two enterprises, 
108 Power A= 3"[(BM share/ Total BMs' Equities)%]. 
- - - ··--- -
1011 Power B = Sum (1 .5* (BM equities/ equities of the enterprise]) . 
- -- ---
-
. -
110 Power C of a certain BM= 0.1 +(0.4*(n-1 )). where n is the number of enterprises. 
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leaving around 15.0% whose investments were in 3 or more enterprises. Applying 
power C shows that the BMs who had investments in 3 or more enterprises (15.0% 
of the total BMs number) shared 56.9% of the power C points, while the great 
majority of the BMs shared less than half the power C points. Based on the number 
of investments, one could argue that 1226 BMs who had investments in 5 
enterprises or more are the core group of the BMs according to power C. In fact, the 
power C points per BM in this group stood at 3. 7, while the remaining BMs had an 
average of 0.3 points. 
Before looking at the applications of power 0 111 , which is based on the 
number of economic sectors that each of the BM investments covers, it js worth 
mentioning that the great majority of BMs (72.8%) were based in one sector. 19.4% 
of the BMs had investments in two sectors, leaving less than 8.0% of the BMs 
whose investments were in 3 sectors or more. 
The majority of the power D points are distributed around the BMs whose 
investments were in 3 sectors or less, by virtue of the fact that the great majority of 
the BMs were concentrated there. 112 One can argue, however, that the core group of 
BMs according to this parameter are those whose investments are in 4 sectors or 
more. These are 781 members (2.9%) who shared almost Y.. of power D points. In 
comparison, however, the power D score per BM was 1.0 points for each of these 
781, while it was only 0.2 points for the BMs whose investments were in 3 sectors or 
less. 
The data shows that there was a huge discrepancy in the distribution of the 
assets and capacities of the BMs when power E113 is applied. In fact, 99.9% of all 
BMs shared only half of the power E points, while the other half was in the hands of 
only 14 BMs. In fact, each of these 14 BMs scored 5.2 points on average, compared 
to only 0.3 points for the remaining BMs. It is worth mentioning that the 
111 Power D of a given BM= (n)•(n)/1 0. n is the number of the economic sectors and 
ranges between 1 and· to: - .. · ·· · · 
112 The fact that every member got a score even if that member had investment in one 
.sector. .only .assigned-the-great-majarity-of. the--points· -to· those-whose-investments-were in ·one-or · 
two sectors. 
-· - ... ·----- -
--- ---i 13 P-ower E= Sum (0.3*([BM equities/ equities of a sector]/100). 
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concentration of power E in the hands of few BMs in this period was greater than 
that of the previous period, which had itself witnessed a high concentration .114 
We now turn to power 1 11 ~, which combines all of the above mentioned 
parameters and gives an overall parameter that can be used to address the 
distinction in capacity between the BMs. The Power I scale index shows a great 
deal of differentiation between the BMs according to the points that each of them 
scored on the scale. Whilst the majority of the BMs are concentrated around a score 
that ranges between 0.1 and 0.9 points, the scale shows that there are BMs whose 
Power points stretched between 10.0 and 31 .0 points. When these points are 
conceived as a measure to reflect the assets that each BM had, and therefore their 
capacity to act, the difference between those who lie at the bottom of the scale and 
those who occupy the upper part of the scale is clearly considerable. 
For instance, there were 18137 BMs (68.4%) whose score on this scale was 
less than 0.9 points and who shared among them only 23.0% of the total power I 
points, resulting in an average of 0.4 power I points per BM. This was 1/3 of the 
overall power I per BM, which registered 1.2 points. In contrast to the majority of 
BMs, less than 1/3 of the BMs shared among themselves more than% of the power 
I points. Among the latter group, the power I points per BM stood at 2.9, i.e. seven 
folds what each BM had in the former group. In fact, the power I index shows that 
234 BMs, i.e. less than 1.0% of the· entire BMs, shared around 10.0% of the power I 
points, and each BM averaged 11 .1 power I points. In other words, each of these 
234 members held assets and therefore had a capacity to act 12 times superior to 
that in the hands of the remaining BMs. 
Based on what the index reveals and reviewing the BMs, this study assumed 
that the core of the BMs according to power I are those members whose score was 
5.0 points or more. Accordingly, 913 BMs constituted the core, and shared among 
themselves less than a quarter of the power I points. Whilst the power I per BM in 
the core group was 7.3 points, 0.97 points were recorded on average for each of the 
remaining BMs. Power I, which was formulated to reflect the discrepancy in the 
assets of the BMs and their capacity to act, shows that each member of the core 
114 See chapter 5. 
· ·--- - · ·-
115 Power of BM = BM [Power A+ Power 8+ Power C+ Power D+ Power E]. 
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group had a power and ability to act and influence 7 times greater than that of the 
non-core members. 
The core group BMs can be divided into two types: the individuals and the 
corporate bodies. The individuals made up the great majority of the core members' 
number and power I points, at 92.2% and 89.7% respectively. Their share of the 
equities, however, was far below this proportion at only 56.9%, leaving 43.1% for the 
corporate members. The influence of the corporate bodies in the domain of the core 
group cannot be deduced from their high proportion of equities. In fact, their 
proportion was boosted by the large investment of the Arat? Mining Company, which 
stood at JD 17,000,000, and also by the large investments that the Jordanian Petra 
Bank made in manufacturing, retail and transportation as its main investment 
strategy before it was liquidized in 1989. 
The largest part of the core group was made up of multi-sector investors, 
sharing the great majority of power I points, equities and number of investments at 
96.5%, ~H .4% and 97.8% respectively. The power I per BM was 7.4 points among 
the multi-sector members, compared to 6.6 points for the one-sector BMs} 16 
Concerning the sole-sector core members' investments, the data reveals that the 
majority of these investments were in commerce, at 79.6%. When the equities, 
however, are concerned, 59.1% were in mining117 and 28.2% in transportation. 
There was no presence of sole-sector BMs in agriculture, electricity, finance and real 
estate. The overall distribution of the core BMs' investments among the economic 
sectors shows that commerce, manufacturing, finance and services had the main 
proportions of the investments number at 25.0%, 24.3% 16.9% and 15.6 
respectively. Equitywise, manufacturing absorbed the biggest share of core equities 
at 31.9%, followed by commerce at 15.4%, finance at 13.1 %, services at 12.1 %, 
construction at 8.1% and mining at 6.0%. These figures show undoubtedly that 
manufacturing, finance, commerce, services and, to a lesser extent, construction 
and mining, were the main economic base for the core members. This does not 
mean that other sectors were abandoned by the core members; on the contrary, 
116 Notice tha"t ~~~st half of the power I core group members, equities and power points 
were in the hands of one-sector BMs. It seems that there was a shift among the influential 
members-of-the -bourgeoisie-towards-multi -sector investments':7'See-chapter·5. ·- --
117 Ihe ... high_propor.tion_in, .mining_is- to .due- to- the .... investments of - the- Arab--Minir.~g- -- · 
Company in Jordan. 
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they had investments in all sectors, bearing in mind that the majority of them were 
multi-sector BMs. 
Gender composition shows that only 20 female BMs made it to the core 
group, so that the great majority of the core members were males at 97.6%, sharing 
97.6% of the power points. In addition to the trivial contribution of the females in the 
structure of the core group, the power I per BM of the females was lower than that of 
the males. In fact, the highest score by a female BM was only 10.0 points, 
compared to the 30.0 points of the highest score for male BMs, 
The data shows that the individual core members were mainly among those 
who had NF relatives within the domain of the bourgeoisie. They made up 63.5% of 
the individual core members and shared among themselves 86.3% and 66.8% of the 
individuals' equities and power I points. The power I points per BM among those 
with NF relatives was 1 point above that of those without. Apart from the role of the 
NF ties, which was emphasized on more than one occasion throughout this chapter, 
it seems that there was a kind of correlation - however loose it may be - between 
having NF relatives within the domain of the bourgeoisie and possessing economic 
power.118 In this sense, a shift was experienced during this period, since the BMs 
without NF relatives lost the slight dominance that they enjoyed in the previous 
period within the power I core group.119 
7.5.2 NUCLEAR FAMILY POWER 
It was argued throughout this chapter that the NF is important as a ready 
social entity used effectively by the BMs to carry out their investments, and can be 
considered as a structure serving their interest. The importance of the NF as a 
device in the hands of the BMs increased during this period compared to the 
previous one, as the application of the power parameters and the analysis of the 
bourgeoisie indicates. __ A_s ~as argued in chapter} ~nd CIP.P!ied in chapje,r 5, it is 
_ . 
118 Among_tb.e_1J2...B.Ms._wbo. scor.ed _ 1 0. Q_points-or- rnor:e-on-power-1, -only -14-had-no NF 
relatives in the bourgeoisie d omain. 
--- - - ----- -- -- -
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important to take into account the resulted impact of the NF on the economic power 
of each of the BMs who has NF relatives within the domain of the bourgeoisie. In 
this sense, the NF power is a parameter that calculates the collective power I of the 
BMs who belong to the same NF.120 
The application of the NF power shows that the distribution of NF power 
points among 3134 NFs varies dramatically. For instance, 60.6% of the NFs' 
number, whose NF power scored less than 4 .0 points, share only 22.0% of the NF 
power points. On the other hand, there were only 152 families whose score ranged 
between 16.0 and 100.0 points. These high scores were usually due to the fact that 
their BMs had high scores in power 1.121 Reviewing the different NFs, their score and 
members led one to assume that any NF whose score was 10.0 points or more was 
to be considered as part of the NF power core group.122 
Considering that the NF power core group is made up of the families that 
scored 10 points or more results in 367 NFs constituting 11 .1% of the total families' 
number and sharing 42.2% of the NF power points. A large deal of differentiation 
can be seen between the core NF and the others. For instance, the NF power per 
NF among the core group stood at 18.7 points, which is almost 6 folds that of the 
remaining families. scoring an average of 3.2 points. 
Despite the fact that the core group is made up of the most influential NFs 
within the domain of the bourgeoisie, still there are a few NFs whose score was 
noticeably high. There were 20 NFs whose score was as high as above 40.0 points, 
which is more than double that of the NF power per core NF. 
120 NF Power: Sum Power BM1+ Power 8M2+ .... + Power BMn. N is the number of the 
members of a given NF. 
121 Cer:taioly, few .families-high score was due its large members of BMs. 
122 Due to the variation in the score, it was difficult to draw the line that can divide 
between those NFs whose score can qualify them as core members~n_q_those not. 1Q,O.Qoints __ 
wa·s- cnosen asgoocfaiVioing line was oaseCI -on the fact that power I core members are those 
_ _ w_Qo ~fPLed 5.0 goints or more_aod .tb..e_as.sumptioo .. that.any_r·~E.has.to consist.of.two.members-at- -
least. · 
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7.5 .3 POWER II 
Power 11 123 is another power parameter that takes into account the variables 
of Power I, but also the NF as a device that was widely used by the BMs in carrying 
out their business. In this sense, Power II is more accurate in reflecting the 
economic power of the BMs. As was the case for Power I, the BMs's score in Power 
II varies from as little as 0.2 points to up to 31 .3 points. As could have been 
expected, the great majority of the BMs were concentrated around the bottom of the 
Power II index. 85.4% of the BMs, whose score was less than 3 points, shared 
between them only 50.5% of the Power II points. On the other hand, the remaining 
less than 15.0% of the BMs had almost the same amount of points. In other words 
the average economic power points, which assumedly reflect the capacity of the 
BMs to act, were 5.2 among the 15.0%, but only 0.9 among the great majority of the 
BMs. Moreover, only 231 members, whose score was 10.0 points or more, had 
10.0% of the total BMs' Power II points, registering an average Power II score of 
13.7 each. Undoubtedly, the BMs cannot be looked upon as one unit, since the 
economic power shows a great deal of differentiation. 
This study claims that the core members of the bourgeoisie according to the 
application of Power II are those who scored 6.0 points or more. The core group is 
made up of 904 BMs, whose share of power points is almost 25.0% and in which the 
average Power II score per BM is 9.1, i.e. almost 6 times the average of the overall 
BMs and more than 7 folds that of the non-core BMs. 
The core group is dominated by the multi-sector based BMs, as was the case 
in the Power I core group. 91 .7%, 97.5%, 92.8% and 91 .6% of the core members, 
number of investments, Power II points and equities were in the hands of the multi-
sector BMs. This dominance can also be seen in the capacity of the multi-sector 
BMs, who had on average 9.2 points compared to 7.8 points of the sole-sector BMs. 
Contrary to Power I, the females' presence in this power core group was felt, 
since 118 BMs (13.4% of the individual core members) were females. Their share of 
Power II points stood at 12.2% and they had 8.0% of the investments. Despite the 
o'lerall dominance· ·of the· ·m~ales, the female BMs'· position improved dramatically 
compared to that of the Power I core group. However, their share of the Power II 
---=-:-:::=:=============--------,.~- - ... ...,--·· -- -. -
123 BM Power II : 1/10*(NF Power Points- BM Power I points)+ BM Power I Points. 
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core group was far below the latter's proportions, at 6.5%. Moreover, the Power II 
score per BM in the case of the females was still below that of the males. As was 
argued in the gender section, the fact that many of the females entered the world of 
the bourgeoisie via their NFs explains the improvement of their score when Power II 
is applied. Still, the number of female members who had a noticeable score is 
limited. For instance, there were 15 female BMs whose score was above 10.0 
points, out of a total of 207 members with such a score.'24 
7.6 BOURGEOISIE FRACTIONS 
A categorization of the bourgeoisie of this period into two main fractions 
based on the historical background of its members was advanced in chapter 3. The 
pre-197 4 fraction consisted of all the BMs who had been part of the bourgeoisie prior 
to this period'25 and the newcomers2'16 who joined the bourgeoisie over the course 
of this period. Numberwise, the data shows that the newcomers2 were the majority 
of the BMs at 70.0% compared to only 30.0% for the pre-1974members. The 
newcomers2 were still holding the majority of the number of investments of the BMs 
and their equities at respectively 61 .5% and 54.5%.m 
Power I and power II points among the BMs were again in favor of the 
newcomers2 at 62.5% and 53.9% respectively. The variation between the two 
power parameters is due to the wide presence of NF relatives among the pre-1974 
BMs compared to that of newcomers2. As the distribution of NF power indicates 
that 71 .8% of its points were in the hands of the pre-1974 fraction compared to only 
28.2% of the newcomers. In fact 60.5% of the equities of the BMs with NF relatives 
were in the hands of the pre-1974 members, leaving only 39.5% for the 
newcomers2. 89.6% of the equities of the pre-1974 fraction belonged to members 
124 Among those females are the three daughters of lbrahiim ai-Iaahar, the daughters of 
Yuusiif ai-Ma'shiir and the three daughters of Jamiil Bus!aamii. 
'
25 The pre:1974 ·fraction-·tt1arwas ·dealt with in the· previous period in terms of three 
fractions: pre-1948 Jordan, pre-1948 Palestine and newcomers. See chapter 5 
'
26
- Newcomers2- was- labelled-in- this- fashion to -distinguish it -from -the- newcomers--in 
previous period. 
'
27 see t~bie-1 & 21 Appendix 17. 
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whose some NF relatives were part of the bourgeoisie domain, while the percentage 
was only 47.3% in the case of the newcomers.128 
The frequent use of the NF by the pre-1974 fraction is indicated by the fact 
that 20.9% and 37.0% of the number of their investments and their equities 
respectively were in NF control enterprises, while the proportions of the 
newcomers2' investments in NF enterprises and the equities were relatively smaller 
at 15.0% and 27.7%. Concerning the other forms of ownerships, the neutral control 
enterprises was the most popular form for both fractions absorbing 61 .1% and 
62.1% of the pre1974 and newcomers' investments numberwise and 37.1% and 
40.4 %of their equities.129 Individual control was more popular among the 
newcomers2 having 15.1% and 21 .4%, while it had only 8.8% of the pre-1974 
fraction' investments and 11 .8% of its equities. 
Despite the fact newcomers2 constitute the majority in terms of the BMs 
number and number of investments, this majority is not translated into dominance 
over the pre-197 4 fraction is as firmly indicated by the shares of the latter in both 
equities and power II points figures. Despite the fact that the newcomers2 fraction 
has the upper hand in the overall proportions, the pre-1974 BMs are in a stronger 
position, when they are compared to their counterparts of the newcomers2. For 
instance, equities per BM among the pre-1974 fraction stood at JD 57218 compared 
to JD 29297 among the newcomers2, while the pre1974 BM had 2.3 investments 
number, the newcomers2 BM had only 1.6. The same trend is to be found in the 
power I and power II per BM that registered 1.5 and 2.4 points in the case of the pre-
1974 members, compared to 1.1 and 1.2 points for the newcomers2. In a word, the 
pre-197 4 members possess more assets and have a better capacity to act than their 
counterparts of the newcomers2. 130 
Looking at the fractions' presence in the composition of the economic power 
core groups is an indicative value that reflects the position of each fraction in the 
cleavages of the bourgeoisie in terms of its economic power. Interestingly, only 
39.9% of the power I core group were newcomers2 compared to 52.5% for the pre-
197 4 fraction. Whilst the share of the newcomers2 of the core's equities and power I 
128 see table 1/ appendix 17. 
- --
- ---- - - ----
129 See table 1-3/ Appendix 17. 
-
150see table 4 /Appendix 11. - - - - -----
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points were 12.1% and 35.5% respectively, it reached 44.9% and 54.4% for those 
from the pre-1974 fraction. The upper hand of the pre-1974 BMs in power I core 
group is manifested in power I per BM that was 1.1 point above that of the 
newcomers2. 
The less efficient use of NFs by the newcomers2 compared to the pre1974 
fraction is reflected in the low proportions of the former members in the composition 
of power Ill core group, whose figures were even fewer relative to the pre 1974 
fraction than for power I. Only 21 .8% of the core's members were newcomers2 
sharing 18.8% and 8.6% of the core's power II points and equities respectively. The 
average power II per BM among the pre 197 4 was 1.6 points more than that of the 
newcomers. 
The distribution of the BMs investments according to the sectors does not 
show a great deal of difference. The majority of the pre 1974 fraction investments 
were in manufacturing at 30.6%, followed by commerce at 23.3%, finance at 15.5% 
and services at 13.3%. In the same order, the number of investments of the 
newcomers were 25.6%, 24.5, 14.3% and 15.9%. With regard to equities, the main 
chunk of the pre-1974 and newcomers2' equities were placed in manufacturing 
respectively at 32.0% and 28.4%. Commerce, that was a cornerstone of the 
activities of the bourgeoisie in the previous period, absorbed 22.3% of the pre-1974 
fraction's equities, followed by construction and services at 13.7% and 13.5% and 
finance at 8.2%. Apart from manufacturing, a large proportion of the newcomers2' 
equities were in construction at 25.0%, a small proportion compared to that of the 
pre1974 group, commerce followed at 15.8%, services at 11 .4% and finance at 
9.4%. The differences in the sectoral strategies for both fractions are limited and do 
not allow us to draw conclusions. Both fractions targeted the same sectors. 
however, the proportion of the newcomers2' equities in construction was far larger 
than that of the pre-1974 fraction. Construction could be an appropriate sector for 
the newcomers to penetrate the circles of the bourgeoisie, knowing that this sector 
was expanding after the oil boom. In fact, some of the pre-1974 fraction members 
whose investments were not based in other sectors moved to it attracted by the 
demand for its activities. an(J. its.,profitability. 131 The difference in the proportions in 
'
131
·-For- exampleBacti[f""7family - tl1aCI5asea··rn commerce, insurance, electricity and - -- - ·- -
manufacturing moved_ 1n 197 4 to cqn_str.u~tion..._Naqal Jarnily_is_ano~her .example.- Aiso .. that. was. -----
the case-ofJ;afar ai-Shamii and Muhammad Khiir ai-M'aanii families. 
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commerce can be explained in the case of the pre-1974 fraction by historical factors, 
since that was their activities started from and in the case of the former and the 
newcomers2 it shows the importance of this sector in the Jordanian economy at 
large and the private sector in particular. 
The distribution of the equities in each economic sector among the two 
fractions does not show that there was dominance of any of the fractions in a certain 
economic sector. In fact what each fraction possess of the equities in each 
economic sector is very close to what the other holds. The pre-1974 group_was 
slightly more that that of newcomers2 in commerce, while the former has more in 
finance. The only exception was construction where the newcomers2 had almost 
2/3 of the equities leaving only 30.0% for the pre-197 4. 
Concerning the question of clustering along the lines of the two fractions, the 
data and Chi-squared analysis shows that clustering exists, despite the fact that the 
majority of the BMs of the two fractions were equity-holders in non-fractioned 
enterprises.132 In this sense, some members of these two fractions conducted their 
investments into seemingly contradictory approaches. The first, which is dominant, is 
investment going to non-fractioned businesses. The second is to carry out their 
investments in fractioned businesses. The main factor that could explain the 
contradictory approaches on one hand and the clustering on the other, is the 
streams that brought the newcomers2 to the domain of the bourgeoisie. 
The background of the newcomers2 was extremely complex and the quantity 
of the newcomers2 who joined the bourgeoisie during this period was large by all 
measures. It is possible to claim that the wealth accumulation of the pre-1974 BMs 
owes a lot to the oil boom and the large transfers to Jordan, but these two factors 
were certainly determining factors in the emerging of the newcomers2. Reviewing 
the data of the newcomers2 shows that the great majority of them either were 
Jordanian expatriates in the oil producing countries. Sometimes their fortune abroad 
had changed, so they decided to invest back in Jordan. Others acted as links for 
132 Notice that the expectation ratio upon which that Chi-squared analysis is based is the 
overall proportion of each-oftne~fractions ·had ·;r; the domain "ofoourgeoisie. Hence,-an enterprise 
that contains 10.0% of its members of the pre-1974 would still be considered clustered, since 
_ 10.0% is below the e!:Qportion and therefore the figur~ of ex~tation. Ho~~ver, on~_ cou19.. !-!r9Y~ 
accurately that the presence of any proportion regardless how small it is an evidence of the lack 
________ _ of .. the .. clus~ering . . For. such.a.reason and.other. factors,-this.study.assumed .that .it.is .. important-to- - . - ---
calculate the expectation ratio, however, in case of clustering the results were taken with caution. 
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some investors from these countries to the Jordanian market. Some other 
newcomers2, who were not expatriates, however, managed to make it to the circle 
of the bourgeoisie by virtue of the high levels of the remittances. Large amounts of 
remittances were used to purchase equities in the existing enterprises in Jordan 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Other members of the newcomers came from the state 
bureaucracy. For some, positions in the government already equipped them with 
the necessary connections and knowledge that guaranteed their class position 
transformation '33, and further transfers to the government made such transformation 
for many of them realistic and possible.134 The complex backgrounds and the large 
number of newcomers2 led the pre-197 4 fraction to become alienated from them, 
since the newcomers2 members were either residents in the oil producing countries 
or spent a good portion of their active life in those countries or came from the public 
sector, i.e. from outside the private sector. In this context, the term "new money" 
describing these members or some of them found, its place in public discourse in 
1970s and 1980s Jordan. 
As was mentioned above, the investments of the newcomers took different 
forms, one of which was buying shares through the Amman stock market in 
companies that were established years before this period and that were under the 
control of the pre-1974 BMs. Certainly, the pre-1974 members, despite their 
perceptions about the newcomers2 and their wealth were very keen to attract this 
money to be invested in their enterprises. 135 Other investments were created from 
scratch by newcomers2. Over the years of the growing availability of finance and 
the expansion of economic activities in general, some of the pre-1974 members 
invested together on the basis of connections, links and knowledge that had grown 
between them over the previous period and the one before. 
Looking at the banking sector, as an example, in terms of the interaction 
between newcomers and the pre-1974 members can give rewarding insights. The 
few banks that were established in the pre 1974 years were under the control of the 
133 There are many examples of high rank bureaucracy that made to the bourgeoisie 
domain. One of the interesting examples the high rank employees of the Central Bank of Jordan 
in the 1970s who became part of the bourgeoisie during the late 1970s and 1980s. 
134 Other newcomers from other backgrounds who joined the bourgeoisie like those who 
transferred their- investmeAts-to-derdaA-after-the-break-out-of-the-l:ebanese·civil·war. 
13!i One of the ways. that was used to attract remittances was the frequent public reissuing 
of shares of the PS enterprises during 1970s and 1980s. 
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pre-1974 BMs.'36 New banks were established entirely as the brainchild of 
newcomers2.137 Some of the banks in the former category stayed under the control 
of the pre-197 4 BMs despite the fact that there was a large number of equities held 
by newcomers2. In addition to the successful management of these banks such as 
the case of the Arab Bank and the Jordanian National Bank, the pre-1974 big 
shareholders kept increasing their stake over the period. 138 Certainly. they were also 
successful in building their alliances with the new big shareholders. Some of the 
newcomers2 who invested in some of the pre-1974 banks managed to sideline the 
pre-1974 BMs who had been in control and assume control over the banks. The 
most obvious example is the Bank' of Jordan in which Tawfiiq Faakhuurii by virtue of 
purchase of its shares and building an alliance with other shareholders drove the 
Muhammad Siiduu ai-Kurdii family from its long control over the bank asserting the 
control of himself and his nuclear family over the Bank. 139 
7.7 THE BMS AND THE VERTICAL VARIABLES 
This section aims to analyze the BMs in term of some important vertical 
variables such as tribalism, ethnicity, Religion and country of origin. these variables 
are important dimension in the Jordanian society. Some of them have important role 
in some political and social aspects. Tribalism has been covered in the course of 
discussing the NF ties. 
136 Such as The Arab Bank under the management of Shuuman family, or the Jordanian 
National Bank under Yuusif ai-Ma'shar, Khaliil ai-Sakar and Iash & Abud-ai-Rahmaaniuuqan 
families and Amman-Cairo Bank. 
137 For instance, Petra Bank that was established by Ahamd ai-Galabii with big 
shareholders from Jordanian expatriates and Kuwait & Saudi investors. The Jordan-Gulf Bank 
that was established by Hassan 'Abudai-'Azilz a Jordanian expatriate with investments from in 
Qatar and other Jordanian expatriates. 
138 For example Shuuman family acquired a large number of shares of the Arab bank 
during 1970s and 1980s. Also Yuusif ai-Ma'shar bought a large number of shares of the 
Jor;danian_NatlonaLBank,.in.additjon to a-large-number-ef-shares-ef-the Arab·Bank·strengthening - -
his position as banking BM. 
'
39 See ai-Malki, A . {1.9Q6), The Bank of Jordan, p13-36. 
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7 .7.1 ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND 
This subsection deals with two of the main variables that can be basis on 
which the people of the Jordanian society mobilise and contribute to their identity, 
i.e. religion and ethnicity. An account of the ethnic groups within the domain of 
bourgeoisie is to be covered first followed by analyzing the BMs in terms of religion. 
The BMs breakdown along the line of ethnic backgrounds in Jordan shows 
that the overwhelming majority was Arab BMs at 97.9%. The CIRCASSIAN and CH 
made together 1.0%, Kurds 0.5%, Armenians 0.3% and 0.4% for other ethnic 
groups. These proportions were almost the same where number of investments140, 
equities 141 and power I points 142 are concerned. There was a slight decline of the 
shares of the ethnic minorities compared to those in the previous period. However, 
the equities per BMs was at its highest among the Kurds BMs at JD 55031 followed 
by Armenians at JD 47979, Arabs at 36726 and Ch/Circassian at JD 28411 , while 
the power I points per BM was very close at around 1.0 point. 
The distribution of the ethnic minorities among the economic sectors shows 
that manufacturing, commerce, finance and services were the main sectors that 
absorbed the great majority of their equities at 30.3%, 20.1%, 13.7% and 14.4%. 
Concerning the number of investments, alongside manufacturing, commerce and 
finance that had 28.2%. 11 .8% and 19.1% respectively, there was construction that 
had respectable proportion at 19.2%. It seems that other sectors were less 
appealing for the minorities BMs. Despite the overall general common pattern of 
investments concentrated in the 4 above-mentioned sectors, the distribution of each 
ethnic minority among the economic sectors reveals a further concentration in some 
specific sectors. For instance the Armenians' equities were mainly in manufacturing 
at 33.4% and commerce at 34.2%, while 43.5% of the Kurds' equities in 
manufacturing and around 10.0% in each of commerce, services. construction and 
finance, while the break down of the Circassian/ch equities was more balanced 
through sectors. 143 
140 Arabs (98.1), Circassian & Ch (0.9%), Kurds (0.4%), and Armenians (0.2%). 
141 Arabs (97.9%). Circassian & Ch (0.7%), Ku~:; (0.7%), a!ld Armenians (0.4%). 
142 Arabs (98.2%}, Circassian & Ch (0.8%), Kurds (0.4%), and Armenians (0 2%) 
143 see table 7-9/ Appendix 17. 
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The great majority of the ethnic minorities' equities and investments were in 
neutral control (43.4% of equities and 55.3% of investments). Substantial 
proportions were also in individual control (32.7% & 15.6%). NF control (23.2% & 
21.8%). The NF control form was well used by the different ethnic minorities 
however, it was less used by the Kurds: only 12.8% of their equities were in that 
form, while 51 .8% were in neutral control businesses.'« Despite the shunning away 
from the NF control businesses, Kurds BMs used the NF ties very effectively in the 
neutral control businesses. For instance the control over The Bank of Jordan by the 
nuclear family of Husnii Siiduu 'Ali ai-Kurdii is an example of such use. 
Clustering on the base of the ethnic minorities is not found in any of the 
different groups. There was only one enterprise in construction whose ownership is 
shared by two Kurds who are not connected by any kinship ties. There is no 
evidence that any of these ethnic groups tends to invest together in the same neutral 
enterprises or establishing enterprises where the ownership is of ethnic base rather 
than NF base. 
Where religion is concerned, the breakdown of the BMs figures shows that 
Muslim BMs were dominant having 84.5% of the BMs investments compared to 
15.5% for Christian BMs. The Christian BMs made up 15.0% of the total number of 
BMs and 14.2% of power I points. Slightly above the latter proportions, Christian 
BMs equities were 18.5% compared to 81 .4% for the Muslims. In comparison to the 
previous period, the Christian BMs proportions went down by 4-5 points in all above-
mentioned measures.145 This decline in their shares was gained by their Muslim 
counterparts, but also by the corporate bodies whose presence expanded during this 
period. Certainly some of the latter were Jordanian companies owned by or under 
the strong influence of Christian BMs, however, not all of them and not to the degree 
that could suggest that the decline in Christian proportions was compensated 
indirectly by companies are under their leadership. The only elucidation at hand for 
such a decline is that the great majority of the newcomers were Muslims as well as 
the decline in the overall ratio of the Christians to the population. The dominance of 
the Muslim members cannot be compared, however, to that of the Arabs or males 
where the ethnic groups and gender are concerned. The Muslims BMs proportion of 
144 F.or. instanee; -the-share-.ef· the-GIRCASSIAN-and-Armenians· equities in the-NF -eentrel 
was above 30.0% each, while they were 39.0% and 44 3% in 11eutral control businesses. 
145 See table 11 I Appendix 17. 
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the equities when the Christian and corporate bodies are included is less than 2/3. It 
is also important to mention that equities per Christian BM stood at JO 45577 
compared to only JO 35206 for the Muslim BM. Power I points per BM was equal 
for both Muslim and Christian at 1.2 points. 
Concerning the economic sectors, Christian and Muslims' equities and 
investments were in all economic sectors without exception. The sectors that had a 
high proportion of the Christians' equities were manufacturing at 30.6%, commerce 
at 20.3%, construction at 16.3% and services at 14.4%. The proportion of 
Christians' equities in transportation and services notably exceeded that of the 
Muslims' equities. In addition to the manufacturing, commerce and services that had 
the majority of the number of the Christians' investments at respectively 28.3%, 
22.9% and 13.1 %, finance had a substantial proportion of the investments number at 
18.1 %. Reviewing the different sectors and their sub-sectors does not reveal that 
there was any sector that was noticeably dominated by one religious group rather 
than the other. 
There is no relevant difference in the Muslims and Christians' strategies 
concerning what forms of ownership their business took. Christian and Muslim BMs 
had placed the biggest portions of their equities in neutral control enterprises at 
40.4% and 37.5% respectively, and 60.1% and 61 .0% of their investments number 
were in the same form. NF control absorbed a substantial 1/3d of each group's 
equities and 21 .8% and 16.6% respectively of the Christian and Muslim total number 
of investments. 25.0% of the Christians equities were in Individual control forms, 
while this category made up 28.6% of the Muslims' equities. 
7.7.2 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
The breakdown of the BMs' according to their country of origin shows that 
BMs of Palestinian origin made up the majority at 65.5%, followed by Jordanian 
origin at 25.5% and Syrians at 6.4%. The proportions of Egyptian, Hajazi, Iraqis, 
Lebanese, royal family and ·others were· insignificant at respectively 0.3%; 0;1 %, 
0.1 %, 0.4%, 0.1 and 0.4%. With a slight improvement on the proportion of the BMs' 
~-- _..,. ... - -- .. . ~ ---- - - - --
of Syrian origin, the proportions of the investments number was almost identical to 
-- ·--- - ----- --· --- --
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that of the number of BMS.146 Almost identical proportions to the above mentioned 
ones, each country of origin group made up of the total power I points.147The 
distribution of equities among BMs of dtfferent countries of origin, reveals that 
Palestinian still have the majority at 61 .8% followed by Jordanians at 27.5% and 
Syrians at 7.8%. BMs from remaining fractions made up only 3.0% of the equities. 
Compared to the previous period, each country of origin fraction kept its order when 
the different measures were considered, however, three important changes took 
place. The proportion of those of Palestinian and Jordanian origin slightly improved 
equity wise and number wise. The BMs of other countries of origin declined slightly, 
with the exception of the Syrians whose proportion dramatically drooped by 4.0 
points numberwise and almost half of its proportion equitiywise. A small part of the 
decline in the Syrians' proportions was gained by BMs of Jordanian and Palestinian 
origin, though the biggest part went to the corporate bodies including the Jordanian 
companies. Certainly, some of the Jordanian companies were under the Syrian 
BMs control, but not to the extent that the proportion of these companies would 
measure up to the decline in the Syrians proportions. Certainly the small Syrian 
community in Jordan can rationalize its limited ability to inject new blood in the 
bourgeoisie domain, while this possibility is viable in the case of the Jordanian and 
Palestine communities whose population don condition the dynamic of large number 
of their members joining the bourgeoisie by virtue of shifting their class position. 
During this period in particular, this could be better understood knowing that large 
proportion of newcomers were among the Jordanian expatriates in the gulf area, 
where hardly were Jordanian of Syrian origin. . 
The overwhelming proportions of the Palestinian fraction in the above applied 
measures does not mean that this fraction is in absolute dominance. Including the 
proportions of the corporate bodies and the non-Jordanian nationality has the result 
that the proportions of the Palestinian fraction in each measure is around 40.0%. On 
the other hand, comparing the equities per BM in each of the fractions reveals that it 
was at its highest among the Lebanese at JO 68048. Equities per BM of Syrian 
origin was JO 45337 and it was 39682, while in the case of the Palestinians, it was 
JD34472, the lowest equities per BM among all the countries of origin fractions. The 
146 Palestinian origin made up the majority at 65.5%, followed by Jordanian origin at 
25~2%-and-Syriar:~s. at-7.,..1-%,wtilile-the-rest-of-the-BMs-of-ether-origins"made-less thaA-3:0%~ -
_ _ __ ~~~ .BMs_qfJ~alestinian.origin_made up.65.3.%_oLpow.~r_Lpoints,. Jordanian_at.25.1_% and _ _ 
Syrians at 6.9%, while the remaining other origins made less than 2.0%. 
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same can be seen in power I points per BM, where Palestinian BM lapsed behind 
the BMs of the fractions especially the other Syrians and Jordanians. 
The distribution of the BMs among the different sectors reveals that the major 
proportion of Jordanian, Palestinian and Syrian BMs' equities was concentrated in 
five main sectors: manufacturing, commerce, construction, services and finance. 
For instance, 90.1%, 90.3% and 92.1% of the Palestinian, Jordanian and Syrian 
equities were in the latter sectors. 
However, each of these fractions has substantial weight in one or two of 
these five sectors. For instance 40.1% of the Syrian equities were in manufacturing, 
where almost half of the Jordanian fraction equities were in manufacturing and 
construction. Although the Palestinian fraction equrties distribution is more balanced 
compared to other fractions, still one third of its equities were in manufacturing. 
Concerning fractions such as Hajazi, Iraqi and Egyptian, the data shows that the 
majority of their equities were absorbed by commerce primarily and manufacturing 
secondly. The great proportion of the Lebanese equities, however, was placed in 
transportation. 
The breakdown of the equities in each sector in terms of the BMs' country of 
origin shows each of these fractions had a proportion of the equities in each sector 
almost equivalent to their proportion of the BMs equities. Some sectors, however, 
reveal that a fraction had a substantial proportion of its equities. 18.6% of the mining 
equities, for instance were in the hands of the Syrian fraction, i.e. almost three times 
of the overall Syrian proportion equity-wise. On the hand, the Jordanian proportion 
(34.4%) of the equities in construction exceeded the overall al proportion of 
Jordanian fraction and the proportions of Jordanian in any economic sector equities. 
The same applies on the 72.2% of the real estate equities that were in the hands of 
the Palestinian fraction.1"8 
Looking at the forms of ownership that each of the country of origin fractions 
invested in shows that there was no significant difference. For the three main 
fractions Palestinian, Jordanian and Syrians equities were divided into almost three 
-
148 See table 15-16/ Appendix 17. 
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equal shares: neutral control, NF control and individual control. 149 Despite the overall 
small proportion of the other groups, still the data indicates that BMs equities of 
these groups was concentrated in the neutral control enterprises. The great majority 
of the equities in each of the ownership forms was made of Palestinian BMs followed 
by Jordanian and then Syrian almost in the same proportion that each of these 
groups possessed the overall BMs equities. However, the only surprise is in the 
non~bourgeoisie corporate bodies control (usually state or state institutions) where 
the Jordanian origin BMs made the majority at 53.4% compared to 31 .1% for 
Palestinians. In the case of the three vertical variables that this section dealt with, 
there is no evidence that any of them were clustering with members of their own 
community excluding other fractions.150 
149 38.7, 38:0°/o .  and 32.-8% of the Palestinians, Jordanian and Syrian BMs' equities were· 
in neutral control forms, while the proportions were respectively 33.8%, 29.2% and 32.8% in the 
9as~ s>l!!l~ NF control and the P.rOQ.Ortio!J. in_ individual control 26:.4~ • 3_9.80fo and 22.4%. _ Th_E! . 
major difference is in the Syrian BMs whose involvement in inaiViaual control enterprises, though 
-- it.is big, was .less.than.that.of-P-alestinians .and.Jordania~n . ---- - . ·-·- ·- --· _ _ _ _ _ 
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Conclusion 
This study pursued an empirical analysis of the Jordanian bourgeoisie 
structure and composition (1967-1989). The lack of studies concerning class 
structure in general. and the bourgeoisie in particular, in Jordan had not only left a 
vacuum in this field that it is important to cover, but also overstates the importance of 
other areas of study to the expense of the horizontal dimensions of the Jordanian 
society. Giving an account of the Jordanian bourgeoisie, its structure and 
composition is not simply a mental exercise that fills a field that was ignored by other 
studies. It provides an alternative approach to the study and analysis of Jordan, i.e. 
in terms of its socio-economic structure. It contributes to a shift in the central focus 
from studies concerned with cultural or purely political dimensions to studies dealing 
with socio-economic groups. Studying such social groups provides, on one hand, a 
clear definition of their composition and structure and, on the other hand, their role 
and capacity to act within the Jordanian society. In this context, this study aimed to 
give an empirical analysis of the Jordanian bourgeoisie as a social group that consist 
of people who share a common economic position and interest. Defining what the 
Jordanian bourgeoisie is in name and figures is vital in order to have a better 
understanding of this group in particular and its potential capacity to act, and 
certainly gives insights into the Jordanian social formation in general. 
The very motivation for this study made achieving it more difficult. The 
absence of studies about the Jordanian bourgeoisie meant that this study has had to 
construct from scratch its foundation. a definition of the bourgeoisie and what 
constitutes the Jordanian bourgeoisie. The usage of the term 'bourgeoisie' or 
'bourgeoisie class' in Jordan especially and the Middle East generally varies to 
mean different concepts and to refer to different groups. It is commonplace to come 
across loose and even contradictory definitions where the bourgeoisie is concerned. 
'Bourgeoisie' is widely used interchangeably with affluent. occupational groups and 
powerful groups. Its usage is associated with other concepts and terms that are 
themselves barely well defined, such as the elite politically, socially or economically, 
the decision making circles, the state elite and traditional elite, and high ranking 
150 Based on applying chi squared analysis. 
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bureaucracy or management. Therefore, this study defined the bourgeoisie 
according to the Marxist paradigm that states that class is a relational concept that 
refers to a group of people who have the same position in the production process. 
Hence, 'bourgeoisie' is the class that contains members who share amongst 
themselves the control over the means of production and appropriate surplus labour 
in a certain social formation over a specific period of time. 
As much as class definition in the Marxist paradigm seems straightforward, it 
is problematic in more than one area. Coinciding with the birth of the concept over 
150 years ago, there had been a lot of debate on the relevance of class as a social, 
economic, political and ideological agent that had threatened the very basis of the 
entire conceptualization of class. This study, which reviewed the different contesting 
schools in reference to this issue, put forward 'class in practice' as a concept that 
refers to a given class that is determined by economic structure and embraces all 
aspects of actions and activities taken by the members of that class. Based on 
'class in practice', this study could define the relations that were imposed on the 
class activities from other social variables outside the class structure, such as 
religion, ethnicity, gender, etc. The other problematic issue within the Marxist class 
definition was the evolution of the class structure in the last half century that gave 
birth to the so-called 'new middle classes'. This study resolved this problematic 
issue by the use of concepts and theorems of the contradictory lactations within the 
class structure. 
In light of the absence of previous studies which deal with the bourgeoisie in 
Jordan, this study constructed a mechanism that could define who the bourgeoisie 
members are in Jordan during the two periods of the study (1967-1973) and (1974-
1989). Based on the fact that 'bourgeoisie' is a class defined by its control over 
means of production and does not stem from its political or occupational position or 
power nor from its social status, this study took the Jordanian economy as the 
starting point of defining the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie should be extracted from 
those who are active within the Jordanian economy. Analyzing the Jordanian 
economy was a necessary stage in order to define the context that the bourgeoisie 
is active within, The_er:rumasi~ on th~ role of the $tate and its cootri.Pution to the 
economy was to assess the role of the private sector, where the bourgeoisie is 
·based:-This-study used-·the-Ministry·of-lndustry-and-l'rade--archive ·that ·contains-all-
materials· -relating:-to - the- private- sector--enterprises-in- the· ·period- of-·the study;- · 
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assuming that it reflects the private sector activities. Based on the figures for these 
enterprises. its sub-sectors. capital and other information about their owners and 
mangers, this study developed a mechanism that distinguishes between those who 
are bourgeoisie members and those who are not. 
The private sector participants who were considered as bourgeoisie 
members were defined and analyzed according to the assets that they controlled in 
serious economic sectors and sub-sectors. 
The study concluded that in each of the two periods the bourgeoisie 
members had under their control the great majority of the assets of the private 
sector. The bourgeoisie members were also in dominant control of the assets in 
each sector and sub-sector of the Jordanian economy apart from the sub-sectors in 
which the state was heavily involved, such as phosphate production, or were closed 
to private sector activities, such as telecommunication and air transportation. The 
bourgeoisie's control of the great majority of assets in all sectors where the private 
sector was involved, on one hand, and the limited role of the state in the economy 
compared to other Middle Eastern countries, on the other, resulted in the 
bourgeoisie having control of a great deal of assets that differentiate it quantitatively 
and qualitatively in its capacity to act from other social groups. 
This study analyzed the bourgeoisie according to their assets and their 
economic fields, distinguishing the more powerful group within the bourgeoisie. 
Economic power, which was developed as a parameter for the purpose of this study, 
showed, according to specific criteria, the core group of the bourgeoisie, according 
to its control of the assets and therefore its greater capacity to act. 
The bourgeoisie was analyzed in terms of its economic sectors, showing that 
commerce was still the cornerstone sector in its activities, despite the increasing role 
of other sectors. It has been shown that an important distinction can be drawn 
between members whose activities are confined to one sector and those whose 
activities are stretched over more than one economic sector. In this context, it 
seetns that some parts of the bourgeoisie cannot be defined according to sectoral 
classification , since·their ·assets-are in more than ·one economic sector. The ·capital 
finance (multi-sector) bourgeoisie fraction, according to the findings of this study, 
was more powerful and had better capacity to act in terms of assets: l n addition To 'It 
being essential for analysis purposes:-the importance' of the' birth 6lthe' muiti:Sedor - . 
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fraction. whose fusion took place within the domain of the bourgeoisie, brought 
together activities in the commerce, manufacturing, banking, insurance and services 
into the hands of one segment of the bourgeoisie. Such a phenomenon results in a 
deficiency of the traditional bourgeoisie structure (industrial, comprador, agrarian 
bourgeoisie, etc.) that is rooted in the colonial or the early independent periods. 
The study in each of the periods divided the bourgeoisie into fractions based 
on its historical formation. In the first period (1967-1973), the bourgeoisie was 
divided into pre-1948 Jordan bourgeoisie, pre-1948 Palestine bourgeoisie and the 
newcomers. The study analyzed the activities of the three fractions along the lines 
of this division concluding that there was no trend of clustering among members of 
these fractions. In the second period, the division was made to distinguish rather 
two main fractions, one of which is the pre-1974 bourgeoisie that contains the 
bourgeoisie of the period before. while the second consists of members who joined 
throughout the second period. This study showed that the second period 
newcomers infiltrated the circle of the traditional bourgeoisie either through an 
alliance with them or by establishing their own businesses. 
Ownership forms of the bourgeoisie businesses gave insights about their 
investment strategies in general. It also showed that the nuclear family form of 
ownership is a cornerstone for their economic activities and the running of their 
businesses. In contrast, the tribal or extended family ties form of ownership was of 
no relevance. Its existence was rare and did not constitute a trend that can be 
analyzed. 
This study took into account the main vertical dimensions that scholars claim 
are of importance concerning the study of Jordan, such as religion, country of origin , 
ethnicity and gender. applying them to the composition of the bourgeoisie in both 
periods. Despite the fact that the role of females increased over the years in the 
constitution of the bourgeoisie, their rote and their assets were still of less 
importance than those of the male members. This study claims that the bourgeoisie 
during 1967-1989 was still male dominant. The break down of the bourgeoisie 
members according to their vertical dimension showed that certain degree of 
- - ~·· .... - • • • ! .... - · • -- - - -
clustering existed. However, it was still too low to constitute a trend that could lead to 
t.he q!vj~LQJJ. of the bourg_eQisie ~cqordingJQ_ t~.e~~_qimensions. _ 
------=- -- ------ --
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The composition of the bourgeoisie, its structure and strategies, shown 
throughout the chapters of this study, as well as the lack of influence of the vertical 
dimensions on its structure raises questions about the relevance of the vertical 
dimensions in studying a typical middle eastern country like Jordan and also about 
the importance of class analysis as an approach, which can give a better 
understanding for the social structure in Jordan or in the Middle East. It also draws 
attention to the need for general and particular analysis of social classes in terms of 
their capacity and power and what they bring to the equation of social, economic and 
political change in the Middle East. These questions, concerns and issues lay 
beyond the scope of this stl.ldy. 
-- - - - - - -- - --- - -- -
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